The Cicero Spy Affair: German Access to British Secrets in World War II (Perspectives on Intelligence History)

281 Pages·1999·1.17 MB·English

by  Richard Wires

The Cicero Spy Affair

THE CICERO SPY AFFAIR
German Access to British Secrets
in World War II
RICHARD WIRES
Perspectiveson IntelligenceHistory
DavidKahn,SeriesEditor
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Wires,Richard,1930–
TheCicerospyaffair : GermanaccesstoBritishsecretsinWorld
WarII / RichardWires.
p. cm.—(Perspectivesonintelligencehistory,ISSN1525–9544)
Includesfilmography.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0–275–96456–6(alk.paper)
1. Bazna,Elyesa,1904–1970. 2. WorldWar,1939–1945—Secret
service—Germany. 3. Espionage,German—GreatBritain. 4. Spies—
Germany. I. Title. II. Series.
D810.S8B399 1999
940.54'8743—dc21 98–50249
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable.
Copyright(cid:1)1999byRichardWires
Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe
reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe
expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher.
LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:98–50249
ISBN:0–275–96456–6
ISSN:1525–9544
Firstpublishedin1999
PraegerPublishers,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881
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CopyrightAcknowledgments
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usedwithpermissionoftheImperialWarMuseum.ThejacketphotoofAdolfHitleris
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For
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Contents
Preface ix
1. The‘‘Notorious’’Case 1
2. TurkeyandthePowers 13
3. TheVolunteerSpy 29
4. SellingtheSecrets 43
5. Germany’sIntelligenceLabyrinth 57
6. QuestionsandDoubtsinBerlin 69
7. OperationBernhard 85
8. Cicero’sOutstandingPeriod 97
9. TheContestforTurkey 113
10. SearchingforanAgent 129
11. Cicero’sLastAchievements 143
12. AnAmericanSpy 159
13. De´nouementandAftermath 173
viii Contents
14. TheAffairinRetrospect 187
Notes 205
Filmography 243
SelectedBibliography 247
Index 259
Aphotoessayfollowspage142.
Preface
Intheextensiveliteratureaboutespionageaffairsandintelligenceac-
tivities during World War II the episode known as Operation‘‘Cicero’’
has gained prominence and popularity, because of its remarkable
characterandironies.Formorethanfourmonthsduringthewinterof
1943–1944thevaletofBritain’sambassadorinneutralTurkeyphoto-
graphedsecret papers that his employer failed to safeguard properly;
bysellinghisundevelopedfilmstoarepresentativeofGermanintelli-
genceinAnkaraforareportedtotalof$1.2milliontheservantbecame
history’sthenmosthighlypaidspy.Theaccesstooneofitsopponents’
most important embassies marked Germany’s outstanding achieve-
ment in an otherwise poor record of secret service work. But little
came of the success. Manyof the documentswereextremelyvaluable,
but the dictatorship never used the information effectively; theenter-
prising spy escaped being caught but soon discovered that his money
was mostly counterfeit. References to the affair have become a staple
of intelligence lore, usuallywith emphasis onthe mostsensationalel-
ements and often with little regard for the actual facts, but there has
not yet been a full and objective account of the episode. A careful and
comprehensive analysis of the available evidence and troublesome
issues is needed, not only to identify and counteract the distortions
and misconceptions so commonly found but also to examine the ex-
traordinary events and conflicting views within their larger histori-
cal context.
My interest in the affair began with the first published accounts of
boththeespionageandcounterfeitingoperations,anditcontinuedover
the years because of reminders through travels and other contacts.
While staying with friends one summer in rural Austria I visited the
nearby caves at Redl-Zipf,wheretheforgeryteamhadbeenhurriedly
x Preface
moved. On later occasions I often toured the lake and river region,
where crates of bogus notes were abandoned in the war’s final weeks.
DuringearlyvisitstoTurkeyIstayedatthenow-replacedParkHotel
inIstanbul,wheresomanyforeignersinWorldWarIIcarriedontheir
intrigues.IsawtootheC¸elikPalaceHotelinBursa,whichthespyhad
been expanding when word came from the Bank of England that his
British banknotes were forged. When the former ‘‘Cicero’’ belatedly
published his own account of the espionage, stressing how a young
Germansecretary’sdefectiontotheAllieshadthreatenedhissafety,I
discoveredthatsheandIsharedaClevelandbackgroundandties.Also,
duringanintelligenceassignmentinMunich,wherethefrustratedex-
spylaterdied,IacquiredaprofessionalappreciationoftheCicerocase’s
many oddities and ironies. Then the controversy over the affair that
erupted in Britain in the 1970s revealed the lack of consensus about
what had happened. Only later did I consider preparing a detailed
study of the episode, still surprised that no one else had yet taken on
the task, but learning too that a degree of obscurity best suited many
people.
The activities and operations of spies and intelligence agencies are
understandably shielded in official secrecy, necessary for security but
alsoreadilyinvokedforlesscommendablereasons—thehabitcreating
amystiquethatconcealsfailuresandencouragesconjectureandrumor.
Such factors are present here. The sources available for inquiry into
the Cicero affair are substantial, despite the many gaps. Some docu-
ments, like reports of the intelligence service that ran the operation,
have disappeared; other records, such as items covering the investi-
gations of a security leak, remain closed. But sizable bodies of diplo-
maticmessagesexchangedbetweentheBritishandGermanembassies
andtheirrespectivecapitalsprovideahelpfulsubstitute.Inparticular
they permit an understanding of the powers’ opposing policies and of
the difficulties that each side experienced. There are useful memoir
accounts by the three Germans most directly involved in buying and
analyzing the spy’s films. Although each writer had self-serving mo-
tives for publishing his book, and all distorted the facts to suit their
separate intentions and views, the different perspectivesandinsights
tend to complement one another. For his part the spy too belatedly
recorded his experiences; his recollections are untrustworthy, though
theyarethesoletestimonytouchinguponcertainactivities.Especially
when he discusses his thoughts and self-image, and also when others
dothesame,theirexactwordsrevealmuchabouttheindividuals.Com-
ments by the victims of the spying have been meager. Given the cir-
cumstances and embarrassmentof the affair, fewBritishparticipants
havemadepublicstatementshelpfulinreconstructingit.
Since the complete story of the espionage case involves more than