The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky: Scientific Legacy

349 Pages·1999·118.418 MB·English

by  L. S. Vygotsky

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
L. S. VYGOTSKY
Volume 6
ScientificLegacy
COGNITION AND LANGUAGE
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COLLECTED WORKS
THE OF
L. S. VYGOTSKY
Volume 6
ScientificLegacy
Translatedby
MARIE J.HALL
Prologueby
DOROTHY ROBBINS
CentralMissouriStateUniversIty
Warrensburg,Missouri
andtheToistoyInstitute
Moscow.Russia
Editorofthe EnglishTranslation
ROBERT W. RIEBER
JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice
andtheGraduateCenter
CityUniversityofNewYork
New York.NewYork
KLUWERACADEMIC/ PLENUM PUBLISHERS
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TheLibraryofCongresscatalogedearliervolumesol'thistitleasfollows:
Vygotskii.L.S.(LevSemenovich).l896—i934.
ThecollectedworksofL.S.Vygotsky.
(Cognitionandlanguage)
Translationof:SobranieSochinenii.
Vol.l- includesbibliographiesandindexes.
Contents:v.i.Problemsofgeneralpsychology.
l.PsychologyI.Rieber,R.W.(RobertW.)ll.Carton,AaronS.
BFlZi.V94l3 I987 l50 87-72l9
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PROLOGUE
Dorothy Robbins
CentralMissouri State University
Warrensburg, M0 64093
The Tolstoy Institute, Moscow
1.Preamble
ScientificLegacy is the title of this collection,which was published in Russian
after Vygotsky’s death. This volume is divided into three sections, ranging from
tools and signs in child development to emotions, endingwith an analysis of the
emotionsof actors.Beforebeginning thisprologue, an introductionwill be offered
in memory of Lev Semonovich Vygotsky as a Russian first, a man who lived only
until 1934,and who died at the early age of thirty-seven. Readers are encouraged
to position his thoughts within the framework ofphenomenological bracketing, or
suspending one's own perspective, in order to gain an understanding of Vygotsky
through his Russian roots. Vygotsky did not separate deeper levels of psychology
fromEuropean (inparticular, German and Spinozian)philosophy, allofwhich can
be labeled non-classical psychology.‘ D. B. Elkonin was of the opinion that
...L S.Vygotsky'a transition from the interpretation of social environment as a
‘tactcr’totheunderstandingofthe‘soclal’asthe‘some'ofpersonalitydevelopment
symbolizesthebeginningofnon-classicalpsychologyofconsciousness.2
Inspeakingmetaphorically,muchofclassicalpsychologycanbecomparedwith
Newtonian physics,where Vygotsky’sthoughtswould then relate tonewer areasof
physics, such ascomplexity-chaos theory.3 Vygotsky’s vision was for the next cen-
tury,4 and has been called heightpsychology (viewing the potential future of an
‘A.Asmolov 1998,pp.($24).
1A.Asmolov 1993.p.21).
3“itseemsalmostcertainthathe[Vygctsky]used—andtheeditorshavedeleted—hisfavoritequotation
afrnomautThreontstikcyh:u'Mmaannibseihnigmsoerlfssutpr'ekrhhiiuam,’astnot.ch.e.i"on(Joorraveslekmye1n9t8a9l,cph.a2o6s,3)w.hich isyet tobe shapedinto
‘V.S.SobkinandD.A.Leontlev(in:Cupchikand[Arid(eds),1992,p.192).“Vygotskytreatedhuman
psychologynotasanaturalsciencebutratherasasyntheticscience,integratingnatural,humanitarian,
and socialknowledge.That iswhysomany of Vygotslty'senlighteninghypotheses and insightshave
not yet been realized in c.o.n.creteresearch on andknowledge of the human being. Vygotsky moved
towardanewpsychology Perhapsitisthescienceofthehuman mindforthenextcentury,which
isexpectedtobethe ageofpsychology.Themoretimehaspassed sinceVygotsky'sdeath.the more
weseehim ahead of us, lightingourpath.” Itshouldbestatedthatwithin Asmolov'sunderstanding
ofnon-classicalpsychology, Freudian descriptionsoftheunconsciousin psychoanalysisareviewed as
an importantsource;however,within the parametersofheight anddepth psychology asdescribed by
A.A.becntyev,theFreudianpsychoanalytictreatmentoftheunconsciousdealswithpersonalproblems
forthemostpart.
V
vi Prologue
individual), as Opposed to Freudian (inter alia)depthpsychology.5 Vygotsky was a
meaning-seeker, asopposed toarationalformalist,6 focusingattention on the entire
formation of individualpersonality.7 He was a Marxist philosopher, andialthough
it hasbeen claimed that his Marxism could be compared to Althusser and Haber-
mas,a
Vygotsky lived in modern revolutionary times, irnpiementinghis/psychology-
philosophyasaguidelineforultimatesocietalchange,especiallyinthedevelOpment
of the individual personality. And just as most contemporary interpreters of Des-
cartesleaveouthis numerous references toGod,many interpretationsofVygotsky
have not attempted to position him within a Marxist framework. Even when this
attemptismade,thedialecticoftenservesastheultimatepositioning ofVygotsky’s
thoughts (togetherwith otherconceptssuch as“cell”);however, therewasanother,
higher levelwithin which Vygotsky placed his overall theoretical framework,which
was'Spinozian monism. For example:
Monism was'one of the central assumptions of the truly scientific ...Marxist
methodology;mindandbodyconstituteasinglerealityinthefunctioninghumanbeing;
therefore asinglesciencemustultimatelydescribeandexplaintheunity.9
In otherwords,Vygotsky truly transcended the conceptofdualism while accepting
it as a necessary point of departure for dialectical change. Readers are now en-
couraged to view Vygotskian thought as an attempt at synthesis, outside of
Cartesian polarity. It iswith thisdoublevision that thereader is asked toview this
collection ofworks from twoperspectivessimultaneously:thedialecticwithin amo-
nistic framework. Vygotsky used variables such asstructure,function, organization,
etc.,asinstrumentsof dialecticalanalysis;however, dichotomieswereplaced within
a unified whole. In otherwords:oneofthehighest realmsof Vygotskianpsychology-
philosophyisnotlocatedwith thepolaritiesofCartesiandualism,but within Spinozian
philosophy, which isultimatelymonistic. Within this perspective, the concept of de-
terminism needs to be redefined. For example:
SinceSpinozawas an eminent deterrninist, it followed from Vygotsky’s presentation
that a new form of determinismwas generated in the philosophy of Spinoza-asa
methodological base of a new psychological theory free of the blrthmarks of the
Cartesian method of thinking. According to Vygotsky, this theory has as itssubject
man asan integral andactivepsychOphysieal being,strivingtowardself-development,
motivatedonlybybodily-spiritual needs.itskeycategoryistheconceptofmotivation
(Yaroshevsky,thisvolume,p.264).
Vygotsky did not remain at the level of opposing dualities, such as conscious vs.
unconscious, relativism vs. determinism, continuum vs. transitional break, etc.
Higherground istakenbyVygotskyinthisvolume(andinallofVygotsky’sworks),
which liftshispsychology-philosophybeyond manycontemporaryscientifictheories
of today.
Vygotsky’s thoughts are situated withina Russian context and should not be
directlycomparedwith the Cartesian understanding oflife.Thereisanoverallcon-
tinuity of Vygotsky’s works from the very beginning, emerging in aesthetics, art,
5A.A.Leontyev(1992,p.42).“If‘superficlalpsychology’(forexample,behaviorism)passesappearance
offasessence,andif‘depthpsychologyderivespsychinexistencefromthesphereoftheunconscious'
andthe‘unconsclousitselfdoesnot develop,‘that is,ifdepthpsychology isInprincipleantisocialand
antlhistorical,then onl our‘helghtpsychology' isatrulyscientific,social,andhistoricalpsychology."
‘A.Asmolov (1993.p. 1).
7A.Leontiev(1996,p.9):“Vygotskyisthecreatorofthis‘newlook’inpsychologybasedonthepriority
of personality andon the ideaof aconstant dialoguebetween man andtheworld,man andculture,
manandanotherpeople,man andhimself.”
'1.Bruner(1987,p.2).
9D.Joravsky(1939,p.264).
Prologue vii
theater, literature,semiotics,poetry, etc.Vygotsky’s untimely death prevented him
from completingone of the most important articlesexplaining his detailed under-
standingof Spinoza.At the same time, Vygotskywas not totally uncritical of Spi-
nozian philosophy related to his own psychology-philosophy. The last chapter of
thisvolume is a fittingclose to all of the Collected WorksofL. S. Vygotsky, with a
return toVygotsky’s loveof aesthetics and the theater.Thisvolume is a tribute to
the continuity of Vygotsky’s droughts and life, and to the organic and systematic
valuing he not onlywrote about,but also lived.
2.Tool and SignIn the Development of the Child
Vygotsky discussed Biihler’s attempt to compare human and anthrOpoid be-
havior, concludingthat this isnot possible (exceptat the genetic level) because of
the inclusion of speech and practical thinking. The discussion turns from the de-
velopmentofwork,connectingtools,speech,andpractical intellecttothatof signs,
childdevelopment,and symbolicactivity.Vygotskystatedclearlythat“thesymbolic
activityofthechild isnotinvented by him and isnot memorized” (p.9).Theques-
tion remains as to the sign:is it firstmediated within the lower mental functions,
or the higher mental functions?Vygotsky answers this question consistently:
Thesignarisesasaresultof acomplexprocessofdevelopment—in thefullsenseof
the word. At the beginning of the process, there is a transitional, mixed form that
combinesinitselfthenaturalandtheculturalin thebehaviorofthechild(p.9).
Therefore,sign and meaningarenot congruentat the beginning, but developwith
thetransitionofthefunctionofaword,ultimatelyturninginward,which transforms
thewhole structure.
Vygotsky’s conceptualization of word can be used in understanding the rela-
tionship between the externalized/internalized dialecticalwhole. This example also
offers insight intoVygotsky’suse of explanatorypsychology. Word for Vygotsky im-
plies a socializedcontext that never standsalone.Word forhim isa centralfeature
of consciousnesswith aninvisible,but constantcircularrelationshipbetween word—
thought—word. Word, according to A. A. Potebnya (1835-1891), is composed of
sound, inner form (which consists of image-representation), and meaning.lo Po-
tebnya’s theories contained a core element of the asymmetrical, necessary for the
dialecticalprocess. EachwordwasviewedbyPotebnya asatheorywithin asocialized
context,never standingalone.Onceagain,theexampleof Potebnya (aphilosopher
and linguist whom Vygotsky read in depth) reflects to some degree the doubling
experience that one finds throughout Vygotsky’swritings, and regarding word, it is
understood here from a Russian perspective. .
Often within linear, symmetricalmodels, development is assumed to progress
continually;however, Vygotsky is of the opinion that for development to proceed
from the social-intermentalstageto the individual-hitramental stage,the functions
of simpler lawsmust be activated first, allowing for periodic regression:
Socialformsofbehavioraremorecomplexanddevelopearlierinthechild;becoming
individual,theydroptofunctioningaccordingtosimplerlaws(p.ii).
Another way of stating this is that transition from the collective to the individual
formof behavior “initiallylowersthe levelof thewhole operation" (p.53).Speech
and symbolicsignsareused fortransformationsfromnatural lawstohighermental
103ccM. Yaroshevsky (1939. pp. 77-73); L Matejka in a.w. Bailey et a]. (1973, pp. 146-172);A.
Kozuiin (1990.pp. 19-20).
viii Prologue
functions.Allowing forasymmetry is a keyfeature of Vygotsky’s thoughts in many
...
of his works, as in the following example: “ speech and action are related to
each other and form a mobile system of functionswith an unstable [hence,asym-
metrical]typeofinterconnections”(p.23).Withspeech,behaviorcanbecontrolled,
in particularwhen theplanningfimction isused toanticipatethe future.In dividing
theplanningfunction from the reflectivefimction of speech,many psycholVoyggiosttsskoi/'f
Vygotsky’sdayviewed theseaspectsasbeingopposedtoeachother,while
affirmed that there is an internal connection between these two functions. They
actuallyconnectthelowertothehigher functionsofspeech,which helpstoexplain
their true origin, while uniting the higher mental processes located within origin,
structure, andfitnction (p.40).Once again, the paradox resurfaces, inwhich Vygot-
sky.claimsthat one must be clear that the “history of development of each of the
higher mental functions isnot the direct continuation and further improvement of
..
the corresponding elementary functions ."(p.42).Thehigher mental functions
permeate the lower mental processes, and reform all of them (p. 44). In studying
the higher mental functions, Vygotsky is of the opinion that the only path is ex-
perimentation (p. 45), which demonstrates that he does not sidewith descriptive
psychology,whileat the sametimeplacinghistheorieswithinphilosophy.Thepath
to understanding the unity of all mental functions isdevelOpment. His concept of
development is neither intellectualist (“discovery”)nor mechanistic (“habits”),both
of which serve only a subordinateposition. In the beginning stagesof child devel-
opment,both natural andculturalcomponentscanbe observed,andwith this,play
isconsidered tobe the path of development of thechild,alongwith the'growth of
sign activity.Development then proceeds fromexternal tointernalmediation,with
Vygotsky cautioning the reader that a necessary regression usually takes place, as
mentioned before:
Development, asfrequentlyhappens, moves not in acircle in thiscase,but along a
spiralreturningon ahigherplane toa point thatwaspassed (p.53).
In touching upon the topic of perception, Vygotsky rephrases his understanding
that
the lawsthat hold in psychophysiology of natural perception arenot abolishedwith
the transition to the higherformsthat interest usbut move asif tothebackground
and continuetoexist in acontracted andsubordinate formwithin the newpatterns
(P-23)-
The older functions continue to exist assubordinate units ofthe new whole. From
earlystages,speech functionsasan activepart of perception, allofwhich includes
movement.Inthebeginningofchildhood,theinitialfocusisdirectperception,with-
outmediated speech,where thechild perceives thewhole.In the article“Fromthe
Notebooks of L.S.Vygotsky” (1983),there isadiscussionofAsya (Vygotsky’sold-
est daughter)regarding perception, where Vygotsky stated that
speech dissectsperception, pushes it along the way of analysis; it doesnot seeears
plus eyes. etc., but enumerates like this. At first there is a verbal enumeration
(analytical),whichwastakenfortheatom.is.ti.ccharacterofperception Itself (fromthe
parttothewhole);nowitbecomesclear thatthisisnotthecase,thatperception
goesfromthewholetoparts.Ourproblem:WhydoesAsya,afterperceivingthewhole.
enumeratejust the partsinspeech?(p. 11).
The natural positioning of perception and movement changes when the word, or
another sign, appears in this process, with an indirect, mediated character being
assumed. The description of perception follows the same developmental line of
othertheories, fromcentripetaltocentrifugal,with an asymmetricaldialecticbeing
included, and much room left for development from the whole to the center, re-
turning to the whole.
Prologue ix
3.Emotions
InVolume 1of thisseries,Lecture4offersintroductorythoughtson emotions,
with an excellent summaryby Jerome Brunet (pp. 11-13),much of which applies
to the section in thisvolume. In the chapteron emotions,there is a long,detailed
discussion regarding the James-Lange theory,and the generalproblem of deriving
an understanding of emotions from physiological reactions. Although the James—
Lange theory freed emotionsfrom their phylogenetic roots (seeVol. 1,p. 11),the
problem of emotionswas still tied to primitiveness. W. B. Cannon (a physiologist
and student of James), “rejected the concept that there is any simple connection
between an emotion and itsphysical expression"(Vol. 1,p. 12).The fact that this
chapterwasnotcompletedbyVygotsky,with theneeded explanationregardingSpi-
nozian theory, is disappointing in many respects (see p. 261 for an explanation).
This chapter begins with a long and detailed discussion describingvarious animal
operationsinwhich Sherringtonseverednerves,sometimesthespinalcord,internal
organs, and at times, other groups of skeletal muscles in gruesome experiments,
yetthedogsstillexperiencedemotionsafterbeingoperated on.Vygotskywasquick
to point out that thefunctionalconsequences of emotions as a result of these ex-
periments were not real emotions themselves; meaning that the animals only ex-
periencedimpotentemotionsinreality,notbeingabletorespond appropriatelywith
action, such as fleeing as a result of fear.Another example of the lack of corre-
spondence of physical reactions being equivalent to emotionswas given regarding
patients with facialparalysiswho could experience an internal sense of laughter.
The problem in general is that the theory of emotions has traditionally been
positioned within ananti-historical(p. 155)understanding,without the inclusion of
theories of development (p. 158).Vygotsky strongly felt a need to overcome
Cartesian principles, with a link being made between the philosophical tenets of
Spinoza, even though vygotsky clearly believed that Spinoza did not have all of
the answers to solving future sychologicalproblems of emotions. Cartesian prin-
ciplescould not solve the pro lems of emotions/passionswithin a dualisticunder-
standing,accordingtoVygotsky,whostated:“Butpassions, thisbasicphenomenon
of thehuman soul,arethe primary manifestationsof the dualhuman nature com-
bining the spiritand thebody in onebeing"(p. 162).Instead of opposingoneside
with the other, Vygotsky stated that the duality between the lower/higher nature,
body/soul, passion/will are natural occurrences; however, it was felt that although
passions are situated within duality, they may be overcome.“ Vygotsky’s overall
framework remains consistent, offering the final blow to the theory of Descartes.
VygotskysimplytookCartesianthoughttoitslogicalconclusion,whichrunscounter
to human intuition:
Thesoulislocalizedand,thus,itismaterializedandmechanized.Movingandactivated
bythebody,thesoulmustitselfbebodily;itismadeofmaterialsubstanceregardless
of allprotestationsthat itisa thinkingsubstancecompletelydifferent from thebody
(p. 189).
...ifthesoulisInvolvedinthemechanicalcircuitofpassionsandactsasamechanical
force,itmustbesubjecttothebasiclawsof mechanics(p.170).
At the same timewhat actually arises is a parallelism ofspiritual and bodily facets
of human passions.Thesoulis then viewed asfunctioning outsideof life (p. 197).
"“He[Spinoza]believedthathumanfreedomwasnot,aswascommonlyheld,indeterminacyofchoice,
butwasself-determination,entirelybyone'sownnature,treefromexternalcompulsion.This,forhim,
wasactionproper.whiledetermination by extraneouscauseswaspassion, thesubjection towhichhe
calledbondage"(Harris, 1992,p.6).
x Prologue
Put together, Cartesian dualism leads to body/spirit, animals/humans, conscious-
ness/life (p. 198). V. F. Asmus, with whom Vygotsky agreed, stated that the
Cartesian doctrine is consistent with the church teaching of the day, namely that
the worldfrom the beginning was created in all itsperfection (p. 199)for humans.
Therefore, Cartesian philosophy13not only mathematical and mechanical, it issi-
multaneously metaphysical. Since Descartes’ understanding of emotions can be
tracedbacktoembryonicdevelopment,originatingclosetothedigestivetract,there
isthe conclusion that complexpassionsresult from the embryonicstates,with pas-
sionsbeing innate (p. 202). If one accepts this position, then there is no real ca-
pabilityfordevelopment,.withtheappearanceof emotionsbeingabletochange,but
not the emotions themselves (p.205).
In general,theJames—Langetheoryincorporated Spinoza’sthinkingwhileactually
.
beinglinked tothethoughtsofDescartes.ThenextpositionwasrepresentedbyDilthey,
whoreturned to Spinoza’sthoughtsofdefinition,precisenomenclature andclassification,
in order to focus on descriptivephilosophy-psychology. vygotsky voiced his surprise at
thefactthatthebackward,deadissuesofSpinozaweretakenupbyDilthey,asopposed
to other Spinozianfuture-oriented explanationsthatwerenaturalistic, deterministic, ma-
terialistic andcausal(p.219).TheproblemhereisthatLange'sexplanatorytheoriesand
Dilthey’sdescriptivetheoriesbothclaimthattheirideasliewithinaSpinozianframework,
whilebeingOpposedtoeachother.Intheend,Vygotskyconcludesthat“...something
.
of Spinozist teaching is contained in each of these theories that fight each other”
222); however, vygotsky goes beyond description and explanation, with what he calls
reconstruction, reestablishment, recreation ofthe whole concretenessofwhatrs experienced
which
(p.225).An overallsummaryofemotionsisgiven onp.227,paragraph 3, would
be an excellent startingpoint forunderstanding theentirechapter.
AlthoughVygotskysawtheneedforbothdescriptiveandexplanatorypsychology,
he was most disturbed by the inherent determinism (here Cartesian, not Spinozian)
withinintrospectivepsychology.ByusingSpinozianphilosophy,Vygotskywasconsistent
when he avoided the attempt at splitting the mind—spirit—soul into bodily elements,
sinceitisthepreservationofthewholethatisimportant.ForSpinoza,thedrivetoward
homeostasisdidnotrepresent equilibriumonlybutself-development(p.263),beingfu-
tureoriented.If moretimewould havebeen allowed Vygotsky,hewould havewritten
inmore detail on Spinoza,includinga criticalanalysisaswell (e.g.,perhapsregarding
the lack of inclusion ofhistoricism within Spinoziannaturalism,seep. 264
Inconclusion,Vygotskydefendedexplanatorypsychology;however,when sepa-
rating explanation from emotions, experience needs to be viewed within historical
development.Vygotsky’scausalexplanationof emotionsislabeledsociodeterminism
(p. 265) by Yaroshevsky.
4.On the Problem of the Psychology of the Actor’s CreativeWork
ThelastsectionisafittingclosetotheCollectedWorksofL.S.Vygotsky.There
is a discussion of different theories, for examMe, those of Stanislavsky'2 (whose
l2K.S.Stanislavskylivedfrom 1863to 1938.“His[Stanislavsky's]conceptofacting.whichhecalledthe
theoryof emotional experience,was essentiallyopposed to the twodominatingsystemsof theatrical
performance of thetime: the crafttheoryandtheperformance theory.Neither systemneeded active
humancommunicationandthereforedidnotstudyit.Theadherentsofthecrafttheoryreducedevery
roletomerereproduction ofcertainclichesestablishedin theatricalpracticebygenerationsofactors
and completelyruled out thevery idea of meaningful communication between actorson stage.Nor
didtheperformancetheory(D.Diderot,V.Meyerhold,andothers)makeaconnectionbetweenpartner
communication andactingstandards..."(Berkhin, 1988,p.7).