The Dark God (2005)

150 Pages·2012·2.51 MB·English

the dark God
umbr(a)
2005
A JOURNAL OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 2005
U MBR (A)
ISSN 1087-0830 ISBN 0-9666452-8-6
EDITOR: UMBR(a) is published with the help of grants from the
following organizations and individuals at the
Andrew Skomra
State University of New York at Buffalo:
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE: The Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Culture
Mike Baxter The Graduate Student Association*
Trisha Brady The Group for the Discussion of the Freudian Field
Sorin Cucu The English Department
Peter DeGabriele The English Graduate Student Association
Alexei Di Orio The David Gray Chair (Steve McCaffery)
Moriah Hampton
The James H. McNulty Chair (Dennis Tedlock)
Shane Herron
The Melodia E. Jones Chair (Gerard Bucher)
Alissa Lea Jones
Nicole Jowsey
Sean Kelly
Alan Lopez *The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of
Jonathan Murphy the GSA.
Sol Pelaez
Andrew Skomra
Roland Végső
Address for Editorial and Subscription Enquiries:
FACULTY ADVISORS: UMBR(a)
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Alissa Lea Jones
Andrew Skomra
Special thanks to Éditions de L’Herne for granting permission to publish
DISTRIBUTION: an excerpt from: Christian Jambet, Le Caché et l’Apparent
Alissa Lea Jones © Éditions de L’Herne, 2003
4 EDITORIAL: THE OBJECT OF RELIGION
andrew skomra
9 ETHICS AND CAPITAL, EX NIHILO
lorenzo chiesa and alberto toscano

27 THE STRANGER AND THEOPHANY
christian jambet
43 UNIVERSALISM AND THE JEWISH EXCEPTION:
LACAN, BADIOU, ROZENZWEIG
kenneth reinhard
73 WRESTLING WITH THE ANGEL
tracy mcnulty
87 PASOLINI, an improvisation
(OF A SAINTLINESS)
philippe lacoue-labarthe
95 BEING A SAINT
serge andré
105 WHEN LOVE IS THE LAW:
ON THE RAVISHING OF LOL V. STEIN
dominiek hoens
119 RELIGION AS CRITIQUE, CRITIQUE AS RELIGION
marc de kesel
138 REVIEWS
CONTENTS
EDITORIAL:
THE OBJECT
OF RELIGION
andrew skomra
“There is something profoundly masked in the critique
of the history that we have experienced....Ignorance,
indifference, an averting of the eyes may explain
beneath what veil this mystery remains hidden. But
for whoever is capable of turning a courageous gaze
towards this phenomenon — and...there are certainly
few who do not succomb to the fascination of the
sacrifice in itself — the sacrifice signfies that, in the
object of our desires, we try to find evidence for the How does one begin to make sense of religion
presence of the desire of this Other that I call here within the field of psychoanalytic thinking?
the dark God.” Such a question, despite appearances, is
— Jacques Lacan1 more than a hapless ploy to avoid speaking
of such a nebulous matter. Amidst the disarm-
ing resurgence of religious fundamentalisms
and the cries of mortified secularists who
feel they are suffering from the return of
this offensive signifier, psychoanalysis main-
tains that the idea of religion possesses an
intensive, “crystallizing power.” What binds
these mortal enemies is the precise fact
that each looks upon religion as though it
were an object, coming later to distinguish
themselves only by the angle from which
they scrutinize its opacity. The hesitation
of recent psychoanalytic thinking amidst
the veneration and aversion that surrounds
religious phenomena can perhaps best be at-
tributed to the widespread demand to know
what to do, or where to place “it.” Analytic
discourse refuses to ascribe value to the
question of whether the object of religion is
good or bad, living or dead. Pleas to make
such judgments, for analysis, are the very
mainspring of the problem.
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Thus, for psychoanalysis there is nothing any reasonable being cannot ignore — that is,
novel in the interrogation of religion. Al- unless a certain barbarous repetition is what
though Freud contends that religion is “the these beings have chosen to pursue.
2
universal obsessional neurosis of humanity,”
For Freud, as well as Lacan, the stakes
the socially-sedimented nature of belief is
of religion are only of this world — only
not met with a strictly hostile, atheistic re-
pertinent after the establishment, and in
jection. Instead, his encounters with the in-
relation to, modern science and the subject
credible non-sense of religion served a quite
which it engendered. But, when the question
pedagogic function. We can observe in the
of religion is raised in analytic discourse it
long and sinuous line, traced from Totem and
is not inspected through the avatars of ra-
Taboo to the point where “the pen fell from
tional, positivist science. Such sciences, at
3
Freud’s hands” at the climax of Moses and
least on the surface, turn a blind eye to the
Monotheism, that his encounters with devout
“archaism” of religion — basing their search
cultures marked a descending slope into the
for knowledge on unquestioned evidential
vital recesses of our modern condition. Such
models so as to accelerate and freely enjoy
labor proved essential to the very formula-
the accumulation of information absent of
tion and endurance of the project of psycho-
any first or final cause. If ever it appears
analysis. Although emerging in the form of a
as an object of concern within these sci-
“critique” of all religious sacralization, what
ences, religion is deemed a mere obstacle
Freud unfurrowed was the grain of truth be-
to humanity’s apparently inscrutable incli-
hind religion’s zealous repressions, isolating
nation toward progress. Lacan’s sagacity,
their ultimate necessity for the genesis and
in this respect, is evident in his strategic
structure of discourse — which is to say, the
mobilization of religious thought for the
creation of a history irrevocably tied to the unsettling of apathetic precepts that scien-
birth of the modern subject, the foundation tific thinking supposedly constitutes itself
of collectivities, and even the very possi- upon. The foremost recipient of his wrathful
bility of history. Though his interest in the wit, it seems, is the smug indifference that
cultural contours of religion, we will admit, science shows toward the problem of causal-
held Freud ever-too-slightly captivated by ity. What Lacan signals in his intervention is
the monothetic, his exploits demonstrated that in a world dutifully constructed to be
that science (within definable limits) is not the container for manufacturing and appro-
confined to the mere cataloguing of its own priating data, what inevitably transpires is
historical development. Rather, the real rev- the flattening of our experience such that no
elation that Freud unearthed was the obliga- objective realm is left for desires or convic-
tory reformulation of the margins of our past tions of truth that go beyond predetermined
and present conditions of existence, which coordinates. The inane contradictions and
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delirium that inevitably ensues, it could be Analysis, by way of a formal, ontological
argued, receives its complement in the form reduction, points to the necessity of ex-
of a culture of techno-gadgetry that hope- periencing an irremediable alienation that
lessly introduces products to temporarily religion historically bears witness. In spite of
sustain these endeavors without cause. These its ever-present suspicion vis-à-vis science,
little bits of pleasure, in their objective dis- however, psychoanalysis most certainly does
posability, point out the effects of scientific not rally to the cause of religious fervor.
agendas that unknowingly acknowledge the Instead, the real commitment of analysis
need for attachments, and limits for its proves all-the-more adept at stymieing those
pursuits, only to fall back on squandering all righteous few who speak in the name of God,
of its resources. The realms of the religious and claim to know something of his desires.
emerge in Lacan’s counter-attack against the For the pious to speak from such a position
grave political and economic consequences of knowledge amounts to nothing more than
that stem from disavowing the passion for an- the egregious attempt to conform its congre-
nihilation that fuels the solipsism of scientific gations, and patrol the border, to something
man. It is the contention of psychoanalysis that does not exist. The theoretical labor of
that the reckless enjoyment of knowledge in- psychoanalysis, then, with respect to reli-
itself, and the byproducts that we are neces- gion, consistently turns around this point,
sarily left with, is carried out only through a which is nothing more than a questioning of
prior ignorance or hatred not toward religion the Other: how shall one preserve a position
per se but to the infrangibility of a certain for God despite its utter vacuity? If analysis
religious function that absently structures evokes religious figures and tropes, it is never
our relation to existence as such. to find a way to fill in this gaping hole. Rather,
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they are employed for the servicing, and ques- vocation of analytic thinking insists upon is the
tioning, of desire — that is, to either deny or occupation of an impossible, “in-between,”
compel one’s pursuit of an obscure element site that promotes the dissolution of any posi-
that escapes all discursive appropriation. God tion choosing either to transfigure or discard
the concealed truths of the religious. To be
is only significant for analysis if it remains as
allied with such a cause necessitates the very
a guarantee of our own indefiniteness, as a
rethinking of religion’s objective status, with-
signifier that preserves a space for an absence
out giving in to its own tradition’s devotion
while at the same time foreclosing any pos-
to a dark, mimetic desire. The task, then, is
sibility of our ever obtaining it. Religion is
to remain faithful to an immanent, impure
placed within the reasonable limits and condi-
One. The question of creation, the ontological
tions necessary for sustaining the very opacity
status of One, the exception, sacrifice, saint-
of our jouissance. From this vantage, psycho-
liness, love — all are common figures culled
analysis does not feign the subject’s ability to
from the immense history of religion. But this
square accounts with its creator. Given the
is no return, as the significance attributed to
structural impossibility of such balancing acts,
such notions has been rigorously subtracted
analysis goes well beyond the obliviousness of
from, on the one hand, any position hoping
moral dogmas, which persist only through a
to resolve the subject’s discord with divinity,
faith in reconciliation that yields nothing more
and on the other hand, from any logic seek-
than anxious and excessive prohibitions, and
ing to forget the yawning gap that internally
ultimately desire’s putrefaction. divides this leering Other. We are thus left
The difficulty of speaking about religion, with testimonies to an irrevocable, absolute,
then, will only intensify when one’s impera- difference — the convictions of which prolifer-
tive is to do so psychoanalytically. What this ate in infinitesimal acts of thought.
1. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan,
Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans.
Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981), 275.
2. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, in The
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James
Strachey et al. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-
1974), 2:43.
3. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis, 259.
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It is well known that, according to Aside from its muted incorporation
Lacan, authentic creation can only be into dogma, where it has lingered
symbolic creation ex nihilo. What is in a peculiarly uneasy and incon-
principally at stake here is the issue sistent truce with ancient Greek
of the simultaneity between the initial conceptions of physis, poiesis, and
“fashioning of the signifier” and the techne, the doctrine of creation ex
introduction of a void, a nihil (the nihilo — duly neutralized by the
Thing) in the primordial real. With historical emergence of a science of
the introduction of the first signifier, being, and repudiated once again
Lacan says, “one has already the in the formation of modern, or post-
entire notion of creation ex nihilo” Kantian, philosophy — has insis-
which is itself “coextensive with…the tently shadowed political modernity
Thing.”1 The nihil must clearly be as- in the twin figures of capital and
sociated with the void of the Thing, revolt. As Jean-François Courtine
whose emergence is concomitant and other contemporary scholars
with that of the signifier, and not with have attested, despite accusations
the primordial real for which the no- of creationism, ever since Scotus
tions of fullness and emptiness have and Suarez ontology proper has
as yet no sense (120). been fundamentally based on the
bracketing of any real reference
*** or proportion vis-à-vis an instance
The notion of creation ex nihilo, as of creation, divine or otherwise.
the extraction of the symbolic signi- Ontology treats the being simply in
fier that concurrently annihilates the terms of its being, as ens, res, aliquid,
primordial real, provides the most or mere object, but never really as
conclusive explanation of Lacan’s ens creatum — which is to say, never
recurrent reference to the opening as ex nihilo but as extra nihil. In this
line of St. John’s Gospel, “In the respect, ontology is logically indiffer-
beginning was the Word.” The word ent to the distinction of infinite and
that was in the beginning — the Holy finite, creator and created: it expels
Spirit that created the unconscious the creatural, only deigning, in its
qua “power plant” in Seminar IV — is scientific zeal, to deal with entities.1
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ETHICS AND CAPITAL, EX NIHILO
lorenzo chiesa and alberto toscano
nothing but “the entrance of the signifier into ***
2
the world.” Here one might well be tempted
An inchoate, perhaps symptomatic, index of
to ask: is there any more need to confirm that
the political persistence of the ex nihilo is to
Lacan’s naïve “system” is marked by what
3 be found in the reactionary modernism of
Derrida names the “ideality of the signifier”?
Ezra Pound. In his Cantos, Pound’s desire for
Contrary to what Lacan’s provocative formu-
anti-capitalist economic reform is invested
las often seem to suggest, his creationism
in the obsessive figure of usury, the Dantean
does not presuppose any transcendent prin-
Usura. Like latter-day partisans of a just,
ciple. Indeed, “it is paradoxically only from a
adaptive equilibrium for the human oikos,
creationist point of view that one can envisage
Pound is haunted by the perverse theologi-
the elimination of the always recurring notion
cal resonance not of the commodity per se,
of creative intention,” which is instead tacitly
but of the capitalist use of money — echoing
“omnipresent” in evolutionism. Evolutionism
Aristotle’s concern with the unhinging effects
relies on a divine creative intention in that
that money qua interest could have on the ho-
“the ascending movement which reaches the
meostatic functioning of the polis. Take these
summit of consciousness and thought” is de-
emblematic lines, from Canto XLVI: “Hath
duced from a “continuous process” (213; em-
benefit of interest on all / the moneys which,
phasis added). In other words, evolutionism 2
it, the bank, creates out of nothing.” For
is teleological and theological by definition,
Pound, it is the creation of money ex nihilo by
and derives human thought from an evolu-
the banks that lies behind the circumambient
tion of matter that ultimately depends on the
cultural degeneration, the ravaging of any
transcendent consciousness of God.
natural balance and the sterilization of the
In contrast, for Lacan, the creation ex nihilo arts (“Came not by usura Angelico” [XLV,
of the signifier on which human thought de- 230]). As Robert Casillo writes, “while
pends is truly materialistic; Lacan’s creation- Pound is by no means hostile to all forms
ism is a form of anti-humanist immanentism, of money, he obsessively attacks that form
since it is grounded on the assumption that of it — namely usury — which he thinks the
the symbolic is un-natural and not super- Jews created and which figures in econom-
natural, the contingent product of man’s ics as the virtual equivalent of the abstract
successful dis-adaptation to nature. Such an and monopolistic Jewish God, who creates
unnatural dis-adaptation, which obviously reality ex nihilo. At the same time, Pound is
dominates and perverts nature, can never- certain that Jewish usurers exploit honest
3
theless originate only immanently from what labor and impede the forces of production.”
we name “nature” and thus contradicts the Incidentally, we encounter here a key theme
alleged continuity of any (transcendently) in the modern preoccupation with the ex
“natural” process of evolution. Matter does nihilo, the opposition of creatio to production
UMBR(a) 10