The Angolan Presidency: - Maka Angola

26 Pages·2012·0.85 MB·English

by  Justin Pearce

The Angolan Presidency: The
Epicentre of Corruption

Rafael Marques de Morais
Index

Movicel ........................................................................................................................... 4
Portmill, Investimentos e Telecomunicações (40%) .................................................. 6
Modus Comunicare - Telecomunicações (19%) ......................................................... 6
Ipang – Indústria de Papel e Derivados, Limitada (10%) ........................................... 7
Lambda (6%) .............................................................................................................. 7
Novatel (5%) ............................................................................................................... 8
Notes on Movicel ....................................................................................................... 9
Banco Espírito Santo Angola ........................................................................................ 11
Biocom – The Angolan Bio-Energy Company .............................................................. 14
Nazaki Oil ..................................................................................................................... 16
Media Nova .................................................................................................................. 21
World Wide Capital ...................................................................................................... 22
Lumanhe ...................................................................................................................... 23
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 24

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Introduction

This report shows how the Presidency of the Republic of Angola has become the site
of shady business deals, a fact that has consequences for citizens’ freedom and
development, as well as for the country’s political and economic stability. The text
responds President José Eduardo dos Santos’s call, on 21 November 2009, for a zero
tolerance policy against corruption.

For the sake of clarity, this investigation limits itself to a small demonstration of the
business practices employed by the minister of State and head of the Military Bureau
(Casa Militar) in the Presidency, General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior
“Kopelipa”. This is the man responsible for co-ordinating the defence and security
sectors of the state. General Kopelipa is one of the triumvirate that today dominates
Angola’s political economy, along with General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento
“Dino”, the presidency’s head of telecommunications, and Manuel Vicente, the
chairman and CEO of the national oil company, Sonangol. Their dealings
acknowledge no distinction between public and private affairs. Manuel Vicente is the
link that connects the considerable powers accumulated by the generals, to
Sonangol and to his own position as one of the most powerful members of the MPLA
Political Bureau, for being the president’s protégé, and in charge of overseeing the
private business dealings of the ruling party.

Sonangol is the biggest company in the country and the state’s major source of
revenue. Several analysts have viewed Sonangol as the most important factor in
ensuring the survival of President Dos Santos’s regime – in the worlds of finance,
politics and diplomacy as well as the main source of illegal self-enrichment for the
top state officials.

In some instances the report refers to the relationships of mutual interest and
complicity with other members of the government and public officials in carrying out
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business, that involves the looting of state assets, and other acts that go against the
law of the land.

Key sectors such as petroleum, telecommunications, banking, media and diamonds
form part of the business empire built by these figures. The firms involved include
Movicel, Biocom, Banco Espírito Santo Angola, Nazaki Oil & Gás, Media Nova, World
Wide Capital and Lumanhe.1

The report frequently refers to the Law on Public Probity, even in cases that date
from before it was signed into law in March 2010 and consolidated various anti-
corruption provisions that had been in force since 1989.2 All of the articles contained
within the Law on Public Probity can be found among this earlier body of law. In the
interests of greater clarity, this text therefore refers to the Law on Public Probity as
an overarching reference to the laws in force since 1989. For instance, the Law on
the Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers (Law 21/90) prohibits public office
bearers from entering into business deals over which they would have influence or
decision-making powers in the course of their official duties (art. 10, 2).
Movicel

There are currently only two mobile phone operators in the country, Unitel and
Movicel. As a private operator, Unitel started its services in 2001, as a joint-venture
between Sonangol, Portugal Telecom and two Angolan private companies GENI and
Vidatel, each one with 25% of the shares.

Last year, through Resolution 67/09 of 26 August, the Council of Ministers ordered,
without a public tender process, that Movicel be privatised and sold off to a

1 The cases disclosed in this paper are based on official records in my possession. Otherwise, the
secondary sources used are identified in the footnotes.
2 The Decree 23/90 (On the Patrimonial Benefits of Public Office Bearers), the Decree 24/90 (On the
Rules for Gifts to Public Office Bearers), the Law 22/90 (Law on the State Discipline), the 13/96
(Statutory Law for Members of Government and their Salaries) constitute the body of legislation
harmonised in the Law on Public Probity, and thus by the latter revoked.
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consortium of Angolan businessmen at a cost of US$200 million. The Council of
Ministers tried to justify the decision by referring to the difficulty in finding investors
for the privatisation of the company, and to the urgency to raise funds for the
government coffers “in the face of the global financial crisis”. This decision,
according to the government, had been made possible by the identification of
“national private investors who can guarantee the essential financial resources for
the immediate implementation of Movicel’s investment plan, and to boost the
financial reserves hoped for by the national treasury”.

In the meantime, 59% of Movicel’s capital was transferred to two companies
formally belonging to high-ranking officers subordinate to General Kopelipa: Portmill
and Modus Comunicare. On 10 June 2009, General Kopelipa, General Dino and
Manuel Vicente, formally left Portmill Investimentos e Telecomunicações, of which
they had been the owners with 99,96% of the capital, split evenly among
themselves. They gave up their shares, through Portuguese business manager
Ismênio Coelho Macedo, to a group of high-ranking officers in the Presidential
Guard. This is a unit which falls under the Military Bureau. Regarding Portmill,
Lieutenant-Colonel Leonardo Lidinikeni, officer of the president’s security detail,
holds 99,96% of the shares in the company. Lieutenant-Colonel Tadeu Agostinho dos
Santos Hikatala, officer of the presidential security detail, holds 99.92% of the shares
in Modus Comunicare.

Ismênio Coelho Macedo also had the task of buying and restructuring a small
communications, advertising and marketing company Modus Comunicare –
Comunicação e Imagem Ltd, whose shares were never sold publicly, but rather
divided out among top officers in the Presidential Guard. On 14 August 2009 the
company was transformed into a limited company dedicated to telecommunications.
This date shows that the legal process to change the company’s status was
concluded only two weeks after Dos Santos’s government had granted it 19% of
Movicel’s capital.

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On 29 July 2009, the Council of Ministers approved the privatisation of 80% of
Movicel’s capital by the Angolan companies Portmill Investimentos e
Telecomunicações (40%), Modus Comunicare (19%), Ipang – Indústria de Papel e
Derivados (10%), Lambda (6%) and Novatel (5%). The remainder of Movicel’s capital
is held by the state enterprises Angola Telecom and Empresa Nacional de Correios e
Telégrafos de Angola, with 18% and 2% respectively.

These tables show the companies that benefited, and their shareholders.
Portmill, Investimentos e Telecomunicações (40%)

Shareholder Role
Lieutenant-Colonel Leonardo Officer of the President’s Security Detail,
Lidinikeni Presidential Guard
Francisco Ndeufeta
Manuel dos Santos
Rodrigues Cardoso
Nelson Paulo António
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Mbava Psychological Action Department
Military Bureau of the Presidency
Modus Comunicare - Telecomunicações (19%)

Shareholder Role
Lieutenant Colonel Tadeu Officer of the President’s Security Detail,
Agostinho dos Santos Hikatala Presidential Guard
João Ricardo Belarmino
Lieutenant Colonel João Adviser to the head of the Presidential
José António Soares Guard, General Alfredo Tyaunda
José Kakonda
Colonel José Luís Alves Military Bureau of the Presidency

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Ipang – Indústria de Papel e Derivados, Limitada (10%)

Shareholder Role
N’datembu – Comércio Geral,
Importação e Exportação Ltda.

Ipang is the only beneficiary company that has businessmen in its shareholding
structure. These are Miguel Domingos Martins and his three children, lawyer
Ildeberto Manuel Teixeira and the Portuguese national José Mamade Etbal. Another
businessman associated with Ipang is Spanish national Óscar Ouersagasti Soraluce.
Ipang's only publicly known business activity is its shareholding participation in
Movicel.

More information about Ipang and its other potential investors will be updated in
due time.

Lambda (6%)

Shareholders Role
José Carvalho da Rocha Minister of Telecomunications and
Information Tecnologies
Aristides Safeca Deputy minister of Telecomunications
Zulmira Mitange da Rocha Wife of minister José Carvalho da Rocha
Arminda Vireya Safeca de Sá Relative of deputy minister Aristides Safeca
Antónia Dias dos Santos Caxinda

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While serving as National Director of Telecommunications, Aristides Cardoso
Frederico Safeca took part in Movicel’s Privatisation Board, in accordance with
Despatch 67/07 by Finance Minster José Pedro de Morais, dated 19 January 2007.
This commission was headed by the then economic advisor to President dos Santos,
Archer Mangueira.

Since October 2006, Aristides Safeca has also been chairman and chief executive of a
Belgian company Parisa. Aristides Safeca and his brothers Alcides Safeca, who is
secretary of State for the Budget in the Finance Ministry, and Amílcar Safeca, the
director of the mobile phone operator Unitel, hold a majority share in Trans Omnia,
where they are in partnership with General Fernando Vasquez Araújo, head of the
Chief Directorate for Weapons and Technology of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Trans Omnia has benefited from multimillion-dollar
contracts for supplying foodstuffs to the FAA, a topic that will be dealt with on
another occasion.

In spite of the new Law on Probity, Aristides Safeca still enjoys impunity as he
muddles up his public duties with his private affairs. While deputy minister of
Telecommunications he is also chairman and administrator of Parisa, a foreign
enterprise, and continues to do numerous business deals with the state to his own
self-enrichment and that of his family and associates.
Novatel (5%)

Shareholder Role
Hélder Bruno da Gama Bento Former head of Movicel’s legal
department
Paula Sammer Pinto Jorge
Aurélio Vimbuando Muelecumbi
Onezandro Catinhe Mauro
Santos Piedade
Marília da Conceição dos Santos Kissuá
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The transfer of 5% shares of Movicel to Novatel is yet another example of the
misappropriation of state property. Novatel was created on 29 April 2009 after the
report from Movicel’s Privatisation Board and three months before the Council of
Ministers announced the beneficiaries of the privatisation process.

At the time Movicel was formally privatised, the shareholders of Novatel had no
private or collective assets which could have qualified them as entrepreneurs. One
person involved with Novatel denied being the real beneficiary. However, even
though there are legal loopholes to conceal the names of beneficiaries, the names
stated above are of the registered shareholders who, in accordance to the statutes
of Novatel (art. 5, 1) are the real owners. Thus, by all means, these individuals are
formally responsible for the legal rights and obligations entitled to the registered
shareholders.

Notes on Movicel

The names among the shareholders in the businesses that were granted shares as a
result of the privatisation of Movicel clearly illustrate the government’s dishonesty.
Contrary to the official explanation, this was not a deal that involved a group of
national private investors, and certainly not one with the kind of financial resources
that the treasury so needed in the light of “the global financial crisis”. There has
been no public or official confirmation that the sum of US$200 million has been paid
to the state. Moreover, several economists have estimated that Movicel is worth a
few times more than that sum. The deal was simply a case of handing out state
assets to individuals, in which General Kopelipa, with the connivance other
influential bodies close to the presidency, and the Telecommunications and
Information Technology Ministry are the main beneficiaries.

In terms of the Law on Public Probity, members of the government and high officials
in the presidency are breaking the law in various ways. The principle of public
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probity prohibits any public servant from accepting loans, favours or gifts that might
affect “the independence of his or her judgement and the credibility and authority of
the public administration and its institutions and services”.

The privatisation of Movicel can be seen as an unscrupulous act by the head of
government, President Dos Santos, in granting favours to his subordinates. One
lawyer, who preferred to write anonymously, describes the privatisation of Movicel
as “an administrative act suffering from the vice of abusing power for the sake of
private interest”. According to the lawyer, this abuse of power occurs “when the
administration does not pursue the ends of public interest but rather of private
interest, for reasons of family relationships, friendship… corruption, or any other
motives of a private nature”. 3

Movicel under public ownership was one of the most profitable and well organised
of the state businesses, with more than 2.5 million customers. The privatisation of
Movicel did not make it more efficient, or bring in more money for the state. At the
same time the privatisation undermined market competitiveness and further
weakened the standing of the private sector, by strengthening the grip that
government officials, doubling as businessmen, have over the private sector as a
result of the plundering of state assets.

The same lawyer discusses the legal invalidity of the privatisation of Movicel. “The
absence of public tender, as required by the law, renders null the procedure and
subsequent contracts, owing to the omission of an essential element” (Articles 76(2)
line f and 127 of Legal Decree 16A/95 of 15 December).

According to the lawyer’s arguments:

3 See Semanário Angolense, “A (i)legalidade do processo de privatização da Movicel”,
http://semanario-angolense.com/home/semanario_angolense_333.pdf, Number 333, 12-19
September 2010, page 29.
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