The Army Air Forces in WWII - Air Force Historical Studies Office

771 Pages·2001·19.93 MB·English

Volume Seven
SERVICES AROUND THE WORLD
THE ARMY AIR FORCES
I n World War I1
PREPARED UNDER THE EDITORSHIP OF
WESLEY F R A N K C R A V E N
Princeton University
JAMES LEA GATE
University of Cliicago
New Imprint by the
Office of Air Force History
Washington, D.C.,1 983
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OmCe
WaShinRtOn. D.C. 20402
Library of Congress Number: 48-3657
THEU NIVERSITOYF CHICAGPOR ESSC, HICAG3O7
Cambridge University Pmss, London, N.W. 1, England
The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada
0 1958 by The Uniuersity of Chicago. Published 1958.
Composed and printed by THE UNIVERSITOYF
CHICAGPOR ESSC, hicago, Illinois, U.S.A.
This work, first published by the University of Chicago Press,
is reprinted in its entirety by the Office of A& Force History.
With the exception of editing, the work is the product of the
United States government.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title :
The Army Air Forces in World War 11.
Vol. 1 originally prepared by the Office of Air Force
History; v. 2, by the Air Historical Group; and v. 3-7,
by the USAF Historical Division.
Reprint. Originally published : Chicago : University
of Chicago Press, 1948-1958.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. Plans and early operations, January
1939 to August 1942-v. 2. Europe, torch to point-
blank, August 1942 to December 1943-tetc.1-v. 7.
Services around the world.
1. World War, 1939-1 945-Aerial operations,
American. 2. United States. Army Air Forces-
History-World War, 1939-1945. I. Craven, Wesley
. .
Frank, 1905- 11. Cate, James Lea, 1899-
111. United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force
History. IV. United States. Air Force. Air Historical
Group. V. United States. USAF Historical Division.
D790.A89 1983 940.54’4973 83-17288
ISBN 0-912799-03-X (v. 1)
..
11
FOREWORD
to the New
Imprint
I
N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget ordering each war
agency to prepare “an accurate and objective account” of
that agency’s war experience. Soon after, the Army Air Forces
began hiring professional historians so that its history could, in the
words of Brigadier General Laurence Kuter, “be recorded while
it is hot and that personnel be selected and an agency set up for
a clear historian’s job without axe to grind or defense to prepare.”
An Historical Division was established in Headquarters Army
Air Forces under Air Intelligence, in September 1942, and the
modern Air Force historical program began.
With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for
writing and publishing a seven-volume history. In December 1945,
Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander of Army
Air Forces, asked the Chancellor of the University of Chicago to
“assume the responsibility for the publication” of the history,
stressing that it must “meet the highest academic standards.”
Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Frank Craven of New York University
and Major James Lea Cate of the University of Chicago, both of
whom had been assigned to the historical program, were selected
to be editors of the volumes. Between 1948 and 1958 seven were
published. With publication of the last, the editors wrote that
the Air Force had “fulfilled in letter and spirit” the promise of
access to documents and complete freedom of historical interpre-
tation. Like all history, The Army Air Forces in World War II
reflects the era when it was conceived, researched, and written.
The strategic bombing campaigns received the primary emphasis,
not only because of a widely-shared belief in bombardment’s con-
tribution to victory, but also because of its importance in establish-
ing the United States Air Force as a military service independent
of the Army. The huge investment of men and machines and the
effectiveness of the combined Anglo-American bomber offensive
against Germany had not been subjected to the critical scrutiny
they have since received. Nor, given the personalities involved and
the immediacy of the events, did the authors question some of the
command arrangements. In the tactical area, to give another
example, the authors did not doubt the effect of aerial interdiction
on both the German withdrawal from Sicily and the allied land-
ings at Anzio.
Editors Craven and Gate insisted that the volumes present the
war through the eyes of the major commanders, and be based on
information available to them as important decisions were made.
At the time, secrecy still shrouded the Allied code-breaking effort.
While the link between decoded message traffic and combat action
occasionally emerges from these pages, the authors lacked the
knowledge to portray adequately the intelligence aspects of many
operations, such as the interdiction in 1943 of Axis supply lines
to Tunisia and the systematic bombardment, beginning in 1944,
of the German oil industry.
All historical works a generation old suffer such limitations.
New information and altered perspective inevitably change the
emphasis of an historical account. Some accounts in these volumes
have been superseded by subsequent research and other portions
will be superseded in the future. However, these books met the
highest of contemporary professional standards of quality and
comprehensiveness. They contain information and experience
that are of great value to the Air Force today and to the public.
Together they are the only comprehensive discussion of Army Air
Forces activity in the largest air war this nation has ever waged.
Until we summon the resources to take a fresh, comprehensive
look at the Army Air Forces’ experience in World War 11, these
seven volumes will continue to serve us as well for the next quarter
century as they have for the last.
RICHARD H. KOHN
Chief, O@ce of Air Force History
iv
FOREWORD
* * * I * * * * * * *
T
HIS is the seventh and final volume of The Amy Air Forces
in World War ZZ. The first five volumes told the story of
combat operations in the several theaters; the sixth described
the means by which men were recruited and trained and machines
were provided to insure victory in those operations. The present
volume deals with certain services which were common to the whole
of the Army Air Forces. In part, these were the non-Air Corps organi-
zations which in the AM,.$ere subsumed under the ambiguous desig-
nation of “Arms and Services,” but the Table of Contents will show
both additions and deletions from that AGO listing. There is, in-
evitably, some repetition, for the services herein described were so in-
extricably a part of air combat that they have received, it is hoped, due
attention in the account of each air campaign. There, however, the
focus was on the activities of the tactical units comprising the theater
air force; here it is upon the services as each in its unique way con-
tributed to the fulfilment of the AAF mission. But there is some merit
in telling the story from the point of view of the various service organ-
izations, not only to give a unified account of the accomplishments of
each, but because in sum these narratives provide a most useful guide
for those who would understand the nature of the air war.
These services encountered, as did the tactical air forces, problems
at two different levels. First, and perhaps more simple of solution if
more pressing, were those of devising and securing the equipment nec-
essary for a war in which technology and production counted heavily
and of training men whose skills were even more important than the
machines-though this latter need may easily be slighted now that we
have crossed the horizon toward the push-button age. The other prob-
lems were organizational in form, but in essence they hinged on intri-
cate points of command and control which were fundamental to the
American concept of war. World War I1 was unique not only in that
V
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II
it was the first war truly world wide in geographical scope but in that
for the first time combat operations were divided in fairly equal pro-
portions among our ground, sea, and air forces. To a remarkably satis-
factory degree the strategic problems of the universal, three-dimen-
sional war were worked out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff, but within the theaters (or areas, as they were
called in the U.S. Navy-controlled Pacific) the standard doctrine was
maintained of an unfettered control of all land, sea, and air forces by
the theater commander-in-chief, acting under directives of JCS and
CCS. In detail, commanders might differ in their interpretation of
prerogative, but, in general, their views were antagonistic to those
thought essential by the new AAF services.
The basic argument for these services was to some extent rooted in
the fundamental concept of an autonomous or independent air force
that achieved some recognition in the reorganizations of June 1941
20
and 9 March 1942. But, beyond that, there were important areas in
which the new ideas conflicted with standard AAF doctrines, to a
lesser degree than when opposed to the theater doctrine but still to a
degree that was hard to resolve. From any point of view-theater,
AAF, or AAF service-the argument was always the same whatever
the immediate issue: unity of command. Because the interpretation of
this issue has continued to be of national interest-indeed, has grown as
a matter of prime public concern-the editors have thought that the
organizational struggles described in the following chapters go far be-
yond their immediate purpose by illustrating the complexity of
modern warfare.
It is not without reason that the Air Transport Command occupies
the first and most prominent place in this book. In terms of size ATC
was by far the greatest of the organizations under consideration; it was
an important user, along with the tactical air forces, of most of the
other services; its struggle for a separate and corporate existence
exerted some influence within the other organizations; and it was ATC
that set a pattern for close collaboration with the civilian world that
was necessary during the rapid expansion of the Air Corps after 1939.
Originally, ATC had to depend heavily upon the commercial airlines,
but so vast were its operations and so varied its experiences that in the
end there was much that the civilian lines could learn from the com-
mand.
Early experiments with air transport within the Air Corps were
v1
FOREWORD
born of the necessity for economy and were limited to intraservice de-
livery of airplane parts. The tremendous expansion of this function
was accompanied by the assumption of two other major responsibili-
ties: the delivery-or ferrying, to use the term borrowed from the
British-of military aircraft to the using agency and the movement of
passengers. When cargo and passenger services were extended to other
Army forces and ATC became a common carrier for the War Depart-
ment, its growth beyond the most sanguine dreams of 1939 was
assured.
Dependence upon the commercial airlines began with the expansion
of the Air Corps in 1939 and was most pronounced in the early days
of the war, but it continued in some degree until V-J Day, by which
time ATC's size and accumulated experience overshadowed that of
the combined civilian carriers. The most important forms of aid may
be classified roughly in terms of planes and personnel borrowed, tech-
niques adapted to military use, and direct transport service performed
under contract.
Early Air Corps attempts to develop transport planes had produced
no satisfactory model, and, in spite of redoubled efforts, no successful
design was produced during the war years. So, inevitably, the AAF
turned to civilian models already in production and to various modifi-
cations of heavy bombers. The early standby, and indeed the most de-
pendable plane within its capacities throughout the war, was the Doug-
las DC-3, known alternately, according to its special modifications, as
the C-47 and the C-53. Long successful in civilian passenger service
but already obsolescent at Pearl Harbor time, the twin-engine DC-3
had many features ill suited to the convenient handling of bulky
freight, and its pay load was too light for the new tasks. But it was
flyable under almost any conditions, was easily maintained, and,
above all, was in production. Similarly, the AAF adopted the Douglas
DC-4, a newer four-engine airliner just coming into production in
1941,a nd, as the C-54, this plane became the workhorse where long
range and a heavy load were important considerations. Much was ex-
pected of the Curtiss C-46, designed in 1940 as a twin-engine com-
petitor of the DC-4 and Boeing Stratoliner; it was easy to load and had
great lift, reasonable speed, and a comfortable range. Eventually, it
came to do yeoman service in certain areas, but until 1944 the C-46
was subject to various mechanical ailments calling for numerous modi-
fications and was a hard plane to fly and to maintain.
Vii
THE A R M Y AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR I1
Of the converted bombers, the most important were the variants of
the B-24-the C-87 and a tanker model, the C-109. In spite of the
obvious disadvantages of a made-over tactical plane, the C-87 had
speed and range and proved a lifesaver until the C-54 came into full
production.
In view of the AAF’s later stress on air transport, it may seem
strange in retrospect that its development program for the necessary
planes lagged so far behind that for tactical aircraft. But it must be
remembered that the transport doctrine, though beginning to crystal-
lize by the time of Pearl Harbor, was profoundly affected by the addi-
tional responsibilities (welcome enough to ATC) delegated by the
War Department. In this respect the original air war plan, AWPD/ I
of August 1941, is instructive. Though remarkably accurate in its
forecast of requirements in general and in most individual types, and
though written under the direction of ATCs later commander, the
plan fell far short in its estimate of the number of four-engine planes
needed for victory. However, the fairest test is to compare the Amer-
ican transport aircraft, in quality and quantity, with those of our
enemies and Allies; in such a comparison the AAF, with a fleet which
was largely improvised, was without a rival.
ATC borrowed actual planes as well as plane models and produc-
tion potential from the airlines, and it borrowed men as well. These
included top-ranking executives, pilots and crewmen, and mechanics
and technicians of all sorts. The terms of the loan varied from indi-
vidual to individual and often with the same man-induction, tempo-
rary military service, civilian employment by ATC, or contract
service.
Contract service, which began before the United States entered the
war, enlisted the aid of an airline to do a specific job of ferrying, or of
hauling cargo and passengers, or of operating air bases. The experience
of these companies, their aircraft and equipment, and their installations
were of enormous help. There was often friction between their civil-
ian employees and military personnel doing the same job under less
favorable circumstances, and there were instances when it seemed to
the latter that the airlines were more interested in present profits and
future status than in winning the war. But, indeed, victory would have
come harder without the very real aid of the airlines.
If the AAF depended heavily upon an existing civilian structure for
men and planes in its transport service, its doctrine and organization
...
Vlll
FOREWORD
were born of its own experience and imagination. The Air Transport
Command grew out of the Air Corps Ferrying Command, established
in May 1941 to direct the delivery of lend-lease planes to our Allies.
This duty continued at an accelerating pace, and to it was added that
of ferrying U.S. replacement planes and of supervising the overseas
flight of combat units bound for a theater of operations. For the ACFC
there was some guidance in RAF ferrying experience but not for the
broader concept of mass transport of passengers and freight which be-
came eventually a larger operation. The new designation of Air
Transport Command came on 20 June 1942 along with the expanded
responsibilities. The reorganization included a new headquarters in
Washington and, in various strategic locations overseas, a wing organi-
zation with control over local troops and installations but not over air-
craft or crews passing through. This was in accord with the new idea
of a strategic transport service, directed from Washington, with local
transport being provided by theater carrier units. This design ran
counter to accepted ideas of unified command of all forces within a
theater, and it was only after many controversies and after theater
commanders came to understand its over-all advantages that the new
concept won general acceptance. The theater commander reserved
the right to levy on ATC forces in an emergency, a proviso subject to
varying interpretations, but, as transport facilities became more plenti-
ful, this clause was invoked less frequently. This revolutionary idea of
a strategic command for air transport was an important factor in
ATC's enormous accomplishment; attempts to extend the principle to
include Navy air transport services failed to materialize until after the
war when MATS proved to be the first practical form of unification
between the services and demonstrated in the Berlin airlift the mobility
and power of concentration inherent in its strategic concept.
The magnitude of the ATC effort can be read in the statistics plen-
tifully supplied in the pages which follow. With a peak force of
200,-
ooo officers and men and 3,700 planes, ATC in the single month of
July 1945 carried passengers and tons of cargo, most-
275,000 IOO,OOO
ly in overseas flights; in all, the command ferried more than a quarter
of a million planes. To secure the requisite transport planes was an
arduous task, but far mort difficult was the job of recruiting and train-
ing pilots and crews in direct competition with combat forces enjoy-
ing always a higher priority. Pilots were drawn from several sources:
originally from the pool of airline pilots trained by the Air Corps and
ix
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR I1
holding reserve commissions; then from veteran civilian pilots of vary-
ing types of experience; later from pilots rotated home after a combat
tour; in greatest numbers from Training Command graduates; and
from women pilots, both experienced (WAFS) and newly trained
(WASP). Except for the first group, most of the pilots needed addi-
tional instruction-transitional training in the many aircraft types fer-
ried by ATC and training for long ovenvater flights, novel to most of
the recruits. A contract program provided by the civilian Airlines
War Training Institute proved unequal to the demand, and in the long
run most of the instruction was given by ATC’s operational training
unit program which trained crews for the several types of transport
planes and in the techniques needed for transport flying.
The over-all command pattern and the common strategic mission
gave some unity to ATC operations in all theaters, however competi-
tive the simultaneous demands of the theaters might be. This unity did
not exclude variety, for each theater had its special problems and its
own tempo, Essentially, the ATC story is that of building and operat-
ing a half-dozen major airways, some with branch or feeder lines. The
story is told in some detail in the following chapters, and here it is
necessary only to indicate the main lines of development in those air-
ways.
Oldest in service was the South Atlantic route (comprising by 1943
the Caribbean, South Atlantic, North Africa, and Central Africa
Wings), which was born of the need to ferry lend-lease aircraft to the
British in the Near East and to the Russians via Tehran. The opening
in July 1942 of a staging base on Ascension Island midway across the
South Atlantic made the route practicable for twin-engine planes. Fear
of an Axis victory in Egypt sent ATC south of the Equator to set up
a possible alternate to the Accra-Khartoum-Cairo (or -Aden) route to
the Middle East, but, fortunately, need for its use never materialized.
Early plans to reinforce Australia via a trans-African airway also
faded early in the war. But great impetus was given to ATC’s opera-
tions over the South Atlantic by the Allied invasion of French Africa
in November 1942. This called for a branch line from Accra up to
Dakar and eventually for a direct route from Natal to Dakar suitable
for four-engine planes. There was also a line from Northwest Africa
to the United Kingdom, and, after the invasion of Italy, a branch was
fed into that peninsula, Corsica, and southern France. The extension
of intratheater services had come only with the absorption of duties
X