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The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy PDF

364 Pages·1995·4.46 MB·English
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The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy This page intentionally left blank The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy David Mayers New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1995 Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madria Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1995 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in -Publication Data Mayers, David Allan The ambassadors and America's Soviet policy/David Mayers. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-506802-5 1. United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—United States. 3. Ambassadors—United States—History—20th century. 4. Ambassadors—Soviet Union—History—20th century. I. Title. E183.8.S65M373 1995 327.73047-~<lc20 94-30032 135798642 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper To my son, Peter This page intentionally left blank PREFACE Whether or no he had a grand idea of the lucid, he held that nothing ever was in fact . . . explained. One went through the vain motions, but it was mostly a waste of life. Henry James, The Ambassadors This book occupies a point of intersection for several analytical concerns. First and rather narrowly, this study belongs to the category of bureaucratic history. As such, it tells the story of those U.S officials most intimately involved with the Soviet Union: ambassadors in Moscow. Their appointments, place in the foreign policy hierarchy, and reporting are scrutinized here. Second, this book is con- cerned with the American response to life in the USSR as it evolved during seven and a half decades. Literature on this subject has emphasized the impact of the Soviet Union on the imagination and experience of disaffected Americans drawn to the promise of socialist justice. Comparatively little, however, has been written on the reaction of U.S. envoys during successive stages of Soviet history from Lenin and Stalin to Gorbachev. Finally and most important, the book examines Soviet-U.S. relations and Cold War diplomacy from an angle that has received insubstantial scholarly attention—the embassy in Moscow. Each of the book's sections is assembled in a distinctive way that indicates something about its objectives and comprehensiveness. The first part, dealing with pre-1933, amounts to an extended introduction and depends largely on materials of a secondary nature: memoir literature, other scholars' research, published gov- ernment documents such as the estimable Foreign Relations of the United States series, and a moderate number of primary documents. The second part, corres- ponding with Stalin in power, constitutes the core of the book. It depends on the same type of materials mentioned, but the proportions of mix are changed in favor of primary sources from such repositories as the Library of Congress, National Archives, Hoover Institution, and presidential libraries. The third section, on the post-Stalin era, is handicapped by problems familiar to writers of contemporary history: a lack of perspective and inadequate access to major collections. The vagaries of the federal government's declassification procedure are surpassed only by that confusion reigning in many archives of the former Soviet Union. The third viii PREFACE part necessarily hinges on sources of an uneven and elusive type: memoir litera- ture, newspaper and journal articles, oral histories, and interviews. Not everyone whom I approached for an interview granted one. I say this without rancor but to emphasize my gratitude to those people who let me impose upon their time and patience. These men and women are named in the interview and correspondence section of the bibliography. Three institutions generously supported me in the course of writing. Fellow- ships enabling me to take academic leaves and to travel to archival collections came from Boston University, Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the John M. Olin Foundation. My stay as a visiting scholar at Hoover was exception- ally pleasant. Professional associations allowed me to make presentations of my work in progress. I gladly acknowledge the help I received from Brown University's Wat- son Institute for International Studies, the European International Studies Confer- ence in Heidelberg, Harvard University's Russian Research Center, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the University of Southern California's Center for International Studies, and the U.S. Naval War College. Portions of chapters were originally published in slightly different form. Much of Chapter 4 appeared as "Preparing for Moscow: Training U.S. Diplomats and the Dilemmas of Recognition," Brown Foreign Affairs Journal (Winter 1992); part of Chapter 5 as "Ambassador Joseph Davies Reconsidered," SHAFR Newsletter (September 1992); Chapter 8 as "After Stalin: The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy, 1953-1962," Diplomacy and Statecraft (July 1994). Again, it was a pleasure to work with the editorial staff at Oxford University Press. I want to thank Valerie Aubry and David Roll, in particular, for their courtesy and encouragement. I do not want to implicate any of the following people in this book's shortcom- ings, either interpretative or factual. Still, the criticism and advice of these friends and colleagues were crucial: George Baer, Philip Bayer, Vladimir Brovkin, Walter Clemens, Stephanie Fawcett, Irene Gendzier, Norman Graebner, William Green, Wendy Hazard, Stephen Jones, William Key lor, Murray Levin, Igor Lukes, Ste- ven Lyne, Richard Melanson, Charles Neu, Arnold Offner, Lucian Pye, Christine Rossell, Mauki Satzger, Robert Schulzinger, the late Paul Seabury, Mark Silver- stein, Michael Joseph Smith. Special thanks to Walter Connor and Hermann Eilts. While on a memorable faculty exchange in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) and Moscow, I conceived the idea of writing this book in conversations with Peter Kenez. Since then, he has read every chapter, saved me from egregious errors, and urged me to reflect on views that he found untenable. Once more, despite demands from her professional career, my wife, Elizabeth, has provided invaluable assistance as editor par excellence. Our son, Peter, did not contribute directly to this took. But he added joy to the years of its writing. Newton, Mass. D. M. April 1994 CONTENTS United States Chiefs of Mission in St. Petersburg and Moscow, xi Introduction, 3 I Before Moscow 1. St. Petersburg and the U.S. Diplomatic Tradition, 11 2. From Comity to Estrangement, 35 3. War and Revolution, 67 II In Stalin's Time 4. Preparing for Moscow, 93 5. Purges and the Failure of Collective Security, 108 6. Fragile Coalition, 136 7. Neither War Nor Peace, 164 III Great Power Rivalry 8. After Stalin, 191 9. Controlled Rivalry, 212 10. Collapse and the Art of Diplomacy, 239 Notes, 261 Bibliography, 307 Index, 323

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George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, W. Averell Harriman, William Bullitt, Joseph E. Davies, Llewlleyn Thompson, Jack Matlock: these are important names in the history of American foreign policy. Together with a number of lesser-known officials, these diplomats played a vital role in shaping U.S. strategy
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