The Atomic Energy Commission under Nixon: Adjusting to Troubled Times

270 Pages·1993·27.25 MB·English

by  Glenn T. Seaborg

THE ATOMIC
ENERGY
COMMISSION
UNDER NIXON
Also by Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban
Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years
THE ATOMIC
ENERGY
COMMISSION
UNDER NIXON
Adjusting to Troubled Times
Glenn T. Seaborg
with
Benjamin S. Loeb
Palgrave Macmillan
© Glenn T. Seaborg 1993
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1993 978-0-312-07899-7
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly & Reference Division,
St. Manin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, NY 10010
First published in the United States of America in 1993
ISBN 978-1-349-60618-4 ISBN 978-1-137-04834-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-04834-9
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Seaborg, Glenn Theodore, 1912-
The Atomic Energy Commission under Nixon: adjusting to troubled
times / Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission-History. 2. Nixon, Richard M.
(Richard Milhous), 1913- .3. Nuclear energy-Government policy
-United States-History. l. Loeb, Benjamin S., 1914- .
II. Title.
HD9698. U52S43 1993
353.0085'6--<ic20 92-30137
CIP
To the spirit of
international cooperation in science, wherein
may lie mankind's best hopes
for the future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword .IX
Acknowledgments . . xvii
Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations . xix
Prologue: Brief Encounters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PART I: EXPLOSIONS
1. The Demise of Plowshare . 11
2. Testing the ABM Warhead 29
PART II: ARMS CONTROL
3. The Nonproliferation Treaty 51
4. SALT ......... . 73
5. The Advice of Scientists . 87
PART III: FUROR OVER RADIATION STANDARDS
6. Monticello ......... . .101
7. The Environmental Onslaught .113
8. Challenge from Within .. 123
9. Lowering the Limits .. . . 139
PART IV: RISE AND FALL OF THE BREEDER
10. Getting Off the Ground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
11. Issues Along the Way .169
12. Crash Landing. . . . . 181
PART V: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
13. A Matter of}ustice ......................... 193
14. Toward a Department of Energy . .. ... 211
Epilogue .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Appendix: AEC Commissioners During
Chairmanship of Glenn T. Seaborg . . . . · .. 253
Selected Bibliography · .. 255
Index ....... . · .. 259
FOREWORD
M
y resignation as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
became effective on August 16, 1971. I had served in that capacity for
ten and a half years, longer than any other chairman and extending over the
administrations of three presidents. I have written elsewhere about my service
under presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, confining those
accounts, however, to imponant arms control initiatives in which the Atomic
Energy Commission played a significant and constructive role.! This volume,
relating to the first two and a half years of the administration of Richard M.
Nixon, will cover a wider front. For one thing, I cannot give as complete an
account of arms control developments as in the earlier volumes because the
Nixon administration, for reasons I will seek to explain later, chose to exclude
the Atomic Energy Commission from much of its former panicipation in this
arena.
But then I also want to tell a broader story. It is the story of what it is like
to preside over a once proud and privileged government agency that is declining
in reputation and influence; how one establishes goals when choices are limited
by an impoverishment of means; of the maneuvers that are employed to sustain
what seem to be wonhwhile endeavors; and of how one sons out policy and
politics, chooses between adherence to principle and compromise, and in the
end must sometimes fight rearguard actions for survival.
Let it be clear that this book does not purpon to be a complete history of
the Atomic Energy Commission during this troubled period. The multifaceted
nature of the agency's activities, extending across a wide spectrum of military
and civilian endeavors, would make that too daunting a task. I have chosen
instead to use a case study approach and to concentrate on just a few stories.
These include the effon to maintain standards limiting the release of radioac
tivity from nuclear power plants to levels that would both protect public health
and permit the industry to survive; the effons, probably unrealistic and largely
frustrated, to move forward with a new generation of reactors (breeders) that
would produce more fissionable material than they consumed; the attempt,
against technical and political obstacles, to keep alive a program to use nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes; the difficulties encountered in carrying out
x THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION UNDER NIXON
the AEC's obligation to test a warhead for an antiballistic missile program
already approved by Congress; a brief look at how the Nixon administration
approached its arms control challenges; a confrontation with the Department
of Justice in which the AEC sought to defend the rights of an individual who
we believed was being falsely accused of disloyal behavior; and. finally. the
struggle. ultimately partly successful. to maintain the integrity of the AEC's
basic structure against the consequences ofd rastic reorganization proposals that
would have splintered it.
All in all. it is far from being a triumphant story. The Nixon years were
difficult ones for the AEC. In part this may have been due to the special foibles
of this president and his administration. More significantly. however. our
difficulties can be attributed to the spirit oft he times. particularly the opposition
to the Vietnam War and a rising environmental consciousness. Such factors
produced an atmosphere that was not friendly to large-scale science and
technology initiatives. particularly those that involved some government par
ticipation. In this uncongenial atmosphere the AEC sustained some frustrations
and defeats. Not all of these were due to circumstance. The AEC made its share
of mistakes. some of which I freely acknowledge herein. On the other hand. we
did some things right. and for this the agency deserves some credit.
As in my previous historical writings. a main source for this book has been
the journal that I maintained on every day of my government service. The entire
journal has been published in 28 volumes.2 A principal component of the
journal was a daily diary. from which I quote frequently herein. Using such a
source has the advantage that it records how things appeared at the time. not
in retrospect over a time gap of many years. Excerpts from the diary are not
always so labeled. but they can be recognized because they are set in this
typeface. I should note that the diary entries included herein. while substan
tively the same. may occasionally not be the same in every word or phrase as
the original diary entries included in the published journal. The original entries.
usually dictated in haste during or at the end of a busy day. may not have been
couched in the clearest language. especially for a lay audience. and may also
have lacked context needed. or may have contained detail not needed. for this
narrative. In making these changes. I bear in mind what John Kenneth
Galbraith noted to justify similar changes in his book. Ambassador's Journal:
"No historical merit attaches to bad English."3
The journal also contains copies of important documents (correspondence.
reports. press releases. minutes of meetings. newspaper articles. and so on)
relating to each day's events. If no other documentation is offered in footnotes
or endnotes for a document referenced in the text. the reader can infer that it
is available in my daily journal.