The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in Counterinsurgency Partnership PDF
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UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff PPeennnnssyyllvvaanniiaa SScchhoollaarrllyyCCoommmmoonnss Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2013 TThhee CCrriittiiccaall AAllllyy:: CCooeerrcciioonn aanndd DDeefifiaannccee iinn CCoouunntteerriinnssuurrggeennccyy PPaarrttnneerrsshhiipp Barbara Elias University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Elias, Barbara, "The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in Counterinsurgency Partnership" (2013). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 751. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751 For more information, please contact [email protected]. TThhee CCrriittiiccaall AAllllyy:: CCooeerrcciioonn aanndd DDeefifiaannccee iinn CCoouunntteerriinnssuurrggeennccyy PPaarrttnneerrsshhiipp AAbbssttrraacctt In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under what conditions do in- country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening forces and under what conditions do allies dismiss foreign demands? By examining thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies to their in- country counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in-country allied compliance with (or defiance of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of "power" in international relations and moving beyond underspecified explanations of alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures inherent in this type of counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies. Specifically, the study argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with foreign allied demands, including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the requested policy; 2) the alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the capacity of the host government; 4) wartime complications; and 5) the presence of an acute enemy threat. These variables interact with each other to produce a complex set of incentives for allied cooperation or defiance. In particular, the study argues that whether or not allied interests converge or diverge over a proposed policy interacts with the unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied preferences converge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an incentive to free-ride and is unlikely to comply. Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the in-country regime has an incentive to participate in order to avoid being undermined by its ally acting unilaterally. Overall, the study found remarkable consistency across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/3 of foreign requests complied with, 1/3 complied with in part, and 1/3 left unfulfilled. DDeeggrreeee TTyyppee Dissertation DDeeggrreeee NNaammee Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) GGrraadduuaattee GGrroouupp Political Science FFiirrsstt AAddvviissoorr Avery Goldstein KKeeyywwoorrddss Alliances, Coercion, Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, Intervention, Power SSuubbjjeecctt CCaatteeggoorriieess International Relations | Peace and Conflict Studies | Political Science This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/751 THE CRITICAL ALLY: COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS Barbara Elias A DISSERTATION in Political Science Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2013 Supervisor of Dissertation _____________________ Avery Goldstein, Professor, Department of Political Science Graduate Group Chairperson _____________________ Nancy Hirschmann, Professor, Department of Political Science Dissertation Committee Avery Goldstein, Professor, Department of Political Science Edward Mansfield, Professor, Department of Political Science Michael Horowitz, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Alex Weisiger, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science ! ! THE CRITICAL ALLY: COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS COPYRIGHT 2013 Barbara Elias This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/ ACKNOWLEDGMENT Turns out, this is harder than it looks. I am enormously grateful to my professors, Avery Goldstein, Ed Mansfield, Mike Horowitz and Alex Weisiger. Avery who was patient, smart and incisive, Alex who invested enormous energy reading every draft and challenging important details. I owe Alex a debt I can never repay for converting me from a one-trick national security document researcher to a proper political scientist complete with quantitative tools (amazing!). Thank you also to Mike who gave me perspective and Ed who, after listening to the initial proposal, asked, “wait, can you actually do this?” He was not convinced, but let me try anyway. Thank you. In addition, I am grateful to the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania for an incredible opportunity and education, as well as Brown University for my first education in international relations under Jim Blight and janet Lang. Enormous thanks are due to the National Security Archive, where badass academics and intellectual troublemakers go to dig up evidence and do great research. Several institutions were wonderfully supportive of this project. I would like to thank the Browne Center for International Politics, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, GAPSA, the Teece Family, and the Jewish Family Service Association of Cleveland for honoring me with funds and encouragement. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my family. I am grateful to my mom, dad, and poppou, Cameron, Aimee and Mary. Yia-yia, who taught me that you could be very small and very strong, much like clever political actors in international relations. Thank you to Anna and my other sisters Rosella Cappella, Kim Turner and Johanna Lacoe who picked me up, dusted me off and were my flashlight in the dark. Finally, thanks to Nathaniel who set this project back a few months, but made it better because he made me better. """! ! ABSTRACT THE CRITICAL ALLY: COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS Barbara Elias Avery Goldstein In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under what conditions do in-country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening forces and under what conditions do allies dismiss foreign demands? By examining thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign interventions Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies to their in-country counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in- country allied compliance with (or defiance of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of “power” in international relations and moving beyond underspecified explanations of alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures inherent in this type of counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies. Specifically, the study argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with foreign allied demands, including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the requested policy; 2) the alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the capacity of the host government; 4) wartime complications; and 5) the presence of an acute enemy threat. These variables interact with each other to produce a complex set of incentives for allied cooperation or defiance. In particular, the study argues that whether or not allied interests converge or diverge over a proposed policy interacts with the unilateral ability of "#!! ! intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied preferences converge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an incentive to free- ride and is unlikely to comply. Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the in-country regime has an incentive to participate in order to avoid being undermined by its ally acting unilaterally. Overall, the study found remarkable consistency across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/3 of foreign requests complied with, 1/3 complied with in part, and 1/3 left unfulfilled. #!! ! TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ........................................................................................ IV LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................. IX LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................ XI CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1 The Central Argument ............................................................................................. 4 Why Examine These Alliances? ................................................................................ 8 CHAPTER 2: THEORY, ARGUMENT, AND LITERATURE ................. 14 Literature Review ................................................................................................... 17 Military Studies—Counterinsurgency Warfare ............................................................................. 17 International Relations .................................................................................................................. 19 Re-conceptualizing Ideas in International Relations on Allied Commitment, Dependency, and Interests .................................................................................... 26 Commitment ................................................................................................................................. 26 Dependency .................................................................................................................................. 30 Interest .......................................................................................................................................... 33 Variables and Hypotheses ...................................................................................... 35 Independent Variables – What Determines Compliance? .......................................................... 37 Control Variables—Other Important Factors .............................................................................. 45 A Note on the Interaction Between Variables .............................................................................. 48 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY .......................................................... 51 The Reliability of U.S. Department of State Cables from Wikileaks ........................ 59 The Foreign Intervening Force—Selecting Requests to Allies ................................. 66 The Dependent Variable—Compliance ................................................................... 67 Independent Variables ........................................................................................... 74 CHAPTER 4: VIETNAM ..................................................................... 91 Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Vietnamese Compliance ..................... 92 Summary Findings ................................................................................................. 93 Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance ................................................. 100 Capacity ....................................................................................................................................... 100 Dependency and Unilateral Action ............................................................................................ 104 Interests ....................................................................................................................................... 111 Conditions of War, Internal Politics and External Threats ....................................................... 128 The End of the War and U.S. Withdrawal .............................................................. 137 #!"! ! Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 142 CHAPTER 5: IRAQ .......................................................................... 144 Summary Findings ................................................................................................ 144 The U.S., Coalition Provisional Authority and the Government of Iraq ................ 146 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ................................................................................. 147 The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) .......................................................................................... 153 The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and Permanent Government of Iraq (GOI) ............ 155 Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Iraqi Compliance .............................. 161 Data on Iraqi Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary .................................... 165 Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance .................................................. 171 Capacity ........................................................................................................................................ 171 Dependency and Unilateral Action ............................................................................................. 173 Interests—Costs and Benefits ...................................................................................................... 181 Conditions of War and Internal Politics ..................................................................................... 191 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 195 CHAPTER 6: THE U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN ...................................... 199 Summary Findings ............................................................................................... 200 Hamid Karzai and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan ......................... 202 The U.S. Civilian Advisory Effort ............................................................................................... 209 Methodology - Tracking U.S. Demands and Afghan Compliance ........................... 211 Data on Afghan Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary ................................. 213 Independent Variables – Explaining Compliance ................................................. 219 Capacity ........................................................................................................................................ 219 Dependency and Unilateral Action ............................................................................................ 222 Interests—Costs and Benefits ..................................................................................................... 237 Conditions of War and Internal Politics .................................................................................... 242 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 245 CHAPTER 7: THE U.S.S.R. IN AFGHANISTAN ............................... 247 Summary Findings ................................................................................................ 247 The KGB Factor .................................................................................................... 251 The Soviet Bureaucracy ........................................................................................ 253 Finding a Scapegoat ............................................................................................. 256 Strategy and the Soviet Intervention in the Afghan Regime, 1979-89 ................... 258 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 262 Afghan Compliance with Soviet Demands ............................................................ 266 #"!"! ! Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 273 Other Counterinsurgency Interventions by Non-Democratic States Vietnam in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen, Cuba in Angola, Syria in Lebanon ........... 274 Vietnam in Cambodia ................................................................................................................ 274 Egypt in Yemen ........................................................................................................................... 277 Cuba in Angola ............................................................................................................................ 279 Syria in Lebanon ......................................................................................................................... 284 CHAPTER 8: INDIA IN SRI LANKA ............................................... 286 Summary Findings ............................................................................................... 286 Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Insurgency (LTTE)—A Briefing ............................ 288 Methodology—Tracking Indian Demands and Sri Lankan Compliance ................ 296 Data on Sri Lankan Compliance with Indian Demands—Summary ....................... 297 Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance ................................................. 304 Capacity ....................................................................................................................................... 304 Dependency & Unilateral Action ................................................................................................ 305 Interests ...................................................................................................................................... 309 Conditions of War and Internal Politics ..................................................................................... 317 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 324 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION .......................................................... 328 APPENDICES ................................................................................. 340 Appendix A: METHODOLOGY—EXAMPLES ....................................................... 340 Appendix B: CHART COMPARING TYPES OF DEMANDS MADE BY FOREIGN ALLIES ACROSS COUNTERINSURGENCY WARS ................................................ 349 REFERENCES ................................................................................. 352 #"!""! !
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