The Concept of Moral Progress PDF
Preview The Concept of Moral Progress
Frauke Albersmeier The Concept of Moral Progress Practical Philosophy Edited by Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Neil Roughley, Peter Schaber and Ralf Stoecker Volume 24 Frauke Albersmeier The Concept of Moral Progress D61 ISBN 978-3-11-079883-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-079891-3 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-079901-9 ISSN 2197-9243 DOI https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110798913 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to any content (such as graphs, figures, photos, excerpts, etc.) not original to the Open Access publication and further permission may be required from the rights holder. The obligation to research and clear permission lies solely with the party re-using the material. Library of Congress Control Number: 2022944083 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 with the author(s), published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This book is published with open access at www.degruyter.com. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com Acknowledgments Thisbookisarevisedversionofmydissertationofthesametitle,whichIdefend- edattheHeinrichHeineUniversityDüsseldorfinJanuary2020.Iamindebtedto ChristophKannforhisexcellentsupervisionandtoFrankDietrich,whoactedas the second thesis referee. For critical feedback on this work and many helpful discussions of related topics, I thank, first and foremost, Alexander Christian. I have also benefitted from conversations with David Hommen, Oscar Horta and Gottfried Vosgerau. I thank the German Research Foundation for funding the research projectinwhich I have been employed duringmydoctoral studies and the University and State Library Düsseldorf for supporting the open access publicationofthiswork.Forthemanywaysinwhicheachofthemhassupport- edandencouragedme,Iamdeeplygratefultomyparentsandmygrandparents. OpenAccess.©2022theauthor(s),publishedbyDeGruyter. Thisworkislicensedunderthe CreativeCommonsAttribution4.0InternationalLicense.https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110798913-001 Contents Introduction 1 Methodological Preliminaries 7 . Moral Progress, Intuitions, and the Limits of Analysis 7 . Improving Concepts 14 . A Better Way of Thinking about Moral Change 19 Moral Progress: Conceptual Commitments, Pragmatic Expectations 25 . Progress 26 . Morality 29 .. Moral Judgments 31 .. Moral Awareness and Moral Consideration 34 .. Moral Agency and the Capacity for Moral Progress 37 . The Concept of Moral Progress: Pragmatic Expectations and Concerns 39 Ethics and the Idea of Moral Progress 44 . Consequentialist Concerns: Inclusivity and Better States of Affairs 49 . A Kantian Reservation 58 . Moral Progress as the Cultivation of Virtues? 63 . Liberty, Progress and Inevitable Ethical Regress 66 .. The Practical Problem of Liberal Progress 68 .. The Theoretical Paradoxes of Fallible Progress 72 . Moral Progress and Moral Objectivity 79 .. A Progress-Realism Tie-Up? 79 .. A Success Concept and a Success Theory 83 .. From Progress to Moral Facts: Appearance and Explanation 86 .. No Miracle at All: Moral Progress in Antirealist Terms 92 .. Deliberative Commitments and Deliberative Duties 94 The Phenomenon of Moral Progress 98 . Dimensioning Moral Progress 100 .. The Social Scale of Moral Progress 101 .. Global and Local Progress 104 .. Domains of Morality 106 .. Identifying the Moral Point of Departure 108 VIII Contents . Theoretical and Practical Progress 112 .. Moral Progress: Hollow or Disoriented? 113 .. Must Moral Progress Be “Made?” 115 .. Uncertainty Regarding the Roles of Theory and Practice 127 .. Moral Progress in Theory? 135 .. Progress by a Fluke? 153 .. Improvement in Moral Performance 170 .. Moral Progress with an Impact 174 . Dimensioning Reconsidered 177 Moral Progressand Moral Motivation: Improvement as a Fetish? 180 . On the Motivational Relevance of the Idea of Moral Progress 182 . The Fetish Objection to Concern for Morality 186 .. The Right Thing as a Fetish 188 .. Morality as a Fetish 200 . The Fetish Objection to Desiring Moral Progress 203 .. A Reasonably Abstract Desire 203 .. Moral Progress as the Right Thing to Pursue 209 .. Settling for Progress 217 . Motivational Relevance Reconsidered 220 Conclusion 229 Bibliography 235 Index 245 Introduction Itispartoftheself-imageofmembersofmanyculturesthattheybelongtopro- gressedsocieties.Industriallydevelopedliberaldemocraciesaretypicallyregard- ed (at least fromwithin) to be the result of progress in manydifferent realms— technological, scientific, and political.Certain groups within these societies do not merely view themselves as progressed but also mark their political outlook asprogressive,associatingcertainsocio-politicalagendaswith theperpetuation of a presumably progressive project. While such agendas typically revolve arounddistinctly moral considerations pertaining tothe protection of the inter- ests of individuals, the case for supposedly politically progressive objectives is rarely cast in the language of “moral progress.” Manyofuswelcomeprogresswithrespecttovaluessuchasequality,social inclusion, political participation. Some moral agents are actively involved in working toward these changes and in battling what they see as moral evils, suchasthefailuretoaidpeoplefleeinghungerandterrorism,thepracticeofan- imal experimentation, or the destruction of ecosystems. But we rarely address anyofthesecausesasmanifestationsorinstancesofaneedformoralprogress. Talkof “moralprogress”isnotablyabsentfrommoraldiscourse.Untilrecently, thiswastrueofdiscourseinmoralphilosophy,anditcontinuestobethecasefor public discourse.This absence is puzzling because as moral agents,we should be expected to be interested in determining how we are doing morally, how wearedoingcomparedtothosethathavecomebeforeusandlivedinlesspro- gressedcircumstances,andwhetheroureffortscontributetoamorecomprehen- sivedevelopmenttowardthebetterorwhetherwearetreadingwater.Yet,these questions are not discussed in terms of moral progress. Thereareseveralpossiblereasonswhyappealsto“moralprogress”areoften eschewed.Anaversionto“moralizing”debatesmightplayarole,aswellasthe intention to avoid being presumptuous in issuing judgments of moral progress (or moral judgments more generally, for that matter), but also an uncertainty about whether specific achieved changes constitute moral progress or whether therehasbeenmoralprogress,allthingsconsidered.Maybemoralagentsingen- eral have a bleaker outlook: maybe they doubt that further moral progress is even possible or feel that progress has become obsolete and our mission as moralagentsisrathertoform“theresistancetotheperpetualdangerofrelapse” (Adorno 2003,145). Rather than holding reservations against the idea of moral progress or applying the notion of moral progress in normative discourse, the agents participating in this discourse might simply not see any need to speak of moral progress.Those who are working to advance certain causes for moral OpenAccess.©2022theauthor(s),publishedbyDeGruyter. Thisworkislicensedunderthe CreativeCommonsAttribution4.0InternationalLicense.https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110798913-002 2 Introduction reasons care about these causes rather than progress—or moral progress—as such. Furthermore,where there is need tomark a change for the morallybetter explicitly,itmightbethecasethatthenotionofprogressitself—where‘progress’ remainsunspecified—isthoughttosuffice,becauseprogressisalreadyregarded as somewhatmorallyloaded. But the idea of moral progress is not superfluous orredundant.Wemisssomethingifweneveraskwhetherchangeforthebetteris moralprogressandifweneverthinkofourmoralgoalsintermsofmoralprog- ress. The relative absence of the concept of moral progress¹ from our moral dis- courseisalsopuzzlingbecause,supposedly,theideaofmoralprogressishighly important motivationally for moral agents. Michele Moody-Adams claims as much when she says that it is “a necessary presupposition of action for beings likeus”(Moody-Adams2017,153).Infact,thepresentvolumewillexpandonex- istingviews ofthemotivationalsignificanceofbeliefin the possibilityofmoral progress. Even in its most abstract form,the idea of moral progress—moral im- provement,wherever it may lead—might be a proper object of a moral agent’s desire—something to strive for,despite its abstractness.This ideawill be vetted inthefinalchapter,whichwillcarveoutanevenmorepositivemotivationalrole for the concept of moral progress than it has been assigned so far. Ifweassumethatmoralagentsdocareabouthowtheydomorally,whenwe observethattheydofightformoralcausesandcontrastthiswiththelackofex- plicitappealstothenotionofmoralprogress,wefindthattheconceptofmoral progress plays a largely implicit—but not insignificant—role in our moral lives. Theaimofthepresentinvestigationistomaketheconceptofmoralprogressex- plicit.Uncertainty about the existence or the possibility of moral progress can onlyberemovedonceuncertaintyaboutthecontentoftheconcepthasbeenre- moved. Judgments about the occurrence of moral progress serve our moral ori- entation by marking accomplishments and goals (§2.3.).They can be better ar- ticulated and justified based on a clear grasp of what they attribute to the evaluatee. The little attention that hasbeen given tomoral progress thus farcontrasts withthewaythemoregeneralideaofprogresshasbeentreated.Progressinthe generalsense is arecurringthemein the historyofphilosophy,perhapsassoci- atedforemostwiththeeraofEnlightenment—whereitwasproposedasaviable possibility and an objective (Condorcet 1963) as well as criticized (Rousseau Inthefollowing,itwilloftenbenecessarytodistinguishbetweenthephenomenonofmoral progress,theconcept,andtheterm.Iwillmarktheconcepteitherbyusingsmallcaps(moral progress) or by speaking of the concept of moral progress, and I will use single quotation marksfortheterm‘moralprogress.’
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