The Critique of Psychology

243 Pages·0.594 MB·English

by  Thomas Teo

The Critique of Psychology
From Kant to Postcolonial Theory
Thomas Teo
York University
Toronto, Canada
Library of Congress Control Number: 2005923747
ISBN-10: 0-387-25355-6 e-ISBN 0-387-25356-4 Printed on acid-free paper.
ISBN-13: 978-0-387-25355-8
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What is founded on nature grows and increases, while what is
founded on opinion varies.
FRANCISBACON(1561–1626)
But is psychology founded on nature?
Preface and Acknowledgments
What contributes to the development of the discipline of psychology?
Traditional answers suggest that it is new empirical evidence. However, a
closer look at the history of psychology over the last two hundred years
indicates that the accumulation of facts, problem solutions, induction, and
the explanation of anomalies play only supporting roles. Indeed, studies
on the social, political, and economic factors that have shaped the disci-
pline have contributed significantly to an understanding of the theoreti-
cal and practical dynamics of psychology. With the shift to externalist
explanations, problem-oriented historical and theoretical analyses have
fallen out of grace. However, if one agrees with Gould’s (1996) statement
that “science moves forward as much by critiquing the conclusions of oth-
ers as by making novel discoveries” (p. 25), then an analysis of the history
of the critique of psychology becomes central. Thus, the focus in this book
is not on socio-historical contexts, but on arguments, more specifically,
critical arguments, regarding the problems of mainstream psychology at
different stages of its development—a critique that has been combined
often, but not always, with a vision for a better psychology and the prom-
ise to solve the theoretical, methodological, and practical problems of the
discipline. Such a program requires emphasizing the logic, structure, and
flow of rhetoric, which takes on an important function in psychology’s
history and contributes to an understanding of the modifications of the
mainstream but also the margins. Afocus on arguments does not mean
that socio-historical traditions are not important. On the contrary, external
dimensions are significant for recognizing changes, but they are not the
center of attention in the following reconstructions.
Enough material has been accumulated that allows for a history of
the critique of psychology since the second half of the 18th century. Thus,
the idea that the critique of psychology is an intellectual movement that
emerged only in the last forty years in Europe and in North America, and
is based on a postmodern spirit, should be rejected. All selected critiques
vii
viii PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
of psychology in this book share dissatisfaction with the dominant views
of psychology at a certain time, but they have endorsed different, even
contradictory epistemologies, ontologies, and ethical-political world-
views. The proposed systematic history and theory of the critique of psy-
chology can only provide a brief snapshot of some of those influential and
multifaceted critiques and arguments.
A history of the critique of psychology could distinguish between
critiques that have been successful from those that have been influential.
Successmight be defined in terms of critiques that have led to a change of
the whole discipline, whereas influentialmight mean that discourses have
shaped reflections and practices of groups of psychologists. The book cov-
ers both dimensions in discussing critiques that have been successful such
as Kant’s and, even more clearly, the natural–scientific critique of psy-
chology in the 19th century, and in presenting and reflecting on influen-
tial critiques such as the human–scientific, Marxist, feminist, postmodern,
and postcolonial critiques of psychology, which have inaugurated new
research programs in psychology but have never formed the mainstream.
This book does not address whether certain critiques should or should not
have been influential, or how these critiques should be ranked or evalu-
ated. This is a metatheoretical task left to the reader.
The history and theory of the critique of psychology is intended as a
positive project, performed not for the sake of constructing problems, but
in order to provide intellectual tools that help to develop the discipline of
psychology. Critiques have shaped the field, are changing the discipline,
and will continue to be relevant to the future of psychology. Critics have
an important role to play when they identify faults in the discipline, and
some of them provide ideas how psychology’s shortcomings can be over-
come. Certainly, it is not beneficial to any discipline to ignore and repress
its faults, with the hope that they will take care of themselves. It is an
intellectual obligation to point out in an honest and open reflection that
psychology may be submerged in problems, even when no solutions are
provided, rather than assuming apriori that psychology is doing just fine.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The book contains arguments and summaries of some of my research over
the last few years, literature overviews, new and original research, and,
hopefully, innovative perspectives. Some chapters contain summaries
and adaptations of previously published material by me. Despite sub-
stantial revisions, some ideas presented in Chapter 2 were originally pub-
lished by me as “Functions of Knowledge in Psychology” in New Ideas in
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix
Psychology(Vol. 17, no 1, pp.1-15). I thank the publisher Elsevier for grant-
ing permission to reproduce part of that material (copyright © 1999 by
Elsevier). Parts of my 2002 article “Friedrich Albert Lange on Neo-
Kantianism, Socialist Darwinism, and a Psychology without a Soul” in the
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 38, 285-301, were used for
Chapter 4. John Wiley & Sons has permitted me to reuse that material
(copyright © 2002 by Wiley). Portions of my chapter “Karl Marx and
Wilhelm Dilthey on the Socio-Historical Conceptualization of the Mind”
in the book edited by C. Green, M.Shore, and T. Teo, The Transformation of
Psychology: Influences of 19th-Century Philosophy, Technology and Natural
Science (pp. 195-218), Washington, DC, American Psychological
Association, were used in Chapters 5 and 6. Those parts were adapted
with permission (copyright © 2001 by the American Psychological
Association). Parts of my article “Klaus Holzkamp and the Rise and
Decline of German Critical Psychology in the journal History of
Psychology” (Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 235-253) were summarized in Chapter 6.
Those parts were adapted by permission (copyright © 1998 by the
Educational Publishing Foundation). Chapter 9 contains summaries of
my book chapter “The Historical Problematization of ‘Mixed Race’ in
Psychological and Human-Scientific Discourses” in A. Winston’s edited
bookDefining Difference: Race and Racism in the History of Psychology(pp. 79-
108), Washington, DC, American Psychological Association. Those parts
were adapted by permission (copyright © 2004 by the American
Psychological Association). Selections of my and Angela Febbraro’s article
“Ethnocentrism as a Form of Intuition in Psychology,” originally pub-
lished in the Theory and Psychology (Vol.13, pp. 673-694) and used in
Chapter 9, were adapted and reprinted by permission of Sage
Publications (copyright © 2003 by Sage Publications). I appreciate the per-
mission given by all these publishers. However, it is important to note
that the chapters in this book do not contain simple reprints of these arti-
cles but assimilate and accommodate ideas of those publications into this
book. Readers concerned with copyright issues should compare the orig-
inal and the adapted material.
The book is my sole responsibility, which also means that presenta-
tions and misrepresentations are my fault. I am grateful to the Canadian
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for providing a Standard
Research Grant that covered costs associated with parts of the research. I
would like to thank Angela Febbraro for her useful and critical comments
on the manuscript, especially Chapter 7. I appreciate the many fruitful dis-
cussions that I have hadwith my students over the last several years, espe-
cially in the undergraduate course Theories of Human Nature, and in the
graduate course Historical and Theoretical Foundations of Contemporary
x PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Psychologyat York University. I particularly express my gratitude to Jason
Goertzen and Leeat Granek for their valuable editorial work and for com-
piling the indexes for this volume.
THOMASTEO
Contents
CHAPTER 1. ONTHEHISTORIOGRAPHYOFTHECRITIQUE
OFPSYCHOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2. METATHEORYANDTHECRITIQUEOFPSYCHOLOGY . . . . 19
Psychological Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Psychology as a Problematic Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
CHAPTER 3. KANTANDEARLY19THCENTURYCRITICS
OFPSYCHOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Kant’s Critique of Rational and Empirical Psychology . . . . . 41
Early 19th Century Critics of Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
CHAPTER 4. THENATURAL-SCIENTIFICCRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Lange’s Critique of Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
The Problem of Speculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Controversies in Natural-Scientific Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . 72
CHAPTER 5. THEHUMAN-SCIENTIFICCRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Dilthey’s Rejection of Natural-Scientific Psychology . . . . . . . 78
The German-Speaking Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
The English-Speaking Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
CHAPTER 6. THEMARXISTCRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Karl Marx’s Critique of Philosophical Psychology . . . . . . . . . 94
Vygotsky’s Critique of Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
xi
xii CONTENTS
Holzkamp’s Critique of Traditional Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . 101
French Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
CHAPTER 7. THEFEMINISTCRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
The Feminist Critique of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Critique of the Psychological Subject Matter
andIts Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Challenges to Subject Matter, Relevance, and Methodology . . 124
Reflections on Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
CHAPTER 8. THEPOSTMODERNCRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
The End of Metanarratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
The Problem of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Subject and Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Aesthetics and “Liberation” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
CHAPTER 9. THEPOSTCOLONIALCRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
The Problem of Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
The Epistemological Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Scientific Racism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Hidden Neo-Colonial Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
The Problem with Problematization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
An Example of a Postcolonial Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
CHAPTER10. REFLECTIONSONTHEETHICAL-POLITICALCHARACTER
OFPSYCHOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Models for the Science-Politics Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Evaluative Scenarios for the Science-Politics
Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Facts and Decisions in the Human and Natural Sciences
and Political Affordances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Truth, Politics and an Ethical-Political
Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
NAMEINDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
SUBJECTINDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
1
On the Historiography of the
Critique of Psychology
Why has a systematic history of the critique of psychology never been
written? If one follows the distinction between traditionalandcriticalhis-
tories of psychology, the reasons will be very different.1Traditional histo-
rians have no interest in focusing on the deficits of psychology because
their attention belongs to the successes of the discipline. Critical or new
histories have not attended to the history of the critique of psychology
because of a skepticism towards intellectual history, which does not
require working in archives, because it would make theoretical compe-
tence as important as historical knowledge, and because it would make
critical histories of psychology themselves part of the history of the cri-
tique of psychology. It is necessary to clarify this terminology before these
arguments can be reflected upon.
Traditional historians of psychology have focused on contributorsto the
discipline and their innovations in theory, methodology, and research.
Persons, individuals, or great menhave been studied as significant in shap-
ing the outlook of the field. From such a perspective these individuals can be
labeled accurately as great psychologists (R.I. Watson & R. B. Evans, 1991) or
pioneersof psychology (Fancher, 1996). Other historians have elucidated the
1