THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self ...

431 Pages·2009·2.24 MB·English

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self-Knowledge

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the

School of Philosophy

Of The Catholic University of America

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

©

Copyright

All Rights Reserved

By

Therese Scarpelli Cory

Washington, D.C.

2009
Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Self-Knowledge

Therese Scarpelli Cory, Ph.D.

Director: John F. Wippel, Ph.D.

This dissertation presents a comprehensive analysis of Thomas Aquinas’s theory of
self-knowledge, examining each of the four kinds of self-knowledge he identifies: (1) actual
perception of one’s existence (actual self-awareness); (2) habitual self-awareness; (3)
apprehension of the soul’s nature; and (4) the judgment of this apprehension in light of
divine truth. Broadly speaking, it contends that Thomas is attentive to experienced
phenomena and provides precise and thoughtful analyses of phenomena such as bodily
consciousness, implicit and explicit awareness of oneself as subject, unified perception of
the self as a single subject, and scientific knowledge of the soul’s nature. Moreover, his
explanation of self-knowledge is consistent with the principles of his general theory of
knowledge, while it also takes into account the unique characteristics of an act of knowledge
wherein the knower is the known, and integrates both Augustinian and Aristotelian
principles. Thus Thomas’s comments on self-knowledge constitute a carefully nuanced
doctrine with significant implications for both his theory of knowledge and his explanation
of human subjectivity.
The first chapter examines the doctrine of two of his main sources, Augustine and
Aristotle, while placing special emphasis on the way that difficulties of interpretation of
texts in both these thinkers helped shape Thomas’s own conception of self-knowledge. It
then reviews chronologically his major texts on self-knowledge, while examining them for
possible doctrinal developments and highlighting significant systematic problems for
consideration in the thematic discussions of the following chapters.
The second chapter analyzes in detail the first type of self-knowledge—the soul’s
awareness of its individual existing self, focuses on the problem of its content and the mode
in which it is achieved, and argues that according to at least one definition of “intuition,”
Thomas is defending a theory of intuitive self-awareness.
The third chapter investigates the second type of self-knowledge—the soul’s habitual
self-awareness through its own presence to itself—and argues for the existence of a
Thomistic account of implicit actual self-awareness.
The fourth chapter examines the third and fourth kinds of self-knowledge and
reviews F.-X. Putallaz’s argument that reditio completa constitutes a fifth type of self-
knowledge.
Lastly, the fifth chapter studies the implications of Thomas’s theory of self-
knowledge for his view of human nature. It returns to the commentaries on the De anima
and Liber de causis to argue that habitual self-knowledge is essential to immaterial being,
and that Thomas’s discussion of habitual and actual implicit self-knowledge constitutes a
psychological approach to the nature of human personhood which complements his much
better-known metaphysical definition of personhood.
This dissertation by Therese Scarpelli Cory fulfills the dissertation requirement for the
doctoral degree in philosophy approved by John F. Wippel, Ph.D., as Director, and by Kevin
White, Ph.D., and Gregory Doolan, Ph.D., as Readers.

____________________________________
John F. Wippel, Ph.D., Director

____________________________________
Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader

____________________________________
Gregory Doolan, Ph.D., Reader
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To David
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ἐδιζησάµην ἐµεωυτόν
—Heraclitus, fr. 101

. . . nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum.
Ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum angustus est:
ut ubi sit quod sui non capit?
Numquid extra ipsum ac non in ipso?
Quomodo ergo non capit?
Multa mihi super hoc oboritur admiratio, stupor apprehendit.
Et eunt homines mirari alta montium,
et ingentes fluctus maris,
et latissimos lapsus fluminum,
et Oceani ambitum,
et gyros siderum,
et relinquunt se ipsos . . .
—St. Augustine, Confessiones
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CONTENTS
Abbreviations..............................................................................................................................ix

Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................xi

Introduction

A. Why Study Aquinas’s Theory of Self-Knowledge?..................................................................1

B. Status quaestionis and Structure of the Present Work...............................................................3

C. Thomas’s General Theory of Knowledge.................................................................................9
1. Knowledge of Material Objects...................................................................................9
2. Knowledge of Immaterial Substances........................................................................17

D. Procedural Observations.........................................................................................................22

Chapter I: Historical and Textual Sources for Thomas’s Theory of Self-Knowledge

Introduction..................................................................................................................................25

A. Historical Sources for Thomas’s Doctrine..............................................................................25
1. Augustine..................................................................................................................25
2. Aristotle....................................................................................................................37

B. The Texts.................................................................................................................................45
1. A Preliminary Set of Distinctions: Thomas’s Commentary on the Sentences.........47
a. An early division of self-knowledge
b. Towards the standard Thomistic division of self-knowledge
2. A Fourfold Doctrine of Self-Knowledge: De veritate, q. 10, a. 8............................56
3. Knowing the Soul Through Itself: Summa contra gentiles, bk. 3, ch. 46.................61
4. Knowing the Soul Through its Act: Summa theologiae Ia, q. 87, a. 1.....................66
5. Knowing Oneself as Other Things: In De anima, bk. III.........................................71
6. Returning to One’s Essence: Super Librum de causis, propositions 7 and 15.........77
7. Analysis of Historical Development in the Texts......................................................86
a. The basis for self-knowledge in human nature
b. Classification of phenomena
c. Problem group #1: mechanisms of self-knowledge
d. Problem group #2: self-familiarity and permanent self-knowledge

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Chapter II: Actual Self-Awareness: Perceiving That I Exist

Introduction..................................................................................................................................98

A. The Content of Self-Awareness..............................................................................................99
1. Indistinct Knowledge and the Twofold Operation of the Intellect.........................100
a. The problem and a path to its solution
b. A theory of indistinct knowledge
c. Indistinct knowledge and the knowledge of essence and existence
2. Making Sense of Self-Awareness...........................................................................120

B. On Intuitive Cognition...........................................................................................................126
1. General Definition of Intuition...............................................................................126
2. Intuitive Perception of the Soul..............................................................................130

C. The Mode of Self-Awareness................................................................................................134
1. The Nature of the Act.............................................................................................134
a. Intellectual vision
b. Perception, intuition, experience: non-discursive intellection of ones
c. The non-discursivity of self-awareness
2. The Genesis of the Act...........................................................................................150
a. Directness: the pre-discursivity of self-awareness
b. The immediacy of self-awareness
c. The presence of the soul to itself in an act of self-awareness

D. Concluding Comments..........................................................................................................171

Chapter III: Habitual Self-Awareness: The Meaning of Selfhood

Introduction................................................................................................................................175

A. The Presence of Habits..........................................................................................................180
1. An Exploration of Presence....................................................................................180
2. Intellectual Habits as a Kind of Presence...............................................................184
a. Thomas’s doctrine on habits
b. Intellectual memory

B. Habitual Self-Awareness as Ontological Identity.................................................................198
1. Why Habitual Self-Awareness is Habitual.............................................................198
a. A perfective disposition
b. The problem of exercise
2. Why Habitual Self-Awareness is not a Habit ........................................................213
3. The Question of Doctrinal Evolution.....................................................................218
a. Evidence for continuity
b. The fate of habitual self-awareness in Thomas

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C. The Intentionality of Self-Awareness...................................................................................226
1. What is Implicit Self-Awareness?..........................................................................228
2. Thomas’s Account of Implicit Self-Awareness......................................................229
a. Awareness by the common sense or habitual self-awareness?
b. Implicit self-awareness as an actual self-awareness
c. Implicit self-awareness as key to other textual problems
3. Attention Problems: The Relation of Implicit and Explicit Self-Awareness..........248
4. Thomas’s Appropriation of Augustine’s “se nosse”..............................................255

D. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................257

Chapter IV: Discovering the Nature of the Soul

Introduction................................................................................................................................261

A. Knowing What I Am............................................................................................................263
1. The Origin and Goal of Quidditative Self-Knowledge...........................................263
2. The Process of Discovery.......................................................................................269
3. Species or Concepts................................................................................................276
4. Summary.................................................................................................................285

B. Judging the Soul in the Light of Divine Truth......................................................................287
1. Judgment of esse in re in the Light of Divine Truth...............................................289
a. Verification of a form apprehended through sensation
b. Judgment as logical verification of a reasoned conclusion
2. Judging vs. Apprehending the Soul’s Nature.........................................................302
a. Judgment of the soul’s nature
b. Development of doctrine in the judgment of the self

C. Judgment and the reditio completa.......................................................................................312
1. Putallaz on Reflexion in the Strict Sense................................................................313
2. Difficulties with Putallaz’s Interpretation of Reflexion.........................................317

Chapter V: Self-Knowledge and Human Personhood

Introduction................................................................................................................................327

A. How Thomas Defines the Human Person............................................................................328
B. Self-Knowledge as Essential to the Metaphysical Definition of Personhood.....................336
1. Reditio completa and Self-Subsistence...................................................................336
2. Intellectuality and Self-Knowledge........................................................................354
C. Self-Knowledge as Thomas’s Psychological View of Personhood.....................................358
1. Selfhood and the “I”...............................................................................................359
2. The First-Person Problem.......................................................................................363
3. Unity of Consciousness..........................................................................................367
D. Self-Knowledge and Embodied Personhood.......................................................................378

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Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................388

Bibliography..........................................................................................................................................403
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