The Art of Veiled Speech: Self-Censorship from Aristophanes to Hobbes

335 Pages·2015·2.07 MB·English

by  Baltussen

The Art of Veiled Speech
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The ArT of
Veiled Speech
Self-censorship
from Aristophanes to hobbes
edited by
han Baltussen and peter J. davis
university of pennsylvania press
philadelphia
copyright © 2015 University of pennsylvania press
All rights reserved. except for brief quotations used for
purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book
may be reproduced in any form by any means without written
permission from the publisher.
published by
University of pennsylvania press
philadelphia, pennsylvania 19104- 4 112
www.upenn.edu/pennpress
printed in the United States of America on acid- free paper
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
A cataloging- i n- publication record is available from the
library of congress
The art of veiled speech : self-censorship from Aristophanes
to hobbes / edited by han Baltussen and peter J. davis.
  pages cm
 includes bibliographical references and index.
 iSBN 978-0-8122-4735-0 (alk. paper)
 1. classical literature—history and criticism. 2. politics
and literature—history. 3. freedom of speech in literature—
history. 4. freedom of speech—history. 5. censorship—
history. i. Baltussen, han, editor, author. ii. davis, peter J.,
editor, author.
pA3015.p63A78 2015
363.31—dc23
2015005388
contents
chapter 1. Parrhêsia, free Speech, and Self- censorship 1
Han Baltussen and Peter J. Davis
chapter 2. Self- censorship in Ancient Greek comedy 18
Andrew Hartwig
chapter 3. Parrhêsia and censorship in the Polis and
the Symposium: An exploration of hyperides Against Philippides 3 42
Lara O’Sullivan
chapter 4. A Bark Worse Than his Bite? diogenes the cynic
and the politics of Tolerance in Athens 74
Han Baltussen
chapter 5. censorship for the roman Stage? 94
Gesine Manuwald
chapter 6. The poet as prince: Author and Authority
Under Augustus 115
Ioannis Ziogas
chapter 7. “Quae quis fugit damnat”: outspoken Silence
in Seneca’s Epistles 137
Marcus Wilson
chapter 8. Argo’s flavian politics: The Workings of power
in Valerius flaccus 157
Peter J. Davis
vi contents
chapter 9. compulsory freedom: literature in Trajan’s rome 176
John Penwill
chapter 10. christian correspondences: The Secrets of
letter- Writers and letter- Bearers 209
Pauline Allen
chapter 11. “Silence is Also Annulment”: Veiled and Unveiled Speech
in Seventh- century Martyr commemorations 233
Bronwen Neil
chapter 12. “Dixit quod nunquam vidit hereticos”: dissimulation and
Self- censorship in Thirteenth- century inquisitorial Testimonies 251
Megan Cassidy- Welch
chapter 13. inquisition, Art, and Self- censorship in the early
Modern Spanish church, 1563–1834 269
François Soyer
chapter 14. Thomas hobbes and the problem of Self- censorship 293
Jonathan Parkin
epilogue 318
Han Baltussen and Peter J. Davis
list of contributors 321
index 323
Acknowledgments 329
chapter 1
Parrhêsia, free Speech, and
Self- censorship
Han Baltussen and Peter J. Davis
prologue
Jocasta: What is hard for exiles?
Polynices: one thing is biggest: he has no parrhêsia.
Jocasta: Not saying what you think, that’s typical of a slave.
Jocasta: That is painful, being foolish with the foolish.
Polynices: for the sake of gain you have to be a slave against your
nature.
— euripides, Phoenician Women
in this brief exchange between a mother and her exiled son, euripides has
Jocasta and polynices discuss the place of parrhêsia in fifth- century Athenian
thinking.1 first, parrhêsia is the property of a free citizen: it characterizes a
man who is free (i.e., he is not a slave) and who participates in the affairs of
his native city (i.e., he is not an exile). Second, parrhêsia is defined not as “free
speech” as commonly understood in the twenty- first century, as a universal
human right, but as “frank speech,” the ability to “say what you think.” in the
view of Jocasta and polynices, slaves and exiles must hide their true thoughts.
The tension between “frank speech,” typical of the ideal free citizen, and the
art of “veiled speech,” that is, the methods of expression adopted by the less-
t han- free, is this book’s central theme.
This opening chapter both sets out the broader conceptual framework we
2 han Baltussen and peter J. davis
use for this collection and clarifies the ways in which subsequent chapters
share this common theme of veiled speech and self- censorship. one point in
need of clarification is why we focus on veiled speech as a form of subversion.
Another is what the common thread is in the selection of authors ranging
“from Aristophanes to hobbes,” despite their chronological spread and range
of different historical and literary contexts.
We have taken a broad sweep at the evidence because censorship is a
phenomenon that seems to have no temporal or geographical boundaries: it
characterizes both totalitarian dictatorships and liberal democracies from an-
cient Athens to the twentieth century and is still with us in the twenty- first.
While the centralized forms of censorship practiced in countries like china
and iran are notorious, we should not forget that even states with a constitu-
tional commitment to freedom of speech impose limits on that freedom;
nowhere is the right absolute. And this is not by any means a bad thing.2 how
to balance the right to free speech against other legitimate concerns is a pe-
rennial issue. The most extreme form of free speech is no doubt frank speech,
parrhêsia, which etymologically originates in pan (“everything”) and rhêsia
(“speaking”): in other words, the freedom to “say all.” But it will be obvious
that in practice this is hardly ever possible. cultural and social conventions
impose limits on what we can say, whether in interactions between private
persons (family, friends, colleagues) or in the public sphere between individu-
als and the state. in general terms, censorship can be defined as the regulation
of a person’s political and moral expression by the imposition of limits on the
free circulation of ideas, images, and information.3 All democratic states rec-
ognize that there is an inherent tension between the individual’s right to free
speech and the public’s interest in such matters as privacy, security, the ad-
ministration of justice, and the protection of community standards.
The collection’s chronological spread of essays was chosen to cover a
number of flashpoints in classical and later periods, ending just before the
modern age when the concept was about to change (Bce: fifth, fourth to
third, and first centuries; ce: first, second, fourth to sixth, seventh, thir-
teenth, sixteenth to seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries). it should be kept
in mind that the selection is also in part a result of the availability of good
material, especially in periods when the tension around free speech (and at-
tempts to control it) intensified, as for instance in imperial rome or the
christian era. furthermore, the essays cover not only different literary genres
(that is, poetic texts as well as historical, epistolary, and philosophical prose)
and many periods in history, but also many modes of expression (the
Parrhêsia, free Speech, and Self- censorship 3
collection is “multimodal” in that it makes use of examples from oral culture
and theater, written sources, and images to illustrate the persistent presence
of self-r egulating measures by writers and creative artists of a variety of
works).
These three aspects of the topic under scrutiny (diversity in chronology,
theme, and medium) raise another issue regarding the theoretical framework
of this collection. These considerations about the ubiquity of self- censorship
not only help to illustrate that this is a perennial problem, but also help to
define self- regulation as a social and cultural phenomenon. While traditional
treatments tend to position the discourse on censorship solely within the
political environment, there is as yet little debate on self- regulation in antiq-
uity. in other words, these essays are taking the first steps to study this aspect
based on carefully selected samples, and the volume as a whole puts forward
a number of claims that we hope will change the focus and widen the scope
regarding the debate on parrhêsia and the limits different groups choose to
impose on it.
While it would go too far to claim that our investigations will produce a
“theory” of self-c ensorship, the chapters clearly emphasize the many ways in
which the (potentially) oppressed respond to the threat of controlling au-
thorities. As a result a picture emerges that throws light on the dynamics of
the subtle subversion in different kinds of context. By carefully defining the
core terms such as parrhêsia, libertas, and (self-) censorship, we aim to ensure
that our perspective is built on clear principles and distinctive from the stan-
dard one, in which the censoring party is often central and regularly subjected
to a modern (negative) judgment.
The evidence also justifies the importance of antiquity— which is why
the weight of chapters leans toward classical and late antique/medieval times.
The inclusion of two chapters relating to the early modern period puts us in
a position to add a further dimension to the discussion (the religious censure
of images), and to sketch the views of a theorist about self- censorship based
on his own experience (suppression of his work).4 combined, the chapters
show how the concrete situations that are analyzed underscore the social ori-
gin of subversion and censorship. Thus each chapter shores up the broader
thesis we articulate. We hope that this will eventually allow for a theoretical
framework that clarifies the dynamics between “oppressors” and “the op-
pressed,” even if (1) we use these terms not just in a political sense, (2) we
privilege the perspective of the oppressed (and those under the threat of op-
pression), and (3) we allow for some gaps in coverage— it is impossible to