THE CASE OF IRAN, 1953-1979 Amin Saikal A thesis submitted for the D

400 Pages·2016·53.74 MB·English

THE EMERGENCE OF A STATE FROM DEPENDENCE TO REGIONAL
POWER: THE CASE OF IRAN, 1953-1979
Amin Saikal
A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science, School of General
Studies, Australian National University.
July 1979.
STATEMENT
I hereby declare that this thesis has not already been
accepted in substance for any degree, and is the result
of my own independent research.
Amin Saikal
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE i
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION: 1
CHAPTER II - IRAN AND TRADITIONAL WORLD POWERS RIVALRY: 8
Early Rivalry g
Rule of Reza Shah 21
Iran in World War II 28
Mossadeq and 'Oil Nationalisation' 45
CHAPTER III - IRAN'S DEPENDENCE: 1953-1963: 59
The Oil Industry 52
American Economic Aid 57
American Military Aid 70
Iranian-Western Alliance 73
Iran's Dependence and Domestic Politics 78
Iran's Dependence and Regional Position 87
CHAPTER IV - 'THE WHITE REVOLUTION': 95
The Nature of the White Revolution 109
The Political Consequences of the White Revolution 115
'National Independent Foreign Policy' 128
The Changing Foreign Policy Position 131
Page
CHAPTER V ~ THE EMERGENCE OF IRAN AS AN 'OIL POWER': 135
The Oil Policy of 'Positive Equilibrium': 1953-1960 135
The Oil Policy of 'more production more revenue': 141
1960-1970
The Oil Policy of 'price rise, price and production 153
control': 1970-1975
PART II
INTRODUCTION 187
CHAPTER VI - THE SHAH'S VISION: 191
CHAPTER VII ~ RESOURCES CAPABILITY: 208
Economic Programme and Objectives 210
Military Capability 219
CHAPTER VIII - PATTERN OF REGIONAL BEHAVIOUR: 230
"Regional Co-operation" 231
Iran-Arab Relationship 234
Iran-Eastern Zone 246
"Anti-Subversion" 254
CHAPTER IX - REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SHAH'S POLICIES: 264
CHAPTER X - CONCLUSION: 295
Notes 306
Bibliography 365
Maps
i
PREFACE
This thesis examines the rule of Mohammed RezaShah Pahlavi of Iran
(1953-1979) in the context of his regime's 'dependence' on the United
States in the 1950s for its survival, and his attempts, in the 1970s, to
transform Iran into a major pro-Western regional power with aspirations
to eventual world power status. In this, it critically reviews both
the domestic and foreign policy objectives and behaviour of the Shah.
It basically argues that despite all his achievements, the Shah's goals
and policies were full of inherent contradictions and weaknesses. They
were not responsive to the needs of Iran and failed to achieve even
their own objectives. In fact, they unleashed the very trends and
developments which ultimately led the Iranian people to launch the 1978
mass movements against the Shah's rule, forcing him from the throne on
the grounds that he was the 'enemy' of Iran and 'puppet' of the United
States.
In completing this research I owe much to many institutions and
individuals. I wish to thank the Colombo Plan authorities, the
Australian Government and the Australian National University (ANU) for
their financial support and sponsorship of a field trip which took me to
Iran, Britain, and the United States in 1976. Among individuals I am
very much indebted to Professor JIL. Richardson of ANU and my super-
visors, Dr J.A.A. Stockwin and Mr Geoffrey Jukes for their valuable
advice, encouragement and guidance, and their help with many administra­
tive problems at all stages of my research. I would also like to
express my gratitude to Dr Gordon White, who provided me with the very
ii
helpful supervision in the early stages of ray research, and Geoff
Chandler of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau, who played an
important role in ensuring the continuity of my Colombo Plan award and
organising my field trip . Among numerous friends, I would like to thank
Mara Moustafine for her encouragement and advice, and especially Amanda
Thornton - for her tremendous intellectual and moral support throughout
the research period. I should also like to thank Dr Paul Keal and John
Atkin for reading parts of the draft of the thesis.
In Tehran, I wish to thank many individuals for their informative
discussions and encouragement. They included the former Prime M inister
Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the former Education M inister Manuchehr Ganji, and
the former Information and Tourism M inister Daryush Hymoyoon, as well as
several senior officials and intellectuals, most of all, Dr Farhad
Mehran, Dr Majid Tehranian, Dr Harmoz Hekmat, Dr Mansur Farsad, Mahmoud
Faroughi, Amir Taheri, Cyrus Elahi, Reza Sheikh-ul-Islam i, Dr Ali Nik-
Kha, Amir Ansawri and Hassan Arfa, not to mention several members of the
opposition who refrained from giving me th eir real names for reasons of
p o litical expediency. Moreover, I would like to thank Richard Bash of
the American Embassy and Christine White of the Australian Embassy for
facilitatin g my research in Iran.
In B ritain, I am grateful to Peter Avery and Malcolm Macintosh, who
both enriched me .with their knowledge of Iranian politics and furthered
my enthsiasm about the project. I also wish to thank Lewis Turner for
his conversation and Janet Calver of A ustralia House for facilitatin g my
stay in London.
iii
In the United States, I owe much to Professor Marvin Zonis, who
spent hours with me in helping me to shape what is now the topic of
this thesis. I also wish to thank several other officials and scholars
for their encouragement and help, including the B ritish Ambassador Sir
Peter Ramsbotham, Alvin C ottrell, Bruce Van Voorst, Robert Haupt, '>
William G riffith, Lincoln Bloomfield, Geoffrj/ Kemp, Richard Gottam,
Rohullah Ramazani, Leonard Binder, Colonel B ill Thomas, Lloyd Henderson,
George Green, Sepehr Zabih, George Lenczowski and Richard Frye.
Moreover, two people who actively facilitated my stay were Margaret
Gray and Jonathan Thwaites of the Australian Embassy. I am also grate­
ful to the Washington Post and Hoover Institute for letting me use their
respective lib ra rie s. All interpretations (except where otherwise
indicated) and any errors of fact are entirely my responsibility.
1.
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Until the beginning of 1978, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran was
generally regarded as one of the world's most powerful and richest
rulers. He ruled his strategically and economically important Islamic
kingdom with absolute authority and spent its enormous oil income as
he saw fit. His publicly avowed goal was to transform Iran into a
'progressive' pro-Western self-sustaining industrial and military power
before its exportable oil ran out, as the Shah estimated it would, by
the end of the century. In order to achieve his ;goal, he pursued a
forceful policy of domestic political repression, and worked hard to
maximise Iran's economic and military capabilities on the basis of its
growing oil wealth, particularly from the early 1970s. In this, he
was extensively supported by his major Western allies, led by the
United States, which found him a most reliable ally to look after
Western interests in the Iranian region. The Shah was personally
convinced of the strength and popularity of his leadership. He
believed that he was rightly leading a majority of his 33 million
subjects (of several ethno-linguistic-tribal origins) to achieve one
of the highest standards of living in the world, with maximum peace
and security, within the shortest space of time possible; and he
believed that over 99 percent of Iranians, who had placed his commanding
portrait wherever they lived and worked, were behind him in this task.
During 1978, however, the strong Shah was suddenly beset by nation­
wide mass riots, demonstrations and strikes against his rule, which
progressively undermined his authority at considerable human and material
cost. By the beginning of 1979, amid increasing bloodshed, paralysis of
2.
the state machinery and of the economy, and the imminent lack of solid
support from his armed forces, the Shah's power declined precipitately.
He could no longer command any substantial support from either his
people or his leading ally, the United States, which found it
inexpedient to back him any more. After 25 years of absolute rule,
the Shah had no choice but to leave Iran on 17 January for a 'temporary'
stay abroad — a departure which has probably resulted in his permanent
exile. This paved the way for his chief religious-political opponent,
Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini, the strongest leader of the Iranians'
anti-Shah 'revolution', to return to Iran after 14 years of exile at
the hands of the Shah, and proclaim the country an 'Islamic Republic'.
Khomeini has not yet detailed what precisely w ill be the structure
of his 'Islamic Republic' and how it w ill function in Iran — a country
which went through an intense stage of capitalist oriented socio-economic
growth during the Shah's rule. From the little that is known, however,
the 'Islam ic Republic' (according to Khomeini) w ill be essentially
guided and governed by the Qur'anic codes, as ordained by Allah and
practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and his Companions. Most important
among these is Ali, favoured as the foremost successor of Mohammed by
the S hi'ite sect of Islam, which is dominant in Iran. Khomeini
considers this to be the correct way to free Iran from what he sees
as the tyrannical, immoral and corrupt aspects of the Shah's rule;
to conserve Iranian oil wealth only for the well-being of the Iranian
people (as against the Shah's desire to serve foreign interests and
turn Iran into a regional gendarme); and to guide all Iranians,
irrespective of their social and political leanings, to live in peace
prosperity and unity against domestic 'evils' (anything repugnant to
Islam) and foreign interference, and to live according to their own
3.
means and needs.
Thus Khomeini has undertaken to end not only the 2500 year old
Persian monarchy and therefore the Shah's dynastic claim over it, but
also most of the Shah's policies, particularly those underlining the
pro-Western transformation of Iran into a primarily regional power.
These events have been dramatic and world-shattering in many ways.
They have caught by surprise even most of those said to be best informed,
including the CIA, for very few could foresee such a rapid collapse of
the Shah's apparently well entrenched and powerful administrative,
security and military apparatus. This has caused mounting debate and
discussion around the world, especially in Western academic circles.
The basic question confronting everyone, however, is: why and how did
the whole development come about?
Clearly this question could be approached from several points of
view. Two approaches, however, may be mentioned here. One would be
simply to apply particular conceptual frameworks which have been worked
out by Western scholars on the basis of case studies and which
essentially reflect Western experience. The other is to refrain from
applying these frameworks as such, but nevertheless to seek help from
them on those occasions where for analytical purposes they seem appropriate
The first of these approaches is likely to be more misleading than
helpful in exploring and evaluating the complexity of Iranian politics.
As Bernard Lewis succinctly writes:
It is no doubt tempting to try to explain Middle Eastern phenomena
in terms of European, or North and South American experience ...
But on the whole such comparisons — perhaps analogies would be a
better-word -- obscure more than they explain. No doubt Middle
Eastern societies and politics are subjected to the same human