The Agency and the Hill - CIA

408 Pages·2008·3.5 MB·English

THE AGENCY AND THE HILL:
CIA’s Relationship with Congress,
1946–2004
L. Britt Snider
The Center for the Study of Intelligence
CSI was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelli-
gence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an organiza-
tion that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring
the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems.” The
center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitio-
ners, attempts to document lessons learned from past operations,
explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and
stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence chal-
lenges.
To support these activities, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence
and books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctri-
nal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also
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Intelligence Collection.
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ISBN: 978-1-929667-17-8
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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this book
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asserting or implying US government endorsement of the author’s
factual statements and interpretations.
THE AGENCY AND THE HILL
The Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publications Data
Snider, L. Britt
The Agency and the Hill:CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004/
L. Britt Snider
Includes bibliographic references, index.
ISBN 978-1-929667-17-8 (pbk.:alk paper)
1. Intelligence—United States. 2. Congress.
3. Intelligence history. 4. Intelligence oversight.
5. Intelligence organization. 6. Intelligence management.
7. Intelligence policy.
Typeset in Times.
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THE AGENCY AND THE HILL:
CIA’s Relationship with Congress,
1946–2004
L Britt Snider
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC
2008

CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii
PART I: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS LIKE
Chapter 1: THE NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP, 1946–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Central Intelligence Group (1946–47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Early Oversight Arrangements: 1947–56 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Mansfield Resolutions: 1953–55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Debate in the Senate: 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Subsequent Developments: 1956–59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Issue of GAO Audits: 1959–62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Shootdown of the U-2: 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Bay of Pigs: 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Remainder of the 1960s: A Period of Quiescence . . . . 23
McCone’s Early Interaction with the Congress . . . . . . . . . . 23
CIA Interaction with the Congress: 1963–66 . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The SFRC Asserts Its Right to Oversee the CIA: 1966 . . . 26
1971: A Pivotal Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Congressional Inquiries into Watergate: 1973–74 . . . . . . . . 28
Congressional Inquiries into the CIA
Activities in Chile: 1973–74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Allegations of Domestic Spying and Other
Abuses: 1974–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Church Committee: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
The Nedzi/Pike Committees: 1975–76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
The Early Congressional Arrangements: 1947–76 . . . . . . 39
The Joint Committee “Panacea” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
The Personalities, Attitudes, and Circumstances
of the Early DCIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CHAPTER 2: THE RELATIONSHIP: 1976–2004 . . . . . . . . . 51
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: 1976 . . . . . . 51
The House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence: 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
v
CONTENTS
1977–80: The Committees Prove Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
The Mining of the Nicaraguan Harbors and
the Casey Accords: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Term Limits as an Issue for the SSCI: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
GAO Again: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Continued Wrangling over Covert
Action Notification: 1985–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Tightening Control over Intelligence Funding: 1986 . . . . . . 63
Investigating the Iran-contra Affair: 1986–87 . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Changes to Congressional Oversight
Prompted by Iran-contra: 1987–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
GAO Audits Resurface: 1987–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
The Creation of a Statutory Inspector
General for the CIA: 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Statutory Recognition of the Agency’s
Support of Congress: 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Formalization of Notification Procedures:
The Guatemala Inquiries, 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Procedures for “Whistleblowers” Who Wished
to Contact Congress: 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
The Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 Attacks: 2001–2003 . . . . . . 73
Criticism from the 9/11 Commission and an
End to Term Limits: 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
What Changed When the Select Committees Were Created 75
The Joint Committee Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Term Limits for Members of the Select Committees . . . . 77
The Impact of Personalities, Attitudes,
and Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
CHAPTER 3: INTELLIGENCE-SHARING AND
OTHER INTERACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The Early Period: 1947–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
After the Creation of the Select Committees: 1976-2004 . 114
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Significance of the Incidental Interaction with Congress 120
Why Congress Needs Intelligence Support . . . . . . . . . . . 121
The Impact of Intelligence-Sharing with the Congress . . 122
vi
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
AT THE CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
One-Man Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
An Expanded Office of Legislative Counsel: 1976–81 . . 127
Casey and Congress: 1981–86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Responding to Iran-Contra: 1986–90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Strengthening Ties to the Hill after
the Guatemala Episode: 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
The Office of Congressional Affairs: 1988–2004 . . . . . . . 131
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
The Agency’s Arrangements for Dealing
with the Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
PART II: WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP PRODUCED
CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
The Agency’s Original Charter: Section 202
of the National Security Act of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
The CIA Act of 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Additional Legislation: 1949–64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 . . . . . . 143
The Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 . . . . . 145
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 . . . . . . 145
Exemption from the Freedom of
Information Act for CIA: 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
The CIA Inspector General Act of 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
The Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992 . . . . . . . . . . 149
Naming of the Headquarters Compound: 1998 . . . . . . . . . 150
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Legislating Missions and Authorities for the CIA . . . . . . . 153
The President and Intelligence Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
What Never Made It Through the Congressional Mill . . . 157
CHAPTER 6: PROGRAM AND BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
The Transition from CIG to CIA: 1946–47 . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Covert Action: Funding a New Mission for the Agency . . 161
vii
CONTENTS
Interaction in the Early Years: 1948–52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Interaction during the Eisenhower Years: 1953–60 . . . . . . 165
The Agency Headquarters Building: 1951–56 . . . . . . . . . . 170
Developments in the 1960s and Early 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Consideration of the Budget Process by
the Church and Pike Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Budget Oversight by the Select Committees
on Intelligence: 1977–81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Interaction During the Reagan
Administration: 1981–89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
The End of the Cold War and Its Effect
on the Budget: 1989–95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Return to Relative Stability and Modest
Increases: 1995–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
The Impact of the 9/11
Attacks: 2001–2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Exercising Power of the Purse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Hiding within the Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
The Quality of Budget Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
The Impact of Budget Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
CHAPTER 7: OVERSIGHT OF ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Early Years: 1947–74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Church and Pike Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Early Interaction with the Select Committees: 1976–80 . . 201
Later Interaction Regarding Analytical Issues: 1980–90 . . 204
The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the
Persian Gulf War: 1990–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
The Gates Confirmation Hearings: 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Interaction with the Select
Committees 1991– 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Nature of the Interaction over Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Implications of Sharing Intelligence
for Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
viii