The Concept of Judgment in Montaigne

155 Pages·1968·4.119 MB·English

by  Raymond C. La Charité (auth.)

THE CONCEPT OF
JUDGMENT IN MONTAIGNE
THE CONCEPT OF
JUDGMENT IN MONTAIGNE
by
RAYMOND C. LA CHARITE
•
:
~
.
. .
MARTIN US NI]HOFF / THE HAGUE / 1968
ISBN 978-94-015-0357-0 ISBN 978-94-015-0919-0 (eBook)
DOl 10.1007/978-94-015-0919-0
© I968 by Martinus Nijhofl. The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
TO GIN I
N ous nous cherchions avant
que de nous estre veus
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IX
INTRODUCTION I
I. IGNORANCE, FORMATION, AND OPERATION 13
Ignorance and Judgment 15
Formation of Judgment 21
Operation of Judgment 31
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF JUDGMENT 43
Exaltation and Alteration 44
God and Institutions 48
The Emotional Nature of Man 54
Deficiency: A Practical Guide 62
III. JUDGMENT AND BEING 69
Self-Identification 74
The Role of Appraisal 82
The Problem of Essence and Self-Awareness 92
The Nature of Movement and Personality 95
The Function of Experience 98
The Relationship of Judgment and Life 106
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUDGMENT TO THE OTHER FACULTIES 110
Entendement 112
Sens 119
Raison and Discours 125
Conscience 133
CONCLUSION 141
BIBLIOGRAPHY 144
INDEX 147
ACKNOWLEDG MENTS
I am greatly indebted to Donald M. Frame of Columbia University,
under whose guidance and assistance this study was prepared, for his
wonderful encouragement, his admirable patience, and his extremely
valuable suggestions; but, above all, I am most grateful to him for his
generosity and kindness as both professor and friend.
I also wish to thank Frank P. Bowman and Robert K. Bishop of the
University of Pennsylvania for their careful reading and criticism
of the manuscript.
The debt lowe my wife is immeasurable, for she made it all possible.
INTRODUCTION
Many critics seem to consider it inappropriate or unnecessary to ask
what Montaigne means by the faculty of judgment. Laumonier speaks
of "Ie bon sens, qu'il oppose si souvent a la memoire et qu'il appelle
encore 'jugement' et 'entendement', c'est-a-dire la faculte de penser et
de reflechir juste." 1 Our appreciation of what is implied by judgment,
that is by Montaigne's notion of judgment, has been delayed perhaps
by a too facile acceptance of a so-called synonymity of meaning among
the psychological terms used by Montaigne. In a discussion of key
concepts in Montaigne, Donald M. Frame has accurately summarized
the present situation with regard to our knowledge of Montaigne's
notion of judgment and other key concepts: "We all have our hunches,
but we need more than that." 2
For the expression of his interest and concern for the intellectual and
moral activities and capabilities of the mind, Montaigne draws upon a
broad and elementary semantic field. These primary psychological terms
are jugement, entendement, sens, raison, discours, and conscience. Al
though these words may be used synonymously, Montaigne does seem
to maintain certain basic distinctions among them; frequent substi
tutions of terms must be the result of semantic and ideational differ
ences. Moreover, the association of several psychological words within
a single sentence implies gradations, however slight they may be. This
study represents, in part, an effort to elucidate and clarify the dis
tinctions and relationships which exist, in Montaigne's usage, among
the above-mentioned words. More importantly, this study concentrates
on a detailed semantic and ideational analysis of the most significant,
1 Paul Laumonier, "Montaigne precurseur du XVIIe siecie," Revue d'histoire litteraire de
la France, III (1896), 209. Andre Cresson, Montaigne, sa vie, son oeuvre (Paris, 1947), p. 59,
remarks that "Ie but doit etre la formation de I'esprit, Ie developpement de ce bon sens, de ce
jugement que chacun porte en lui."
2 Donald M. Frame, "What Next in Montaigne Studies?," French Review, XXXVI (1963),
583.
2 INTRODUCTION
for both Montaigne and his reader, of these words, that is the term and
concept jugement.1
The concept of judgment is central to Montaigne. Indeed, it consti
tutes perhaps the essential part of the odyssey for self-reliance and self
discovery which Montaigne undertakes in his Essais : "Le jugement est un
a
util tous subjects, et se mesle par tout. A cette cause, aux essais que
j'en fayici, j'y employe toute sorte d'occasion" (1,50,289).2 Knowledge
of the world is possible only through knowledge of the self, for the way
in which the inner self views the peripheries of the outer world de
termines what aspects of that world are to be made known. The self
determines what it finds of immediate value or of passing interest for
its operation in the outer bounds of human existence.
The self, the intangible factor which ordains man's individuality,
must often move in an alien world. To live in this strange and perplexing
environment, there must be knowledge of how to act, ascertain if one
is right or wrong, assess the merits of a given experience, and then
extract from this event a mode of behavior. This knowledge is gained,
stored, evaluated, and executed by the judgment.
That the notion of judgment is one of the most important keys to an
understanding of the whole of Montaigne's work may be seen by the
number of times (212) that Montaigne refers to this faculty.3 It is
impossible to deal with Montaigne without an acute awareness of his
concern for the faculty of judgment, whether it be with regard to
himself, Montaigne the man, or to that extension of himself, Montaigne
the author of the Essais.
Few critics have discussed Montaigne without referring to the concept
of judgment which pervades his work. However, as has already been
noted, many critics tend to oversimplify the semantic problem. Certain
ly, it would be impractical to give an account of all that has been said,
1 No attempt will be made to differentiate between the term jugement and its concept.
We assume for purposes of this study that, as Georges Matore says, "Ie mot est lie au concept
d'une maniere quasi indissoluble." La Methode en lexicologie (Paris, I953), p. 33.
2 Montaigne, CEuvres complCtes, ed. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris, I962), I, 50,
289, i.e., Book I, Essay 50, p. 289. The stratum indicators denoting (A), (B), and (C) material
have been corrected where necessary, and, unless otherwise indicated, all references are to
this edition. The expression "stratum indicator" and its alphabetical representation (A, B,
or C) refers to material of specific periods of composition; (A) indicates material written by
Montaigne in time to appear in the 1580 edition of the Essais; it also includes the revisions
of the 1582 and 1587 editions of Books I and II; (B) introduces material first published in
1588, and (C) material written after I588. Throughout this study, reference to Montaigne's
"suppression" of a psychological term implies that the word has been omitted through
subsequent revision.
3 For a compendium of passages which deal with the general idea of judging, see Eva
Marcu, Repertoire des idees de Jlontaigne (Geneva, 1965), pp. 697-720.
INTRODUCTION 3
within the vast corpus of Montaigne criticism, about the faculty of
judgment. At best, one can select only the most pertinent studies, those
studies that treat extensively, if not exclusively and specifically, the
faculty of judgment.
Gabriel Compayre is particularly interested in Montaigne's ideas on
education, and since, for Montaigne, education means the training of the
judgment, Compayre elucidates what is meant by judging: "To judge
is first of all to think for one's self .... To judge is to think rightly ....
To judge well, lastly, is to be able and ready to act well." 1 Accordingly,
the proper performance of these three acts is the result and goal of
judgment, a faculty whose role is both intellectual and moral. As man's
critical spirit, it "observes, reasons, and concludes." 2 Judgment also
discerns good from evil and thus acts as our moral conscience: "It is
that we may become better men that he [MontaigneJ would have us
better able to judg-e. He constantly associates those two points of
view." 3 P. Mansell Jones is of the same opinion. Critical judgment and
moral judgment or moral conscience are inextricably intertwined:
"Ju dgment must be given the widest grounds for exercise, from the most
trivial daily acts to the finer matters of taste; but of supreme importance
is its application to moral issues, ranging from the recognition of the
highest good down to the estimate of a common custom, a particular
habit or an individual mode of conduct." 4
Van den Bruwaene is particularly aware of the "nuances dans les
termes qui designent une activite de l'esprit humain." 5 He finds that
one readily notices that jugement, entendement, and intelligence are less
pejorative than discours and raison. Nevertheless, Van den Bruwaene
concludes that "on ne peut considerer l'emploi de ces mots que comme
une simple preference." 6 As far as judgment is concerned, "qu'on
entende par la une operation de l'esprit, un habitus ou la faculte elle
m~me, la raison, l'intelligence," 7 Montaigne usually looks upon it
favorably. Its principal role seems to be its opposition to the excesses
of reason.
1 Gabriel Compayre, Montaigne and Education of the Judgment, trans. J.-E. Mansion
(New York, 1908), p. 66. Only the English translation of this work was available to me.
2 Compayre, pp. 68-69.
3 Ibid.
• P. Mansell Jones, French Introspectives from M ontaigne to A ndrd Gide (Cambridge, 1937),
P·36.
5 Leon Van den Bruwaene, "Les Idees philosophiques de Montaigne," Revue neo-scolastique
de philosophie, XXXV (1933), 493.
6 Van den Bruwaene, p. 506, n. 49.
? Ibid., p. 507.
4 INTRODUCTION
For Georges Poulet, judgment is the faculty which solidifies and
immobilizes ever-changing time: "L' operation par laquelle on fait
siennes les heures et les choses, n'est rien autre que Ie jugement." 1 In
this way, judgment creates being, a being which is observable and with
which one can communicate. Without judgment, the self, in its mobile
fluidity, could never achieve unity. Montaigne was acutely aware of
this: "Je ne peints pas l'e stre. J e peints Ie passage: non un passage
d'aage en autre, ou, comme dict Ie peuple, de sept en sept ans, mais de
jour en jour, de minute en minute" (III, 2, 782). The journey from
passage to estre is effected by means of the judgment. Thus, judgment
is both an act and a faculty: "Ie judgement est tout entier dans une
actualite .... Mais d'un autre cOte il apparait aussi comme virtualite
pure. II n'est pas ce qui est possede, mais ce qui possede, ce qui, en fin
de compte, peut posseder." 2
Donald Frame presents the best available schema of the relationship
of the faculties of the soul. Judgment is generally superior to common
sense, although Montaigne sometimes equates them. Moreover,
judgment is synonymous with reason "in the sense of right reason but
contrasts with reason's other sense, wrong reasoning, by being close to
the facts, patient, always ready to learn, cautious in reaching con
clusions." 3 Conscience is probably one of judgment's functions; the
soul is at rest when judgment is in command.4 Of the utmost im
portance is its interdependency with self-study.5
In summary, the existing scholarship on judgment in Montaigne
emphasizes two important facets of the concept: its relationship with
the other faculties of the soul and its self-creative function. The purpose
of this study is to pursue and explore in greater detail these two di
rections and to bring together the history or dossier of judgment, as it
is found in the Essais. This study attempts to elucidate the meaning
and the importance of the faculty of judgment in the Essais, its
strengths, its weaknesses, its functions and activities.
Did Montaigne find the origin of the concept of judgment within
himself and by himself? What was the meaning of jugement in the
sixteenth century? Did Montaigne deal with ancient or contemporary
1 Georges Poulet, Etudes sttr Ie temps httmain (Paris, 1950), p. 13.
2 Poulet, p. '4.
3 Donald "'1. Frame, JIontaigne's Discovery of Jlan: The Humanization of a Humanist
(:-.lew York, 1955), p. 80; see also his Jlontaigne: A Biography (New York, 1965), p. 259.
4 Frame, Jlontaigne's Discovery of .}Ian, p. '44.
5 Ibid., p. 80.