The Anglo-Irish Truce

373 Pages·2014·1.5 MB·English

University of Limerick

Ollscoil Luimnigh

The Anglo - Irish Truce:
An analysis of its immediate military impact, 8 - 11 July 1921

Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc

Ph.D. 2014
University of Limerick

Ollscoil Luimnigh

The Anglo - Irish Truce:
An analysis of its immediate military impact, 8 - 11 July 1921

Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc

Thesis presented to the University of Limerick for the award of the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Supervisor: Dr. Ruán O’Donnell

Submitted to the University of Limerick,
September 2014
Abstract

This thesis is a study of the dynamics of the Anglo-Irish Truce of 11 July 1921 which
brought a formal conclusion to the Irish War of Independence. Although this work
explores the origins, character and significance of the agreement, its primary focus is an
analysis of the effect the announcement the impending armistice had on the use of lethal
violence in the final days and hours of the conflict. It uses empirical data to interrogate
existing hypotheses, and test popular theories surrounding the cessation of the Irish
Republican Army’s military campaign. Furthermore, it examines in detail the hitherto
neglected subject of the reaction and responses of the British forces in Ireland to the
agreement. This study also establishes the role the advent of the Truce played in
fomenting ‘Belfast’s Bloody Sunday’, one of the most intense outbreaks of sectarian
violence in modern Irish history. This thesis addresses key questions which are central to
understanding the Truce and the conflict as a whole. The new research presented in this
study challenges an established historical narrative. The empirical findings make a useful
contribution to the development of a more complex and comprehensive history of the
Irish revolutionary period.
The research contained in this thesis arrives at a number of defining conclusions.
The rank and file of both the IRA and British forces were taken completely unawares by
the advent of the ceasefire and, contrary to previous claims; there was no premeditated or
concerted national campaign by either side in an attempt to inflict as many fatalities on
their enemies as possible immediately before the conflict ended. A handful of provincial
IRA units issued orders to launch fresh military offensives after the announcement of the
Truce but these had a desultory effect. Contrary to previous claims these units
concentrated on regular military operations such as ambushes and barrack attacks rather
than so called ‘soft targets’ such as the execution of civilians and assassinations of
members of the British forces. The vast majority of IRA operations which occurred
nationally in the final days and hours of the conflict were motivated by local factors
rather than national political developments.
Although the IRA continued to use lethal violence right up to the beginning of the
Truce, almost all of these attacks were typical of those which had developed during the
  i
conflict and were not specifically motivated by the announcement. The British forces in
southern Ireland engaged in similar military operations but, like their enemies, there is no
evidence to suggest that these operations were specifically motivated by the impending
ceasefire. Only in Belfast, where there was sustained inter-communal violence in the final
days of the war, can reaction to the Truce be said to have resulted in an upsurge. Even in
that instance, negative loyalist reaction to the ceasefire was just one of a number of
contributory causes, amongst which local factors predominated. Ultimately, the use of
lethal violence in the immediate pre-Truce period, though often brutal, was largely
typical of the conditions which had developed in that conflict. The events and killings in
July 1921, often cited as having been conceived as a deliberate reaction to the
announcement of the Truce, were infact almost wholly coincidental to the machinations
which brought the conflict to a formal end.

ii
Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Ruán O’Donnell, for his confidence in me and his
support and assistance during the writing of this thesis.

I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Dr. John O’Callaghan for his invaluable help and
advice during my research.

Thanks are due also to other historians who have helped with my endeavours, including
Dr. Seán Gannon, Dr. John Borgonovo, Dr. Andrew Bielenberg, Dr. William Mulligan,
Dr. Philip McConway, Dr. Thomás Mac Conn Mara, Dr. Daithi Ó Corrain, Dr. Anne
Matthews, Dr. William Sheehan, Dr. Gerard Noonan, Dr. Brian Hanley, Dr. Tim Horgan,
Dr. William Kautt, Dr. Billy MagFhloinn, Fr, Brian Murphy O.S.B., Cormac Ó Comhraí,
John Dorney, Tommy Graham, Donal Fallon, Barry Keane, Liz Gillis, Tom Toomey, Des
Long, William Butler, Liam O’Duibhir, Jim McDermott, Seán Enright, Gerry White,
Brendan O’Shea, Cormac O’Malley, Liam Hogan, Mike Maguire, Phil Flood and Kathy
Hegarty Thorne.

A special thanks to my parents Pat and Monica for their financial assistance during my
time at university, and to my sister Deirdre and my brother Kevin for their support.

Finally, thanks to my wife Anne Maria for all her encouragement, love and support.

  iii
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, represents my own work.

Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc

iv
Table of Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgements iii
Declaration iv
List of Tables ix
Key to abbreviations x

Chapter One: Introduction 01

Chapter Two: The political and military origins of the Truce and its transmission to combatants

(I) Introduction 09

(II) Early peace initiatives 10
November 1920: Military developments, Roger Sweetman’s appeal and the Peace Resolution 14
Archbishop Clune’s negotiations with the British Government 19
The British cabinet divided, March - May 1921 26

(III) The failure of the Government of Ireland Act: political crisis and the British need to end hostilities 29
The Empire, international commitments and British military difficulties in Ireland 34
Stagnation of the military conflict, and the impetus for a Truce 38

(IV) The final negotiation of a Truce, July 1921 43
The question of IRA belligerency 48
Knowledge of the British and Irish combatants that a Truce was imminent 51
IRA ceasefire dispatches: orders to ground arms or escalate activity? 57

Chapter Three: The announcement of the Truce and the execution of suspected spies by the IRA

(I) The intelligence war 61
The execution of suspected spies and informers: theories
Comparison: ‘short shrift for spies’, British counter-intelligence in World War One 63
The announcement of the Truce and its impact on the intelligence war 68

(II) The execution of suspected spies immediately prior to the Truce 69
The killing of David Cummins 71
The killing of ‘Eric Steadman’ 76
The killing of Major George Bernard O’Conor 78
The killing of John Poynton 81
The killing of William J. Nolan 83
  v
The killing of John H. N. Begley 86
Failed IRA attempts to kill suspected spies 87

(III) Anti-Protestant sectarianism? 92
Ex-servicemen and former members of the RIC 107
The question of ‘guilt’ of those killed by the IRA prior to the Truce 113

(IV) Timing: A rush for justice? 118
Non-fatal punishment of suspected spies by the IRA immediately prior to the Truce 120
Assessment 123

Chapter Four: IRA attacks on off-duty British troops following the announcement of the Truce

(I) Introduction 128
The Hague Convention of 1907 and guerrilla attacks on off-duty troops 132

(II) ‘Uniformed Spies’: IRA attacks on off-duty RIC personnel, 8 - 11 July 1921 134
Constable Alfred Needham 137
Constable Frederick Cormer 140
Constable Alexander Clarke 142
Sergeant James King 145
Planned attack on the Special Constabulary at Newry and the killing of Draper Holmes 147
Non-Fatal attacks on off-duty members of the RIC 150
The attack on Constable Farmiloe 151
The abduction of Constables Atwell and Doyle, and Special Constable Sinnamon 153
Other IRA actions taken against off-duty members of the RIC 155

(III) IRA attacks on off-duty British military personnel, 8 - 11 July 1921 156
The ‘Ellis Quarry shootings’: historiography 160
The ‘Ellis Quarry shootings’: factual narrative 164
The ‘Ellis Quarry shootings’: theories 167
Private Richard Edward Larter 170
Sergeant Edward Mears 171
Attack on British Army officers near Kilmallock 172
British troops captured by the IRA prior to the Truce and released unharmed 173
The Dublin ‘Hit Up’ 175
Assessment 178

vi
Chapter Five: Pre-Truce offensives and IRA military operations, 8 - 11 July 1921
(I) Introduction 182
The 1st Eastern Division IRA pre-Truce offensive 183
The 3rd Tipperary Brigade IRA pre-Truce offensive 188
The combined 1st and 2nd Kerry Brigades IRA pre-Truce offensive 191

(II) Analysis of the IRA’s military campaign nationally between 8 - 11 July 1921 198
Pre-Truce military activity in the IRA’s 1st Western Division (Clare and Galway) 198
Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA’s Cork Brigades 201
Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA’s Limerick Brigades 206
Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Waterford 208
Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Connacht 209
Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Dublin and the southeast 211
Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Ulster 214
Assessment 216

Chapter Six: Fatalities inflicted by the British forces following the announcement of the Truce

(I) Introduction 225

(II) The reaction of rank and file British troops towards the Truce 227
Offensive British military activities which occurred after the announcement of the Truce 230
‘The Kilgobnet Mine Disaster’ 232
Attempted assassinations of republicans prior to the Truce 235
The death of Denis Spriggs, and the phenomenon of prisoners ‘shot trying to escape’ 237
The death of Margaret Keogh: Alleged assassinations and the British ‘Murder Gang’ 244
John Foley & Hannah Carey: Civilians shot dead by British patrols 253
Assessment 258

Chapter Seven: The Raglan Street Ambush and sectarian violence during ‘Belfast’s Bloody Sunday’

(I) Introduction 263

(II) The Raglan Street Ambush 267
‘Belfast’s Bloody Sunday’ 270
Recurring themes in the history of political and sectarian rioting in Belfast 276
Revenge for Raglan Street?: The ‘Murder Gang’ and British reprisals in Belfast 281
Role of the Special Constabulary in the ‘Bloody Sunday’ riots 286
Role of the IRA, Hibernians and nationalist gunmen in the Bloody Sunday riots 294
Assessment 299

  vii
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 301

Appendix 1: Fatalities that occurred after the announcement of the Truce mentioned in the text 309

Appendix 2: Analysis of the reasons for the failure of the December 1920 truce negotiations 311

Appendix 3: The IRA's military capability at the time of the Truce 323

Bibliography 343

viii