The Bomber Who Calls Ahead

236 Pages·2015·2.1 MB·English

TheBomberWhoCallsAhead: Terrorism,Insurgency,andthePoliticsofPre-AttackWarnings
JosephM.Brown
Submittedinpartialfulfillmentofthe
requirementsforthedegreeof
DoctorofPhilosophy
intheGraduateSchoolofArtsandSciences
COLUMBIAUNIVERSITY
2015
(cid:13)c 2015
JosephM.Brown
Allrightsreserved
Abstract
TheBomberWhoCallsAhead: Terrorism,Insurgency,andthePoliticsofPre-AttackWarnings
JosephM.Brown
Terroristandinsurgentgroupssometimesgivepre-attackwarnings,informinggovernmentsofthe
time and place of attacks before they occur. This dissertation explains why militant groups give
these warnings. It also explains why governments believe these warnings and respond to them,
mobilizingemergencyresourcesandcarryingouteconomicallydisruptiveevacuations. Basedon
interviewsandotherhistoricalresearchontheIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA),EuskadiTaAskatasuna
(ETA), the Tamil Tigers, Shining Path, and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), this
dissertation argues that pre-attack warnings serve a casualty-limiting function. Militant groups
give warnings when civilian casualties are politically costly for the group. Civilian casualties are
especiallycostlyforgroupsthatdependonlocalpopulationsforshelter,fundingandothercritical
resources. These conclusions are confirmed by logit analyses of a new database of more than
3,000 bombing events. A game theoretic signaling model also predicts when governments will
believe and respond to warnings. Governments respond to warnings when militants are known
towarnonlywhenattackingandthefrequencyofprankwarningsislow. Themodel’spredictions
are confirmed by interviews of police in Northern Ireland and Spain. A novel finding is that a
highfrequencyofpranks(falsewarningsemanatingfromindividualsoutsidethemilitantgroup)
mayforcemilitantstowarntruthfully. Militantsmayalsoworkwithgovernmentstocreateclear
channels for communication, using third party intermediaries, codes, and redundant messages
to set militants’ warnings apart from the “noise” of pranks. This finding substantiates a game
theoreticpredictionthatexperimentalmethodshavesofarfailedtovalidate: thatincreasednoise
mayinduceseparatingequilibria,increasingratherthandecreasingtheinformationinasignal.
Contents
ListofFigures ii
ListofTables iii
Introduction 1
1 ScopeandRelationtoExistingLiterature 10
2 TheoryandResearchDesign 24
3 Pre-AttackWarningsbytheProvisionalIRA 32
4 TestsonPairedCaseStudies 52
5 QuantitativeAnalysis 78
6 Warnings,PhoneChains,andTrust 120
7 ExtensionstoStateBehavior 163
8 Conclusion 183
References 216
i
List of Figures
1 ProbabilityofWarning: Non-Maximalist,Non-Religious,Non-SuicideAttacker . . . 104
2 ProbabilityofWarning: Maximalist,Religious,Non-SuicideAttacker . . . . . . . . . 104
3 ProbabilityofWarning: Non-Maximalist,Religious,SuicideAttacker . . . . . . . . . 105
4 ProbabilityofWarning: Maximalist,Religious,SuicideAttacker . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5 ProbabilityofWarning: Maximalist,Non-Religious,Non-SuicideAttacker . . . . . . 106
6 ProbabilityofWarning: CivilSocietyTarget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7 ProbabilityofWarning: InfrastructureTarget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
8 ProbabilityofWarning: GovernmentTarget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9 ProbabilityofWarning: BusinessTarget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
10 ProbabilityofWarning: PrivateCitizensTarget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11 ProbabilityofWarning: Maximalist,Religious,Non-SuicideAttackerandMaximal-
ist,Religious,SuicideAttacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
12 ProbabilityofWarning: Non-Maximalist,Religious,Non-SuicideAttacker(PTS=4)
andMaximalist,Religious,SuicideAttacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
13 ProbabilityofWarning: Non-Maximalist,Religious,Non-SuicideAttacker(PTS=3)
andMaximalist,Religious,SuicideAttacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
14 AttackingMilitant’sSignalWhenGovernmentMobilizesSelectively . . . . . . . . . 131
15 GovernmentResponsetoWarningsWhenMilitantsSignalTruthfully . . . . . . . . . 135
16 GovernmentResponsetoWarningsWhenMilitantsPoolOnWarning . . . . . . . . 136
17 Effect of Maximalism: Europe vs. Non-Europe Cases (PTS=2, Autonomy=0, Reli-
gion/Islam=0,Suicide=0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
18 ProbabilityofWarning: Maximalist,Religious,SuicideAttackerandNon-Maximalist,
Religious,Non-SuicideAttacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
ii
List of Tables
1 LogitResults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2 PearsonCorrelationMatrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3 VariableMeans,EuropeandNon-Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4 LogitResults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5 MarginalEffects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
6 LogitResultswithDummyVariablesTerrStrongandStatespond . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7 CodingsofMilitantGroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
8 CodingsofMilitantGroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
iii
Acknowledgements
I owe many thanks to many people who supported me through the long process of writing this
dissertation. I can name most of them, but some must remain anonymous for their own reasons.
OfthoseIcanname,Ithankmyadvisors,RobertJervisandPageFortna,aswellasmydissertation
defenseandproposalcommitteemembers: SeverineAutesserre,StuartGottlieb,AustinLong,and
Robert Shapiro. I thank Johannes Urpelainen and Macartan Humphreys for their advice regard-
ingmyformalmodel. IalsothanktheDepartmentofPoliticalScienceatColumbiaUniversityfor
beingmybaseandinstitutionalsupportfrom2009to2015.
For their generous financial support, I thank the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy and the
Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4) at the Earth Institute at
Columbia University. I also thank Professor Christopher Coker and the Department of Interna-
tionalRelationsattheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScienceforhostingmeasaguest
researcherduringmyfieldworkinIrelandandGreatBritain.
I thank the Coiste na nIarichimí Republican ex-prisoners support group for making former IRA
prisoners available for interviews. I also thank the Falls Road office of Sinn Féin, the North-
ernIrelandRetiredPoliceOfficersAssociation(NIRPOA),thePoliceServiceofNorthernIreland,
the Northern Ireland Policing Board, the Samaritans organization, the Department of Justice of
NorthernIreland,theIrishRepublicanHistoryMuseum,theRoyalUnitedServicesInstitute,and
theCAINprojectattheUniversityofUlster.
For their special assistance in Northern Ireland, I thank Seánna Walsh, Danny Morrison, Robert
McClanahan, John O’Hagan, Eamon Mallie, William Mawhinney, Jonathan Blake, Joanne Mur-
phy, Brendan Birt, Geraldine Mc Allister, Peter Gilleece, Kevin O’Brien, Jo Black, Leanne Donly,
TimFarrell,PatrickThomson-McQuiston,MauraScully,andLouiseQuinn. Fortheirassistancein
iv
Britain,IthankJonathanPowell,GordonBarrass,JohnBew,RichardEnglish,andPeterNeumann.
For their assistance with my research on ETA and the government of Spain, I thank Antton
Etxebeste, the Guardia Civíl, Urko Aiartza, the New York Euzko-Etxea, Brian Currin, Gorka Es-
piau,PaulRios,JosebaZulaika,andtheLokarriorganization.
For their assistance with my research on the LTTE and Sri Lanka, I thank M.A. Sumanthiran,
Jayantha Dhanapala, the British Tamils Forum, the Federation of Tamil Sangams of North Amer-
ica, Tamils Against Genocide, John Rogers and Ira Unamboowe of the American Institute for Sri
LankanStudies,JehanPereraandNationalPeaceCouncilofSriLanka,andJayadevaUyangoda.
FortheirassistancewithmyresearchinPeru,IthankMariaCruz-Saco,SalomónLernerFebrés,Ri-
cardoCaro,GustavoGorriti,PaulaMuñoz,JeanFrancoOlivera,MariaRae,EduardoToche,Talia
Castro-Pozo, Cynthia Sanborn, Orieta Pérez, the Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos,
andtheCentrodeInformaciónparalaMemoriaColectivaylosDerechosHumanos.
I thank my research assistants for their tremendous help in producing the quantitative database
for my research: David Ray Anderson, Fatima Dar, Katie Garcia, Gi Jae Han, Kangdi Li, Antoine
Sander,AdefunkeSonaike,andNidaleZouhir. IalsothankmyBasqueandSpanishtranslator,Jon
LizarragaDíaz.
IthankthemanyacademicswhoassistedmeinobtainingIRBapprovalformyresearch: Rebekka
Friedman, Diego Navarro Bonilla, Zachariah Mampilly, Xabier Irujo, Roger Mac Ginty, Richard
English,NeilDeVotta,MarkWhitaker,RolandVazquez,andZoeBray.
Finally, I thank my family, friends, and loved ones for the support they have given me over the
pastsixyears.
v
Dedication
To my grandfather, Joseph M. Valloti, the original doctor in the family, who has always inspired
andsupportedme.
vi
Introduction
Thousands of shoppers visit the stores in the commercial center of Manchester, England on any
given Saturday. The morning of June 15, 1996 was typical in that regard. Between 75,000 and
80,000 people packed the department stores, restaurants, and other businesses in the city center,
unawareofthe3,300lbammoniumnitrateanddieselfuelbombhiddeninaredandwhitefreight
trucknearby. ElitemembersoftheProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)haddriventhetruck
intoManchestershortlyafternineo’clockthatmorning,parkingitoutsidetheglassdisplaywin-
dowsofMarksandSpencer,oneofthelargestdepartmentstoresinthecity. Thestagewassetfor
anextraordinarybloodbath.
Then, shortlyafter 9:40AM, thesituation changeddramatically. Police rushedto thearea around
Marks and Spencer and began examining vehicles. They quickly identified the truck contain-
ing the bomb, noting the suspicious wiring running from its cabin into the cargo compartment.
The police rapidly evacuated the surrounding area, creating a protective no-go zone stretching a
quarter mile from the truck in every direction. Police also notified the British Army’s elite bomb
disposalteam,whicharrivedonthesceneat10:45AMwitharemotecontrolledrobotspecifically
designedtoapproachanddefuseIRAbombs.
Despite the best efforts of the army bomb experts, the IRA truck bomb exploded at 11:17 AM.
It was the largest peacetime explosion in the history of the United Kingdom. A blinding fireball
andshockwavepulverizedstorefronts,newsstands,andcars. ThecommercialcenterofManch-
ester was raked by flying rubble, glass, and hot metal. A black mushroom cloud rose over the
city. Remarkably, however, the explosion did not kill anyone. Manchester police had worked
efficiently, evacuating thousands of people from the city center, and when the bomb went off, it
torethroughaghosttown. Fireandambulancecrewscombingthesceneafterwardencountereda
sceneofutterdevastation–roughly£1billioninphysicaldamage. Buttheonlybodiestheyfound
were those of the unfortunate bomb disposal robot and a number of shop mannequins that had
beenblownoutofstorewindowsandintothestreets(BBC2006;Harnden1999: 248-251).
1