THE AMSTERDAM HAUTE BANQUE, 1650s-1914 Joost Jonker University of Amsterdam/Utrecht

34 Pages·2013·0.31 MB·English

WEDGED BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE WORLD :
THE AMSTERDAM HAUTE BANQUE, 1650s-1914

Joost Jonker
University of Amsterdam/Utrecht University

I. Introduction.
The term haute banque poorly fits the firms which dominated the Amsterdam market
at one time or another, for two reasons. Firstly, they offered a variety of financial
services without engaging in banking proper, that is transforming deposits into loans
and living off the spread inbetween. At times interest earnings generated a
considerable part of income but, because of the way in which the local market
worked, it was never a core business. Unlike, for instance, Britain, where deposit
banking became the norm from the late 17th century, the Amsterdam haute banque
business model rather resembled a combination of today’s private equity firms with
venture capitalists and hedge funds, that is to say, firms deriving their main revenues
from commissions and profits on transactions arranged.
Secondly, with the exception of a few 19th century cases, Amsterdam firms
rooted in the commodity trade and retained close links to that, in some prominent
cases until the dawn of the 20th century. The importance of financial services differed
between firms and between periods. Classifying individual ones as belonging to the
haute banque is therefore a little arbitrary, the more so since we do not have the
archival sources to assess the balance of operations for any firm until the late 18th
century. These factors render dating the emergence and composition of an haute
banque group equally arbitrary. The survey which follows should therefore be treated
with some caution, since it is neither complete nor sufficiently precise, notably for the
earlier period. Much work remains to be done. During the 17th and 18th centuries
there were many bankers and banking firms, even very prominent bankers such as
Clifford, Pels, Muilman & Son, or D’Echenique, of whom we know little more than
their names. Some of those could be fleshed out through patient reconstruction by
trawling Amsterdam’s voluminous city archives, notably the Wisselbank and the
notarial records.
1
One important aspect should be kept in mind. the Amsterdam haute banque
was never a closed group, new firms continually arising through the ranks of the
commodity trade to complement or supplant old, established, but sometimes slightly
worn names. Haute banque firms such as Pels, Clifford, or later Hope & Co. did have
considerable market power, but rarely to the extent of shutting out new initiatives
because the market was too fragmented and too mobile for that. Operating in a
constantly shifting international environment, facing clients able to access a wealth of
alternatives a the world market, the Amsterdam haute banque, for its their ostensible
wealth and power, was always permeable, open to newcomers supplanting
established names with innovative ideas, keener entrepreneurship, better terms.

II. Origins and first blossoming.
The Amsterdam market, heavily oriented towards the Baltic, already possessed
sufficient interest for the Fuggers to employ a factor there from 1511, Poppius Occo.1
About his business we know little more than that he specialized in trade and finance
with notably Denmark, which yielded sufficient rewards for him to enjoy a
sumptuous lifestyle in true Renaissance mould, embellished by the arts. Merchants
like Occo also raised money for their own and for foreign sovereigns. In 1489
Maximilian of Austria granted Amsterdam the right to add his crown to its coat of
arms in return for financial services rendered; merchants supplied both Charles V
and the provincial Estates with loans in 1555; and during the 1610s two German
princes received smaller loans.2 Such transactions remained incidents, however, and
driven more by political than by commercial motives. This was not for a want of
capital power. Following the Fall of Antwerp in 1585 and the closure of the Scheldt
river for commecial shipping by the Dutch Republic Amsterdam developed
precociously, extending its trade network over all of Europe, to Africa, the Levant, the
Americas, to Asia. High retained earnings fuelled this expansion, providing sufficient
capital to launch the Dutch East India Company or VOC in 1602, with Amsterdam
merchants supplying 3.6 guilders of the 6.8 million total equity.3 And still there was

1 M. Carasso-Kok, ed., Geschiedenis van Amsterdam tot 1578, stad uit het niets (Sun: Amsterdam 2004) 160; O.
Nübel, Pompeius Occo 1483-1537, Fuggerfaktor in Amsterdam (Mohr: Tübingen 1972); G.W. Kernkamp,
‘Rekeningen van Pompejus Occo aan koning Christiaan II van Denemarken, 1520-1523’, in: Bijdragen en
mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 36 (1915) 255-329.
2 W.F.H. Oldewelt, ‘De Hoefijserse schuld (1616-1681)’, in: Jaarboek Amstelodamum 51 (1959) 37-52.
3 O. Gelderblom and J.P.B. Jonker, 'Completing a financial revolution: the finance of the Dutch East India trade
and the rise of the Amsterdam capital market, 1595-1612', in: Journal of Economic History 64 (2004) 641-672.
2
money to spare; for a whaling company, a West India Company (WIC), for land
reclamation which, in the Holland province alone, absorbed an estimated 9.5-13
million guilders during the first half of the 17th century, most of it invested by
Amsterdam businessmen.4
Such ventures were typically launched by a syndicate which then recruited
shareholders through family, friends, and business relations, a durable configuration
still widely used during the late 19th century. Capital mobilization on the Amsterdam
market was always a matter of dense networks gathering money from many
comparatively small investors rather than a few big players clubbing together.
Another key market feature was the emphasis on liquidity tied to an aversity to debt
finance. Businessmen accepted deposits as a favour, from family members and close
friends, not as a prime source of finance. Some used debt to a higher degree than
others, but most sought to finance their operations with equity, not with debt.5
Proper merchants do not have much debt, a 1622 pamphlet warned, because
settlement days punish those who with bankruptcy.6 This marked preference was
probably a response to the sharp liquidity fluctuations characteristic of Early Modern
money markets tied to the early development of lombarding securities, which
appeared soon after the founding of the VOC.7 The ability to switch easily and
securely from assets to cash and back made both creditors and debtors wary of long-
term commitments, especially if uncollateralized. Over time the lombard market,
termed prolongatie market because the transactions were commonly prolonged
(rolled over) on expiry of the customary three-month term, evolved into the main
repository for surplus cash, setting terms with which merchants competed at their
peril.8 As a result the market had no firm base of deposits and this prevented the
most likely candidates, the kassiers or cashiers, from developing into bankers once
official action had clipped the wings of their businesses. As money changers and cash
keepers, the cashiers really ran the payments system and no doubt they accomodated

4 H. van Zwet, Lofwaerdighe dijckagies en miserabele polders, een financiële analyse van
landaanwinningsprojecten in Hollands Noorderkwartier, 1597-1643 (Hilversum 2009) 474.
5 O.C. Gelderblom, ‘The governance of Early Modern trade: the case of Hans Thijs (1556-1611)’, Enterprise &
Society 4 (2003) 606-639.
6 Pamphlet Knuttel No. 3348 (no page numbers).
7 Gelderblom and Jonker, ‘Completing’ 660-663; L.O. Petram, ‘The world’s first stock exchange, how the
Amsterdam market for Dutch East India Company shares became a modern securities market, 1602-1700’, PhD
Thesis, University of Amsterdam 2011, 122-134.
8 J.P.B. Jonker, Merchants, bankers, middlemen, the Amsterdam money market during the first half of the 19th
century (NEHA: Amsterdam, 1996) 90-104.
3
their clients with advances as and when needed.9 However, in 1609 the city council,
wanting to put the payments system on a more secure footing, established the
Wisselbank or Exchange Bank, designed to function as a girobank on the Italian
model and provide merchants with stable means of payment.10 Through a successful
rearguard action the cashiers repositioned themselves to remain a crucial
intermediary between the Wisselbank and the market, but at the same time confined
to a particular, narrow segment without scope for an evolution into banking.
For all its precocious growth Amsterdam does not appear to have assumed
Antwerp’s function as an international financial centre for some considerable time.
Leading businessmen such as Louis de Geer and Elias Trip, brothers in law and joint
partners in a large firm for manufacturing and trading in arms, must have generated
voluminous international payments with their sales all over Europe and their
advances to the Swedish King for copper supplied to them. In 1634 the firm had a
capital of 2.4 million.11 Two brothers Marcelis did a similar, and no less voluminous,
business in iron, arms, and finance with Denmark, lending very substantial amounts
for which they received Danish real estate in return, not always to their
contentment.12 But the continuing war with Spain distanced the Republic from
Southern European networks, so Antwerp merchants could retain a firm grip on
trade and finance with Spain and thus on the large amounts of bills circulating in that
trade until the late 1640s.13 The money transfers from Madrid to the Spanish
Netherlands alone averaged 3 million écus or 7.5 million Dutch guilders a year at a
time when deposits in the Wisselbank barely crept above 3 million guilders, so the
Antwerp bill market was probably much larger than the Amsterdam one.14
During the 1640s Antwerp’s Spanish trade began to wither, however, and its
mercantile community took a bad hit with the crown’s 1647 bankruptcy and another

9 Jonker, Merchants 233-248.
10 L. Gillard, La Banque d’Amsterdam et le florin européen au temps de la république néerlandaise (1610-1820)
(Éditions EHESS: Paris 2004); Nieuwkerk, M. van, ed., The Bank of Amsterdam: on the origins of central
banking (Sonsbeek Publishers: Arnhem 2009), P.W.N.M. Dehing, Geld in Amsterdam, wisselbank en
wisselkoersen, 1650-1725 (Verloren: Hilversum 2012).
11 J.P.B. Jonker and K.E. Sluyterman, At home on the world markets, Dutch trading houses from the 16th century
to the present (SDU: The Hague 2000) 58-60; J.G. van Dillen, Van rijkdom en regenten, handboek tot de
economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Republiek (Nijhoff: The Hague 1970) 317.
12 Van Dillen, Rijkdom 318-319; C.J. van Bochove, The economic consequences of the Dutch, economic
integration around the North Sea, 1500-1800 (Aksant: Amsterdam 2008) 98, 103, 114, 115, 117-119, 138, 226,
248, 249.
13 R. Baetens, De nazomer van Antwerpens welvaart, de diaspora en het handelshuis De Groote tijdens de eerste
helft van de zeventiende eeuw (Gemeentekrediet: Brussels 1976) 244-248.
14 J.J.H. de Lonchay, Étude sur les emprunts des Souverains belges au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle (Lamertin:
Brussels 1907) 982-987; cf. Baetens, Nazomer I, 244-248.
4
one when Spain sharply reduced its transfers following the Peace of Westphalia in
1648. As a result the Iberian and Flemish firms which had specialized in this trade
went bust, retired from business, or moved to the Dutch Republic, leaving the market
seriously depleted.15 By contrast, the peace with Spain enabled the Republic to
expand trade with that country and its American colonies, with the result that this
sector and the bullion flows which it generated became one of the mainstays of Dutch
trade.16 During the 1650s a group of prominent Sephardic Jews emerged on the
Amsterdam market specializing in the woolen trade and gradually moving into
finance.17 Belgian minting dropped for a lack of silver, causing complaints about the
power of the Wisselbank and forcing the mintmasters repeatedly to increase their
price in a vain attempt to attract bullion flows back.18 At the same time interest rates
started to drop, increasing the attraction of doing business there. Borrowers became
interested to seek loans in Amsterdam; the first foreign monarchs looking for money
appeared in the late 1650s, now for financial rather than political reasons.19 Slowly
the contours of an international financial centre emerged.

III. Transiting during the climacteric.
This coincided with a transition of the Republic’s economy from very dynamic growth
to a phase of consolidation. Rivals such as Britain and France introduced trade
protection discriminating against Dutch imports, igniting some sixty years of near
continuous warfare with one or the other. Other rivals began making more peaceful
inroads into Holland’s commercial supremacy, venturing onto the same shipping
routes, introducing similar terms and conditions, even copying the fluytschip cargo
carrier to get on a par in shipping productivity. Merchants responded by switching
from trading for their own account, widely practised during the Republic’s
expansionary phase to capture new markets, to the commission trading typical for

15 Baetens, Nazomer; J.I. Israel, ‘The economic contribution of Dutch Sephardic Jewry to Holland’s Golden Age,
1595-1713’, in: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 96 (1983) 505-535, ibidem 521, 522, 523
16 Israel, ‘Economic contribution’ 530.
17 J.I. Israel, ‘De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden tot omstreeks 1750- demografie en economische activiteit',
in: J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld, I. Schöffer, ed., Geschiedenis van de joden in Nederland (Balans: Amsterdam
1995) 97-128, ibidem 116-117.
18 V. Janssens, Het geldwezen der Oostenrijkse Nederlanden (Koninklijke Vlaamsche Academie: Brussels 1957)
10, 12.
19 See, for instance, Resolutions of the Estates of Holland (RSH) in National Archives The Hague, Generaale
Index op Resoluties Staten van Holland on microfilm: Geneva: RSH 27 March 1657; Denmark: 19 October
1657, 18 May 1658, 2 and 3 October 1659, 20 February 1660, 23 September 1666, 26 November 1666; Britain:
24 May 1660.
5
more settled and more competitive circumstances.20 Moreover, the volume of
Amsterdam trade enabled them to concentrate on commission trading and to
outsource allied commercial services such as transport, handling, expedition, and
insurance to dedicated providers which offered such services at comparatively low
cost.
This specialization gave the fading entrepot market a new lease of life because
commercial rivals could not immediately match it.21 Finance developed into the
system’s lynchpin, helped by the evolution of bills of exchange into acceptances,
which enabled merchants to sell their reputation for probity. For a small fee
merchants would allow their overseas correspondents to draw on them. When
presented with the bill, the firm would ‘accept’ it by signing for payment at maturity,
thus improving the paper’s negotiability, which in turn increased the attraction of
routing business through Amsterdam and making international payments in guilder
denominated acceptances on Amsterdam houses.22 Changes to the Wisselbank’s
operations added further attractions. During the 1680s the bank ended a period of
prolonged stagnation following the stabilization of the guilder in the 1650s by
introducing new lombard arrangements to draw more bullion to Amsterdam. Since
trading receipts issued for gold and silver deposited with the bank was much cheaper
than handling bullion, deposits shot up, boosting liquidity and, in combination with
the low interest rates, firmly anchoring Amsterdam’s commercial position. For a
considerable time to come no commercial centre in northwestern Europe could offer
better terms than a bill on Amsterdam, the guilder becoming the international
currency of choice in the same way as the pound sterling in the 19th century, or the
dollar in the 20th.23
Consequently, during the second half of the 17th century merchant houses
came to prominence which, in addition to their commodity trade, had a distinctly
greater finance component. As often as not this remained closely related to the trade.
In 1659, for instance, Jean Deutz, obtained an exclusive sales agency for mercury
from the Austrian emperor. Like Trip and De Geer before him, he gave large advances
on mercury supplies to his client. After his death his widow continued the business as
Wed. Jean Deutz & Sn., the first instance we have of a commercial business

20 Jonker and Sluyterman, At home 73-97.
21 Jonker and Sluyterman, At home 97-104.
22 For a good explanation of acceptances I. Schnabel, H.S. Shin, ‘Liquidity and contagion: the crisis of 1763’, in:
Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (2004) 929-968.
23 Gillard, Banque 231-298.
6
enhancing its stature by assuming a formal name.24 In 1695 this firm pioneered an
important innovation by offering investors shares in a negotiatie, a unit trust fund
holding a 1.5 million guilders 5 per cent loan for the emperor, backed by mercury
supplies.25 In addition to this high finance, Deutz also lombarded securities and
provided small loans to private individuals. A relative, Joseph Deutz, did a very
similar business based on the exclusive sales agency for Swedish pitch and tar. At one
point he had 1,200 guilders worth of bibles amongst his lombards. Other merchants
such as Louys Trip also lombarded securities, sometimes apparently as part of
securities transactions.26
The Sephardic firms which came to prominence during the 1650s also
combined finance with trade, at least initially. Following his arrival from Antwerp in
1652 Antonio Lopez Suasso, for instance, established himself as a leading importer of
wool from Spain but he dealt in other commodities as well, notably jewels. He
gradually moved more and more into finance as agent for the Stadholder William III,
who used Suasso’s European financial connections to counter Louis XIV’s
expansionary policy. At the same time Suasso acted as agent for the Spanish king,
channeling payments to his German allies and eventually financing the Spanish
diplomatic service in northern Europe. As a reward for his services Suasso received
the unprecedented honour of an aristocratic title. His son Francisco continued in his
footsteps, reportedly lending William III two million guilders without collateral to
pay for his peaceful invasion of Britain in 1688. Like his father he moved money
around to thwart French aspirations and facilitate payments for the Spanish king, in
close collaboration with the king’s political representative in Amsterdam, the
Sephardic merchant and financier Manuel de Belmonte.27
At the same time the firm of Machado and Pereira operated as William III’s
main army contractors, supplying anything from bread to kitchens and horses and
wagons for the armies fighting the succession of wars raging in Western Europe

24 Jonker and Sluyterman, At home 91. In 1719 the firm was renamed into Jean Deutz & Sn.
25 J.E. Elias, De vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795 (Amsterdam 1963) 637, 1047-1048; I.H. van Eeghen,
‘Buitenlandse monopolies voor de Amsterdamse kooplieden in de tweede helft van de zeventiende eeuw’, in:
Jaarboek Amstelodamum 53 (1961) 176-184; P.W. Klein, ‘A 17th century monopoly game, the Swedish-Dutch
trade in tar and pitch’, in: J. Schneider, ed., Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege, II, Wirtschaftskräfte in den
Europäischen Expansion (Bamberg 1978) 459-471.
26 O.C. Gelderblom, J.P.B. Jonker and C.J.M. Kool, ‘Banks versus markets: the character of the Amsterdam
financial system during the 17th century’, working paper Utrecht 2013.
27 D. Swetschinsky and L. Schönduve, De familie Lopes Suasso, financiers van Willem III (Waanders: Zwolle 1988)
26-41; Israel, ‘De Republiek’ 118-119; idem, European Jewry in the age of mercantilism, 1550-1750 (Littman
Library: London 1998) 109-110; idem, ‘Economic contribution’ 523, 528.
7
during the last decades of the 17th and first decades of the 18th century. The firm also
helped provisioning the Amsterdam naval squadron taking part in the 1688
expedition.28 Having to bridge the often rather wide gap between purchases and
payment on a constant basis, Machado and Pereira acted in fact as financiers of the
war effort. One of their agents, Solomon de Medina, moved to Britain and, as chief
supplier to Marlborough’s armies, became the first Jew be to be knighted there.29
Other prominent Sephardic merchants-bankers were Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, a
dealer notably in Brazil wood, tobacco, sugar, spices, and diamonds who also acted as
the chargé d’affaires for the Portuguese crown, and Jacob Delmonte, a leading wool
merchant.30 In effect these Jewish financiers were the closest Holland came to having
a group of Hofjuden, bankers with close connections to the court.31

IV. Living in splendour.
These merchants-bankers distinghuished themselves by their political connections
and by their sumptuous lifestyle. Jean Deutz, for instance, was the brother-in-law and
a close friend of Johan de Witt, the Republic’s most important politician during the
1650s and 1660s. He also acted as adviser to the financially astute statesman.32 The
Suasso’s stood, of course, on intimate terms with the Stadholder and his court. In his
capacity as diplomatic representative for the Portuguese king Jeronimo Nunes da
Costa conducted a household to match, entertaining foreign diplomats, statesmen,
and princes.33 Because of Manuel de Belmonte’s position as the personification of the
alliance between the Republic and Spain during the war-torn late 17th century, his
house also served as natural meeting point for foreign diplomats and nobility.34
As for lifestyle, Amsterdam merchants were considered to live frugally by
foreign observers, who often commented on the Dutch propensity to save rather than
spend, and on the lack of ostentatiousness. Even so the rich stood out, of course, as
everywhere else, most visibly through their often gorgeous canal side houses. In

28 Israel, ‘De Republiek’ 120-121; idem, ‘Economic contribution’ 532-533.
29 Several other Sephardic merchants acted in similar capacities for German princes: Israel, ‘Economic
contribution’ 533.
30 Israel, ‘De Republiek’ 116-118; idem, ‘Economic contribution’ 524-525, 528, 529.
31 G. Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, ‘Jewish private banks’, in: Y. Cassis et al., ed., The world of private banking
(Ashgate: Farnham 2009) 213-230.
32 H.H. Rowen, John de Witt, Statesman of the ‘True Freedom’ (Cambridge UP: Cambridge 1986) 50-51; L.
Panhuysen, De ware vrijheid, de levens van Johan en Cornelis de Witt (Olympus: Amsterdam 2005) 181, 252,
253, 255, 259-261, 271, 360, 362, 433.
33 Israel, ‘De Republiek’ 117-118.
34 Israel, ‘De Republiek’ 119-120.
8
Occo’s days Amsterdam had been a modest town with a couple of thousand
inhabitants, but by 1650 it was a comparatively large city of some 200,000 people.
Three rings of canals encircling the medieval centre had been built to accommodate
the swelling population. The two innermost ones, the Herengracht and the
Keizersgracht, were given over to housing for the rich, with at their southern
segments plots of double the standard width for those wanting more space and able
to afford it. As often as not those houses had, and some still do, a deep garden
running to the opposite side of the block and ending in stables opening on to the next
street or canal.
Joseph Deutz commissioned the leading architect of his day, Philip Vingboons,
to design such a double house for him at Herengracht (now no. 450), so he had ample
room to hang his picture collection. The brothers and business partners Louys and
Hendrick Trip chose the Kloveniersburgwal (no. 29) as location for their immense
joint mansion, built by Justus Vingboons and closely mirroring Jacob van Campen’s
splendid town hall on the Dam square, then newly finished and testimony of
Amsterdam’s proud commercial self-confidence. Belmonte’s grand mansion stood at
Herengracht no. 586, those of Suasso and Nunes da Costa just across the river Amstel
and almost next to each other at Nieuwe Herengracht 43 and 47 respectively.
Contemporaries marvelled at the magnificent gardens behind the houses, havens
sheltered from the city’s bustle. Other indulgences favoured by the commercial elite
were country mansions, with lordly titles if possible. Dutch society never created
regular mechanisms to let burghers ascend to the nobility in the way other European
countries did, so ambitious businessmen could not aspire to that. But they could buy
social deference by acquiring feudal titles which, having lost most of their original
public function, were regularly bought and sold as chattels. Thus in 1696 the third
Jean Deutz, then head of his grandfather’s firm, bought the lordship of Assendelft to
add lustre to the nearby castle of Assumburg which he had acquired two years before.
His example was to be widely followed during the 18th century.

V. The importance of the securities trade.
The switch to commission trading, the Iberian trade, and William III’s policies were
not the only factors boosting the evolution of finance. Buoyed up by rising wealth,
securities trading developed into a major business with an increasingly sophisticated
9
array of derivatives and products.35 Sephardic Jews were quite prominent in this
trade as well. In 1688 one of them, Joseph Penso de la Vega, an acquaintance of
Francisco Lopes Suasso, published a justly famous account of the techniques used on
the Amsterdam exchange.36 One new product introduced during the 1670s were
tontines. Developed during the 1650s in Italy and France as a public debt
instruments, these constructions were mainly used for private pension arrangements
by Dutch investors. Tontine contracts were in effect unit trusts with an element of
chance. A number of investors clubbed together to buy a block of securities, usually
VOC shares, members splitting the revenues until a specified last surviving number
obtained the joint fund. Some 200 such contracts were concluded between 1670 and
1700, most of them in Amsterdam, the estimated total value totalling 4.3 million
guilders.37 We have already seen how Deutz applied the unit trust construction to
repackage an Austrian loan in 1695.
William III’s accession to the British throne in 1688 opened entirely new
avenues for finance. By ending the political stalemate between Crown and Parliament
the Glorious Revolution spurred the London money market into action. A series of
joint-stock companies were floated for insurance, banking, and trade, notably the
Bank of England and the South Sea Company. To pay for the wars with Louis XIV the
government adopted ‘Dutch Finance’, selling large amounts of floating debt. The
burgeoning opportunities attracted an influx of Dutch bankers and brokers keen to
apply the techniques described by Penso de la Vega in a new, much larger, and as yet
underdeveloped market. These bankers also channeled surplus Dutch savings into
British securities and widened British access to Amsterdam’s pool of liquidity
centered on the Wisselbank, with a triple effect. Dutch investments in Britain rose
rapidly, peaking at an estimated 200 million guilders in 1750.38 On the back of that
specialized traders arose linking the Amsterdam and London markets and developing

35 O. Gelderblom and J.P.B. Jonker, ‘Amsterdam as the Cradle of Futures Trading’, in: W.N. Goetzmann, K.G.
Rouwenhorst, ed. The Origins of Value, the Financial Innovations that Created Modern Capital Markets
(Oxford UP: Oxford 2005) 189-205; Petram, ‘World’s first’.
36 J. Penso de la Vega, Confusion de confusiones (ed. G.J. Geers and M.F.J. Smith, Nijhoff : Den Haag 1939; English
translation H. Kellenbenz, Baker Library: Boston 1957 ); J.I. Israel, ‘Een merkwaardig literair werk en de
Amsterdamse effectenmarkt in 1688: Joseph Penso de la Vega's Confusion de confusiones’, in: De zeventiende eeuw
6 (1990) 159-161.
37 O. Gelderblom and J.P.B. Jonker, ‘With a view to hold, the emergence of institutional investors on the
Amsterdam securities market during the 17th and 18th centuries’, in: J. Atack, L. Neal, ed., The Evolution of
Financial Markets and Institutions (Cambridge UP: Cambridge 2009) 71-98, ibidem 90-92.
38 A.C. Carter, Getting, spending and investing in early modern times, essays on Dutch, English and Huguenot
economic history (Van Gorcum: Assen 1975).
10