Table Of Content

The Atlas of Reality The Atlas of Reality A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics Robert C. Koons and Timothy H. Pickavance Thiseditionfirstpublished2017 ©2017JohnWiley&Sons,Ltd Registeredoffice JohnWiley&Sons,Ltd,TheAtrium,SouthernGate,Chichester,WestSussex,PO198SQ,UK EditorialOffices 350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148-5020,USA 9600GarsingtonRoad,Oxford,OX42DQ,UK TheAtrium,SouthernGate,Chichester,WestSussex,PO198SQ,UK Fordetailsofourglobaleditorialoffices,forcustomerservices,andforinformationabouthowtoapply forpermissiontoreusethecopyrightmaterialinthisbookpleaseseeourwebsiteat www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell. TherightofRobertC.KoonsandTimothyH.Pickavancetobeidentifiedastheauthorsofthiswork hasbeenassertedinaccordancewiththeUKCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988. 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Contents Acknowledgements xvii PartI Foundations 1 Introduction 3 1.1 ABriefHistoryofMetaphysics 3 1.2 WhyDoMetaphysics? 5 1.2.1 Fatalismandalternativepossibilities 6 1.2.2 Causation:rights,responsibilities,andknowledge 6 1.2.3 Thefoundationsofscience:laws,space,andtime 7 1.2.4 Mindandbody 7 1.2.5 Personalidentityandpersistence 8 1.3 HowtoUsetheBook 9 2 Truthmakers 13 2.1 Introduction 13 2.1.1 Propositions 14 2.1.2 Truthmakers 17 2.2 FiveArgumentsforClassicalTruthmakerTheory 19 2.3 TheChallengeofDeflationism 25 2.4 TruthmakerMaximalism 30 2.4.1 Fundamentalityandlogicallycomplexpropositions 30 2.4.2 Theproblemofnegativeexistentials 31 2.5 AlternativestoTruthmakerMaximalism 36 2.5.1 AtomicTruthmakerTheory 37 2.5.2 SpectralTruthmakerTheory 40 2.5.3 TruthSupervenesonBeing 42 2.6 ConclusionandPreview 44 Notes 45 3 Grounding,OntologicalDependence,andFundamentality 47 3.1 IsGroundingReal? 49 viii Contents 3.1.1 Connectionswithnaturallanguage 49 3.1.2 Plausibleexamplesofgrounding 49 3.1.3 Philosophicaldebatesthatturnongroundingclaims 50 3.1.4 Fruitfulnessofgrounding 51 3.1.5 Groundingisdifferentfromconceptualpriority,reduction,and supervenience 52 3.2 RelationbetweenGroundingandTruthmaking 55 3.2.1 Interdefinability? 55 3.2.2 Cangroundingtheoryreplacetruthmakertheory? 56 3.3 RelationbetweenGroundingandOntologicalDependence 58 3.3.1 Twokindsofessence 58 3.3.2 Circulardependency? 58 3.3.3 Twokindsoffundamentalentity 59 3.3.4 Groundingandessence 61 3.4 Conceptualvs.Extra-ConceptualGrounding 62 3.4.1 Theontologicalimportofgrounding 64 3.4.2 SupportfortheOneTruthmakerperFundamentalPropertyPrinciple 65 3.5 AlternativestoGrounding? 65 3.5.1 Quine’smethodofparaphrase 66 3.5.2 Fine’sreallyoperator 67 3.5.3 Primitivefundamentality,naturalness,andprimitivestructure 68 3.6 CanGroundingRelationsbeGrounded? 69 3.7 ConnectionsbetweenGroundingandEntailment 71 3.8 HowisGroundingDifferentfromCausalExplanation? 72 3.9 Conclusion:GroundingandOntologicalEconomy 72 Notes 73 PartII Dispositions 4 Conditionals 77 4.1 CounterfactualConditionals:Semantics,Logic,andMetaphysics 78 4.2 Hypotheticalism 84 4.3 Anti-HypotheticalismandLawsofNature 86 4.4 StrongHypotheticalism:CounterfactualAccountsofPowersandDispositions 90 Notes 92 5 LawsofNature 94 5.1 StrongNomism:TheDretske-Armstrong-Tooley(DAT)TheoryofLaws 94 5.2 Neo-Humeism:ReductionofConditionals,Laws,andPowers 99 5.2.1 Argumentfromscientificrealism 100 5.2.2 Theextrinsicalityobjectionandsmallworlds 102 5.2.3 Objectionbasedoninduction 103 Notes 105 6 PowersandProperties 106 6.1 AdvantagesofStrongPowerism 106 6.1.1 Causalconnectionsandcausaldirection 106 6.1.2 Strongpowerismandscientificknowledge 107 6.2 TheIndividuationofProperties 108 Contents ix 6.2.1 Thecausaltheoryofproperties:causalstructuralism 111 6.2.2 Dual-aspectvs.mixedtwo-categorytheories 117 6.3 ObjectionstoStrongPowerism 118 6.4 Conclusion 121 Notes 121 PartIII UniversalsandParticulars 7 Universals 125 7.1 Introduction 125 7.1.1 Whatpropertiesmustexplain 126 7.2 Realism 128 7.2.1 TroublesforRealism 129 7.3 UniversalsandtheProblemofIntentionality 142 7.4 PropertiesastheGroundofCausalPowers 145 Notes 145 8 ReductiveNominalismandTropeTheory 147 8.1 ReductiveNominalism 147 8.1.1 PredicateNominalism 148 8.1.2 ClassNominalism 149 8.1.3 ResemblanceNominalism 152 8.2 TropeTheory 165 8.2.1 TwovarietiesofTropeTheory 167 8.2.2 SometroublesforTropeTheory 167 8.3 Conclusion 169 Notes 169 9 ParticularsandtheProblemofIndividuation 171 9.1 Introduction 171 9.2 Facts 172 9.3 Substances 175 9.3.1 RelationalOntology 176 9.3.2 ConstituentOntology 179 Notes 200 10 Relations,Structures,andQuantities 201 10.1 AccountsofRelationalFacts 201 10.2 Non-SymmetricalRelationsandtheProblemofOrder 206 10.2.1 Thetwinproblemsofconverserelations 207 10.2.2 Takingthingsinorder 210 10.2.3 Afamilyofdistinct,complexinstantiationrelations 210 10.2.4 ConstituentOntologiesandnon-symmetricrelations 211 10.3 StructuralUniversalsandConstituentOntology 215 10.4 Determinables,Quantities,andRealNumbers 219 10.4.1 DeterminateUniversalTheory 220 10.4.2 SimpleIntensityTheory 221 10.4.3 CompositeIntensityTheory 224 x Contents 10.5 ConclusionandPreview 225 Notes 225 PartIV TheNatureofReality 11 NihilismandMonism 229 11.1 NihilismandAliquidism 229 11.2 Monism 237 11.2.1 ParmenideanMonism 238 11.2.2 Spinoza’sMonism 240 11.2.3 Bradley’sMonism 243 11.2.4 JonathanSchaffer’sCosmicMonism 249 Note 252 12 TheNon-ExistentandtheVaguelyExisting 253 12.1 DoesEverythingExist? 253 12.1.1 Meinong’sCharacterizationPrincipleandRussell’stheoryof descriptions 254 12.1.2 Quantifiersandpluralexpressions 258 12.1.3 ExportationandtheBarcanFormula 260 12.1.4 ArgumentsforActualism 262 12.1.5 ArgumentsagainstActualism 266 12.1.6 Definingexistence 270 12.2 OnticVagueness 271 12.2.1 Themultiplemeaningtheoryofvagueness. 274 12.2.2 Realontologicalvagueness 275 12.2.3 Canidentityorexistencebevague? 279 12.3 Conclusion 280 13 Solipsism,Idealism,andtheProblemofPerception 281 13.1 DefiningtheMentalandtheExternal 282 13.2 SolipsismandPhenomenalism 284 13.3 TheoriesofPerception 286 13.3.1 Theargumentfromhallucinationandillusion 288 13.3.2 Theargumentfromcolors 297 13.4 ArgumentsagainstPhenomenalism 306 13.4.1 WhatfollowsfromtheVeilofPerception? 306 13.4.2 Common-senseandScientificRealism 307 13.4.3 Theapparentimpossibilityofphenomenalreduction 308 13.5 ArgumentsagainstSolipsism 309 13.5.1 Appealstocommonsenseandtoperception 309 13.5.2 TheParadigmCaseArgumentagainstubiquitousillusion 310 13.6 ConclusionandPreview 312 Notes 313 PartV Modality 14 Possibility,Necessity,andActuality:Concretism 317 14.1 Introduction 317 14.2 Concretism:WorldsasUniverses 321 Contents xi 14.3 ProblemsforConcretism 327 14.4 Conclusion 331 Note 331 15 Abstractionism:WorldsasRepresentations 332 15.1 MagicalAbstractionism 333 15.1.1 ModalAnti-Indexicalism 334 15.1.2 Non-indexicalreductionsofactuality 336 15.1.3 AdilemmaforMagicalAbstractionism 339 15.2 StructuralAbstractionism 341 15.2.1 LinguisticAbstractionism 342 15.2.2 PictorialAbstractionism 347 15.3 AristotelianTheoriesofPossibility 348 15.4 Conclusion 350 Note 351 16 DeReModalityandModalKnowledge 352 16.1 ModalityDeRe:TransworldIdentityandCounterpartTheory 352 16.1.1 FromAbstractionismtoTransworldIdentity 354 16.1.2 FromConcretismtoCounterpartTheory 355 16.1.3 StrongTransworldIdentityandmerehaecceitisticdifferences 360 16.1.4 Summary 362 16.2 ModalityandEpistemology:PossibilityandConceivability 363 16.2.1 Variousnotionsofconceivability 363 16.2.2 Objectionstoidentifyingthenecessaryandtheapriori 364 16.2.3 Knowledgeofpossibility:patchworkprinciples 367 16.2.4 Aristotelian/Poweristconceptionsofmodalknowledge 368 16.3 Conclusion 369 Notes 369 PartVI SpaceandTime 17 IsSpaceMerelyRelational? 373 17.1 TheNatureofLocation 373 17.2 SpatialSubstantivalism 375 17.2.1 TheoryofSpatialQualities:Advantagesanddisadvantages 378 17.2.2 SpatialParticularism:Distanceasanessentialbutexternalrelation 378 17.3 SpatialRelationism 381 17.4 AbsencesandVacuums 386 17.5 Conclusion 388 Notes 389 18 StructureofSpace:Pointsvs.Regions 390 18.1 ConstructingPointsfromRegions 391 18.1.1 Digressiononlogicalconstructions 391 18.2 Pointsvs.Regions 394 18.3 ArgumentsagainstPointsasFundamental 397 18.3.1 Finitism 398 xii Contents 18.3.2 Mathematicalparadoxes,fromZenotoTarski 402 18.3.3 Spatialboundariesandphysicalcontact 405 18.4 Voluminismvs.Volume-BoundaryDualism 408 18.4.1 Continuousvariationinquantityandquality 410 18.4.2 Coincidentboundaries:Actualvs.potentialboundaries 413 18.5 Conclusion 414 Note 414 19 TheStructureofTime 415 19.1 IsTimeComposedofInstantsorIntervals? 415 19.1.1 ArgumentforInstantism:Possiblesuper-tasks 417 19.1.2 ArgumentsforIntervalism:Impossiblesuper-tasks 419 19.2 InstantsasDependentEntities 425 19.3 DoesTimehaveaBeginning? 427 19.4 Conclusion 429 20 Time’sPassage 430 20.1 TensersandAnti-Tensers 432 20.2 VarietiesofAnti-Tensism 435 20.2.1 ReflexivethoughtsandOldAnti-Tensism 435 20.2.2 IndexicalpropositionsandNewAnti-Tensism 436 20.3 VarietiesofTensism 437 20.4 Presentism 439 20.5 ArgumentsforTensism 442 20.5.1 The“ThankGoodness”Problem 442 20.5.2 Evidenceagainstindexicality:Parallelsbetween‘now’and‘actually’ 447 20.5.3 Theexperienceoftheflowoftime 448 20.5.4 Thepresentasauniquelyactualboundarybetweenpastandfuture 451 20.5.5 Thethreatoffatalism 453 20.5.6 Circulartimeandtimetravel 454 20.6 Conclusion 456 Note 457 21 ArgumentsforAnti-Tensism 458 21.1 HowFastDoesTimeFlow? 458 21.2 TruthmakersforTruthsaboutthePast 461 21.2.1 ReductionisticPresentismorOccurentism 461 21.2.2 Suigenerispropertiesofpresent-dayobjects 461 21.2.3 Primitivepast-tensedfactsorstatesofaffairs. 462 21.2.4 RejectionofTruthmakerTheory 463 21.2.5 TruthmakerproblemsforGrowingBlockTensism 463 21.2.6 Furthertruthmakerproblems:Cross-temporalspatialrelations (Motion) 464 21.2.7 Truthmakerproblems:Othercross-temporalrelationsbetweenpast entities 466 21.2.8 AfinaltruthmakerproblemforPresentism:Open-ended generalizations 469 21.3 TheTheoryofRelativity 469