Table Of Content

INDEX TO AUTHORS BASEMAN, KENNETH C. with Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and Glenn A. Woroch. Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating Systems Software. XL:265-315. BAUMANN, MICHAEL G. and Paul E. Godek. Could and Would Understood: Critical Elas- ticities and the Merger Guidelines. XL:885-899. BELDERBOS, RENE and Peter Holmes. An Economic Analysis of Matsushita Revisited. XL:825-857. BLair, ROGER D. The Ghost of Albrecht: Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft. XL:205-225. and Amanda K. Esquibel. The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat. XL:257-264. and Amanda K. Esquibel. Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging. XL:371-396. BRENNAN, TIMOTHY J. Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today? XL:455- 482. CORREIA, EDWARD O. Antitrust and Liberalism. XL:99-168. DEVLIN, ROSE ANNE and Stylianos Perrakis. Legislating Competition in the Russian Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy. XL:901-927. ECKARD, E. WoopROwW The Impact of the 1980’s Merger Movement on U.S. Industrial Concentration. XL:397-421. ECONOMIDES, NICHOLAS and Lawrence J. White. Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient Is the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule?” XL:557-579. Index-3 INDEX TO AUTHORS EsposiITo, FRANCES FERGUSON and Louis Esposito. Monopolization, Social Welfare and Overlap. XL:433-453. Esposito, Louis see Esposito, Frances Ferguson ESQUIBEL, AMANDA K. see Blair, Roger D. GABEL, DAVID and David I. Rosenbaum. Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entre- preneurial Capital: Lessons from Wisconsin. XL:581—608. GANDAL, NEIL and David J. Salant. Hollygopoly: Oligopolistic Competition for (Hollywood) Movies. XL:699-712. GopEK, PAUL E. see Baumann, Michael G. HAUSMAN, JERRY A. and Timothy J. Tardiff. Efficient Local Exchange Competition. XL:529-556. HAZLETT, THOMAS W. Predation in Local Cable TV Markets. XL:609-644. HOLMES, PETER see Belderbos, René KAHAI, SIMRAN K. with David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo. Deregulation and Predation in Long-Distance Telecommunications: An Empirical Test. XL:645-666. KASERMAN, DAVID L. see Kahai, Simran K. INDEX TO AUTHORS Kass, MICHAEL W. and Michael A. Salinger. Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases? XL:667-698. Kovacic, WILLIAM E. Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight. XL:483-499. LAINE, CHARLES R. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: A Concentration Measure Taking the Consumer’s Point of View. XL:423-432. LOPATKA, JOHN E. Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit. XL:1-97. and William H. Page. Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making. XL:317-370. Mayo, JOHN W. see Kahai, Simran K. NOLL, ROGER G. The Role of Antitrust in Telecommunications. XL:501-—528. PAGE, WILLIAM H. see Lopatka, John E. PERRAKIS, STYLIANOS see Devlin, Rose Anne ROSENBAUM, DAVvIp I. see Gabel, David Ross, STEPHEN F. Justice Breyer and the Fault Lines of Antitrust. XL:169-204. SALANT, DAvip J. see Gandal, Neil Index-5 INDEX TO AUTHORS SALINGER, MICHAEL A. see Klass, Michael W. SHEPHERD, GEORGE B. Overlap and Antitrust: Fixing Prices in a Smoke-Filled Classroom. XL:859-884. STEVENS, DALLAL Framing Competition Law Within an Emerging Economy: The Case of Brazil. XL:929-971. TARDIFF, TIMOTHY J. see Hausman, Jerry A. TRAVERS, ARTHUR H. Commercial Bribery and the Antitrust Laws. XL:779-824. WARREN-BOULTON, FREDERICK R. see Baseman, Kenneth C. WHITE, LAWRENCE J. see Economides, Nicholas WiLcox, THOMAS C. Behavioral Remedies in a Post-Chicago World: It’s Time to Revise the Vertical Merger Guidelines. XL:227-256. WISE, MICHAEL O. Antitrust’s Newest “New Learning” Returns the Law to Its Roots: Chaos and Adaptation as New Metaphors for Competition Pol- icy. XL:713-777. Woroch, GLENN A. see Baseman, Kenneth C. INDEX TO SUBJECTS ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT Behavioral Remedies in a Post-Chicago World: It’s Time to Revise the Vertical Merger Guidelines. Thomas C. Willcox. XL:227-256. BREYER, STEPHEN Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit. John E. Lopatka. XL:1-97. Antitrust and Liberalism. Edward O. Correia. XL:99-168. Justice Breyer and the Fault Lines of Antitrust. Stephen F. Ross. XL:169-204. The Ghost of Albrecht: Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft. Roger D. Blair. XL:205-225. CARTELS Monopolization, Social Welfare and Overlap. Frances Ferguson Esposito and Louis Esposito. XL:433-453. Overiap and Antitrust: Fixing Prices in a Smoke-Filled Classroom. George B. Shepherd. XL:859-884. COMMERCIAL BRIBERY Commercial Bribery and the Antitrust Laws. Arthur H. Travers. XL:779- 824. COMPETITION The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:257-264. Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating Systems Software. Kenneth C. Baseman, Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and Glenn A. Woroch. XL:265-315. Index-7 INDEX TO SUBJECTS Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making. John E. Lopatka and William H. Page. XL:317-370. Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:371-396. Efficient Local Exchange Competition. Jerry A. Hausman and Timothy J. Tardiff. XL:529-556. Legislating Competition in the Russian Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy. Rose Anne Devlin and Stylianos Perrakis. XL:901-927. Framing Competition Law Within an Emerging Economy: The Case of Brazil. Dallal Stevens. XL:929-971. CONSENT DECREES Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases? Michael W. Klass and Michael A. Salinger. XL:667-698. DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS Hollygopoly: Oligopolistic Competition for (Hollywood) Movies. Neil Gandal and David J. Salant. XL:699-712. ECONOMICS General Antitrust’s Newest “New Learning” Returns the Law to Its Roots: Chaos and Adaptation as New Metaphors for Competition Policy. Michael O. Wise. XL:713-777. Market Structure The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: A Concentration Measure Taking the Consumer’s Point of View. Charles R. Laine. XL:423—432. Index-8 INDEX TO SUBJECTS Is the Theery Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today? Timothy J. Brennan. XL:455-—482. The Role of Antitrust in Telecommunications. Roger G. Noll. XL:501-528. “EFFICIENT COMPONENT PRICING RULE” Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient Is the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule?” Nicholas Economides and Lawrence J. White. XL:557-579. FOREIGN ANTITRUST LAWS Brazil Framing Competition Law Within an Emerging Economy: The Case of Brazil. Dallal Stevens. XL:929-971. Russian Federation Legislating Competition in the Russian Federation: A New Challenge for Antitrust Policy. Rose Anne Devlin and Stylianos Perrakis. XL:901-927. FUTURE OF ANTITRUST Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit. John E. Lopatka. XL:1-97. Antitrust and Liberalism. Edward O. Correia. XL:99-168. Justice Breyer and the Fault Lines of Antitrust. Stephen F. Ross. XL:169-204. The Ghost of Albrecht: Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellischaft. Roger D. Blair. XL:205-225. INDEX TO SUBJECTS HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: A Concentration Measure Taking the Consumer’s Point of View. Charles R. Laine. XL:423-432. INDUSTRY STUDIES Computer Software The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:257-264. Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Tech- nical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for Operating Systems Software. Kenneth C. Baseman, Frederick R. Warren-Boulton and Glenn A. Woroch. XL:265-315. Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making. John E. Lopatka and William H. Page. XL:317-370. Some Remarks on Monopoiy Leveraging. Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel. XL:371-396. Manufacturing The Impact of the 1980’s Merger Movement on U.S. Industrial Concentration. E. Woodrow Eckard. XL:397-421. Telecommunications Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today? Timothy J. Brennan. XL:455-—482. Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight. William E. Kovacic. XL:483—499. The Role of Antitrust in Telecommunications. Roger G. Noll. XL:501-528. Efficient Local Exchange Competition. Jerry A. Hausman and Timothy J. Tardiff. XL:529-556. Index-10 INDEX TO SUBJECTS Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient Is the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule?” Nicholas Economides and Lawrence J. White. XL:557-579. Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons from Wisconsin. David Gabel and David I. Rosenbaum. XL:581-608. Predation in Local Cable TV Markets. Thomas W. Hazlett. XL:609-644. Deregulation and Predation in Long-Distance Telecommunications: An Empirical Test. Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo. XL:645-666. Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases? Michael W. Klass and Michael A. Salinger. XL:667-698. Hollygopoly: Oligopolistic Competition for (Hollywood) Movies. Neil Gandal and David J. Salant. XL:699-712. LANDMARK CASES An Economic Analysis of Matsushita Revisited. René Belderbos and Peter Holmes. XL:825-857. MARKET DEFINITION Could and Would Understood: Critical Elasticities and the Merger Guidelines. Michael G. Baumann and Paul E. Godek. XL:885-899. MERGERS Horizontal The Impact of the 1980’s Merger Movement on U.S. Industrial Concentration. E. Woodrow Eckard. XL:397-421. Vertical Behavioral Remedies in a Post-Chicago World: It’s Time to Revise the Vertical Merger Guidelines. Thomas C. Willcox. XL:227-256. Index-11 INDEX TO SUBJECTS OVERLAP Monopolization, Social Welfare and Overlap. Frances Ferguson Esposito and Louis Esposito. XL:433-453. Overlap and Antitrust: Fixing Prices in a Smoke-Filled Classroom. George B. Shepherd. XL:859-884. PREDATORY PRICING Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons from Wisconsin. David Gabel and David I. Rosenbaum. XL:581-608. Predation in Local Cable TV Markets. Thomas W. Hazlett. XL:609-644. Deregulation and Predation in Long-Distance Telecommunications: An Empirical Test. Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo. XL:645-666. An Economic Analysis of Matsushita Revisited. René Belderbos and Peter Holmes. XL:825-857. REGULATION Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight. William E. Kovacic. XL:483-499. ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT Commercial Bribery and the Antitrust Laws. Arthur H. Travers. XL:779-824. THEORY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS Antitrust’s Newest “New Learning” Returns the Law to Its Roots: Chaos and Adaptation as New Metaphors for Competition Policy. Michael O. Wise. XL:713-777. Index-12