The Concept of Justice

88 Pages·1971·9.341 MB·English

by  N. M. L. Nathan (auth.)

New Studies in Practical Philosophy
THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE
New Studies in Practical Philosophy
General Editor: W. D. Hudson
The point of view of this series is that
of contemporary analytical philosophy.
Each study will deal with an aspect of
moral philosophy. Particular attention
will be paid to the logic of moral discourse,
and the practical problems of morality.
The relationship between morality and
other 'universes of discourse', such as art
and science, will also be explored.
Published
R. M. Hare Practical Inferences
R. M. Hare Essays on Philosophical Method
N. M. L. Nathan The Concept of Justice
R. W. Beardsmore Art and Morality
Among the titles in preparation are:
R. M. Hare Essays on the Moral Concepts
R. M. Hare Applications of Moral Philosophy
THE CONCEPT
OF JUSTICE
N. M. L. NATHAN
Lecturer in Philosophy,
University of Reading
MACMILLAN EDUCATION
© N. M. L. Nathan I97I
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1971
All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form
or by any means, without permission.
First published 1971 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Associated companies in New York Toronto
Dublin Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras
SNB 333 12398 0
ISBN 978-1-349-01152-0 ISBN 978-1-349-01150-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-01150-6
Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas
jus suum cuique tribuendi.
Ulpian, Digest I, I, IO, pr.
Contents
Editor's Foreword IX
Acknowledgements X
1 Introduction 1
2 The Concept ofJ ustice 4
I Senses of a Word 4
2 The Justice of States of Affairs 5
3 Just and Unjust Actions I9
3 Possible Principles ofJ ustice 22
I Moral Principles in General 22
2 Principles of Justice 25
4 Popular Principles ofJ ustice 30
I Currently Popular and Unpopular Principles 30
2 Some Permanent Constraints 39
(a) Love, hatred and fear 39
(b) Consistency 40
(c) Emotional congruity 47
(d) Summary 55
5 Justice, Equality and Socialism 57
I Egalitarianism 57
2 Capitalism 65
Appendix: Rawls's Theory of Justice 70
Bibliographical Note 78
Editor's Foreword
To arrive at a correct understanding of justice has been the
aim of moral and political philosophy from Greek antiquity
to our own day. In this monograph Mr Nathan presents a
contemporary examination of the concept. He analyses the
meaning of the word 'just' and critically reviews principles of
justice to which men actually adhere or which they could
conceivably propose. The author's intention is not to preach a
particular morality, much less to advocate a certain set of
legal reforms. It is to clarify what men are doing when they
think or speak in terms ofj ustice and to show what can and what
cannot logically be said in such terms.
University of Exeter W. D. HunsoN
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the Editors of Mind and Inquiry for permission
to use material from articles contributed to these journals. My
thanks are also due to Professor D. D. Raphael, who read an
earlier version of this essay and made a number of useful
comments.
N.M.L.N.
Introduction
1
'Just' has a lot of senses; and a formula like 'unjust actions are
always wrong' can express as many different moral beliefs as
there are different senses of 'just'. But even if we fix on one
particular sense of'just', there is a multiplicity ofways in which
the value of an action can be held to depend on whether or not
it is just in that sense, or on the degree of justice or injustice,
in that sense, which can be attributed to it. 'Unjust actions
are always wrong' expresses only one of these ways. For someone
might hold, not that all actions are wrong or impermissible
which are in some particular sense unjust, but that, for instance,
only those actions are impermissible which are unjust to a cer
tain degree, or that actions are impermissible if and only if
they are both unjust and impermissible by utilitarian standards.
And this is to say nothing about the different ways in which the
obligatoriness of an action could be held to depend on whether
or not or how just it is. Any belief which makes the value of
actions depend in any way on whether or not they can be
called just, or on how just or unjust they are, in any particular
sense of'just', I call a principle ofjustice: there are many more
different conceivable principles of justice than there are even
different senses of 'just'. My first aim in this essay is to describe
the range of senses of 'just', and the even wider range of
conceivable principles of justice. And my other aims are to
say something about the logical and psychological factors which
affect the relative popularity of these various principles and
about the political implications of one or two of the more
popular.
It might seem as though the meaning of'just' is so vague that
this programme could only amount to the description and
application of every conceivable moral principle whatsoever.
But we shall see that the senses of 'just' are such that principles
of justice are invariably determinate moral beliefs, whose
implications can be very different from those of moral beliefs