The Alienation of Reason

120 Pages·1988·6.92 MB·English

by  Leszek Kolakowski

The Alienation of Reason
A HISTORY OF POSITIVIST THOUGHT
by Leszel? Kolakowski
Translated by Norbert Gute1'1nan
DOUTILEDAY & COMPANY, INC.
GARDEN CITY! NEW YORK
1968
This book was published in Poland by Panstwowe Wydawnicrwo Naukowe
in 1966 as Filozofia Poz'ytywistyczna (od Hume 'a. do Kola Tifliedenskiego).
Copyright Panstwowe vVydavm.ictwo Naukowe, 1966.
Preface
Library of Congress CAtalog Card Number 68- 57
121 This book is an account of the mam stages of positivist
Copyright © 1968 by Doubleday & Company, Inc.
tbought. whicb bave to be briefly characterized if we are to
All Rights Reserved
grasp the meaning of this pbilosophy, tbat is, the inferences to
Printed in the United States of America
be drawn from it as well as what is enduring in it. The term
First Edition
"positivism" does not refer simply to a specific philosophical
doctrine tbat denies being either a doctrine or a pbilosopby. It
is also used in connection witb a specific theory of law, a
particnlar CUrrent in literary history, and a characteristic treat
ment of a number of theological cJuestions. To use the same
term in all these connections is not entirely arbitrary, but justi
fied to some extent by a common intellectual attitude to be dis
cerned in them alL On the other hand, their similarity is not so
strongly marked as to rule ont separate discussion. In this book
/y
I am concerned exclusively with positivism in the sense of a
philosophical-or, if you prefer, an anti-philosophical-doctrine.
I have deliberately avoided mentioning a great many names,
since my intention is not to provide a detailed historical survey,
listing as many contributors to this current of thought as pos
sible, bnt rather to bring out its most important features, the
ones most helpful for grasping it as a whole. Thus, the reader
will find here only the best-known names in tbe history of
positivism. Even to list the individuals and problems omitted
would be OUt of place here.
The first and tbe last chapters deal with the same subject:
they represent an attempt to characterize the phenomenon as a
whole. However, the first merely expounds the most important
vi PREFACE
features of pOSltlVlSm to be found in the philosophical texts.
In the last I inquire into the general meaning of this style of
thinking, which as a rule is not dealt with by its adherents.
In some cases the book contains critical observations. These
are clearly distinguishable from the purely informative portions.
Most of the criticisms come from other sources, but since this
Contents
book is addressed to the general reader I have not troubled to
indicate where I speak in my own name and where I draw on
others. For the same reason I don't list the critical and historical
r
sources have made use of. My aim here is not to discuss new v
Preface
or previously ignored problems, but merely to present a well
known phenomenon in such a way that the reader may not ONE. An Over-all View of Positivism
only be informed about it objectively, but also brought closer TWO. Positivism Down to David Hume !I
to understanding its function in our culture. Both the informa
THREE. Auguste Comte: Positivism in the
tive and the "analytical" portions of my exposition may, how
Romantic Age 47
ever, be looked upon as the results of already existing reflection,
a procedure admissible iu this type of presentation. FOUR. Positivism Triumphant 73
FIVE. Positivism at the Turn of the Century
SIX. Conventionalism-Destruction of the
Concept of Fact 134
SEVEN. Pragmatism and Positivism 154
EIGHT. Logical Empiricism: A Scientistic
Defense of Threatened Civilization 174
Conclusion 207
Index 221
The Alienation of Reason
\
CHAPTER ONE
An Over-all View of Positivism
The term "positive philosophy" was coined by Auguste
Comte, and it has lasted down to the present iu the shorter form
of "positivism." Not all, however, who according to historians
or critics profess the positivist doctrine, would agree to he classi
fied nnder this heading. As a mle snch objections are motivated
by the fact that thinkers arc reluctant to admit they profess a
doctrine that has had a long and complex bistory. To respect
their wishes, one wonld be obliged in each case to single out
those elements in positivism that are not to their taste, at the
same time pointing out bow mnch of the rest of it they nonethe
less snbscribe to. Also, many thinkers are conscious of the errors
and oversimplifications that grow up around doctrinal labels,
and for this rcason hesitate to enroll themselves under any
banner.
In view of this situation, setting bonlldaries to the cnrrent of
thonght positivism represents in nineteenth- and twentieth-cen
tnry intellectnal history reqcires a decision that is partly arbi
trary. The same problem arises in many other cases (for example,
when one discnsses the history of existentialist or Marxist philos
ophy). A measure of arbitrariness, however, is unavoidable both
for the historian and for the student of philosophical culture.
One has to organize the material at hand according to some
schema, disregarding differences in matters one looks upon as
secondary, if one is to bring ont the continnity in primary con
texts. Nor is this distinction between primary and secondary
strains in philosophy entirely arbitrary. It is based all certain
2 THE ALIENATION ,OF REASON AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POSITIVISM 3
historical data that show, it may be with the aid of purely quanti us with norms that make it possible to distinguish between that
tative (though approximate) indices, that certain themes, prop which may aud that which may uot reasonably be asked. Thus
ositions, or assertions held the attention of readers, polemicists, positivism is a nonnative attitude, regulating how we are to use
and adherents over a given period, while others went almost such terms as "knowledge," "science/' "cognition/' and "infor
unnoticed. The classifier or historian who discerns a certain mation." By the same tokeu, the positivist rules distinguish be
"current" in the history of philosophy goes on to refer solely tween philosophical and scientific disputes that may profitably
to historical, factual criteria in justifying his construction. Other be pursued aud those that have no chauce of being settled aud
wise he might be suspected of ascertaining intellectual trends on hence deserve no consideration.
the basis of arbitrarily chosen principles (though even this is The most important of the rules that, according to the positiv
permissible, provided he clearly formulates his criteria). More ist doctrine, are to be observed in order, so to speak, to separate
over, he refers to a sense of continuity that actually was felt the wheat from the chaff in any statement about the world-i.e.,
by successive generations of adherents, and given expression by to determine the questions worth considering and to discard
them. There is room for error in interpreting such evidence, bnt questions that are falsely formulated or iuvolve illegitimate con
it certainly merits being taken into account. cepts-are as follows.
,
In the present instance, however, we are dealing with a matter 1. The rule of phenomenalism. This may be briefly formu
that is scarcely controversial: the existence of a "positivist cur lated as follows: there is no real difference between "essence"
rent" in nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy is uni and "phenomenon." Many traditional metaphysical doctrines
versally acknowledged. Doubts arise only when we try to define assumed that various observed or observable phenomena are mani
this current, and to formulate rigorous criteria setting it off from festations of a reality that eludes ordiuary cognition; this as
the other currents. This situation is as normal and inescapable in sumption justified the lise of such terms as "substance," "sub
the history of philosophic thought as in the history of art: the stantial form," "occult quality," etc. According to positivism,
interpeuetration of ideas, the ways oue current influeuces an the distiuction between essence and phenomenon should be elim
other or reacts agaiust it, not to menti?u genuine amhignities in iuated from science on the ground that it is misleading. We are
the texts themselves, mean that there IS always room fur more entitled to record only that which is actually manifested in
than one interpretation; perfectly clear-cut divisions are ruled experience; opinions concerning occult entities of which ex
out by the circumstances of the case. p,erieuced things are supposedly the manifestatious are untrust
So let us try to characterize the positivist mode of thinking worthy. Disagreements over questions that go beyond the do-
L-
iu the most schematic, over-all terms. main of .:;xrerience are purely verbal in character. It must be
• Positivism stands for a certaiu philosophical attitude concern noted here-that positivists do not reject every distinctiou be
ing human knowledge; strictly speakiug, it does not prejudge tween "lnanifestation" and ~'cause." After all, it is weB known
questions about how men arrive at knowledge-ueither the psy that whooping cough "manifests" itself by characteristic fits of
chological nor the historical fouudations of knowledge. But it is coughing, and ouce such a type of disease has been isolated, we
a collectiou of rules and evaluative criteria referring to human are entitled to recognize the cough as a "manifestation" and to
coguition: it teIls us what kind of contents in our statements inquire into the specific "hidden mechauism" of this manifesta
about the world deserves the name of knowledge and supplies tiou. Discovery of Bacillus pertussis early iu this. century, as the
AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POSITIVISM 5
4 THE ALIENATION OF REASON
within positivism itself. For the moment, however, we will not
causal agent of the infection, was not, ohviously, incompatible
go into the over-all rules in greater detail b,lt ,let them stand
with the assumptions of phenomenalism. For positivists do not
Out starkly as a means of identifying one fairly important cur
object to inquiry into tbe immediately invisible causes of any
rent in philosophical thought. This would appear more instruc
observed pheuomenon, they object only to any accounting f~r
tive than to restrict the designation ((positivism" to certain
it in terms of occult entities that are by definition inaccessible
branches of this current only.
to human knowledge. Classical examples of entities the positivists
The rule of nominalism. Strictly speaking, this rule may
condemn as illegitimate interpolations lying beyond the domain 2.
be regarded as a consequence of the preceding, but it is pref
of possible experience are "matter" and "spirit." Since matter is
supposed to be something different from the totality of the erable to state it separately, considering that in philosophical
controversy one philosophically valid jndgment often follows
world's observed qualities, and since with this concept we do not
from another, yet terminological ambignities can still arise snch
account for obse.rved phenomena more effectively than without
as may make them appear incompatible. The rule of nominalism
it, there is no reason to make use of it at all. Similarly, if "soul"
comes down to the statement that we may not assume that any
is to denote a certain object different from the totality of the
insight formulated in general terms can have any real referents
describable qualities of human psychic life, it is a superfluous
other than individual concrete objects. As is well known, at
cunstruet, for no one can tell us how the world without "soul"
would differ from the world with "soul." tempts to define knowledge from this point of view were made
at the very beginning of European thought. ViThen Plato con
Needless to say, the phenomenalist "Don't" so form11lated can
sidered the question: What are we actually speaking about when,
give rise to doubt, for it is hard to state it in such a form that
for instance, we speak about the triangle or abom justice? he
it will settle once and for all, in every possible case, whether
formulated a gnestion that has not lost its vitality down to our
our question is a legitimate one, whether it represents the search
own day, thongh it is often posed in different words. We say
for the "mechanism" behind the "manifestation," or whether it is
that the sum of the angles in any triangle is equal to two right
to be thrown into the dustbin of history as "metaphysical." In
angles. But what does the statement actually refer to? Not to
some cases, the decision is easy to make. For instance, if anyone
this or that triangular body, since there is no absolutely perfect
maintained that absolntely unknowable objects exist, a positivist
triangle that meets all the reguirements of geometry; nor can it
would consider him an incorrigible metaphysician on the ground
refer, for the same reason, to all individual triangular obiects.
that he ~as made a statement about a reality that is by definition
And yet it can hardly be said that geometry does not refer to
not subject to experimental controL Conversely, there can be
no doubt ahout whether it makes sense to inqnire into the possi anything at all. H_cnce, OUf assertion must refer to "the" trianrrle,
ble existence and properties of a specific cancer virus, for all that pure and simple. Bnt what is this triangle, which is to be fonnd
nowhere in nature' It has none of the physical characteristics we
it is for the time being observable only through its "manifesta
tions." But there are many cases in wl;ich the decision is not so usually ascribe to bodies. For ooe thing, it is not localized in
obvions. We mention this, not as an objection to positivism, but space. All its properties derive from the fact that it is a triang'le
to call attention to the highly abstract formulations used here to and nothing else; we must acknowledge that it exists in some
characterize the positivist program, also to the fact that incom way, although it is an existence not perceived by the senses, ac
patible interpretations of tbis same over-all rule are ro be fonnd cessible only to reflection.
6 THE ALIENATION OF REASON AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POSITIVISM 7
Nominalists reject this line of reasoning, We have the right to we operate with the perfect circle in our abstract calculations.
acknowledge the existence of a thing, they say, only when ex A system ordering our experiences must be such as not to intro
perience obliges us to do so, No experience obliges us to assume duce into experience more entities than are contained in ex
that our general knowledge about the properties of "the" tri perience and, since it inevitably uses abstractious among its
angle corresponds to a certain entity different from individual means, it must also be such as to enable ns to keep constantly
triangular bodies and possessing a separate existence from them, in mind that these abstractions are no more or less than means,
It is true that our science requires the use of concepmal instru human creations that serve to organize experience but are not
ments that describe certain 1geal state'h~b are nev~eved entitled to lay claim to separate existence .
./ in the empirical world. Not only the mathematical scieuces but According to nominalism, in other words, every abstract
also physics make use of such constructs, More particularly, science is ..'!... method of ordering, a uantitative recordin of
the physics initiated by Galileo must inevitably make use of experiences, and has no 111 ependent cognitive fnnctiQn~he
descriptions of ideal simations, in which certain observable fea sense that, via i~s abstractions, it opens access to eIl1P.irically
mres of the real world are carried to au abstract point of refine inaccessible _domainsgLreality. All the general entities, the ab
ment, Study of the properties of such ideal simations helps stract creations, with which rhe old metaphysics filled the world
us understand the real situations that ouly approximate them are fictions, for they illegitimately ascribed existence to things
more or less closely. But these ideal simations-the vacuum in that have no existence save as names or words. In the language
mechanics, self-contained systems, figures in geometry-are of the old controversies, "universaliry" is merely a characteristic
creations of our own that serve as a superior-more concise and of linguistic constrUcts and also-according to some interpreta
more generalized-description of empirical reality. There is no tions-of mental acts associated with operations involving these
reason to suppose that because we assume such simations for the constructs, In the world of actual experience, however, hence in
convenience of our calculations, they must actually exist any tbe world pure and simple, there are no snch things as "univer
where in reality. The world we know is a collection of individual sals. "
observable facts. Science aims at ordering these facts, and it is 3. The phenomenalist, nominalist conception of science has
only thanks to this ordering work that it becomes a true science, another important consequence, namely, the rule that denies
i,e., something that can be pnt to practical nse and that enables cognitive value to value judgments and n01'mative statements.
us to predict certain events on the basis of others. All our Experience, positivism argues, contains no such qnalities of men,
abstract concepts, all the schemata of the mathematical sciences, events, or things as "noble," "ignoble," Ugood,H "evil," "beauti
and all the idealizati.ons drawn up in the natural sciences ful," "ngly," etc, Nor can any experience oblige us, through any
are contained in these ordering systems. Only thanks to them logical operations whatever, to accept statements containing
, can we give experience a coherent, concise form, easy to remem commandments or prohibitions, telling us to do something or not
•
ber, purified of the accidental deviations and deformations that to do it. More accnrately: it is clear that in relation to an aim
are necessarily present in every individnal fact. Though abso one sets oneself, it is possible to supply logical grounds for
lutely perfect circles are fonnd neither in nartlre nor in the judgments concerning the effectiveness of the means employed;
prodncts of human technology, we can produce circular bodies evaluations of this type have a technical character and may be
rather closely approximating this ideal, thanks to the fact that qualified as true or false to the extent that they have a technical
8 THE ALIENATION OF REASON AN OVER-ALL VIEW OF POSITIVISM 9
sense, i.e" to the extent that they tell us what operations are or belief that the methods for acquiring valid knowledge, and the
are not effective in achieving a desired end, Examples of such main stages in elaborating experience through theoretical re
technical judgments would be a statement to the effect that we flection, are essentially the same in all spheres of experience,
should admiuister penicillin in a case of pneumonia or one to Consequently we have no reason to assume that the qualitative
the effect that children oU2'ht not be threatened with a beat;!1rr differences between particular sciences come to anything more
c 0
if they won't eat, Such statements can, clearly, be justified, if than characteristics of a particular historical stage in the develop
their meaning is respectively that penicillin is an effective rem ment of science; we may expect that further progress will
edy against pneumonia, and that threatening children with pun gradually eliminate such differences or even, as many authors
ishment to make them eat causes characterologic.1l handicaps, have believed, will reduce all the domains of kuowledge to a
And if we assume tacitly that, as a rule, it is a good thing to cme single science, It has often been supposed that this single science
the sick and a bad thing to inflict psychic deformation upon in the proper sense of the term will be physics, on the grounds
children, the above-mentioned statements can be justified, even that of all the empirical disciplines it has developed the most
though they do have the form of uormative judgments, But exact methods of description, and that it encompasses the most
we afe not to assume that any value assertion that we recognize universal of the qualities and phenomena found in nature-those
as true "in itself," rather than in relation to something else, without which no others occur. This assumption-that all knowl
can he justified by experience, For instance, the principle that edge will be reduced to the physical sciences, that all scientific
human life is an irreplaceable value cannot be so justified: we statements will be translated into physical terms-does not, to be
may accept it or we may reject it, but we must be conscious sure, follow from the foregoing positivist rules without further
of the arbitrariness of our option, For, by the phenomenalist assumptions, Moreover, belief in the unity of the scientific
rule, we are obliged to reject the assumption of values as method can be specified in other ways as welL However, the
characteristics of the world accessible to the only kind of above-mentioned interpretation is fairly common in the history
knowledge worthy of the name, At the same time, the rule of of positivism.
nominalism obliges us to reject the assumption that beyond the Around these fonr briefly stated "rules," positivist philosophy
visible world there exists a domain of values "in themselves," has built up an extensive network of theory covering all the
with which our evalnations are correlated in some mysterious domains of human cognition, Defined in the most general terms,
( way, Consequently, we are entitled to ex.press value j~dgments positivism is a collection of prohibitions concerning human
~ on the human world, but we are not entitled to assume that our knowledge, intended to confine the name of "knowledge" (or
grounds for making them are scientific; more generally, the "science") to those operations that are observable in the evolu
L
only grounds for maklI1g them are our own arbitrary choices, tion of the modern sciences of nature, More especially, through
• 4, Finally, among the fundamental ideas of positivist philoso- out its history positivism has turned a polemical cutting edge to
phy we many mention belief in the essential unity of the metaphysical speculation of every kind, and hence against all
scientific method. To an even greater extent that the previous reflection that either cannot found its conclusions on empirical
principles, the meaning of this one admits of various inter data or formulates its judgments in such a way that they can
pretations, For all of that, the idea itself is invariably present in never be contradicted by empirical data, Tbus, according to the
positivist discussion, In its most general form it expresses the positivists, both the materialist and the spiritualist interpretations
10 THE ALIENATION OF REASON
of the world make use of terms to which nothing corresponds
iu experience: it is not known how the world of our experience
would be different from what it is, were we to assume that it is
CHAPTER TWO
not, as materialists think, a manifestation of the existence and "'
movement of matter, or were we to assume that it is not, as the
adherents of religious denominations think, controlled by the Positivism Down to David Hume
spiritual forces of Providence. Since neither of these assump
tions entails consequences enabling us to predict or to describe
additional features of the world apart from what we can predict
The task we have set ourselves requires the following histori
or describe without them, there is no reason to concern our
cal remarks:
selves with them. Thus positivism constantly directs its criticisms
It is possible to begin the history of European positivist
against both religious interpretations of the world and materialist
thought almost anywhere, for many strands we regard as of
metaphysics, and tries to work out an observational position
primary importance in contemporary positivist doctrines had
entirely free of metaphysical assumptions. This position is con
antecedents in antiquity. There are Stoic fragments, also sur
scionsly confined to the mles the natural sciences observe in
viving writings by skeptics and atomists, with passages that
practice. According to' the positivists, metaphysical assumptions
hring vividly to mind the anti-metaphysical treatises of the
serve no pnrpose in these sciences, whose aim is to fonnnlate the
modern era. For instance, these ancient thinkers tell us that
interdependence of phenomena withont penetrating more deeply
experience enables us to ascertain whether a given ohject has
into their hidden "natures" and without trvinQ; to find out
whether the world "in itself," apart from the ;o81;itive situations this or that appearance, but~ that it is illegitimate to go on to
infer that the ohject is in reality such as it appears to be. For
in which it appears to us, has features other than those accessihle
example, we may say that honey appears to be sweet, but we
to experience.
cannot infer from this that honey is sweet; similarly, we may
What sense these positivist prohibitions make in the history of
say that we experience the warmth of fire, but not that fire is
culture, what initial assnmptions they require, and how they
warm "in itself," etc. The main rules of that interpretation of
can be justified, as well as what kind of difficulties are associated
knowledge we call phenomenalism-which require that we dis
with accepting them-all this we will try to analyze in a final
tinguish between the true content of the "data" of experience
chapter. Our main task, however, is to expound the main stages
(appearances, phenomena) and such illegitimate extrapolations
through which modern positivist thought has passed.
from it as present the qualities we observe as qualities inherent
in "the nature of things"-had already been formulated in antiq
uity, though in a form we must today regard as simplistic. (We
should note right here that phenomenalism does not imply that
the only objects of coguition are "psychic contents"-this belief
may be, but is not necessarily, associated with the phenomenalist
position. )