The Battle of Britain : the greatest battle in the history of air warfare

334 Pages·2015·3.24 MB·English

by  Townshend

CLASSIC CONFLICTS
THE
BATTLE BRITAIN
OF
CLASSIC CONFLICTS
THE
BATTLE OF BRITAIN
THE GREATEST BATTLE IN THE
HISTORY OF AIR WARFARE
RICHARD TOWNSHEND BICKERS
FOREWORD BY
AIR MARSHAL SIR DENIS
CROWLEY-MILLING
KCB, CBE, DSO, DFC, AE
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
Air Marshal Sir Denis Crowley-Milling, KCB, CBE, DSO, DFC, AE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
Richard Townshend Bickers
THE RAF
Richard Townshend Bickers
AIRCRAFT OF THE RAF
Gordon Swanborough
THE LUFTWAFFE
Richard Townshend Bickers
AIRCRAFT OF THE LUFTWAFFE
William Green
THE SUPPORT TEAMS
Bill Gunston
BATTLE TACTICS
Air Vice-Marshal J. E. (Johnnie) Johnson, CB, CBE, DSO, DFC, DL
THE HEIGHT OF THE BATTLE
Mike Spick
BATTLE DAY OF AN RAF PILOT
Richard Townshend Bickers
BATTLE DAY OF A LUFTWAFFE PILOT
Richard Townshend Bickers
BATTLE SUMMARY
Group Captain Sir Hugh Dundas, CBE, DSO, DFC, DL
BATTLE DIARY
Richard Townshend Bickers
RAF HEROES
Richard Townshend Bickers
INDEX
C. J. Davies
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Abook like this would be impossible to produce without the help of
many individuals and organisations, and the publishers are grateful
to everyone who contributed to the success of this project. We would like
to thank all who helped by granting interviews and giving permission to
use personal memoirs and quotes. Special thanks are due to: David
Bickers and the Douglas Bader Foundation; Air Chief Marshal Sir
Christopher Foxley-Norris, GCB, DSO, OBE, and Wing Commander N. P.
W. Hancock, DFC, of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association; Air Vice-
Marshal A. V. R. (Sandy) Johnstone, CB, DFC, AE, DL; Andrew Cormack
and the staff of the RAF Museum at Hendon; Lt. Col. Dr. Dieter Rogge,
Oberlieutnant Peter-Jorg Wiesener, Regierungs-oberinspektor Hartmann
and the staff of the Luftwaffenmuseum in Hamburg; Andy Saunders and
the Tangmere Military Aviation Museum Trust; Tony Gilberts and the
39/45 Warbirds Club; the late Paul Smith; and the RAF Air Historical
Branch.
FOREWORD
Some people may think that, over the years, more than enough books
have been written on the Battle of Britain and there can be little new
ground to cover. I believe, however, that this volume comes as a timely
reminder of what was at stake in those dark hours of 1940. So let us
consider for a moment, more than half a century on, how different history
would have been had the German air force gained that vital air
superiority over Britain – so necessary before there could be any thought
of the invasion that Goering had boasted could be launched within a
matter of weeks, with forces moving across the Channel unmolested by
air attack to achieve final occupation.
First, there would have been no American intervention and support in
arms or men, no massive bombing offensive against Germany, and no
base from which to launch a second front. Hitler’s war machine could
have been largely committed to the defeat of Russia and under these
circumstances it could well have been successful. Also, having no
disruption in their nuclear research and development work, it is
conceivable that Germany would have had the atomic bomb within a few
years, thus further strengthening her position as the master of Europe.
Britain could well have been an occupied country to this day.
So I believe it is right that we, as a nation, should once again be
invited to look back to a time in history, now half a century ago, which
proved to be the turning point leading to the eventual defeat of Hitler’s
Nazi Germany.
1940 was the year that air power truly came of age. The success of all
campaigns that followed depended heavily upon gaining and sustaining
air superiority. When General Montgomery (as he then was) returned
home in triumph after the battle of Alamein I was present at a talk he
gave at Camberley. He told us in his forthright manner that he had
rewritten ‘the principles of war’ and his first new principle was, as he put
it, ‘to win my air battle’. He never moved his forces without being sure of
his air cover from then on.
This new publication also brings to mind some of the vital factors
affecting the outcome, some happening well before, and others during,
the Battle. For instance, the British public to some extent still look down
on Neville Chamberlain for deceiving the country in September 1938 with
‘peace in our time’ and with the Munich agreement and appeasement of
Hitler, but it is clear that Chamberlain was not deceived by Hitler, and in
fact, on his return, accelerated the rearmament programme.
Admittedly, the situation in 1938, had we gone to war, would have
been different in many ways. But had events then led to the Germans
reaching the Channel, it is worth recording that we would have had only
70 Hurricanes and 9 Spitfires in the front line. Also, the radar detection
and fighter control systems, the creation of which Air Chief Marshal
Dowding had played a major role in, were still incomplete. It is of interest
that the German air force, in their written appreciation covering
Operation ‘Sea Lion’ (their invasion plan), acknowledged the existence of
our radar stations, but showed no knowledge of the use of the
information for controlling the fighter force which had been developed to
such great effect. In fact, it came as a great surprise to them to find the
extent to which their formations were being intercepted.
When the Battle of France showed all the signs of being lost, it was
Dowding who first faced up to Churchill and flatly refused to allow any
more squadrons to be sacrificed in that contest. Even so, with all the
squadrons available in late August 1940, at the height of the Battle of
Britain, and with the enemy’s continued attacks on our radar installations
and airfields, the outcome hung in the balance. At that point, some
bombs fell in central London and it was then decided to bomb Berlin in
retaliation and to serve as a morale booster at home. Fortuitously, this
caused Goering, who had boasted that Berlin would never be attacked, to
switch, with Hitler’s agreement, the main weight of attack to London.
This crucial misjudgement allowed our fighter stations to recover. Within
weeks, the tide in the air battle had been turned and Hitler decided to
postpone the invasion indefinitely. By early the next year he finally
resolved to turn against Russia regardless of his failure to overcome the
United Kingdom.
The Battle of Britain was an attempt to defeat the will of the British
people, and the whole country played a part in defeating the German
plan.
While the RAF fighter pilots were the tip of the sword, we must also
acknowledge the contributions of many others, whether serving in the
RAF or elsewhere. The nation has much to ‘owe’ to those bomber crews
who battled all the way to Berlin in their comparatively slow aircraft, and
who also played a vital part with their attacks on the invasion ports and
enemy shipping. I cannot praise them too highly. Nor must we forget
other services – Anti-Aircraft Command, the Observer Corps and Civil
Defence as well as Coastal Command and the Royal Navy, with its flotilla
of light vessels which were ever vigilant in eastern and southern ports,
ready to counter the threat of invasion ships and barges. But, in all, the
key was ‘command of the air’. We were short of pilots from the start, but
fortunately, we were never short of aircraft thanks not only to the aircraft
factories but also to the Civil Repair Organisation and RAF Repair
Depots, the latter, between them, turning out 60 aircraft per week. It was
not just the ‘Few’, it was the ‘Many’.
As to the conduct of the Battle, day to day operations were in the
hands of the 11 Group Commander with the other Groups playing a
supporting role as necessary. Dowding at Fighter Command provided the
means and the strategy, while the A.O.C. 11 Group, Air Vice Marshal
Keith Park, fought and won the critical battle. For this he deserves the
highest praise. However, it must be admitted that this subordination of
other Groups to 11 Group was the cause of some bad feeling and friction
between 11 and 12 Groups, particularly over tactics.
Much has been written over the years about ‘Big Wing’ tactics, leading
in some cases to harsh criticism of the parts played by Air Vice Marshal
Leigh-Mallory and in particular Douglas Bader. However, we have had
available for some time the relevant Air Ministry and Fighter Command
files of September/October 1940 covering operations during the battle,
and also the reports submitted to Dowding by both Park and Leigh-
Mallory. These subsequently were passed to the Air Ministry, and here I
find that some authors have not only been selective in their material, but
also biased in their interpretations. For example Leigh-Mallory’s first
report in September 1940 on Wing Operations was forwarded by Fighter
Command to the Air Ministry with the final comment ‘A.O.C. 12 Group is
working on the right lines in organising his operations in strength’, while
in Park’s report it is clear that 11 Group squadrons operated in a ‘Wing’ of
three squadrons on a number of occasions when conditions and warning
time were favourable, and in fact he issued at least two instructions to his
units covering the methods and tactics of ‘Wing’ operations.
Clearly Park was unhappy, to say the least, with the use the Air
Ministry made of the various reports, and he had good reason to be, but
there is no evidence that Fighter Command were critical of the way
Leigh-Mallory was operating his squadrons, if anything the reverse is
true.
It was as a result of these Group Commanders’ reports that Air Vice
Marshal Sholto Douglas (Deputy Chief of Air Staff) began to take an
interest, and set up the now famous meeting in October to ‘Discuss future
Fighter Tactics’. Douglas Bader only spoke once at that meeting, when
invited by the Chairman; but Leigh-Mallory, in bringing him along, had
put him in a mighty privileged position for a Squadron Leader. Frankly
he had no business to do it, as it was bound to invite comment as to his
motives and, of course, upset Park, whose Squadron Commanders in 11
Group had borne the brunt of the battle. Even so, when the minutes of
the meeting were circulated, Dowding and Leigh-Mallory had relatively
minor amendments. Keith Park submitted a copy of the notes he used at
the meeting and requested that they be attached to the minutes, Douglas
refused. Here I must add that I know from many conversations I had with