The Anarchist Collectives

164 Pages·2015·5.69 MB·English

The Anarchist Collectives
Workers’Self-ManagementintheSpanishRevolution,1936–1939
Sam Dolgoff (Editor)
1974
Contents
Preface 6
Acknowledgements 7
IntroductoryEssay
byMurrayBookchin 8
PartOne:Background 28
Chapter1:TheSpanishRevolution 30
TheTwoRevolutions
bySamDolgoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
TheBolshevikRevolutionvsTheRussianSocialRevolution . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
TheTrendTowardsWorkers’Self-Management
bySamDolgoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Chapter2:TheLibertarianTradition 42
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
TheRuralCollectivistTradition
bySamDolgoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
TheAnarchistInfluence
bySamDolgoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
ThePoliticalandEconomicOrganizationofSociety
byIsaacPuente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Chapter3:HistoricalNotes 53
TheProloguetoRevolution
bySamDolgoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
OnAnarchistCommunism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
OnAnarcho-Syndicalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
TheCounter-RevolutionandtheDestructionoftheCollectives
bySamDolgoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Chapter4:TheLimitationsoftheRevolution 64
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
TheLimitationsoftheRevolution
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2
PartTwo:TheSocialRevolution 73
Chapter5:TheEconomicsofRevolution 75
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
EconomicStructureandCoordination
byAugustinSouchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
ANoteontheDifficultProblemsofReconstruction
byDiegoAbaddeSantillan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
MoneyandExchange
bySamDolgoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
StatisticalInformationonAgrarianandIndustrialSocialization . . . . . . . . . 83
Chapter6:Workers’Self-ManagementinIndustry 85
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Workers’Self-ManagementinIndustry
byAugustinSouchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Workers’ControlvsWorkers’Self-Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Chapter7:UrbanCollectivization 90
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
CollectivizationsinCatalonia
byAugustinSouchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
TheCollectivizationoftheMetalandMunitionsIndustry
byAugustinSouchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
TheCollectivizationoftheOpticalIndustry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
TheSocializationofHealthServices
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
IndustrialCollectivizationinAlcoy
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
ControlofIndustriesintheNorth
byJosePeirats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Chapter8:TheRevolutionoftheLand 111
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
TheRevolutionontheLand
byJosePeirats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Chapter9:TheCoordinationofCollectives 119
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
ThePeasantFederationofLevant
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
TheAragonFederationofCollectives:TheFirstCongress
byJosePeirats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Chapter10:TheRuralCollectives 125
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3
AJourneyThroughAragon
byAugustinSouchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
TheCollectivizationinGraus
byGastonLevalandAlardoPrats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
LibertarianCommunisminAlcora
byH.E.Kaminski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
TheCollectiveinBinefar
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
MiralcampoandAzuquecafromCahiersdeI’HumanismeLibertaire . . . . . . . . . . 141
CollectivizationinCarcagente
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
CollectivizationinMagdalenadePulpis
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
TheCollectiveinMasdelasMatas
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Chapter11:AnEvaluationoftheAnarchistCollectives 154
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
TheCharacteristicsoftheLibertarianCollectives
byGastonLeval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Conclusion
bySamDolgoff 158
Glossary 162
Bibliography 163
4
TotheheroicworkersandpeasantsofSpain!
Tomycomrades,theSpanishAnarchists,whoperishedfightingforfreedom!
Tothemilitantswhocontinuethestruggle!
5
Preface
The Spanish Social Revolution has been long neglected in English language works. Its
importance as a revolutionary event and model, and as a concrete example of workers’ self-
managementbythepeopleisjustnotrecognized.Mypurposeinthiscollectionistoprovidean
introduction to this unique experience. In my first chapter and friend Bookchin’s introductory
essay, a general overview and context is presented. Most important, of course, is that this
was a real experience for the people who took part. Through their words and deeds and the
observations of the authors used in this collection, it is hoped that the reader will gain a
meaningfulunderstandingoftheaimsandorganizationoftheanarchistcollectives.
Thematerialhasbeendividedintotwomainsections.Thefirstprovidesessentialbackground
information: the nature of the Spanish Revolution, the collectivist tradition, the development
of the libertarian labor movement in Spain, and the historical events leading up to and then
culminatinginthedestructionofthecollectives.
Thesecond,andmain,sectiondealswiththeactualsocialrevolution—theoverallcharacter-
istics of agrarian collectivization and industrial socialization. It begins with a discussion about
economiccoordination,theplaceandnatureofmoneyinthecollectives,andincludesstatistics
onthenumberofcollectives.Itthendealswithactualdescriptionsoflifeinthecollectives,first
under industrial socialization, and then in the rural collectives: how the new institutions were
established,howtheyfunctioned,howproductionanddistributionwerehandled;aboutcoordi-
nation,exchange,relationsbetweencollectives,andbetweencollectivizedandnon-collectivized
areas. The book ends with a short evaluation of the anarchist collectives with some comments
ontheirrelevanceandlessons.
The glossary, bibliography and appendices add to the overall usefulness of this volume. The
photographs reproduced within begin to correct the visual bias that has left a plethora of war
scenes but very little reflecting the constructive aspects of the Spanish Social Revolution. Most
of the pictures are from contemporary sources held by the editor. I would like to thank Victor
Berch,SpecialCollectionsLibrarianatBrandeisUniversityforpermissiontousethepictureson
pages104,141,and142.
Theobserversspeakingintheseselectionsvisitedthesameregionsandoftenthesamecollec-
tives at different times within the short span of approximately two years. Since each observer
stressed what seemed most important to him, their accounts supplement each other, thus pro-
viding a more balanced view of the new way of life than any single observer could have done.
Under these circumstances, though, some repetition is inevitable. The translations I have made
arestricttothemeaning,butarenotliteral,forIhavealsobeenconcernedwithgivingthespirit
ofthewords,andwithreducingrepetitions.
Finally I would like to express my thanks to all the farsighted and brave people whose work
I have used in putting together this collection. (A short biography on each is included in the
bibliography.) Their efforts have immortalized a social experience of momentous importance.
MyobjecthasbeentopresentthemtotheEnglishreaderwithinacontextthatwillbeuseful.
6
Acknowledgements
It is with the deepest appreciation that I acknowledge the contributions to the present work
ofthefollowingpersons:
Myfriend,ChuckHamilton,forhistirelesstechnicalandeditoriallaborsinturningapoorly
typedmanuscriptintothefinishedbook.
Tomyfriend,Dr.PaulAvrich,forreadingthemanuscriptandmakingvaluablesuggestions.
Tomycomrade,MurrayBookchin,whofirstencouragedmetoundertakethisproject.
Last,butbynomeansleast,mywifeEstherwhoscrupulouslyexaminedthemanuscriptasit
wasbeingwrittenanddetectedmanyerrors.
SamDolgoff
NewYorkCity
January,1974
7
Introductory Essay
by Murray Bookchin
In the morning hours of July 18,1936, General Francisco Franco issued the pronunciamiento
fromLasPalmasinSpanishNorthAfricathatopenlylaunchedthestruggleofSpain’sreactionary
militaryofficersagainstthelegallyelectedPopularFrontgovernmentinMadrid.
The Franco pronunciamiento left little doubt that, in the event of victory by the Spanish gen-
erals, a parliamentary republic would be replaced by a clearly authoritarian state, modelled in-
stitutionally on similar regimes in Germany and Italy. The Francista forces or “Nationalists,” as
theyweretocallthemselves,exhibitedallthetrappingsandideologiesofthefascistmovements
of the day: the raised open-palm salute, the appeals to a “folk-soil” philosophy of “order, duty,
and obedience,” the avowed commitments to smash the labor movement and end all political
dissidence. To the world, the conflict initiated by the Spanish generals seemed like another of
the classic struggles waged between the “forces of fascism” and the “forces of democracy” that
hadreachedsuchacuteproportionsinthethirties.WhatdistinguishedtheSpanishconflictfrom
similarstrugglesinItaly,Germany,andAustriawasthemassiveresistancethe“forcesofdemoc-
racy”seemedtoopposetotheSpanishmilitary.Francoandhismilitaryco-conspirators,despite
the wide support theyenjoyed among the officer cadres in the army,had grosslymiscalculated
the popular opposition they would encounter. The so-called “Spanish Civil War” lasted nearly
threeyears—fromJuly1936toMarch1939—andclaimedanestimatedmillionlives.
For the first time, so it seemed to many of us in the thirties, an entire people with dazzling
couragehadarrestedtheterrifyingsuccessoffascistmovementsincentralandsouthernEurope.
Scarcelythreeyearsearlier,HitlerhadpocketedGermanywithoutashredofresistancefromthe
massiveMarxist-dominatedGermanlabormovement.Austria,twoyearsbefore,hadsuccumbed
to an essentially authoritarian state after a week of futile street-fighting by Socialist workers
in Vienna. Everywhere fascism seemed “on the march” and “democracy” in retreat. But Spain
had seriously resisted — and was to resist for years despite the armaments, aircraft, and troops
whichFrancoacquiredfromItalyandGermany.Toradicalsandliberalsalike,the“SpanishCivil
War” was being waged not only on the Iberian peninsula but in every country where “democ-
racy”seemedthreatenedbytherisingtideofdomesticandinternationalfascistmovements.The
“Spanish Civil War,” we were led to believe, was a struggle between a liberal republic that was
valiantlyandwithpopularsupporttryingtodefendademocraticparliamentarystateagainstau-
thoritariangenerals—animagerythatisconveyedtothisverydaybymostbooksonthesubject
andbythatshabbycinematicdocumentary,ToDieinMadrid.
What so few of us knew outside of Spain, however, was that the “Spanish Civil War” was in
factasweepingsocialrevolutionbymillionsofworkersandpeasantswhowereconcernednot
torescueatreacherousrepublicanregimebuttoreconstructSpanishsocietyalongrevolutionary
lines. We would scarcely have learned from the press that these workers and peasants viewed
the republic almost with as much animosity as they did the Francistas. Indeed, acting largely
8
on their own initiative against “republican” ministers who were trying to betray them to the
generals, they had raided arsenals and sporting-goods stores for weapons and with incredible
valor had aborted the military conspiracies in most of the cities and towns of Spain. We were
almosttotallyoblivioustothefactthattheseworkersandpeasantshadseizedandcollectivized
most of the factories and land in republican-held areas, establishing a new social order based
on direct control of the country’s productive resources by workers’ committees and peasant
assemblies. While the republic’s institutions lay in debris, abandoned by most of its military
and police forces, the workers and peasants had created their own institutions to administer
thecitiesinrepublicanSpain,formedtheirownarmedworkers’squadstopatrolthestreets,and
establishedaremarkablerevolutionarymilitiaforcetofighttheFrancistaforces—avoluntaristic
militia in which men and women elected their own commanders and in which military rank
conferred no social, material, or symbolic distinctions. Largely unknown to us at that time, the
Spanish workers and peasants had made a sweeping social revolution. They had created their
ownrevolutionarysocialformstoadministerthecountryaswellastowagewaragainstawell-
trained and well-supplied army. The “Spanish Civil War” was not a political conflict between a
liberal democracy and a fascistic military corps, but a deeply socio-economic conflict between
theworkersandpeasantsofSpainandtheirhistoricclassenemies,rangingfromthelandowning
grandees and clerical overlords inherited from the past to the rising industrial bourgeoisie and
bankersofmorerecenttimes.
Therevolutionary scope of this conflict was concealed fromus — by “us” I referto the many
thousands of largely Communist-influenced radicals of the “red” thirties who responded to the
struggle in Spain with the same fervor and agony that young people of the sixties responded
to the struggle in Indochina. We need not turn to Orwell or Borkenau, radicals of obviously
strong anti-Stalinist convictions, for an explanation. Burnett Bolloten, a rather politically inno-
centUnitedPressreporterwhohappenedtobestationedinMadridatthetime,conveyshisown
sense of moral outrage at the misrepresentation of the Spanish conflict in the opening lines of
hissuperblydocumentedstudy,TheGrandCamouflage:
Although the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July, 1936, was followed by a
far-reaching social revolution in the anti-Franco camp — more profound in some
respects than the Bolshevik Revolution in its early stages — millions of discerning
peopleoutsideofSpainwerekeptinignorance,notonlyofitsdepthandrange,but
even of its existence, by virtue of a policy of duplicity and dissimulation of which
thereisnoparallelinhistory.
Foremost in practicing this deception upon the world and in misrepresenting in
Spain itself the character of the revolution were the Communists, who, although
but an exiguous minority when the Civil War began, used so effectually the mani-
fold opportunities which that very upheaval presented that before the close of the
conflict in 1939 they became, behind a democratic frontispiece, the ruling force in
theleftcamp.
Thedetailsofthisdeceptionwouldfillseverallargevolumes.Thesilencethatgathersaround
Spain,likeabadconscience,atteststothefactthattheeventsareverymuchalive—togetherwith
the efforts to misrepresent them. After nearly forty years the wounds have not healed. In fact,
9
as the recent revival of Stalinism suggests, the disease that produced the purulence of counter-
revolution in Spain still lingers on the American left. But to dea1 with the Stalinist counter-
revolution in Spain is beyond the scope of these introductory remarks. Fortunately, the bibli-
ography furnished by Sam Dolgoff provides the English-speaking reader with a number of the
more important works on this subject. It might be useful, however, to examine the revolution-
ary tendencies that unfolded prior to July 1936 and explore the influence they exercised on the
Spanishworkingclassandpeasantry.Thecollectivesdescribedinthisbookwerenottheresults
ofvirginalpopularspontaneity,importantaspopularspontaneitywas,norweretheynourished
exclusively by the collectivist legacy of traditional Spanish village society. Revolutionary ideas
andmovementsplayedacrucialroleoftheirownandtheirinfluencedeservestheclosestexam-
ination.
TheSpanishgenerals startedamilitary rebellionin July1936;the Spanishworkersandpeas-
antsansweredthemwithasocialrevolution—andthisrevolutionwaslargelyanarchistinchar-
acter. I say this provocatively even though the Socialist UGT was numerically as large as the
anarcho-syndicalistCNT.1 Duringthefirstfewmonthsofthemilitaryrebellion,Socialistwork-
ers in Madrid often acted as radically as anarcho-syndicalist workers in Barcelona. They estab-
lishedtheirownmilitias,formedstreetpatrols,andexpropriatedanumberofstrategicfactories,
placing them under the control of workers’ committees. Similarly, Socialist peasants in Castile
andEstramaduraformedcollectivesmanyofwhichwereaslibertarianasthosecreatedbyanar-
chist peasants in Aragon and the Levant. In the opening “anarchic” phase of the revolution, so
similartotheopeningphasesofearlierrevolutions,the“masses”triedtoassumedirectcontrol
oversocietyandexhibitedaremarkableélaninimprovisingtheirownlibertarianformsofsocial
administration.
Looking back beyond this opening phase, however, it is fair to say that the durability of the
collectives in Spain, their social scope and the resistance they offered to the Stalinist counter-
revolution,dependedlargelyontheextenttowhichtheywereunderanarchistinfluence.What
distinguishes the Spanish Revolution from those which preceded it is not only the fact that it
placedmuchofSpain’seconomyinthehandsofworkers’committeesandpeasantassembliesor
thatitestablishedademocraticallyelectedmilitiasystem.Thesesocialforms,invaryingdegrees,
hademergedduringtheParisCommuneandintheearlyperiodoftheRussianRevolution.What
madetheSpanishRevolutionuniqueisthatworkers’controlandcollectiveshadbeenadvocated
for nearly three generations by a massive libertarian movement and became the most serious
issues to divide the so-called “republican” camp, (together with the fate of the militia system).
Owingtothescopeofitslibertariansocialforms,theSpanishRevolutionprovednotonlytobe
“moreprofound”(toborrowBolloten’sphrase)thantheBolshevikRevolution,buttheinfluence
ofadeeplyrootedanarchistideologyandtheintrepidityofanarchistmilitantsvirtuallyproduced
acivilwarwithinthecivilwar.
Indeed, in many respects, the revolution of 1936 marked the culmination of more than sixty
years of anarchist agitation and activity in Spain. To understand the extent to which this was
thecase,wemustgobacktotheearly1870’s,whentheItaliananarchist,GiuseppiFanelli,intro-
ducedBakunin’sideastogroupsofworkersandintellectualsinMadridandBarcelona.Fanelli’s
1BoththeUGTandtheCNTprobablynumberedoveramillionmemberseachbythesummerof1936.The
officious,highlybureaucraticUGTtendedtooverstateitsmembershipfigures.Themoreamorphousdecentralized
CNT—themostpersecutedofthetwolaborfederations—oftenexercisedmuchgreaterinfluenceontheSpanish
workingclassthanitsmembershipstatisticswouldseemtoindicate.
10