The Anachronistic Anarchist

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ELISABETHA . LLOYD
THE ANACHRONISTICA NARCHIST*
(Received 7 August 1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
Paul Feyerabendw as certainlyo ne of the most colorful,p rovocative,
combative,e rudite,a nd originalp hilosopherso f our age.
I didn't know any of this when I was twenty-two - when I was
assigned Against Method' as the final book in a survey course on
the history of modem philosophy - the previous reading having
included Descartes, Locke, and Kant'sP rolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics. The course had been run along a typical line - the
empiricists vs. the rationalists,a nd so on - until that point. So it
would be fair to say that I was corrupteda t an early age, Against
Methodb eing the very firstp hilosophyo f science I ever read. And I
loved it. I was pre-meda t the time, with a majori n political theory,
and here it was - a book that finally made sense of what I'd learned
as a science major,a nd said what was wrong with the various ways
that philosophersh ad approachedt he sciences.
Little did I realize at the time that Paul Feyerabend'sv iews were
considered,b y many,t o be anti-philosophicala, nti-reason,a nd anti-
scientific, not to mention iconoclastico r idiosyncratic.
II. PROVOCATION
Paul himself did not help matters. Perhaps it was his theatrical
traininga nd backgroundp, erhapsh is ambivalencea bout academics
themselves - at any rate, he did succeed in provoking many, if not
most, academicp hilosophers.
Considert he slogan by which he is best known:
Philosophical Studies 81: 247-261, 1996.
? 1996 KluwerA cademicP ublishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
248 ELISABETHA . LLOYD
ANYTHINGG OES.
Feyerabendk new perfectlyw ell thatt his slogan would be unpop-
ular among his contemporaries- and he also probably wasn't
expecting to make friends by expressing his opinion that "political
philosophy and the philosophy of science have become sinks of
illiterate self expression"( SFS, p. 10) - or that "fields such as the
philosophy of science, or elementaryp article physics, or ordinary
language philosophy, or Kantianisms hould not be reformed,b ut
should be allowed to die a naturald eath"( SFS, p. 122; emphasis
mine).
Feyerabendl abeled himself an epistemologicala narchist, where
an anarchist,h e says, "is like an undercovera gent who plays the
game of Reason in ordert o undercutt he authorityo f Reason (Truth,
Honesty,J ustice, and so on)" (AM, pp. 32-33).
And indeed, the visions he had for future science (as well as
his analyses of past science) evoked panickeda nd/orc ontemptuous
accusationso f irrationalisma, nd it is easy to see why. In discussing
the developmenta nd content of scientific theoriesa nd methods, for
example, Feyerabendr ecommends the following version of con-
structivec riticism:
Wem ust,h e says, "stepo utsidet he circle [of the customaryv iews]
and either ... invent a new conceptual system, for example a new
theory,t hatc lashes with the most carefullye stablishedo bservational
results and confounds the most plausible theoreticalp rinciples, or
... import such a system from outside science, from religion, from
mythology, from the ideas of incompetents, or the ramblings of
madmen"( AM, p. 68). And he also includes magic, witchcraft,a nd
astrology, as areas towards which philosophers of science should
re-examineo ur attitudes( AM, pp. 100, 298).
Feyerabendw as completely serious,t hen, in his claim that "there
is no idea, howevera ncienta nd absurdt hat is not capable of improv-
ing our knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into
science and is usedf or improvinge very single theory" (AM, p. 47;
his emphasis, as chapterh eading).
The problem with reexamining such old traditions is, he says,
that "science still reigns supreme. It reigns supreme because its
practitionersa re unable to understand,a nd unwilling to condone,
THEA NACHRONISTAICN ARCHIST 249
different ideologies, because they have the power to enforce their
wishes, and because they use this power just as their ancestorsu sed
their power to force Christianityo n the peoples they encountered
duringt heir conquests"( AM, p. 299, his emphasis).
But Feyerabendb elieves that mightd oes not make right - and he
recasts the role of scientists:
Expertsa nd laymen,p rofessionalas nd dilettantit,r uth-freakasn d liars - they
all arei nvitedt o participatien the contesta ndt o maket heirc ontributiotno the
enrichmenotf ourc ultureT. het asko f thes cientisth, oweveri,s nol onger' to search
for the truth'o, r 'to praiseg od', or 'to systematizeo bservationso',r 'to improve
predictionsT'. hesea reb uts idee ffectso f ana ctivityt o whichh is attentionis now
mainlyd irecteda ndw hich is 'to make the weakerc ase the stronger'a s the sophists
said, and therebyt o sustain the motion of the whole. (AM, p. 30; his emphasis).
One might fear, though,t hat this 'motion of the whole' goes exactly
nowhere- or rather,i t may move us backwards,o r aroundi n circles,
but not any closer to trutha bout the way things are.
But no - Feyerabendc laimed that anarchismi s "necessaryb oth
for the internalp rogresso f science and for the developmento f our
culturea s a whole. And, Reason, at last, joins all those othera bstract
monsters such as Obligation,D uty, Morality,T rutha nd their more
concretep redecessors,t he Gods, which were once used to intimidate
man andr estricth is free and happy development:i t [reason]w ithers
away ... " (AM, p. 180; his emphasis).
But enough provocation. On my interpretation,F eyerabend's
views are actually neithera nti-sciencen or anti-reason,n eithera nti-
intellectual nor anti-progress.T he key, I think, to understanding
Feyerabend'sw ork as a whole, is to keep in mind his historical
context, and to grasp that he thought that much of twentieth cen-
tury philosophy of science (and philosophy of mind, language, and
epistemology) was both wrong and pernicious - hopelessly mis-
guided in its methods and aims, and dangerously immoral in its
consequences.
III. BETITEPRH ILOSOPHOYF SCIENCE
I will focus on what I thinki s the hearto f Feyerabend'st hought,i .e.,
his argumentsa bout methods involved in seeking scientific knowl-
edge.
250 ELISABETHA . LLOYD
The basic story is this. In the late nineteenth & early twentieth
centuries, research in the sciences challenged some very basic
commonsense assumptionsa bout what reality is like. (Feyerabend,
unfortunatelyl,i mits his discussion to physics, but the same goes for
biology, with the developmento f evolutionaryt heory.)
Systematicc onflicts between scientific views and commonsense
date back to the Greeks, within the Westernt raditions.T hroughout
two millennia, then, naturalp hilosophersh ad attemptedt o resolve
these conflicts,a ndt o develop methodst hatw ould allow them access
to reality itself.
Then along came a diverse group of scientists and philosophers,
now called 'the logical positivisits', who attemptedt o sort out real
scientific knowledge from superstition,c ommonsense, myth, and
other less-than-privilegedf orms of knowledge.
In doing so, they focused partly on developing formalizedr ules
and patternso f explanationa nd prediction;t his, in turn,n ecessitated
an elaborationo f theorieso f the meaningso f various scientifict erms
and the relations among them. Here we got: theories as axiomatiz-
able sets of sentences;t he distinctionb etween observations entences
and theoreticals tatementso f the theory;t he distinctionb etween the
context of discovery and the context of justification;a nd a deductive
view of testing,c onfirmatione, xplanation,r eduction,p rediction,a nd
the relationsb etween theory and observation.
I believe that much of Feyerabend'sc orpus can be best under-
stood as detailed attacks on various aspects of logical positivist
views about science. But before going any further,i t is extremely
importantt o understandt hat Feyerabend'sv iews aboutm ethodsa re
not simply descriptiveh istoricalc laims about the way that science
actually works;r ather,t hey are explicitly and adamantlyn ormative.
Hence, the familiar philosophical retort to a historian pointing to
some bizarrem oves in past science - namely, "well, all that shows
is that scientists aren'ta lways rational"- is not available to counter
Feyerabend'sv iew. Feyerabendr epeatedly argues that it's neces-
sary for the progress of knowledge and science that people break
whatever rules of reason, logic, or consistency by which they are
supposed to be constrained.2
I will simply assert, at this point, that Feyerabendi s very con-
cerned to defend a fairly perrnissive rationality, that he is not
THEA NACHRONISTAICN ARCHIST 251
a relativist, and that one of his central aims is to encourage
philosophical views about science that are historically grounded,
well-acquainted with scientific practices, and not obsessed with
uncoveringt he one-and-onlyt rues cientificm ethod.I n whatf ollows,
I will outline several of Feyerabend's essential commitments to
the importanceo f proliferation,p luralism, realism, criticism, and
history.
I shall then display some remarkables imilaritiesb etween Feyer-
abend's views and those of the founder of American Pragmatism,
Charles S. Peirce.3I 'm not going to claim that this strangec onver-
gence makes theirv iews true- they could both be wrong. But I will
offer a possible explanationf or how these two notablyd ifferenta nd
original thinkersm ay have arrivedi n some of the same places.
Let us turn now to a brief summary of some of Feyerabend's
positive commitments.I shall sketcho ut five interrelatedfa cets of his
philosophy of science: realism; pluralism;p roliferation;c riticism;
and the vital role of history in the actualp racticeo f science.
First of all, Feyerabendd efended what he called Proliferationo f
theories, frameworks,m ethods, and data, on the basis that it is vital
to good testing of standardo r leading hypotheses.4" Empiricism,a t
least in some of its more sophisticatedv ersions," says Feyerabend,
"demands that the empirical content of whatever knowledge we
possess be increased as much as possible. Hence the invention of
alternatives to the view at the center of discussion constitutes an
essentialpart of the empiricalm ethod"( AM, p. 41; his emphasis).
This all sounds perfectly sensible, until Feyerabend spells out
what he wants to include in that proliferation.H e begins with the
well-substantiatedc laim that recent discussions in the history and
philosophy of science have shown that such scientific advances as
the inventiono f atomismi n antiquityt, he CopernicanR evolution,t he
rise of moderna tomism and quantumt heory,a nd the emergenceo f
the wave theoryo f light, "occurredo nly because some thinkerse ither
decidedn ot to be boundb y certain' obvious' methodologicalr ules,o r
because they unwittinglyb roket hem"( AM, p. 23; his emphasis).
"This liberal practice ... ," Feyerabendc ontinues, "is not just a
fact of the history of science. It is both reasonable and absolutely
necessary for the growth of knowledge. More specifically, one
can show the following: given any rule, however 'fundamental'
252 ELISABETHA . LLOYD
or 'necessary'f or science, there are always circumstancesw hen it is
advisablen ot only to ignore the rule, but to adopti ts opposite"( AM,
p. 23; his emphasis;c f. 1981, Vol 1, p. 76).5
One of Feyerabend'sf avorite examples of a disobedientb ut bril-
liantly successful scientist, is Galileo. Feyerabend argues: "what
Galileo did was to let refuted theories supporte ach other, that he
built in this way a new world-view which was only loosely (if at
all!) connectedw ith the precedingc osmology (everydaye xperience
included), that he establishedf ake connections with the perceptual
elements of this cosmology which are only now being replacedb y
genuine theories (physiological optics, theory of continua),a nd that
wheneverp ossible he replacedo ld facts by a new type of experience
which he simply inventedf or the purposeo f supportingC opernicus"
(AM, p. 160; his emphasis).
And Feyerabenda pplaudsG alileo's moves, not simply because
he admired what he called Galileo's "style ... sense of humor,
elasticity and elegance, [and his] awareness of the valuable weak-
nesses of human thinking"( AM, p. 161) - but because Galileo's
success requiredt hat he break the methodologicalr ules and expec-
tations of his own scholarly community.A ccording to Feyerabend,
then, "Galileo succeeds, because he did not follow the [established
methodological] rules ... Ignorance was bliss" (AM, p. 112; his
emphasis).
Similarly,t he Pluralismt hatF eyerabende ndorsesi nvolves taking
seriously - not simply 'tolerating' - a wide variety of different
methodsa nd accountso f the world.6H is defense of such pluralismi s
thati t makesf or bettere mpiricals ciences. In Feyerabend'sw ords:
A scientist who wishes to maximize the empirical content of the views he holds
and who wants to understandt hem as clearly as he possibly can must therefore
introduceo ther views; that is, he must adopt a pluralistic methodology.H e must
comparei deas with other ideas rathert han with 'experience' and he must try to
improve rathert han discardt he views that have failed in the competition. (AM,
p. 30; his emphasis).
Here, Feyerabend'sg eneral views about knowledge itself come
into play. He writes, "Knowledges o conceived is not a series of self-
consistent theories that converges towards an ideal view; it is not a
graduala pproacht o the truth.I t is rathera n ever increasingo cean of
mutuallyi ncompatible( and perhaps even incommensurable)a lter-
natives, each single theory,e ach fairy tale, each myth that is parto f
THE ANACHRONISTICA NARCHIST 253
the collection forcing the others into greatera rticulationa nd all of
them contributing,v ia this process of competition, to the develop-
ment of our consciousness"( AM, p. 30; his emphasis).
This anti-convergence position may be surprising to some,
because Feyerabendi dentified himself as a realist, and defended
scientific realism throughouth is writings.? These days, scientific
realism is often - though not always - linked with convergence
on - or successive approximationt o - the true categories, objects,
relations, and laws of nature;a nd clearly, Feyerabendr ejecteds uch
convergence as even desirable( 1981, Vol 1, p. 107).
In fact, a closer look at Feyerabend'sd efense of scientificr ealism
reveals somethingv ery odd:h e arguest hatr ealismi s vital to success-
ful proliferationb, ecause it ensurest hatt he theoriesw ill be followed
as far and as seriously as they can be. He argues, "The power of a
theory can be fully utilized only if it is not treateda s an instrument
for prediction, so that the local grammari s allowed completely to
determinet he 'natureo f things"' (1981, Vol 1, p. 119); "... [hence]
there exist very good abstract reasons why a new theory should be
used everywhere:o nly this procedurew ill lead to the strongestp os-
sible criticism of the received point of view" (1981, Vol 1, p. 127;
his emphasis).8
In other words, Feyerabend defends realism on pragmatic
grounds.9
Similarly, Criticism must come from outside the main tradition
at stake. Insiders to that traditionm ust not be regardeda s its only
competentc ritics; outsiders,f rom very differentt raditions,m ust be
addresseds eriously (AM, pp. 9-10). Feyerabend'se mphasis on the
importanceo f maintainingl iving histories of all forms of human
knowledge is grounded in this commitment to the importanceo f
deeply challengingc riticism.10
Finally, it is precisely because discarded or archaic or alien
theories are necessary to illuminatea nd inform our currentk nowl-
edge, thatF eyerabends ees historya s an integrala nd necessaryf acet
of good scientific research1. 1
In summary so far, I've sketched five aspects of Feyerabend's
positive views about the developmento f scientific knowledge: pro-
liferation,p luralism,r ealism,c riticism, and the place of history.W e
254
ELISABETHA . LLOYD
turn now to my analysis of Charles Peirce as Paul Feyerabend's
strangeb edfellow.
IV. AMERICANP RAGMATISM& EPISTEMOLOGICALA NARCHY
I have noticed a numbero f curiouss imilaritiesb etweenF eyerabend's
views and those of Peirce, and I think it's worth exploring these
similarities,i n spite of the fact thatt herea re seriousc omplicationsi n
comparingt he two authors:t hey were workingi n differentc ontexts,
arguing against different opponents and assumptions, and writing
nearly a century apart.F urthermoreI, have found no evidence that
Feyerabende ver read Peirce.I would speculatet hatt his was because
Peirce has been so frequentlym is-reada s a neo-Kantiand uringm ost
of this century - and Feyerabendw as no fan of Kant - and also
because John Stuart Mill's empiricism seemed like a much more
attractivei ntellectuala ncestort o Feyerabend.
It may seem implausibleo r surprisingt hatt herew ould be parallels
between Feyerabend'sa nd Peirce's views; after all, Peirce is most
famous for being a 'convergentr ealist'.a nd for his notion of 'the end
of inquiry', an ideal limit in which unanimityi n knowledge about
reality is reached.
So let us consider one potentially crucial difference between
Feyerabend and Peirce. Is Feyerabend a convergent realist like
Peirce?
The quick answeri s thatP eirce himselfw asn't a convergentr ealist
in the sense so often attributedt o him. Allow me to make a brief
digression to straighteno ut the record on Peirce's 'realism' and
'convergence'.
David Wiggins, for instance, describes a "Peircean view of
Science ... as discovering that which, the world being what it is, is
destinedt o be ultimatelya greedo n by all who investigate"( Wiggins
1976, p. 361). In support,W iggins quotes from Peirce:" Theo pinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate,
is what we mean by truth,a nd the object representedi n this opin-
ion is the real" (Peirce 1878a, p. 139).12 Wiggins' interpretationis
ambiguous here, about whether the ultimate conceptual scheme is
necessarily what it is, rathert han being somethinge lse, but he sub-
sequently attributest o Peirce the view that "therei s a reality which
THEA NACHRONISTAICN ARCHIST 255
dictates the way a scientific theory has to be in order that what
happensi n the world be explainedb y the theory"( 1976, p. 362; my
emphasis).
This sort of characterizationo f Peirce - pervasive as it may be
- is clearly contradictedb y Peirce's writings. I'd like to emphasize
several aspects of Peirce's thoughtt hat decisively disqualifyh im as
this type of convergentr ealist.
Segments of Peirce's writings, with their appeal to 'fated' ends,
may appeart o commit him to a view of knowledge and reality in
which Real things eventuallyforce inquirersi nto True understand-
ings of them. But this is the exact opposite of Peirce's view. In fact,
immediatelyf ollowing the widely quoted passage (above), regard-
ing the "opinion . .. fated to be ultimately agreed to ... ," Peirce
insists that his view "makes the characterso f the real" depend on
"whati s ultimatelyt houghta boutt hem"( 1 878a, p. 139). He argues
thath is view of Reality is thereforei ncompatiblew ith what he calls
an a priori, rationalist, or 'abstract' definition of reality, and he
concludes that Reality - what anythingr eally is - "dependso n the
ultimate decision of the community"( 1868, p. 54). Still, in spite
of this genuine dependenceo n community-mediatedc ognitions, the
outcome of such investigation "is the real, as it really is" (1868,
p. 52; cf Hacking 1983, p. 58).
PerhapsP eirce's decisive dissension with convergentr ealism is
made most clearly in his views about Types and Laws of Nature.
Briefly, he thinks that Laws of Nature are those among an infinity
of regularitiesi n the universe,d istinguishedo nly by the fact thatw e
are interestedi n them; there is nothing 'inevitable' about them, or
about their appearancea t the end of inquiry.
AlthoughP eirce calls himself a 'realist'a boutT ypes, his is not the
sort of realism in which Types correspondt o some sort of 'Natural
Kinds' or naturald ivisions in Nature- and this lack of correspon-
dence results not simply because of the fallibility inherent in any
stage of inquiry;i t also holds for the Types upon which the ideal
communityo f inquirersw ould ultimatelya gree.
On the status of Laws and Types in Nature, Peirce starts from
de Morgan'sl ogical point that "anyp luralityo r lot of objects what-
ever have some characteri n common (no matterh ow insignificant)
which is peculiar to them and not sharedb y anything else" (1878,