The Ascetic Ideal: Genealogies of Life-Denial in Religion, Morality, Art, Science, and Philosophy

312 Pages·2021·1.543 MB·English

by  Stephen Mulhall

OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
The Ascetic Ideal
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
The Ascetic Ideal
Genealogies of Life-Denial in Religion,
Morality, Art, Science, and Philosophy
STEPHEN MULHALL
1
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP,
UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,
andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof
OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©StephenMulhall2021
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2021
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin
aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe
priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted
bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics
rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe
aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe
addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform
andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress
198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2021933148
ISBN 978–0–19–289688–9
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192896889.001.0001
Printedandboundby
CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY
LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand
forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials
containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork.
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
Contents
Introduction 1
EssayOne:AuthorityandRevelation 18
1. AuthorityandRevelationinReligion 18
A. TheAdlerCaseStudy 18
B. QualitativeDialectics 21
C. DialecticandHistory 25
D. LosingConcepts 28
2. AuthorityandRevelationinEthics 31
A. MoralIndividualism 31
B. FellowCreatures 37
C. IndividualityandTestimony 47
D. BorderTerritory:TheEthico-Religious 59
E. Conclusion:IndividuatingResponsiveness 69
3. AuthorityandRevelationinArt 71
A. StanleyCavell 71
B. WilliamGolding 75
EssayTwo:WritingtheLifeoftheMind 99
1. Autobiography,Biography,andPhilosophy 99
2. GenealogyandTruth,ScepticismandModernism 122
3. Coetzee:AutobiographicalTheory 144
4. Coetzee:AutobiographicalPractice 150
A. Boyhood 150
B. Youth 155
C. Summertime 172
EssayThree:Knowing,Framing,andEnframing 182
1. TheInnerandOuterWorldsofChristopherNolan 182
A. Scepticism,Plagiarism,andFanaticism:Inception 186
B. TwoBecomeOneFlesh:MarriageandLove’sAlterationin
Memento 206
C. FilmasConfession:Following 212
D. OneFlesh,TwoMinds:MarriageandLove’sAlterationin
ThePrestige 215
E. LosingYourWay:Perfectionism,Education,andIndividualityin
Insomnia 221
F. Asceticism,Morality,andtheWilltoTruth:The‘DarkKnight’
Trilogy 226
G. PureCinema,Realism,andModernism:InterstellarandDunkirk 237
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
vi 
2. PhysicsasMetaphysics:Philosophy,Science,andTechnology
intheModernEra 251
A. TheUnder-labourersofAsceticism 251
B. TheAgeofTechnology 258
C. ‘WheretheWorldBecomesPicture...’ 265
D. PhotographyasaTechnologyofArtisticModernism 282
References 299
Index 303
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
Introduction
‘Theasceticideal’isthetermNietzscheusesinTheGenealogyofMorality¹forthe
variouswaysinwhichthevalue-systemhelabels‘slavemorality’evolves,ramifies,
and spreads out into the broader reaches of Judaeo-Christian Western culture.
Thenatureandmanifestationsofthatidealaretheexplicittopicofthethirdand
final essay in the Genealogy; but its work depends upon the two essays which
precedeit,inwhichNietzscheanalysesanddiagnosesslavemoralityitself,andin
particularitsdistinctivelyChristianreligioussources.Soitmighthelptoprovide
someinitialorientationforthisbook’sinvestigationoftheasceticidealifIprovide
a reminder (however brief and selective) of the central themes of those first two
essays.
IntheGenealogy,NietzschepresentsChristianityprimarilyasaformoflife—
oneinwhichacertainsetofvaluesorientseverythingthebelieverthinks,says,and
does; andheisinterestednotinwhether thosevalues are true(a validrepresen-
tationofthewaythingsare,morallyspeaking—whateverthatmightmean),butin
their meaning or significance (the value of the evaluation of the world that they
embody).ForNietzsche,thetruthofChristianityinthissenseliesinitsveneration
of the cross—its demand that believers worship the figure of a humiliated,
flagellated, and crucified human being. For the Christian, of course, this figure
embodies their commitment to a life of altruistic self-sacrifice, in which the self
becomesasnothingforthesakeofthewell-beingofothers(particularlytheweak
andvulnerable).Andthedivinestatusofthatfiguredeclaresthatsuchselflessness
istheunquestionableessenceofanythingdeservingthenameofmorality:itmakes
a timeless and absolutely authoritative claim upon us as beings responsive to
ethicalandexistentialvalue.
Byplacingthisvalue-systeminitshistoricalcontext,Nietzschemeanstoputin
question every aspect of this Christian self-understanding. For when Christian
moralityispresentedasahistoricalphenomenon,weareforcefullyremindedthat
ithasatemporalpointoforigin(whichmeansthattheideaofitsceasingtoexist
at some point becomes thinkable), and that it is not only capable of potentially
radicaldevelopmentandalterationthereafter,butmightitselfhaveantecedents—
priorculturalconditionsthathelpedmakepossiblethevalue-systemwhosearrival
nevertheless threatened radically to disrupt them. None of these points is
¹ Trans.C.Diethe,ed.K.Ansell-Pearson(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994).References
totheGenealogyarehereaftertoGMfollowedbyessayandsectionnumbers.
TheAsceticIdeal:GenealogiesofLife-DenialinReligion,Morality,Art,Science,andPhilosophy.StephenMulhall,
OxfordUniversityPress.©StephenMulhall2021.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192896889.003.0001
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
2 
intrinsically inimical to Christianity’s official self-image (since Christians can
acknowledgethem—usingnotionssuchasamomentoftransformativerevelation
anditsunfoldingthroughevolvingtradition—withoutcastingdoubtonthedivine
authority of what is thereby revealed and unfolded). But Nietzsche’s way of
exploiting the undeniable historicality of Christian morality allows him to make
more specific claims about its belatedness and mutability—claims designed to
implant the suspicion that its underlying significance is very different from its
overtself-understanding.
Byexaminingtheetymologyofkeyevaluativetermsthroughthelensprovided
by the broader, lingering cultural traces of the ancient Greek world, Nietzsche
devoteshisfirstessaytoidentifyingapre-Christianvalue-systemhecalls‘master
morality’—one which contrasts good with bad rather than with evil, and which
understandsasgoodpreciselythatwhichiscondemnedasevilbyitsmorefamiliar
alternative. Master morality celebrates those noble souls who can spontaneously
andcourageouslyimposetheirwillontheworld,achievingtheirgoalsandmore
generallydirectlytranslatingtheirdesiresintoeffectiveandsatisfyingaction;and
itcondemnsthosewholackthegreatnessofsoulneededtoachievesuchremak-
ings of the world in their own image—the timid, the feeble, the weak. Christian
morality is a mirror image of these valuations: it transposes their positive and
negative poles, and its attribution of uncannily substantial reality to the latter
reflects its fundamental prioritization of the condemnatory dimension of moral
evaluationoveritscelebratorycounterpart.
Nietzsche suggests that this mirroring is not an accident; on the contrary, it
embodies a powerfully negative, and resentment-fuelled, reaction against master
morality.Christianmoralityisstructuredinsuchawayastoprotectandadvance
theinterestsofthosewhosuffermostfromthehitherto-unquestionedprevalence
of master morality—the weak, nature’s slaves. Life for them in a society akin to
that portrayed in Homer’s tales is one in which they are pushed around by
nature’s masters, and in which their culture celebrates those victimizing them
whilst—if it thinks of them at all—condemning them for being victims. By
invertingthesemodesofevaluation,patternsofthoughtanddeedthatadvantage
the weak would be celebrated, and those disadvantaging them (and hence those
people who naturally evince them) would be condemned; the lives of the slaves
would become worth living, and their inability to assert themselves would be
reconceived by all as an achievement that constitutes the pinnacle of human
flourishing.
Nietzsche thus reinterprets slave morality’s overt advocacy of selflessness as
inherentlyself-interested, andsoashypocritical; altruism notonlycomesnatur-
ally to the weak, but constitutes a vital cultural weapon in the war against those
naturally equipped and inclined to disadvantage them. Insofar as slave morality
asksustotakepleasureinthesystematicpunishmentofnature’smasterssimply
for giving expression to their greatness of soul, it encourages and rewards an
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,29/5/2021,SPi
 3
essentially sadistic aspect of our personality; but it also satisfies our masochistic
impulses,insofarasitdemandsthatwecondemnandrepressanymanifestation,
indeedorthought,ofsuchnobleimpulsesofself-expressionandself-imposition
aswepossess—toscourandscarifyoursoulsaswellasourlives.Andsincesuch
impulses constitute expressions of what Nietzsche sees as the basic principle of
life—the drive of all animate beings to impose their will on the world, and to
enhance that capacity for mastery—slave morality amounts to a denial of life, a
refusal of the vital core of our own existence and of existence as such. In short,
Christianmorality’sendorsementofaltruismisinfactanexpressionofafunda-
mentally self-interested, sadomasochistic denial of life. It is a whited sepulchre,
centred on the entombment of a stigmatized human body—a whole-hearted
affirmationofdeathagainstlife.
Inhissecondessay,Nietzschepresentsthephenomenonofpunishment,andits
associatedconceptionsofguiltandresponsibility,asanexemplaryinstanceofthe
way in which the forms of our communal life are disrupted from within, in
perverselyproductiveways,bytheadventofslavemoralthinking.Buthedoesn’t
do so in a particularly perspicuous manner: a variety of different aspects and
modes ofthatphenomenon,andavarietyofassignmentsofsignificancetoeach
aspect or mode, are invoked in his account, at some speed and with no obvious
singleconnectingthreadofargumentoranalysis.Soanyreaderwillhavetoelicit
or impose some kind of hermeneutic order on these textual elements; and the
followingframeworkmightseemparticularlytemptingtoaphilosopher.
Noformofsociallifecanbemaintainedwithouttheimpositionofdisciplinary
regimeswhichprohibitformsofbehaviourthatdamageothers,andsoimplicitly
presuppose assignments of responsibility. Again following etymological clues,
Nietzsche takes seriously the fact that the term for ‘guilt’ in German (‘Schuld’)
also means ‘debt’; and he accordingly suggests envisaging social discipline as
generally involving a view of the wrongdoer as indebted to those to whom he
does wrong, and the punishment as his means of discharging that debt. But the
focus of such a practice could perfectly well be narrow: a certain kind of public
misbehaviour occasions its activation, and undergoing a compensatory form
of public suffering is conceived of as its equal and opposite outcome—a way of
wiping out the debt, and leaving a clean slate. Such a practice offers a means
of satisfying the creditor’s sadistic impulses (as well as the debtor’s masochistic
impulses);butbecauseitisactivatedsolelybytheperformanceofaspecificact,it
limitsthemoralsignificanceoftheexchangebyimputingastrictlylimitedambit
ofmoralresponsibility.
Since, however, what differentiates action from mere bodily movement is
motive or intention, our interest in wrongdoing is naturally extendable into the
innerlifeofourfellowmen,andsoofourselves.If,forexample,weareconcerned
to protect society against the damage done by wrongful behaviour, we might
concludethatwecouldmoreefficientlyminimizesuchwrongdoingbyminimizing