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THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM (1900-1914) Volume VIII of AN ESSAY IN UNIVERSAL HISTORY From an Orthodox Christian Point of View Vladimir Moss © Copyright: Vladimir Moss, 2020. All Rights Reserv 1 Land of Hope and Glory, Mother of the Free, How shall we extol thee, who are born of thee? Wider still and wider shall thy bounds be set; God who made thee mighty make thee mightier yet… Sir Edward Elgar, “Coronation Ode” (1902). I reject the omnipotence of the secular state because I see it as a tyranny: others reject it because it is not their tyranny… We made the French Revolution. Our fathers thought it was to free themselves. Not at all: it seems it was only to change masters… We have guillotined the King: long live the state King!.. We have dethroned the Pope: long live the state Pope!.. I know the state. It has a long history, full of murder and blood… The state is by its nature implacable: it has no soul, no entrails, it is deaf to pity. Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France (1903). What is the glory of Rome and Jerusalem where all nations and races come to worship and look back, compared with the glory of America, where all races and nations come to labour and look forward! Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot (1908). We will glorify war – the world’s only hygiene. The Futurist Manifesto (1909) Russia, if you fall away from your faith, as many intelligenty have already done, then you will no longer be Russia or Holy Rus’. And if there is no repentance in the Russian people, the end of the world is near. God will remove the pious tsar and send a whip in the persons of impious, cruel, self-appointed rulers, who will drown the whole earth in blood and tears. St. John of Kronstadt (1905). The earthly fatherland with its Church is the threshold of the Heavenly Fatherland. Therefore love it fervently and be ready to lay down your life for it, so as to inherit eternal life there. St. John of Kronstadt (1905). The supreme power in a pure, true monarchy is unlimited, but not absolute, for it is limited morally by the content of its ideal. Hieromartyr John Vostorgov (+1918). There is no law beyond do what thou wilt; every man and woman is a star; the word of sin is restriction. Aleister Crawley, The Book of the Law (1904). Socialism is the last stride in the great rebellion of mankind and at the same time the result of its total exhaustion - the complete spiritual impoverishment of the prodigal son in the long centuries of his wandering far from his father's home and wealth. Semyon Ludwigovich Frank (1909). Man’s minds were out of balance. This explained everything and, by explaining it, condoned it. The penchant of psychology to explain the world solely in terms of the mind now received full play. Cruelty and sexual perversion were natural outlets for frustration induced by the suppression of the id by the ego.   2 George L. Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe (1988). Monarchy can easily be ‘debunked;' but watch the faces, mark the accents of the debunkers. These are the men whose tap-root in Eden has been cut: whom no rumour of the polyphony, the dance, can reach - men to whom pebbles laid in a row are more beautiful than an arch. Yet even if they desire equality, they cannot reach it. Where men are forbidden to honour a king they honour millionaires, athletes or film-stars instead: even famous prostitutes or gangsters. For spiritual nature, like bodily nature, will be served; deny it food and it will gobble poison. C.S. Lewis. The destiny of the Tsar is the destiny of Russia. If the tsar rejoices, Russia will rejoice. If the tsar weeps, Russia will weep, while if there is no tsar, there will be no Russia. Just as a man with his head cut off is no longer a man, but a stinking corpse, so Russia without a tsar will be a stinking corpse. St. Anatoly of Optina (1916). In view of the prevailing, all-encompassing movement of universal apostasy, let your hand not rise in the attempt to stop its elemental flow and progression. It is allowed by God because of human sinfulness to overshadow Christendom and is far beyond our meagre attempts to do something about it. Instead, ‘acquire the spirit of peace, and thousands around you will be saved!’ St. Ignaty Brianchaninov. May the merciful Lord defend the remnant which still believes in Him. But this remnant is small, and getting smaller. St. Ignaty Brianchaninov. Nicholas II was not stupid. Nor was he nearly as weak as is commonly thought. The dilemmas of ruling Russia were vast and contradictory, and it was an illusion to think that simply by agreeing to become a constitutional monarch Nicholas could have preserved his dynasty and empire. Dominic Lieven. Family, society, state, civilization is not a goal in itself. All this is just…, to a greater or lesser extent, a means of achieving the main goal, the sole purpose of saving the soul. St. Nikolai Velimirovich (+1956). Aristocrats… legitimize themselves by a notion of quality which runs counter to the despotism of egalitarian democracy. Henry Kissinger. Everyone has stopped talking: instead they importunately DEMAND that their lives must improve, that the working day should be reduce and wages raised, and they demand this AT ONCE. They also demand the introduction of a democratic republic AT ONCE. Russia has become a madhouse… it’s like an epidemic of plague or cholera. Ivan Zabelin (1905).     3 INTRODUCTION   6   I.  THE  WEST:  “LA  BELLE  EPOQUE”   7   1.  AMERICAN  IMPERIALISM   8   2.  PARIS  AND  THE  SYMBOLISTS   21   3.  THE  DREYFUS  AFFAIR   25   4.  THE  FOUNDING  OF  ZIONISM   30   5.  FIN  DE  SIÈCLE  RELIGION   41   6.  THE  PSYCHOLOGISTS’  ASSAULT  ON  RELIGION  AND  MORALITY   46   7.  THE  FALL  OF  THE  CHINESE  EMPIRE   61   8.  THE  BOER  WAR  AND  THE  CRISIS  OF  BRITISH  IMPERIALISM   69   9.  AFRICAN  GENOCIDE   80   10.  BRITAIN  AND  EUROPE   83   11.  WALL  STREET,  THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE  ACT  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY   94   12.  GLOBALIZATION  AND  ANTI-­‐GLOBALIZATION   97   13.  GERMANY,  NIETZSCHE  AND  THE  FIRST  WORLD  WAR   102   II.  THE  EAST:  SOWING  THE  WIND   114   14.  THE  BOLSHEVIK/MENSHEVIK  SCHISM   115   15.  THREE  RUSSIAS:  PETERSBURG,  KISHINEV  AND  SAROV   118   16.  PROTO-­‐ECUMENISM  AND  THE  ORTHODOX  CHURCHES   128   17.  TOLSTOY  VERSUS  ST.  JOHN  OF  KRONSTADT   140   18.  PEASANTS  AND  SOLDIERS   151   19.  REGICIDE  IN  SERBIA   166   20.  THE  RUSSO-­‐JAPANESE  WAR   172   21.  SAINT  NICHOLAS  OF  JAPAN   178   22.  THE  PRESS  AND  THE  LIBERALS   181   23.  BLOODY  SUNDAY   187   24.  THE  STRIVING  FOR  CHURCH-­‐STATE  SYMPHONY   198   25.  THE  OCTOBER  MANIFESTO   207   4 26.  THE  JEWS  IN  THE  1905  REVOLUTION   212   27.  THE  CHURCH  IN  THE  1905  REVOLUTION   218   28.  THE  CRUSHING  OF  THE  1905  REVOLUTION   223   29.  RASPUTIN   229   30.  THE  PRECONCILIAR  CONVENTION  AND  GEORGIAN  AUTOCEPHALY   241   31.  RUSSIA  RECUPERATES   248   32.  ANGLO-­‐RUSSIAN-­‐GERMAN  RELATIONS   261   33.  THE  STOLYPIN  REFORMS   268   34.  SIBERIA,  THE  FUTURE  OF  RUSSIA   274   35.  THE  FALL  OF  STOLYPIN   279   36.  THE  NATIONALITIES  POLICY:  (1)  THE  SLAVIC  MAJORITY   286   37.  THE  NATIONALITIES  POLICY:  (2)  THE  NON-­‐SLAVIC  MINORITIES   294   38.  YOUNG  TURKS  AND  YOUNG  BOSNIANS   304   39.  NAME-­‐WORSHIPPERS,  SYMBOLISTS  AND  OCCULTISTS   313   40.  VEKHI:  THE  ROOTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION   323   41.  THE  ACTORS  IN  THE  REVOLUTION:  (1)  THE  JEWS   331   42.  THE  ACTORS  IN  THE  REVOLUTION:  (2)  THE  FREEMASONS   335   43.  THE  ACTORS  IN  THE  REVOLUTION:  (3)  THE  CHRISTIANS   340   44.  THE  BEILIS  TRIAL   346   45.  THE  BALKAN  WARS   358   46.  RUTHENES  AND  RUSYNS   374   47.  THE  LAST  YEARS  OF  PEACE   382   48.  DURNOVO’S  MEMORANDUM   393   49.  GUCHKOV’S  PLOT   412   50.  SARAJEVO   418   CONCLUSION.  EUROPE’S  HUBRIS  AND  NEMESIS   442       5 INTRODUCTION This book is the eighth volume of my Essay in Universal History. It describes the zenith of the power of the global European powers, which now included Germany, Japan and the United States, the fall of the oldest empire, China, the beginning of the reaction against imperialism in the oldest and largest of the empires, Britain, and the complex of antagonisms between the European nations that led finally to their reaping the whirlwind, the First World War. But the main focus is on the Russian empire, the last major outpost of true Christianity in the world, and its titanic struggle with the liberal and socialist revolutions, which came to a first climax in the abortive revolution of 1905. The factors leading to the First World War and the Russian revolution are discussed in detail: the coming catastrophe is seen as God’s judgement on nearly 900 years of western apostasy, and over 300 years of eastern backsliding, from the true faith, that is, Orthodox Christianity. Through the prayers of our Holy Fathers, Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on us!   6 I.  THE  WEST:  “LA  BELLE  EPOQUE”       7 1. AMERICAN IMPERIALISM Russia and America were exceptional among the empires - Russia because she rejected the democratic ethos of the others in favour of Autocracy, and America because she rejected the very idea of empire. In fact, she was so anti-imperial that "when Santo Domingo (the future Dominican Republic) effectively offered itself up for annexation in 1869, the proposal was defeated in Congress."1 And yet George Washington had called America an “infant empire”, and that is what she was in all but name. And in 1836 America supported Texas’ secession from Mexico, and in 1846 defeated Mexico in her first imperialist war. In the treaty that followed, “the United States acquired half the territory of Mexico, composing the future states of New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and California.”2 Essentially, America was the same type of liberal empire as the British, the world's major "anti-imperial empire", or “empire of good intentions” (Simon Schama). Like the British, the Americans’ main motivation was commercial gain. But – again like the British – they claimed to bring civilization and Christianity to the pagans. As Ezra Stiles, president of Yale University, said as early as 1783: “Navigation will carry the American flag around the globe itself, and display the Thirteen Stripes and New Constellation at Bengal and Canton… and with commerce will import the wisdom and literature of the east… A time will come when six hundred millions of the human race shall be ready to drop their idolatry… should American missionaries be blessed to succeed in the work of Christianizing the heathen, in which the Romanists and foreign Protestants have very much failed…”3 By the later part of the nineteenth century the Americans had even overtaken the British in industry, thanks to the techniques of standardization of parts and mass production. "In 1870," writes Landes, "the United States had the largest economy in the world, and its best years still lay ahead. By 1913, American output was two and a half times that of the United Kingdom or Germany, four times that of France. Measured by person, American GDP surpassed that of the United Kingdom by 20 percent, France by 77, Germany by 86."4 The distribution of wealth in America was very unequal. “In its distribution of wealth and income,” writes Robert Tombs, “Victorian England was probably comparable with Germany, but much less unequal than Russia and America, where both new and inherited wealth reached unique heights: in 1900 the richest American had at least twelve times as much money as the richest Englishman.”5 The only major way in which the Americans differed from the British (apart from pretending that they didn’t have an empire) was their refusal to accept the gospel of Free Trade. “Between 1846 and 1870,” writes Martin Wolf, “liberalization spread from the United Kingdom to the rest of Europe. Protectionism, which had never                                                                                                                           1 Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, London: Allen Lane, 2004, p. 41. 2 M.J. Cohen and John Major, History in Quotations, London: Cassell, 2004, p. 616. 3 Stiles, in Cohen and Major, op. cit., p. 619. 4 Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, London: Abacus, 1999, p. 307. 5 Tombs, The English and their History, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, pp. 487-488. 8 waned in the United States, returned to continental Europe after 1878 and reached its peak in the 1930s.”6 Only in Britain did the dogma of free trade still rule – although there was a furious debate over it in the early twentieth century, with the Conservative Joseph Chamberlain arguing that some protectionism was useful in order, first, to consolidate the empire in a single free trading block (“imperial preference”), and secondly to allow the income gained from tariffs to be spent on welfare. But he lost the argument, allowing the Liberals to gain a landslide victory in 1906. For their further development, however, it was essential that the Americans settle scores with the British; for the two nations had twice warred against each other in the past, and the British with their powerful navy remained the only power that could seriously contest American domination in the Western Hemisphere. In 1846 they agreed that their frontier in the disputed north-west should be the 49th parallel, which became the longest undefended border in the world. British non-intervention in the American Civil War had the important consequence of initiating a growing reconciliation between the two nations that had often warred against each other in the past, a process facilitated by marriages between American heiresses and English aristocrats (as between Winston Churchill’s parents, and between Lord Curzon and his wife), and by the Anglophilia of great American writes such as Henry James. “Until 1865,” writes Dominic Lieven, “London believed with reason that it could defend its position in the Western Hemisphere by force if necessary and thereby sustain a balance of power in the region.”7 Indeed, as late as 1890, writes Henry Kissinger, “the American army ranked fourteenth in the world, after Bulgaria’s, and the American navy was smaller than Italy’s, a country with one-thirteenth of America’s industrial strength. As late as the presidential inaugural of 1885, President Grover Cleveland described American foreign policy in terms of detached neutrality and as entirely different from the self-interested policies pursued by older, less enlightened states. He rejected ‘any departure from that foreign policy commended by the history, the traditions, and the prosperity of the Republic. It is the policy of independence, favored by our position and defended by our known love of justice and by our power. It is the policy of peace suitable to our interests. It is the policy of neutrality, rejecting any share in foreign broils and ambitions upon other continents and repelling their intrusion here.’ By the end of the century America was beginning to translate her economic power into military might and diplomatic clout. That clout was displayed in 1895, when, as David Cannadine writes, “President Grover Cleveland sent to Congress what was in effect an ultimatum to the British government concerning another long-standing border dispute in the western hemisphere, that between British Guiana and Venzuela. Invoking the Monroe Doctrine, which had declared that no European powers should intervene in the affairs of the Americas, Cleveland peremptorily insisted that a United States commission would decide on the contested boundary, and that their decision would be accepted and indeed imposed, by force if needs be, regardless of how the British government might respond. This was a serious                                                                                                                           6 Wolf, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?’ Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2001, p. 183. 7 Lieven, Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia, London: Allen Lane, 2015, p. 23. 9 challenge to the United Kingdom’s transatlantic position and possessions. Cleveland duly appointed his commission, with which the Salisbury administration, having no alternative, deemed it prudent to co-operate. As on previous occasions, the issue was referred to international arbitration; and as it turned out, the principal British claims were confirmed when the award was finally promulgated in October 1899.”8 The American Secretary of State was blunt in telling the British what the new calance of power in the Western Hemisphere was. “To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law.” America’s “infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.” “America was now a major power, no longer a fledgling republic on the fringes of world affairs. American policy no longer limited itself to neutrality; it felt obliged to translate its long-proclaimed universal moral relevance into a broader geopolitical role. When, later that year, the Spanish Empire’s colonial subjects in Cuba rose in revolt, a reluctance to see an imperial rebellion crushed on America’s doorstep mingled with the conviction that the time had come for the United States to demonstrate its ability and will to act as a great power, at a time when the importance of European nations was in part judged by the extent of their overseas empires…”9 As a result of the Spanish-American War that then took place, America vaulted herself into the ranks of the major powers. The British chose not to contest this. Indeed, in 1899, on the occasion of the Americans’ annexation of the Philippines, Rudyard Kipling wrote a famous poem, “passing on the baton”, as it were, from one liberal empire to another: Take up the White Man's burden — Send forth the best ye breed — Go bind your sons to exile To serve your captives' need; Britain was glad to pass on “the White Man’s burden”, not only because it was heavy in itself, but also because, as Lieven writes, by 1900 “Britain faced an increasing number of competitors at a time when it had long ceased to be the only industrial economy in the world. In these circumstances, any confrontation with the United States would be a disaster. In the twenty years around the turn of the century, Britain conceded hegemony in the Western Hemisphere to the United States, appeasing the Americans by giving way on a series of issues concerning competing interests in Brazil, Venezuela, and Panama. German observers noted sourly but correctly that the British tolerated behavior and rhetoric from the Americans that would have led to furious protests and even war had they come from continental Europeans. Although British wooing of the Americans was by no means always reciprocated on the other side of the Atlantic, the Germans knew that in a competition for American goodwill the English had many advantages, beginning but by no means ending with their shared language.                                                                                                                           8 Cannadine, Victorious Century. The United Kingdom, 1800-1906, London: Viking, 2017, p. 434. 9 Kissinger, World Order, London: Penguin, 2015, pp. 245-246. 10

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Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.