The Alevi of Anatolia

16 Pages·2000·0.08 MB·English

by  Alona Briner

The Alevi of Anatolia
By David Zeidan*

Many Middle Eastern state governments, including Turkey, have tended to deny or
ignore ethnic diversity, promote one specific identity as unitary, monolithic, and characteristic of
the entire population. In Turkey, the suppression of minority identities has affected the little-
known Alevi population, an ethnic group that has not received much attention in the english-
speaking world. The recent resurgence of Sunni fundamentalism in Turkey and the state’s
adoption of a Turkish-Sunni national identity has heightened the Alevis’ problem.

Middle Eastern society is to a large Alevis go by a number of names.
extent still vertically segmented into They are called Kizilbash after the
ethnic/religious communities with complex Turkemen followers of the Safavid Sufi
allegiances that rise to the surface in times order of the 15th and 16th centuries from
of stress. Contrary to the official state line of which they emerged, and also Bektashi, after
a monolithic population, Turkey is no the Anatolian Bektashi Shi’a Sufi order
exception: Turkish society exhibits great founded in the 13th century to which many
variety in its composition. (1) This is belong.(6) Other names include Tahtaci,
especially evident in rural areas where Abdal, Cepni, and Zaza, which signify
populations live naturally with their specific tribal and linguistic identities.(7)
regional, religious, and ethnic Note that Alevis are distinct from the
differences.(2) These cleavages have also Arabic-speaking extreme-Shi’a Alawis of
been transported to Turkey’s urban areas by Syria and Southwest Turkey.
massive rural migration. Alevis traditionally inhabit rural
Turkey’s main ethnic divide Central and Eastern Anatolia, in particular
concerns the Kurdish population of the triangle Kayseri-Sivas-Divirgi. Kurdish
southeastern Turkey, whose separatist Alevis are mainly found in the Tunceli,
struggle, especially as waged by the Elazig and Mus provinces of Southeastern
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has made Anatolia, and some tribal settlement of
headlines around the world. A lesser known Tahtaci and Cepni exist on the
minority is the Alevi community.(3) Mediterranean coast. Many Alevis have
Numbering about 15 million persons, migrated from their rural villages, which
the Alevis account for some 25 percent of tend to be peripheral and underdeveloped, to
Turkey’s population and constitute the the large industrialized cities of Western
country’s second largest religious Turkey and to Western Europe, mainly
community, after the Sunnis. Most Alevis Germany.
are ethnically and linguistically Turkish, While there are many sub-groups
descended mainly from Central and Eastern among Alevis, the community tends to close
Anatolia, though some 20 percent are ranks when it comes to the Sunni world,
Kurds.(4) Alevis use Turkish rather than employing an “us” versus “them” approach
Arabic for their religious ceremonies and and emphasizing its position as a
literature.(5) marginalized religious/ethnic minority.(8)
Observers in rural Anatolia have noticed
Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999) 74
The Alevi of Anatolia

stark differences between neighboring Alevi assertive reaffirmation of the collective
and Sunni villages.(9) Alevi identity. (14)
Alevi opposition to the Sunni The weakening of Kemalist
Ottomans in the 16th century resulted in secularism in the 1990s has yielded two
geographical and social marginalization.(10) paradoxical trends for the Alevis. First, they
In order to survive despite majority hostility have been threatened by the rise of
and persecution, the Alevis developed into fundamentalist Sunni political parties, which
an endogamous religious community with now constitute a significant bloc in the
definite ethnic markers and a tight social- Turkish parliament, and even fielded
religious network. Like Druze, Shi’a, and Turkey’s first ever Islamist prime minister.
Alawis they practiced dissimulation and (15) At the same time, Turkey’s
secrecy about their religion (taqiya). Not liberalization and the growth of civil society
having a central religious authority, Alevis has encouraged an Alevi revival which
form a complex matrix of overlapping includes the founding of hundreds of Alevi
groupings based on lineage, regional, and religious societies in major cities and the
Sufi order links. public practice of Alevi rituals, kept hidden
Despite the Turkish republic’s not so long ago.
avowedly secular stance, Sunni Islam has,
especially since the 1980s, been supported ORIGINS
as a quasi-state religion, much to the Alevis’
detriment.(11) Traditionally branded as Alevism originated from a complex
heretics by the Sunnis, the Alevis still carry mix of mystical (Sufi) Islam, extreme
the stigma of being sectarian “others” today. Shi`ism, and the rivalry between the
Many Sunnis think the Alevis are unclean, Ottoman and Safavid Empires in Anatolia.
practice immorality and orgies, and are not (16) Some Sufi orders, such as the Safavi,
true Muslims. (12) Centuries of persecution, accepted Shi’a reverence for Ali and the
prejudice and misconceptions at the hands of Twelve Imams, and their adherents and
the majority Sunnis have resulted in a sympathisers, called Kizilbash (red-heads)
persistent social gap between the Sunni and (17), later developed into the Alevis.
Alevi Turks. In the 16th century, under Ismail (d.
Turkey’s secular elite and military 1524), the Kizilbash became dominant in
tend to view the Sunni/Alevi rift as artificial Eastern Anatolia, conquered Azerbaijan, and
and manipulated by various interest groups. from there conquered all of Iran. They
However, the sectarian differences are spread revolt against the Sunni Ottomans
deeply rooted in Turkish society, and today among the many Sufi, Shi’a, and Kizilbash
they operate in the context of mass media, groups in Anatolia and as a result, Anatolia
the information revolution, and financial became the scene of protracted warfare
support of fundamentalism by the rich Oil between the Sunni Ottomans and the Sufi-
states.(13) Shi’a Safavids whose center had shifted
Fears that Alevism would lose its from Anatolia to Persia. (18) A series of
unique characteristics were put to rest in the battles resulted in an Ottoman victory in
mid-1980s when, in the face of Anatolia, pushing the Safavids firmly into
modernization, the Alevi community began Iran. (19) The peace of Amasya (1555)
to reconstruct and transform its communal finally recognized Ottoman rule over Iraq
identity patterns, and reformulate its and Eastern Anatolia and Iranian rule over
traditions. This process is linked to a Azerbaijan and Caucasia. (20)
politicization of group members and an
75 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999)
David Zeidan

Anatolia’s Kizilbash found internally by paternal descent. To prevent
themselves militarily, politically and penetration by hostile outsiders, the Alevis
religiously separated from their center in insisted on strict endogamy, which
Iran. They retreated to isolated rural areas eventually made them into a quasi-ethnic
and turned inward, developing their unique group. Alevi taboos limited interaction with
community structures and doctrines. the dominant Sunni political-religious
Following severe persecution and massacres centre. Excommunication was the ultimate
by the Ottomans which lasted into the 18th punishment threatening those who married
century, Alevis went underground outsiders, cooperated with outsiders
pretending to be Sunnis, using taqiya economically, or ate with outsiders. It was
(religious dissimulation permitted by all also forbidden to use the state (Sunni)
Shi`a groups) to conceal their faith and courts. (24)
survive in a hostile environment. The
Kizilbash mixed with another Shi’a-Sufi MODERN HISTORY
group, Bektashis, with which they shared
religious beliefs and practices, and the two Long marginalized and discriminated
intermingled to become Alevis despite local against under the Ottomans, rural Alevis
variations. Isolated from both the Sunni were great supporters of Kemal Ataturk’s
Ottomans and the Shi`a Safavids, the Alevis Young Turk ideology, which stressed
developed traditions, practices, and European-type nationalism as the basis of
doctrines that by the early 17th century state unity and secularism as the guarantee
marked them as a closed, autonomous of modernization and progress. The new
religious community, opposed to all forms construct of an authentic Turkish
of external religion. (21) nationalism favored the Alevis as the true
Unlike Sunnism and mainline bearers of the ancient Turkish Anatolian
Shi`ism, Alevism does not possess a language and culture, while secularism
tradition of authoritative religious promised them equality with the Sunni
scholarship and official carriers of formal majority. For his part, Ataturk saw the
learning. Rather, it is more “a flowing Alevis as natural allies in his struggle
together of various related movements, against the traditional Ottoman elite and he
doctrines, ideas, rituals and traditions in a selectively included Alevi cultural markers
flexible synthesis, its strength lying in in his construct of the new Turkish national
shared local traditions and esoteric identity. (25)
interpretations of Islamic belief and Karen Vorhoff observes that today’s
practice.” (22) Dartmouth University Alevis are proud of their co-operation with
professor Dale Eickelman notes some other Ataturk, and the fact that their leaders had
differences distinguishing Alevis from supported him. Indeed, the Alevis still see
Sunnis: the use of wine for religious themselves as the protectors of Kemalism,
ceremonial functions; non-observance of the Turkism, and democracy in Turkey. (26)
five daily prayers and prostrations (they only The early Kemalist republic is still regarded
bow twice in the presence of their spiritual as the ideal state in which the Alevis were
leader), Ramadan, and the Haj (they fairly represented proportionately to their
consider the pilgrimage to Mecca an percentage of the total population in the
external pretense, the real pilgrimage being National Assembly. (27) Vorhoff also notes
internal in one's heart); and non-attendance the positive impact of Kemalism which
of mosques. (23) Alevis were forbidden to turned Alevis into legally equal citizens,
proselytise, and Alevism regenerated itself built roads through their formerly isolated
Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999) 76
The Alevi of Anatolia

areas, introduced compulsory schooling, and against their own religious hierarchy,
improved communications, drawing the branding them feudal exploiters of the
marginalized Alevis into active and deeper masses.
contact with broader Turkish society. In his The resurgence of Sunni
drive for secularization, however, Ataturk fundamentalism that began in the 1950s and
destroyed religious frameworks, Sunni as has recently grown much stronger also
well as Alevi. (28) Kehl-Bodrogi notes that pushed the Alevis to the political left. (32)
the downplay of religion in public life and Many Alevis reacted by stressing their
the Westernization of the ruling elite turned separate identity and reinterpreting Alevism
Alevism into just one of several cultural in socialist and Marxist idiom that seemed to
themes in Turkish nationalism. have an affinity to Alevi ideals of equality
As the community opened up to the and traditions of revolt. An Alevi leftist
outside world, Alevis became increasingly political party (The Party of Union) even
secular and left-leaning, neglecting their appeared in 1966 but was unsuccessful in
traditional institutions. Solidarity loosened, the elections. (33)
ritual and ceremony lost some of their Alevis found themselves under
meaning, and the spiritual leadership violent attack in late 1970s by right wing
gradually lost its authority. This change in ultranationalists and Sunni fundamentalists,
Alevi internal structures was accelerated by although much of the violence was
massive migration to large cities, at a higher portrayed by the state and the media as left
rate than Sunni Turks, leading to some versus right (rather than Sunni versus
intermarriage and a new generation not Alevi.) In 1978 in the city of Kahramanras
familiar with the Alevi “Way” (yol). (29) in Southern Turkey, local Sunnis went on a
Although Sunni discrimination in rampage, slaughtering scores of Alevis from
employment and education was still a the nearby villages in the worst massacre in
challenge, forcing some Alevis to return to living memory. (34)
taqiya to cope with the stigma, education The widespread violence of the
and migration were seen as the gateway to 1970s led to a military coup in 1980,
social upward mobility, and from 1960s on a whereupon purges of the political left hit the
new Alevi middle class appeared. (30) Alevis hard. For example, their religious
As Vorhoff notes, a generation gap celebrations at Hacibektas were forbidden
emerged in the 1960s between older Alevis, for several years. In the mid-1980s, Turkish
who remained Kemalist and hoped that the prime minister Turgut Ozal encouraged
state would officially legitimize the Bektashi Sunni-orthodox and nationalist unity
order, and the Alevi youth which became ideology, promoting a “Turkish Islamic
very politicized and influenced by Synthesis.” (35) Anti-Alevi Sunni Sufi
revolutionary thought in universities, high orders, such as the Naqshbandi, Suleimanci,
schools, and trade unions. Working for a and Nurcu (36) became more visible, and
radical restructuring of society, the young government propaganda stated that Alevis
generation viewed all "reactionary" elements were actually Sunnis with some divergent
which tried to assimilate them into customs, negating the uniqueness of
mainstream Sunni life as enemies and joined Alevism and embarking on a plan of
extreme leftist parties, reinterpreting “Sunnification.” Infrastructure
historical opposition to Sunnism in terms of improvements in Alevi villages were made
class struggle and continuing the traditional conditional on compliance with mosque
Alevi role of opposition to the state. (31) construction and the participation of all
Some leftist Alevi activists also turned Alevi children in Sunni religious instruction.
77 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999)
David Zeidan

Some Alevis felt that the state had betrayed of other minorities such as the Laz and the
Ataturk’s original secularism which was Kurds, alarming the central government.
meant to protect them from Sunni The pervasive influence of religion
oppression. (37) in public life in the 1990s has grave
Reacting to the challenges, the potential for a worsening of Sunni-Alevi
Alevis banded with secular-liberal Sunni tensions. In 1990 the Ministry of Cults took
groups but were not absorbed by them. They over the organization of the Hacibektas
were not willing anymore to sacrifice their festivities under the pretense of making it an
communal identity on the altar of class- international attraction. Alevis were
struggle and began consciously to identify unhappy with the government interference,
themselves as a political group on the basis especially in 1993-94 when state officials
of a shared religious identity. (38) stressed the Turkish elements of Alevism
The result was an Alevi cultural but ignored its distinctiveness and did not
revival. Spearheaded by the new, educated give it any operating space as a minority
Alevi elite, Alevis organized foundations community.
and trusts, rebuilt Saints’ tombs, and Renewed inter-communal violence is
restored rituals in an effort to reconstruct sadly on the rise. In July 1993, at an Alevi
Alevi culture, community, and identity. A cultural festival in Sivas, a Sunni
reinterpretation of Alevi history and religion fundamentalist mob set fire to a hotel where
culminated in an "invention of traditions" many Alevi participants had taken refuge,
accompanied by a "coming out" for Alevis. killing 35 of them. State security services
For the first time in modern history Alevis did not interfere and prosecution against
publicly accepted their stigmatized identity, leaders of the riot was not energetically
articulated their collective interests towards pursued. (41) In 1994, Istanbul municipal
the state, and demanded equality with the leaders from the Refah Islamic political
Sunni majority. Such efforts have continued party tried to raze an Alevi tekke
into the 1990s. (39) (monastery) and close the Ezgi cafe where
Parallel to the growth of Islamism, young Alevis frequently gathered. In
Turkey experienced a democratic January 1995, a comedian on Turkish TV
liberalization in 1988-89 which opened up cracked a joke about "Alevi incest"
public discussion on issues that were triggering the first-ever street protest by
previously taboo. (40) Liberals pushed for thousands of Alevi youths. Some Alevis
ethnographic studies of the Turkish society now demand a political party of their own to
mosaic, and since 1989 the liberal press has combat Sunni-dominated Islamist parties,
accepted the Alevis as a separate religious while others are afraid that forming an Alevi
community. Encouraged by the deterioration party might lead to civil war. (42)
of the Soviet bloc and increasing ethnic In an effort to allay Alevi
nationalism around the world, the Alevis sensitivities, President Suleyman Demirel
increased their political activism. Along and Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz attended
with other marginalized groups, they fought the 1997 Hacibektas festivities and paid
for legitimacy as a unique Islamic tribute to the Alevi community.
community, legalization of their religious
rituals and practice, integration of their BELIEF AND PRACTICE
doctrine into the state education system, and
a fair allotment of broadcasting time in the Alevis belong to the extremist Shi’a
official media. Alevi publications branch and like all extreme Shi’a, their
multiplied, and Alevis supported the claims reverence for Ali (Muhammad’s cousin and
Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999) 78
The Alevi of Anatolia

son-in-law, and according to the Shi’a to gain access to government funds. In
tradition, his rightful heir) verges on addition to the Quran, Alevis have their own
deification. In fact, Ali is placed above holy books called "buyruk" that contain
Muhammad as the gate (bab) to esoteric doctrine and ritual and are claimed to have
knowledge. (43) Their stance has caused been written by important leaders. Alevis
classical Sunni ulama to classify them as also have many liturgical hymns called nefes
exaggerators (ghulat), outside the orthodox attributed to Shah Ismail and Pir Sultan
Islamic fold. Abdal.
According to Kehl-Bodrogi, Alevis Following a Sufi doctrine of the
accept Ali as the only legitimate successor “Perfect Man,” Alevis believe that salvation
to Muhammad. Muhammad and Ali are both exists in emulating such perfect models as
seen as emanations of the Divine Light— Ali, Haci Bektac, and other Saints. But, as
Muhammad is the announcer and Ali is the Kehl-Bodrogi stresses, the absolute center of
preserver of Divine Truth—and both seem Alevi faith is the edeb moral code: the ideal
to merge sometimes into one divine figure. Alevi is "master of his hand, his tongue, his
(44) Alevis venerate the House of the loins," an ethic that forbids theft, lies, and
Prophet (Ehlibeyt - Muhammad, Ali, Fatima, adultery. Every man must seek "purity of
Hassan, and Hussein) and reject all enemies heart" and self-knowledge, and piety is
of ehlibeyt, especially the Ummayads whom measured by lifestyle and not by ritual. Love
the Alevis believe imposed Sunnism as the and forgiveness are seen as important
dominant orthodoxy in order to to enslave elements in interpersonal relationships.(46)
the masses, distorted true Islam by Observers note that Alevi society is
destroying the original Quran and divided into two separate endogamous
persecuted the Shi’a Imams. groups: the ocak are the spiritual and social
Alevis have a trinitarian concept of elite who claim descent from Ali, Hussein,
the Godhead consisting of Allah, the 12 Imams, legendary Saints or religious
Muhammad and Ali. God is approached by warriors (ghazi) and constitute a priestly
four different "gates": Shariat (Islamic law), caste, and the talips (disciples), the majority
the Sunni way of external duties, the sphere lay members. Religious knowledge is passed
governed by the state and its Sunni down orally in the ocak families who were
orthodoxy; Tariqat (the path), the core of the responsible for the religious and social
community, it is the Alevi mode of worship leadership of the community. Among the
where strangers are not welcome; Marifet ocak are the mursits (teachers), dede
(knowledge), the esoteric intuitive (grandfathers), pirs (elders), and rehber
knowledge of God; and Haqiqat (ultimate (guides), which stand in a master-disciple
truth), union with God, the highest degree, relationship to each other in their hierarchy
to which only a select few (Saints) attain. with each having specific duties towards the
Each gate has ten makams (stations, duties) lay community. The dede oversee several
which the faithful must master before villages and visits them annually, with the
progressing to the next gate. (45) rehber representing him in each village. The
Alevis interpret the Quran in an ocak perform the rituals, teach the new
esoteric, allegoric, and symbolic (rather than generation, initiate the young, mediate in
literal) manner and repudiate the external conflicts, and aid talips in need. They are the
forms of Islam and its five pillars. Alevi central authority for the survival of Alevi
villages lack mosques, save those that were religious knowledge and identity. Some 10
forcibly built in Ottoman times or built by percent of Alevis are of ocak lineage. (47)
Alevis themselves in recent decades in order
79 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999)
David Zeidan

Observers also stress the double The ceremony is held once a year
structure of kinship in Alevi society, under the leadership of a dede assisted by a
designed to protect it against outside rehber, is held in a private house or a
pressures and central government communal building once a year. Women are
penetration. Beyond the blood-kinship of included on an equal footing with men.
family, each lay person is the disciple (talip) Kehl-Bodrogi notes that the ceremony
of a spiritual guide from a sacred lineage in cannot take place unless there is a general
a quasi father-child, teacher-disciple reconciliation among all members of the
relationship. The talip must appear before community, which is achieved by
his dede once a year to be questioned as to questioning community members.
his conduct. (48) In addition, two unrelated Punishments for confessed transgressions
lay men, together with their wives, enter into are meted out, and include fines, corporal
an irrevocable kinship relationship punishment, and excommunication. (53)
(musahiplik) of total solidarity and sharing Other Alevi holy days are Nevruz,
of all possessions and responsibility for all the Persian New Year celebrated on the 9th
debts, as well as mutual encouragement and March, the Khidirellez day on the 6th May
exhortation to walk the Alevi path. The in honour of Khidr (Elijah, St, George), and
relationship is deeper than a blood the twelve day Muharram fast culminating
relationship and ntermarriage between the in Ashura. (54)
two families is forbidden to the second
generation. (49) RELATIONSHIP TO SUNNI
Alevi rituals (ibadet) are communal, ORTHODOXY AND
with the aim of fostering unity (birlik) and FUNDAMENTALISM
love (muhabbet) within the community.
Alevi rituals differ markedly from Sunni The relationship between Alevis and
rituals. Alevis, for example, fast in the Sunnis is one of mutual suspicion and
month of Muharram for 12 days in memory prejudice, dating back to the Ottoman
of Hussein's death at Karbala and the period. Sunnis have accused Alevis of
sufferings of the 12 Imams. The early heresy, heterodoxy, rebellion, betrayal and
tragedy of Hussein’s martyrdom symbolizes immorality. Alevis, on the other hand, have
all the discrimination and persecution argued that the original Quran does not
suffered by Alevis since then. (50) demand five prayers, nor mosque
Vorhoff notes that the central ritual attendance, nor pilgrimage and that the
of Alevi religious life is the ayn-i cem (cem Sunnis distorted early Islam by omitting,
for short) celebration (51) replaying misinterpreting, or changing important
Muhammad's legendary heavenly journey passages of the original Quran, especially
(mirac) with the assembly of forty (kirklar those dealing with Ali and ritual
meclisi), combined with a memorial to the practice.(55)
suffering of the Twelve Imams. The Alevis see Sunni narrowmindedness
celebration includes a sacrificial meal as originating in Arabia and as contrary to
(lokma), a ritual alcoholic drink, nefes the Turkish national character. Sunna and
hymns accompanied by music on the saz, Hadith were Arab elite innovations, created
dance (sema), and the ritual lighting and to ensure Arab dominance of Islam and to
extinguishing of candles. In the villages of enslave the masses through manipulation.
Anatolia the ayn-i cem takes place only in All evil developments in Islam are seen as
the absence of distrusted outsiders, and is the fault of Arab society and character.
held at night under great secrecy. (52) Sunnism, according to the Alevis, is not true
Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999) 80
The Alevi of Anatolia

Islam but an aberration that by its strict one of reason and wisdom which stresses
legalism opposes free and independent education, is progressive, stands for
thought and is seen as reactionary, bigoted, secularism, democracy and science,
fanatic, and antidemocratic. Alevis believe promotes personal and public honesty, and
Sunni nationalism is intolerant, is compatible with modernity.
domineering, and unwilling to recognize In the nationalist discourse of
Alevi uniqueness. (56) modern times Alevis see themselves as the
The ideals of equality, justice, and "real Turks", maintainers of true Turkish
respect for all are prominent in Alevi society culture, religion and folklore in face of the
and give Alevi women a more respected Arabizing Ottoman Sunnis. This view has
status than that of Sunni women. Alevi been strengthened by the Kemalist stress on
women do not need to be veiled and are not Anatolian culture as the authentic source of
as segregated, nor must they fear polygamy Turkish national identity. (58) Since the
or one-sided divorce as Alevis practice beginning of the republic, the Alevis
monogamy and divorce is forbidden. claimed Turkishness as a main marker of
Women also partake equally in the religious their community. Alevism, according to
life of the community. (57) them, is a Turkish-Anatolian religion
In today’s political arena Alevis see combining Islam with elements of Turkish
themselves as a counterforce to Sunni culture including Shamanism. Their faith is
fundamentalism, ensuring the continued much more suitable for Turks than Arabic
secularism of Turkey. Alevis, who have a Islam as it includes Turkish traits
great interest in blocking the rising supposedly suppressed by Sunnism, such as
fundamentalist influence, are the main allies tolerance, humanitarianism, egalitarianism,
of the secularist forces, and are also and a stress on the inner religion of the
searching for alliances with moderate Sunnis heart. Alevis view themselves as the true
against the extremists. They are demanding preservers of authentic Turkish culture,
that the state recognize Alevism as an religion, and language amidst Ottoman
official Islamic community equal to, but pressures to Arabize or Persianize. In sum,
different from, Sunnism. the Turks are the real guardians of Islam,
and the Alevis are the real Turks. (59)
ALEVI VIEWS OF ALEVISM Modern Alevi apologetics trace
Alevism back to the founding stage of Islam.
There is wide variety in the ways in Haci Bektas Veli and other Alevi saints are
which Alevis regard themselves with no used to stress the regional uniqueness of
consensus view. Above all, the modern Alevism and its special relationship to
Alevi leadership aims to develop an "Turkism", and are presented as national
integrated ethnic community in an effort to heroes fighting for Turkish culture. (60)
confront state Sunnism and Sunni Some Alevis follow the Kemalist
fundamentalism. secularist ideology and stress only the liberal
Alevis situationally prioritize various and humanistic values of Alevism as a
aspects of their identity presenting Alevism world-view, downplaying its religious
as a separate religion, a belief-system, the connotations, while a few others would deny
true Islam, an Islamic Caferi madhab, a Sufi that Alevism is Islamic, and claim the
tariqa, an ethnic group, a philosophy, a communities’ origins lie in pre-Islamic
worldview, a way of life, a political position, religious systems such as Mithraism,
a social opposition, a culture, and a Zoroastrianism, or a mythical “Cult of
civilisation. They believe their religion is Angels”, stressing their links to similar
81 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999)
David Zeidan

groups such as the ‘Alawis, Shabak, martyrs in the cause of the dispossessed.
Yezidis, and Ali-Ilahis, all assumed to be Alevi leftists present Alevism as having
fragments of the original community. (61) always led the fight for liberation against all
Another view sees Alevism as the authentic tyranny in the succession to Muhammad,
expression of an Anatolian culture and while reactionary Sunnism served the rich
civilization, and sets up an Anatolian and powerful dominant elites. (65)
cultural mosaic in contrast to a specific
Turkish nationalism. This mosaic includes RENEWAL OF RITUALS AND
Greeks and Armenians in addition to Turks, RECONSTRUCTION OF
Kurds, and Zaza, as these groups were allied COMMUNITY
with the Alevis against Ottoman oppression.
In this view three factors combined to create After a 30-year hiatus, the new
the Alevi community: local Anatolian educated Alevi elite is leading an effort to
heritage; Central Asian Turkic culture and renew ethnic group construction. The
religion, which migrated to Anatolia reformers are committed to adapting
beginning in the 11th century; and old traditional knowledge, customs, and
Anatolian Hellenistic, Roman, and Christian philosophy to modern forms, and also to
inheritance. These three elements, plus rehabilitating the spiritual ocak leadership as
Islam, combined to produce an Anatolian bearers of the specific Alevi essence. Ethnic
religion suitable for Anatolian populations. markers like overhanging mustaches (worn
(62) to help recognize each other and symbolize
Kehl-Bodrogi adds that some Alevis the secrecy of the Alevi creed), (66) chains
see Alevism as the true Shi’a Islam that can with Alevi symbols, and other customs are
adapt to modernity because it is flexible and being reintroduced as Alevism is being
tolerant. The Turks accepted Shi’a Islam on transformed from a folk religion to a modern
conversion out of a natural sense of equality competitor to Sunnism.
and justice. Whilst stressing their Shi’a Old Alevi rituals are being taught to
credentials, these Alevis see Iranian Shi`ism the dislocated urban youth in an attempt to
as aberrant and rigorously stress their strengthen their Alevi identity in the face of
separateness from the state and religion of Sunnism. The Cem rituals, held in town
today’s revolutionary Iran. (63) wedding halls and sport halls, have become
Alevis also stress the humanism of a visual training ground in Alevi traditions.
their ideology: tolerance, love, and respect In this milieu, Alevi music and poetry are
for all men created in God's image and in flourishing again.
whom God manifests himself, regardless of Whereas revolutionary zeal drove the
race, religion, or nation. Love, help for those dedes out of the villages in the 1960s and
in need, kindness, solidarity, sharing, 1970s, they are now respected as symbols of
honesty, self knowledge, freedom, equality, Alevism, and a reform of the institution of
fraternity, and democracy all are seen as dedelik is being discussed which includes
unique humanitarian Alevi traits. (64) the foundation of a central training institute,
Vorhoff also highlights Alevi leftists a theological faculty and a central Alevi
who view their religion as a positive research institute in Hacibektas.
political and social revolutionary ideology Writing is taking over from oral
fighting against oppression and evil on traditions as many try to answer the
behalf of the poor and marginalized sectors question: What is Alevism? The new Alevi
of society. Ali was the defender of the poor authors consciously accept the Alevi identity
and oppressed. Hasan and Huseyn were on the basis of traditional lineage descent
Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999) 82
The Alevi of Anatolia

criteria - being born to Alevi parents. They supranational. Were they Alevi first and
also accept other traditional criteria of Alevi Kurds second, or was it the other way
identity: a unique religious faith with its around? Ethnic and linguistic differences
specific view of God, Saints, values, norms, became stronger in the Alevi camp as Alevi
rites, and customs. A boundary setting Kurds claimed that Alevism is a Kurdish
towards others, a "we" as against a "them" religion which the Turkmens accepted as
group consciousness is promoted as Alevi they migrated to Anatolia. They also claim
authors use idioms associated with ethnic that rather than become Sunnis, persecuted
group identity that stresses "our" culture, our Turkish Alevis became Kurds, keeping their
faith, our identity versus the "other". Alevism. (69)
Current Alevi revivalists have to
ALEVIS AND THE KURDS search for unifying factors to integrate all
linguistic groups into one Alevi community
The Kurds have long been Turkey’s to strengthen their bargaining position with
most prominent ethnic minority. Unlike the the state. Since 1992 the Anatolian-mosaic
Alevis, they generally accepted the Ottoman model, claiming plurality and equality of all
Caliphate as a legitimate Islamic communities is replacing the Turkish-centric
government that did not infringe on their Alevi thesis as the dominant model of
linguistic and cultural rights. But, their Alevism. (70)
situation changed with the rise of Ataturk,
who initiated state suppression of SUMMARY: ALEVI ETHNICITY AND
Kurdishness. The 1920s and 1930s saw a THE TURKISH STATE
series of Kurdish insurrections that
gradually engendered the separatist The changes in Turkish society that
movement of recent decades. started with Ataturk’s secularization drive
Dersim (Tunceli) province is the resulted in a greatly accelerated integration
center of the Kurdish Zaza speaking Alevis of Alevis into Turkish social and political
and it suffers from the double defect of life. Gradually, their traditional social-
being both religiously Alevi and ethnically religious organization broke down, and the
Kurdish. The mixing of Alevi leftism with religion itself seemed to weaken as younger
Kurdish separatism has made this remote generations adopted leftist and Marxist
province a thorn in the side of every central attitudes. Simultaneously some Alevis
government since Sultan Selim The Grim in embarked on a reinterpretation of their
the 16th century, and it remains the least religious idiom and group-defining criteria
developed of Turkey's provinces.(67) The in socio-political terms. They entered into
year 1938 saw a revolt in Dersim that alliances with other, non-Alevi
provoked large-scale retaliation by Turkish "progressive" groups, and have seen a
security forces, the repercussions of which universalization of their unique Alevi
are only now being explored. doctrines, now seen by them as an
As Vorhoff states, Alevism expression of the general human search for
historically united Alevi Turks and Kurds in equality and social justice and freedom from
one Anatolian community. (68) But Alevi oppression and exploitation.
Kurds today face an identity problem. In the The resurgence of Islamic Sunni
1980s, the authentic Turkishness of Alevism fundamentalism in Turkey over the last two
became a dominant part of the discourse, decades has been a mixed blessing for the
causing Kurdish (and Zaza) Alevis to Alevis. The Islamist threat to Turkey’s
question whether Alevism is Turkish or secular orientation, as well as increased
83 Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1999)