The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy

543 Pages·2021·4.73 MB·English

by  Andrew Lambert

THE BRITISH WAY OF WAR
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THE BRITISH
WAY OF WAR
J C
ULIAN ORBETT
and the
B
ATTLE FOR A
N S
ATIONAL TRATEGY
ANDREW LAMBERT
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
NEW HAVEN AND LONDON
iii
Copyright © 2021 Andrew Lambert
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2021944149
e-ISBN 978-0-300-25073-2
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
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For Zohra, always and forever
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CONTENTS
Introduction 1
1 Victorian Empire 14
2 Making Waves 38
3 Finding an Audience 51
4 Politics and Policy 68
5 England in the Mediterranean 87
6 The Naval War Course 99
7 Strategy, Culture and History 123
8 Shaping the ‘British Way’ 145
9 ‘Radiant with the Genius of a Maritime State’: 169
England in the Seven Years’ War
10 Policy, Strategy and International Law 188
11 Imperial Pageantry: Quebec 1908 213
12 Tactics, Signals and Trafalgar 226
13 Maritime Strategy in a Total War 244
14 Teaching National Strategy 262
15 ‘Doctrine – The Soul of Warfare’ 283
16 The ‘British Way’ at War: Big Ideas and Baltic Plans 307
17 Propaganda, Peace and the Liberal Empire 337
18 Naval Operations: A Study in Disarticulated Strategy 359
19 Explaining the Unpalatable Truth: Gallipoli and Jutland 383
20 Carrying On 411
Conclusion 432
Notes 440
Bibliography 501
Acknowledgements 515
Index 518
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Introduction
On 31 May 1920 two of the most original minds ever applied to the devel-
opment of national strategy met over dinner in a spacious Knightsbridge
apartment. The apartment belonged to Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922), offi-
cial historian of British grand strategy in the First World War, and creator of
national strategic doctrine.1 His guests brought the war in the Middle East
to his dinner table, one of them making a profound impression upon him,
as he recorded in his diary:
Hedjaz Lawrence & Ernest Richmond2 to dinner. Very interesting talk
on his experiences & on art of war generally, on which his views are
original, & much in accord with mine. Spoke highly of Wemyss &
Allenby, but of very few others. His horror of waste of life soldiers’
strategy involves needlessly. Very learned on medieval castles, esp. those
in Syria on which we had much fraternising talk. Also of abortive
Alexandretta project, which he regretted & and vainly urged.3
It is significant that Corbett did not slip into the populist ‘Lawrence of Arabia’,
preferring the more specific regional connection. Ernest Richmond was the
third son of Corbett’s best friend, artist Sir William Richmond, and brother
of Admiral Sir Herbert, who projected an amphibious offensive in the Gulf
of Alexandretta that would have been far more effective in securing British
interests than the disastrous Gallipoli operation.4
Corbett’s epigrammatic note reflected a conversation that took place at
two distinct levels. When Lawrence and he discussed wartime operations
and strategy the two men were on common ground. As naval commander-
in-chief in the Red Sea, Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss and his squadron
had been the base from which Lawrence’s campaign had operated, supplying
arms, money, fire support and hot baths, all of which Lawrence greatly
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