The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign of 1914-1918

502 Pages·1967·67.909 MB·English

by  A.J. Barker

1
BARKER
also by A.
J.
THE MARCH ON DELHI
SUEZ: THE SEVEN DAY WAR
ERITREA 94
1
THE BASTARD WAR
The Mesopotamian
Campaign 1914-1918
of
A. Barker
J.
Illustrated with Maps and Photographs
THE DIAL PRESS NEW YORK
m&fr*
1967
First printing, 1967
©
Copyright 1967 byA. Barker
J.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 66-2739:
DESIGN BY SLAVOMIR DRATEWKA
Printed in the United States of America
It was believed to be a sideshow
and "no man's child."
Major General Sir George Gorringe
1447803

Preface
This story is offered as a humble tribute to the valor of the British and
Indian troops who took part in the Mesopotamian Campaign between 1914
and 1918.
It describes one campaign of that terrible cata—clysm which is now gener-
ally known by the prosaic title of World War I that period which was a
turning point in history, after which nothing was ever the same again. Until
1939 those four years, of blood and toil and tears, were u—sually described as
the years of the "Great" War. This is a peculiarly apt title not only because
of the unprecedented scale of destruction and mechanized savagery that
—
ensued but also because of its far-reaching aftereffects, the end of which
has not been seen even yet. World War II, the so-called "Cold" War, and
most of our present troubles are all rumblings of a troubled world as it tries
to readjust to a stable pattern of conditions after the great upheaval which
took place between 914 and 1918. Since some of the more persistent of
1 —
these rumbles emanate from the region of the Persian Gulf an area vital
to Britain's economy, but where British influence has been steadily declining
—
in recent years I regard this campaign as being of special significance.
Modern historians appear to agree that most of World War I was waged
— —
in a muddled fashion and if only because it was so remote the "picnic"
in Mesopotamia was probably the biggest muddle of all. On other fronts
the Allies sometimes profited by their mistakes, but in that part of the world
the Army staggered on from blunder to blunder. The facts present a picture
of political ineptitude and mismanagement; militarily, many of the lessons
which derive from the campaign may now be considered to be technically
outmoded. But politically and morally they are as applicable today as they
were fifty years ago.
In such a complex and relatively compressed account, some faults, omis-
sions, and errors are bound to have crept in unwittingly but I believe that I
vii
viii Preface
have been able to give an accurate and clear indication of the major issues
involved. For those who would criticize on the grounds of inclusion of
detail which appears scarcely relevant, I can only say that every cause has
an effect, and to make history intelligible it is as necessary to trace the causes
as to describe the effects; the student of history soon realizes how fine are the
threads on which hang great destinies and so details are relevant. In war a
Government primarily exercises control over operations by defining the
policy to be pursued and the Services carry out its dictates. In this campaign
the policy was by no means constant and there were other extraneous in-
fluences which affected the operations; the need to include these soon be-
came apparent when the manuscript was sent around for criticism to those
who served in Mesopotamia.
I must crave the reader's indulgence in regard to the correct spelling of
place names; in general I have used the spelling adopted in the Official
History. I have also found it necessary to describe locations close to the all-
important rivers by the old-fashioned but less customary method of reference
to "right" and "left" bank. The sinuous writhings of the course of the
Tigris and Euphrates through the flat plain of Mesopotamia generally pre-
cludes any consistent defining of position by compass point and, for the
reader who is not accustomed to the descriptive method I have used, it is
perhaps necessary to say that the banks are considered to be right or left
from the standpoint of looking downstream. Finally it is perhaps desirable
to say that the expression "British" troops has often been used to describe
soldiers from all parts of the British Empire, as it was then. On occasions
where it has been necessary to distinguish between Indian and European
troops, the expression "native" troops has been used; the expression is by no
means intended as disparagement. The Gurkhas are described as such; they
are not natives of India and are now members of both the British and the
Indian Armies of today.