"The Apple of Discord": The Impact of the Levant on Anglo-French Relations during 1943. by Karen ...

368 Pages·2010·18.13 MB·English

"The Apple of Discord":
The Impact of the Levant on Anglo-French
Relations during 1943.
by
Karen Elizabeth Evans
/'./
The School of History
The University, Leeds
Volume I
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 31 May 1990.
ABSTRACT
"The Apple of Discord": The Impact of the Levant on
Anglo-French Relations During 1943
This thesis provides a detailed account and analysis of
Anglo-French relations in the Levant and their impact on the
more general relationship between the British and the Free
French during the important year of 1943. It aims to examine
and explain how the Levant, traditionally an area of mutual
suspicion and rivalry, created and accentuated discord and
dissension between wartime Allies and , on occasion , even
came perilously close to rupturing their relations.
The introduction provides a survey of Anglo-French
relations in the region as a backdrop against which the
period covered by the thesis must be viewed. Chapters I-IV
examine two policies pursued by Britain in the interests of
the war effort, the persuasion of the Free French to honour
their independence pledge to Syria and Lebanon and the
encouragement of the formation of a unified French movement
in North Africa. Arising from these policies, the mounting
tensions between the Foreign Office and its principal
representative in the Levant and between Churchill and de
Gaulle are explored. The influence of deteriorating Anglo
French relations in the Levant on the Churchill-de Gaulle
relationship is considered as are the high-level Anglo
French discussions in the summer of 1943 which acknowledged
the need for better co-operation in the Levant. Chapters V
and VI investigate the increasing Bri tish involvement in
Levant politics, which resulted in the establishment of
strongly nationalist and anti-French governments in both
Syria and Lebanon.
Chapters VII-XII are concerned exclusively with events
in the Lebanon during late October and November 1943 which
provoked a major crisis in Anglo-French relations. Attention
is focused on the efforts of the Foreign Office and their
French counterparts to defuse the crisis and to lessen its
overall impact, and is contrasted with the intransigence
displayed by Churchill and de Gaulle and with the
belligerence of both French and British authorities on the
spot. The final chapters deal with the efforts made to heal
the breach in the Anglo-French relationship by both sides
and the attempt by both to re-evaluate and reform their
policies in the Levant. The troubled course of the Anglo
French alliance in the Levant throughout the remainder of
the war, including the crisis in Syria in May and June 1945,
is examined in a brief epilogue.
i
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
i
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
iv
INTRODUCTION
i) The Foundations Of French And British Influence 1
ii) The Partition Of The Ottoman Empire: Influence
Consolidated
11
iii) The Mandatory Experience
28
iv) The Advent Of War: The Middle East Unsettled 40
v) Invasion And Armistice
49
vi) The Levant: "No Place For Two ... " 61
CHAPTER ONE: THE PRESSURE FOR ELECTIONS
i) "Reminding" The French 83
ii) Keeping The Ball Rolling
88
iii) The Advent Of Catroux 92
iv) The "Second (Or Third) Honeymoon" Continues 96
v) Criticising The Establishment 105
vi) The Establishment Hits Back 112
CHAPTER TWO: THE PRESSURE FOR UNITY
i) The Unwilling Bride 122
ii) Fuelling The Flames 127
iii) "The Monster Of Hampstead" 131
iv) Reading The Banns 143
v) The Bride And Bridegroom Embrace 151
CHAPTER THREE: TROUBLED TIMES AHEAD
i) Counting The Cost of Marriage 155
ii) Deteriorating Relations 161
iii) The Mokkadem Affair 169
iv) The Bride Asserts Himself 173
v) Divorce Proposed 180
CHAPTER FOUR: LONDON INTERLUDE
i) The Middle East War Council's Resolutions 192
ii) Sterling Area Versus Franc Bloc 199
iii) The "Firm Of Casey and Spears" In England 202
iv) Spears's Indictment And The Foreign Office
Critique 206
v) Meetings With Massigli 213
vi) Massigli Proves His Mettle 219
vii) Attempting To Shackle Spears 224
viii) Keeping In Step With Roosevelt 228
ix) Recognition Versus Acceptance 234
ii
CHAPTER FIVE: BUILDING THE HOUSE OF CARDS
i) Lascelles Holds The Fort 240
ii) The Seating Crisis Resolved 248
iii) Syrian Elections: The Assault Commences 253
iv) The Treaty Debate Opened 258
v) Lebanese Elections: Accusations And Counter
Accusations 264
vi) Manoeuvring In A Microcosm 271
CHAPTER SIX: PERSONALITIES AND POLICIES
i) Casting Out Motes 278
ii) Personality Problems Once More To The Fore 284
iii) Explaining Away Frankenstein 298
iv) A Policy Of Firmness ... 308
v) Or a Policy Of Force? 314
CHAPTER SEVEN: COLLISION COURSE
i) The Slippery Slope 321
ii) "Les Dociles Serviteurs De La Politique
Anglaise" 331
iii) Helleu In Algiers 335
iv) The Lebanese Challenge And The French Response 342
v) Spears Demands British Martial Law 348
vi) Reprimanding The French 354
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE BATTLE JOINED
i) Tension Spreads 361
ii) The Prime Minister Intervenes 367
iii) Casey Calls For British Intervention 376
iv) A Posteriori Reasoning 383
v) Makins And Macmillan Tackle The French 391
CHAPTER NINE: LE NUAGE QUI PASSE ...
i) The View From Carlton Gardens 400
ii) The Trouble Shooter Arrives 407
iii) A Time-Limit Determined 415
iv) Much Ado About Nothing 422
v) Breaking The Rules Of Fair Play 427
vi) "Pour Partir En Guerre Contre l'Angleterre ... " 432
CHAPTER TEN: THE CRISIS UNFOLDS
i) Macmillan Aboard The "Renown" 438
ii) Catroux In Beirut 441
iii) Release Or Reinstatement? 445
iv) Calculated Indiscretions 455
Voices Of Conciliation 463
v)
iii
CHAPTER ELEVEN: FASHODA RECALLED
i) Helleu Appeals To De Gaulle 470
ii) De Gaulle Overruled 476
iii) Une "Demarche Comminatoire" 481
iv) "Historians Will Not Fail To Observe ... " 487
v) The Prime Minister Takes Over 494
CHAPTER TWELVE: THE CRISIS RESOLVED
i) The Problem Of Helleu 502
ii) Catroux Advocates "Le Geste Genereux" 505
iii) Released But Not Reinstated 512
iv) Macmillan's And Massigli's "Little Conspiracy" 515
v) De Gaulle Counter-Attacks 520
vi) The British Ultimatum Withdrawn 525
vii) Eden's Directive On The Levant 530
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE AFTERMATH
i) Participation Or Abstention? 536
ii) The War-Path Resumed 542
iii) Cairo Conversations 553
iv) Taking The British To Task 558
v) The British Make Amends 565
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: REFORMATION AND REASSESSMENT
i) The Augean Stable Cleared 571
ii) A Psychoanalysis Of The Cabinet Politique 575
iii) New Blood Required 578
iv) Transferring The Blame 582
Delenda Est Mission Spears 588
v)
vi) The Bright Horizon 595
vii) A Blueprint For The Future 600
608
EPILOGUE
638
CONCLUSIONS
661
BIBLIOGRAPHY
iv
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Though a wealth of literature already exists which deals
to a greater or lesser extent with the various aspects of
the relationship between Britain and France in the Levant
during the Second World War, it is bound together by one
common factor -- practically without exception, no extensive
use has ever been made of French primary source material.
Some authors have chosen to ignore the French aspect
altogether, some have relied on published official material
and personal memoirs and polemics, whilst others acknowledge
the existence of French material, but discount it on grounds
of limited range and accessibility. What has tended to
emerge from these approaches is an Anglo-centric version of
events, an attempt to analyse all aspects of the problematic
relationship from a British sources, with very little
consideration for the French point of view. In making full
use of the material gathered on two short research trips to
Paris, this thesis is a limited attempt and a very small
beginning, at redressing the balance.
On a more general note, when embarking on this research,
I encountered scepticism in various quarters about the
possibility of access to and the quality of French sources.
That scepticism did not prove justified. It is true that
French archives are not always as "user-friendly" as their
British equivalents, to which the opening hours and
restrictions on orders of documents at the Quai d'Orsay are
testament. Admittedly also, French material cannot compare
in range and quality with that on the British side and this,
to a certain extent, is revealed in the thesis. Nonetheless,
there is French material and it is invaluable for any
attempt to gain a proper insight into French mentality and
policies.
Some elaboration is required on the limited span of this
thesis. My original intention was to cover the years 1943 to
1946, though the thesis would then inevitably have been less
detailed. Material was gathered both in France and Britain
to cover these years, though due to exigencies of both time
and space, that material has yet to see the light of day.
Had circumstances permitted, the thesis would have proceeded
beyond 1943 to an account of the troubled, though less
critical, state of affairs during 1944 and an analysis of
the effect on Anglo-French relations of the arrival of
General Beynet in the Levant, of Duff Cooper in Algiers, of
the liberation of France and the removal of General Spears
shortly thereafter. It would then have gone on to examine
how, by May 1945, despite all these developments which
seemed to augur so well for the future of the Anglo-French
alliance, another even more serious crisis erupted in the
Levant during which the intervention of British troops was
not forestalled and a series of frosty exchanges between de
v
Gaulle and Churchill plunged the temperature of Anglo-French
relations to well below zero.
As it stands the thesis is confined to a detailed
coverage of the eventful year of 1943. The year is
particularly important in the context both of the improved
Allied military situation and the vastly strengthened
position of de Gaulle, due to his establishment in North
Africa. In terms of the situation in the Levant, the year is
crucial in that it witnessed the most significant challenge
yet to the French mandatory position there from the
independent and strongly nationalist Lebanese government.
These events provoked a serious crisis in Anglo-French
relations: Britain threatened to take over the Levant by
declaring martial law and de Gaulle retaliated with a
threat to withdraw his troops. A serious rupture was only
narrowly averted by the considerable efforts of the Foreign
Office, Macmillan and Massigli in Algiers, and Catroux in
Beirut.
In order to set new material, both French and British,
in its proper context, it has been necessary to use certain
well-established British primary sources, such as Fa 371,
(General Political Correspondence) and the CAB series
(Cabinet Minutes and Memorandum). Wherever possible however,
I have used lesser known and hitherto unpublished material
to its fullest extent to provide new insights into the
events covered. This is especially so with the vast bulk of
the French sources: the material gathered at the Quai
d'Orsay was the most valuable, and, for example, the
telegrams between Vienot and Massigli are interesting whilst
those from Helleu and Catroux at the time of the Lebanese
crisis are particularly revealing. The archives at
Vincennes, though primarily concerned with the military,
yielded some extremely useful and surprising telegrams. In
the realm of British documents, which have been much more
heavily trawled, I have tried, for example with the Fa 226
(Spears Mission), FO 660 (Minister Resident, Algiers), FO
800 (Makins papers) and WO (War Office) categories, to
incorporate new material where considered appropriate and
relevant.
Inevitably, constraints of space have meant that many
aspects of the complex situation which prevailed in the
Levant are covered only in a peripheral manner or not at
all. The intricacies of the political situation in the
Levant, the intrigues of local politicians and particularly
their considerable success in utilising the British as a
tool in their efforts against the French, have only been
considered when impinging in a direct and significant way on
the relations between Britain and France, as for example, in
the question of the election of the Lebanese President.
There is no attempt to cover American or Soviet involvement
in the area. Developments in the field of Arab unity have
not been discussed, nor has Britain's more general Middle
Eastern policy, with regard to Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and
vi
Transjordan. Equally, important aspects of the Anglo-Free
French relationship outside the Levant have been treated
only in the broadest sense.
For all these shortcomings, I bear full responsibility,
as for any other errors of fact, translation or
interpretation. By way of humble excuse and apology, I offer
a thought of Churchill's. On learning, in December 1942, of
the high grade conditions which were being attached to the
plans for Overlord, he minuted: "The maxim "Nothing avails
but perfection" may be spelt shorter, "Paralysis"."
During the research and preparation of this thesis, I
have incurred a debt of gratitude to institutions and
individuals alike. I am grateful to the University of Leeds
for the award of a postgraduate studentship, without which
my research could never have been undertaken. I am most
grateful to my supervisor, Professor David Dilks, who first
encouraged me to embark on postgraduate research. In
addi tion to providing me with invaluable advice over the
years, he has engaged in lengthy correspondence on my
behalf, was instrumental in securing me a grant from the
Drummond-Wolff travel bursaries towards the cost of a
research visit to Paris, as well as an extension of the
time-limit imposed by the University to enable me to
complete the thesis. More recently, he has had to persuade
me to put pen to paper, then struggle through the generally
illegible results; finally, he has had to contend with bulky
and incomplete typed drafts, in insufficient time. For all
this assistance, I am indebted to him. I am additionally
grateful to Vivien Collins and Lisa Lodge, the Departmental
secreraries, and to Penny Todd, Professor Dilks's private
secretary, for their part in this saga. Also wi thin the
University of Leeds, I must record my thanks to the late Mr.
Graham Ross who provided me with several useful articles and
to Dr. Richard Whiting for words of encouragement on
occasional meetings in the Public Record Office.
I am grateful to the staff at all the archives and
libraries in Britain and Paris which it has been my
privilege to use, but especially so to those at the Public
Record Office.
In the course of this research, I have made numerous
friends and acquaintances amongst researchers in general and
fellow students on the PhD "quest". I would like to express
my appreciation to them en bloc for the spirit of
camaraderie which has always prevailed and in which I much
enjoyed participating. I would like to extend particular
thanks to Dr. Stefan Petrow and Dr. Moshe Gammer for their
advice and their loyal friendship.
I would like to express my deep gratitude to my family
and friends for their faith, their hope and their charity.
My deepest thanks of all are to Peter, to whom I dedicate
this work.
1
INTRODUCTION
i) The Foundations of Franco-British Influence
Tradi tionally, the Levant1 had always been a fertile
breeding ground for Anglo-French rivalry and mistrust and
the period spanned by the Second World War proved no
exception. The sowing of the seeds of doubt and suspicion
between the two nations pre-dates even the First World War
by many decades, and as such any detailed examination of the
genesis of the conflict falls outside the limited scope of
this thesis; nonetheless, to achieve a better understanding
of the legacy of distrust between the two Allies, a general
outline of the history of the British and French presence in
the Levant is both relevant and beneficial.
The first significant Franco-British involvement in the
Levant can be traced to the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, to the Crusades, or the Christian Holy War
against the infidel; thereafter, Britain and France became
engaged in their own Hundred Years' War, during which the
lands of the Near and Middle East were engulfed by the
ascendant Ottoman Turks, though both nations maintained a
trading relationship with various regions of the vast
Ottoman Empire2 In 1535, Francis I obtained the first
•
capi tulationary grant from Suleiman the Magnificent, by
which France gained certain privileges concerning both the
maintenance of her commercial links and the continued
enjoyment of religious liberties for her nationals within
the Empire. Other European powers subsequently acquired
similar capitulations, including Britain in 1583; these
The Levant traditionally denoted the Eastern part of
1
the Mediterranean and the regions immediately adjacent to
it , i.e. those countries known in recent times as Syria,
Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan. The term gradually came
to be used to relate more specifically to Syria and Lebanon.
Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, (London, 1987), pp 56-59.
2
E '"
2
capitulations were frequently renewed and restated. 3 In one
such renewal in 1740, France acquired the right to protect
all missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, regardless of
nationali ty; as time passed, this right was extended not
merely to foreign clerics, but to their congregations,
including the indigenous Catholic population too. "Thus
France came to view herself as the representative throughout
the Levant, not only of Catholicism, but of Christianity in
all its forms".
4
During the eighteenth century the vulnerability of the
Ottoman Empire was already apparent; it suffered assaults
from Poland, Austria and three defeats inflicted by Russia.
In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte led an expedition to Egypt
aiming to strike at Britain by threatening what had become
the linchpin of her defence of India. Though initially
successful, he was forced to abandon his armies two years
later and Britain joined the Ottomans in overseeing their
expulsion in 1801. So began "the long Anglo-French rivalry
for political control over the Arab lands", for the episode
alerted Britain not only to the need to safeguard her
imperial possessions, but also to the fact that "the
principal menace" was not Russia as she had formerly
believed, but France. 5
Britain's position and interests were further endangered
when Muhammad Ali, a young Albanian officer amongst the
Ottoman forces sent to expel the French, drew inspiration
from Napoleon's example and seized power himself in Egypt.
Recognised as viceroy in 1805 by the Ottoman Empire,
Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East
3
and North Africa, (London, 1968), pp 2-3.
W. I. Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East.
4
The Failure of Policy in Syria and the Lebanon, 1900-1914,
(University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), p 13.
Mansfield, op cit, p 105.
5