The Darkest Red Corner - Chinese Communist Intelligence and Its Place in the Party, 1926-1945

273 Pages·2012·1.774 MB·english

by  Matthew James Brazil

The Darkest Red Corner
Chinese Communist Intelligence and Its Place in the Party,
1926-1945

Matthew James Brazil

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Government and International Relations

Business School

University of Sydney

17 December 2012
Statement of Originality

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not
been submitted previously, either in its entirety or substantially, for a higher degree or qualifications at any other
university or institute of higher learning.

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received
in preparing this thesis and sources has been acknowledged.

Matthew James Brazil

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Before and during this project I met a number of people who, directly or otherwise, encouraged
my belief that Chinese Communist intelligence was not too difficult a subject for academic study.
Michael Dutton and Scot Tanner provided invaluable direction at the very beginning. James
Mulvenon requires special thanks for regular encouragement over the years and generosity with
his time, guidance, and library. Richard Corsa, Monte Bullard, Tom Andrukonis, Robert W. Rice,
Bill Weinstein, Roderick MacFarquhar, the late Frank Holober, Dave Small, Moray Taylor
Smith, David Shambaugh, Steven Wadley, Roger Faligot, Jean Hung and the staff at the
Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong, and the kind personnel at the KMT Archives in
Taipei are the others who can be named. Three former US diplomats cannot, though their
generosity helped my understanding of links between modern PRC intelligence operations and
those before 1949. Catherine Sampson and James Miles, two of the most perceptive people I
have ever met, have given valuable feedback and advice, as have Rosemary Gallant, Jan Wong,
Peter Mattis and Chris Buckley.

Fred Teiwes was a guiding light and tireless font of encouragement and inspiration, especially
during the most difficult parts of this research. His connections and name opened many doors,
and I will always be indebted to him. Words cannot express my gratitude to David Chambers.
His command of Chinese Communist intelligence history is matched only by his generous
willingness to share that knowledge. I could not have finished this project without them. In
addition, I am grateful to Graeme Gill who made certain that I kept the Soviet aspect in mind at
all times.

Sherri Brazil was understanding and patient during this long project, and I wish that I could
repay her love and encouragement. Mark, Esther, Matthew and Elliot Brazil, Bonnie and Ian
Jacobsen, and the late Phyllis Bloom cheered me on with boundless enthusiasm.

Finally, there are dozens of others in greater China whom I should thank by name, but who
prefer anonymity. It is for them that I hope the discussion of this and other topics in the history
of their nation will become more open and honest in future years.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of Originality i

Acknowledgements ii

Table of Contents iii

Tables and Abbreviations v

Chapter One 1
Introduction
Making the Past Serve the Present, Versus Straight Answers
A Revisionist History of CCP Intelligence
Goals and Questions of This Study
Key Terms Defined: “Intelligence” and “Security”
Research Methodology
Structure of This Study and Its Hypotheses and Conclusions

Chapter Two 17
A Survey of Available Literature on Chinese Communist Intelligence,
and the Issue of Objectivity
Early Accounts on CCP Intelligence, and Their Suppression in the PRC
Mad Mirror Images: Works on CCP Intelligence from Taiwan, China, and Russia
Mysteries of the East in Western Eyes, and the Kang Sheng Effect
Closed Archives, Persistent Bias

Chapter Three 33
Under Siege: Founding CCP Intelligence
Comintern Tutorials in Secrecy, Difficulties of the United Front
The KMT-CCP Split and the Special Operations Work Division
Necessity, the Mother of CCP Intelligence
CCP Underground, CCP Intelligence
Early CCP Intelligence Structure and Functions
The CCSO Intelligence Section: Chen Geng’s Agent Networks, 1928-1931
Building Clandestine Communications Assets
How Important Was Zhou Enlai?
How the Red Squads Operated
The Other United Front: Shanghai Foreign Concession Police and the KMT
1931, Year of Disasters for CCP Intelligence, and the Defeat of the CCP in Shanghai

Chapter Four 85
CCP Intelligence and Security in the Base Areas and on the Long March
Problems in Military Intelligence for the Red Army, 1927
Purging Counter-Revolutionaries Committees, the Futian Incident, and the Founding of the State Political
Protection Bureau, 1927-31
Red Army Military Intelligence, and Militarizing CCP Intelligence
The Encirclement Campaigns and CCP Intelligence
The Long March and CCP Intelligence
Red Army Communications and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) on the Long March
iii
Chen Yun’s White Area Work Attacked at Zunyi, First Steps in Restoring Urban Networks
Conclusion

Chapter Five 120
The Early Yan’an Period: CCP Intelligence Rebuilds, Kang Sheng
Reorganizes, 1936-1941
The Setting: CCP Intelligence and Security, and Mao Zedong’s Ascendance in the Party
Negotiation, Infiltration, and Charm: the Lead Up to the Xi’an Incident
Kang Sheng in Russia, 1933-1937: Politics in Command of Security Work
Kang Sheng and Wang Ming Return to China
Purges Live On: Traitor Weeding in Liberated Areas
Higher, Bigger (and Badder): Founding the Central Social Department
Rebuilding, Training, Professionalization
Expansion Into Denied Areas Begins: Three Different Solutions to Three Kinds of Enemy Turf
Starting Up the Intelligence Stations (Qingbao zhan)
Conclusion

Chapter Six 166
Rectification, Rescue, and Intelligence, 1942-45
The Setting: Momentum, Binge, Opportunity, Purge
CCP Intelligence Expands its Reach, and Kang Sheng Consolidates His Scope of Control
The Consensus for Weeding Out Party Ranks
Background Investigations: the weak defense
The Yan’an Campaigns Become Intense, 1942-43
The Tragedies and Absurdities of “Salvation”
Kang Sheng’s Achievements and the Limits of His Control
Suiyuan and Inner Mongolia: The Curse of Proximity?
Wide Influence, Limited Control: Intelligence in East and South China
Pan Hannian’s Urban Networks
A Review of Russian Influence, 1930-1945
Conclusion

Conclusion 237
The Further Evolution of CCP Intelligence
A Hidden Roll in Victory

Bibliography 250
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TABLES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Table 1 Early CCSO Operations 58

Table 2 KMT Statistics on Capture of Communists, 1927-1937 82

Table 3 Three Solutions for Diverse Areas of Operations 157

AB Corps Anti-Bolshevik Corps

BI Background Investigation

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CC Central Committee

CCSO Central Committee Special Operations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CMC Central Military Commission

COMINT Communications Intelligence

Comintern Communist International

CSB Central Statistics Bureau (Zhongtong ju)

CSD Central Social Department (Zhongyang shehui bu)

ECCI Executive Committee of the Communist International

GMD See KMT

GRU Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye
Upravlenie)

HUMINT Human Intelligence

KMT Kuomintang (Guomindang)

MPS Ministry of Public Security

v
MSB Military Statistics Bureau (Juntong ju)

NKVD People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodny Komisariat Vnutrennikh
Del)

OSS Office of Strategic Services

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PPB Political Protection Bureau

PRC People’s Republic of China

PSB Public Security Bureau

SAD See CSD

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIS Secret Intelligence Service

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Chapter One

Introduction

Making the Past Serve the Present, Versus Straight Answers
What was the role of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) intelligence services in achieving
their movement’s 1949 victory? Why did the Party found CCP Intelligence1 as an organ of the
Central Committee (CC) in 1927, and then upgrade it to Department level status in 1939? Since
1980 the Party has allowed the publication of several dozen books, some films, and numerous
magazine articles discussing the history of its intelligence operations during the Chinese
Communist Revolution. All are in Chinese, and seem aimed at an educated middle class
domestic audience—the same people who populate China’s “blogosphere” which the PRC
government seems anxious to monitor and control. These publications and films discuss CCP
espionage and other intelligence collection, counterespionage, counterintelligence, security work,
and covert action2 during the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927-1949). They depict CCP
Intelligence as subordinate to the top political elite, while sometimes diverting blame for its
setbacks and “mistakes” to other senior people. Though some materials in Chinese from Taiwan

1 The Chinese Communist Party reorganized and changed the name of its main intelligence and security service four
times (by an alternative count, five) between 1927 and 1949. Sometimes the organizations had both an overt
designation and a real name known only to persons inside the Party with a need to know to do their jobs. Where
appropriate this study will refer to the proper names that predominate in the Chinese language literature and in
existing English language studies: in mid-1927, the Special Operations Work Division (Tewu gongzuo chu),
subordinate to the military department of the Party Central Committee; from November 1927 to early 1938, the
Central Committee Special Operations Branch (CCSO, the Zhongyang tebie renwu gongzuo ke, or Teke); the
“Defense” (Baowei) organizations that appeared under Mao’s Red Fourth Army in 1929, nominally under the Soviet
government which became the Central Committee’s Central Political Protection Bureau (Zhongyang zhengzhi
baowei ju) in late 1931 and the Northwest Political Protection Bureau in 1935; and from 1938-1949, the Central
Social Department (CSD, the Zhongyang shehuibu; the body is often referred to as SAD, Social Affairs Department,
though the word “affairs” is not contained in the Chinese title). When speaking about more than one of these
periods, or when simplicity demands it, I use the generic term “CCP Intelligence” since these organizations were all
directly under the CCP’s senior leaders after 1927, whether or not the Party was fully united.
2 These terms and others are defined at the end of this chapter.
and Hong Kong are also available, the mainland works have mostly defined the conversation.
As we will discuss in subsequent chapters, they leave unclear some aspects of the significance of
CCP Intelligence in the Chinese Revolution, and its place in the Party.

In February 1962, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, the “great leader” of his time still revered by
millions, wrote a directive that “the past should serve the present, and foreign things should serve
China” (gu wei jin yong, yang wei Zhong yong).3 When considering what information to release
about the specialized topic of CCP Intelligence history, the present PRC government and the
ruling Communist Party still appear guided by this 50 year old instruction. It is difficult to
establish that some in the Party actually fear unrest would result from revelation of embarrassing
facts about CCP Intelligence history. While there may be some concern on that score, we are
probably seeing strict control of information in an administrative exercise by intelligence
bureaucrats, similar to the US Central Intelligence Agency’s administration of Freedom of
Information Act records requests.4 However, the present PRC government systematically
controls information about its own history, and the story of CCP Intelligence is an element of it.
The way the Chinese state administers this slice of its historical narrative is an example of
efficiency, and even elegance and style,5 when compared to their control of discourse on other

3 Geremie R. Barme, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999),
p. 382.
4 The author made early requests for records (2003, 2004) on this topic to the US agency which were never
answered or acknowledged.
5 Not to pretend that Chinese authorities are infallible, but CCP control over this topic sometimes seems nearly as
strong and consistent, yet as invisible, as gravity—especially when contrasted to the brutality often observed when
the CCP confronts unhappy minorities and dissidents. Popular books and films seem to stay with a “script” on CCP
Intelligence history even while those of a more documentary nature such as “Annals” (nianpu) and diaries (riji) will
more closely follow documented events and sometimes contradict them. On a personal level, this author’s requests
for information were ignored when submitted in writing to the Ministry of State Security and to the PRC author Hao
Zaijin, but handled politely and even in a friendly manner when he made a “cold call” at the MSS controlled China
Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) in 2004. I made this visit after speaking with James
Mulvenon, who a year earlier had been allowed into the CICIR book store and walked out with as much as he could
carry. Unfortunately his visit was followed by a policy shift that excluded foreigners from entering the book shop,
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