The Apologetics of Evil: The Case of Iago

124 Pages·2009·0.81 MB·English

by  Richard Raatzsch

Copyright(cid:1)2009byPrincetonUniversityPress
PublishedbyPrincetonUniversityPress,41WilliamStreet,Princeton,
NewJersey08540
IntheUnitedKingdom:PrincetonUniversityPress,6OxfordStreet,
Woodstock,OxfordshireOX201TW
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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Raatzsch,Richard.
Theapologeticsofevil:thecaseofIago=RichardRaatzsch;
translatedfromGermanbyLadislausLo¨b.
p. cm.—(Princetonmonographsinphilosophy)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978-0-691-13733-9(acid-freepaper) 1. Shakespeare,William,
1564–1616—Characters—Iago. 2. Shakespeare,William,1564–1616.
Othello. 3. Evilinliterature. I. Title.
PR2993.I3R332009
822.303—dc22 2008040961
BritishLibraryCataloging-in-PublicationDataisavailable
ThisbookhasbeencomposedinJansonTypeface
Printedonacid-freepaper.¥
press.princeton.edu
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Contents
Introduction
1
Chapter One
The Concept of Iago
11
1.1 The Originof the Concept 11
1.2 Actingwithouta Motive? 14
1.3 Iago’s Modeof Beingand the Idea of a Panopticon 30
Chapter Two
Apologia for Iago
77
2.1 Defense, Justification, and Understanding 77
2.2 Defending Iago 91
2.3 Why Iago Perishes,and What His Downfall Means 103
Acknowledgments
109
Index
111

Introduction
1. If there is any reason why Iago is called ‘‘Iago’’ (and
not ‘‘Othello,’’ ‘‘Cassio,’’ or whatever else), it could be
becauseoftheresemblancebetweentheword‘‘Iago’’and
the word‘‘ego.’’ Forjust asthe word‘‘ego’’ isconnected
with the concept of egoism, contemplation of Iago’s
actions, too, leads to a concept—the concept of Iago—
which resembles the concept of egoism.
Formanypeople,callingsomeoneanegoistisawayof
criticizing him morally. However, some of those who
thinkandspeakthatwayalsoagreethategoismisamore
or less natural stance of humans who, as living individu-
als, just have to take care of their own well-being or at
least of their survival. If, however, this is true, how can
onecriticizesomeonemorallyforbeinganegoist,except
byusingthewordinadifferent,althoughrelatedsense—
and so by being the victim of some kind of confusion?
However,somepeople,mostlyphilosophers,wouldbein-
clinedtosaythatthereisnotonlynothingmorallywrong
aboutbeinganegoist,butthat,properlyunderstood,ego-
ism is the real basis of morality. If egoism is indeed our
natural stance toward one another, which other natural