The Absurd - Thomas Nagel - Philosophy

13 Pages·2010·1.01 MB·English

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
The Absurd
Author(s): Thomas Nagel
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 20, Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 21, 1971), pp. 716-727
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024942 .
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7i6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The formers tands as valid only if we can findc riteriaf ora ssigning
a differenlto gical formt o 'allegedly' than to 'compulsively'.I n this
case, the criteriae xist: 'compulsively'i s a predicate, 'allegedly' a
sentencea dverb. But in countless other cases, counterexampleasr e
not so easily dismissed.S uch an example, bearing on the inference
in question, is
Otto closed the door partway
ThereforeO tto closed the door
It seems clear to me that betterd ata are needed beforep rogress
can be made in this area; we need much more refinedl inguistic
classificationso f adverbial constructionst han are presentlya vail-
able, ifo ur evidencec oncerningv alidityi s to be good enough to per-
mit a richerl ogical theory.I n the meantime,M ontague's account
stands: therei s no reason to thinka morer efinedt heory,i fi t can be
produced, should not be obtainable within the frameworkh e has
given us.
RICHMOND H. THOMASON
Yale University
THE ABSURD *
M
OST peoplef eelo n occasiont hatl ifei s absurd,a nd some
feel it vividly and continually.Y et the reasons usually
offeredi n defense of this conviction are patently in-
adequate: they could not really explain why life is absurd. Why
then do they provide a natural expressionf or the sense that it is?
I
Consider some examples. It is oftenr emarkedt hat nothingw e do
now will matteri n a milliony ears. But if that is true, then by the
same token,n othingt hat will be the case in a milliony ears matters
now. In particular,i t does not mattern ow that in a milliony ears
nothingw e do now will matter.M oreover,e ven if what we did now
were going to matter in a million years, how could that keep our
presentc oncernsf romb eing absurd? If theirm atteringn ow is not
enough to accomplish that, how would it help if they mattered a
milliony ears fromn ow?
Whether what we do now will matter in a million years could
make the crucial differencoen ly if its matteringi n a milliony ears
depended on its matteringp, eriod. But then to deny that whatever
* To be presentedin an APA symposiumon The Meaningo fL ife,D ecember2 9,
1971. Co-symposiastws illb e RogersA lbrittonan d WilliamR ichardsonn; either
of theirp apersa re availablea t thist ime.
THE ABSURD 7I7
happens now will matter in a milliony ears is to beg the question
against its mattering,p eriod; for in that sense one cannot know
that it will not matter in a million years whether (for example)
someone now is happy or miserable,w ithoutk nowingt hat it does
not matter,p eriod.
What we say to convey the absurdityo f our lives oftenh as to
do with space or time: we are tinys pecks in the infinitev astness of
the universe; our lives are mere instantse ven on a geological time
scale, let alone a cosmic one; we will all be dead any minute. But
of course none of these evidentf acts can be what makesl ifea bsurd,
if it is absurd. For suppose we lived forever;w ould not a lifet hat is
absurd if it lasts seventy years be infinitelya bsurd if it lasted
throughe ternity?A nd if our lives are absurd given our present
size, why would they be any less absurd if we filledt he universe
(eitherb ecause we werel argero r because the universew as smaller)?
Reflectiono n our minutenessa nd brevitya ppears to be intimately
connectedw ith the sense that lifei s meaningless;b ut it is not clear
what the connectioni s.
Another inadequate argument is that because we are going to
die, all chains of justificationm ust leave offi n mid-air: one studies
and works to earn money to pay for clothing,h ousing,e ntertain-
ment,f ood,t o sustain oneselff romy ear to year, perhaps to support
a familya nd pursue a career-but to what finale nd? All of it is an
elaborate journey leading nowhere. (One will also have some effect
on other people's lives, but that simply reproduces the problem,
fort hey will die too.)
There are several replies to this argument. First, life does not
consist of a sequence of activitiese ach of which has as its purpose
some later member of the sequence. Chains of justificationc ome
repeatedlyt o an end withinl ife,a nd whethert he processa s a whole
can be justifiedh as no bearing on the finalityo f these end-points.
No furtherj ustificationi s needed to make it reasonable to take
aspirin for a headache, attend an exhibito f the work of a painter
one admires,o r stop a child fromp uttingh is hand on a hot stove.
No larger context or furtherp urpose is needed to prevent these
acts fromb eing pointless.
Even if someone wished to supply a furtherj ustificationf or
pursuinga ll the thingsi n life that are commonlyr egardeda s self-
justifying,t hat justificationw ould have to end somewheret oo. If
nothingc an justifyu nless it is justifiedi n termso f somethingo utside
itself,w hichi s also justified,t hen an infiniter egressr esults,a nd no
chain of justificationc an be complete. Moreover, if a finitec hain
of reasons cannot justifya nything,w hat could be accomplishedb y
7I8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
an infinitec hain, each link of whichm ust be justifiedb y something
outside itself?
Since justificationsm ust come to an end somewhere,n othingi s
gained by denyingt hat theye nd wheret heya ppear to, withinl ife-
or by tryingt o subsume the multiple,o ftent rivialo rdinaryj ustifi-
cations of action under a single,c ontrollingli fes cheme. We can be
satisfiedm ore easily than that. In fact, throughi ts misrepresen-
tation of the processo f justificationt, he argumentm akes a vacuous
demand. It insistst hat the reasons available withinl ife are incom-
plete, but suggestst herebyt hat all reasons that come to an end are
incomplete.T lis makes it impossiblet o supply any reasons at all.
The standard argumentsf ora bsurditya ppear thereforet o fail as
arguments.Y et I believe they attempt to express somethingt hat
is difficultto state, but fundamentallyc orrect.
II
In ordinaryl ifea situationi s absurd when it includesa conspicuous
discrepancyb etweenp retensiono r aspirationa nd reality: someone
gives a complicateds peech in supporto f a motiont hat has already
been passed; a notorious criminal is made presidento f a major
philanthropicf oundation;y ou declare your love over the telephone
to a recordeda nnouncement;a s you are beingk nighted,y ourp ants
fall down.
When a person finds himself in an absurd situation, he will
usually attempt to change it, by modifyingh is aspirations,o r by
tryingt o bringr ealityi nto bettera ccord witht hem,o r by removing
himselff romt he situation entirely.W e are not always willingo r
able to extricate ourselves from a position whose absurdity has
become clear to us. Nevertheless,i t is usually possible to imagine
some change that would remove the absurdity-whether or not
we can or will implementi t. The sense that lifea s a whole is absurd
arises when we perceive, perhaps dimly, an inflatedp retensiono r
aspirationw hichi s inseparablef romt he continuationo f human life
and whichm akes its absurdityi nescapable,s horto f escape froml ife
itself.
Many people's lives are absurd, temporarilyo r permanentlyf, or
conventionalr easons having to do with theirp articulara mbitions,
circumstances,a nd personal relations. If there is a philosophical
sense of absurdity, however,i t must arise fromt he perceptiono f
somethingu niversal-some respecti n which pretensiona nd reality
inevitablyc lash foru s all. This conditioni s supplied, I $hall argue,
by the collision between the seriousnessw ith which we take our
lives and the perpetual possibilityo f regardinge verythinga bout
whichw e are seriousa s arbitrary,o r open to doubt.
THE ABSURD 719
We cannot live human lives without energy and attention,n or
withoutm akingc hoices which show that we take some thingsm ore
seriouslyt han others.Y et we have always available a point of view
outside the particularf ormo f our lives, fromw hich the seriousness
appears gratuitous.T hese two inescapable viewpointsc ollide in us,
and that is what makes life absurd. It is absurd because we ignore
the doubts that we know cannot be settled,c ontinuingt o live with
nearly undiminisheds eriousnessi n spite of them.
This analysis requiresd efensei n two respects: firsta s regardst he
unavoidabilityo f seriousness; second as regards the inescapability
of doubt.
We take ourselves seriouslyw hetherw e lead serious lives or not
and whetherw e are concernedp rimarilyw ithf ame,p leasure,v irtue,
luxury, triumph, beauty, justice, knowledge, salvation, or mere
survival. If we take other people seriouslya nd devote ourselves to
them,t hat only multipliest he problem.H uman life is fullo f effort,
plans, calculation, success and failure: we pursue our lives, with
varyingd egreeso f sloth and energy.
It would be differenitf we could not step back and reflecto n the
process, but were merelyl ed fromi mpulse to impulse withouts elf-
consciousness.B ut human beingsd o not act solelyo n impulse.T hey
are prudent,t heyr eflectt, heyw eighc onsequences,t heya sk whether
what they are doing is worthw hile. Not only are theirl ives fullo f
particular choices that hang together in larger activities with
temporals tructure:t hey also decide in the broadest termsw hat to
pursue and what to avoid, what the prioritiesa mong theirv arious
aims should be, and what kind of people theyw ant to be or become.
Some men are faced with such choices by the large decisions they
make fromt ime to time; some merelyb y reflectiono n the course
their lives are taking as the product of countless small decisions.
They decide whom to marry,w hat professiont o follow,w hethert o
join the CountryC lub, or the Resistance; or they may just wonder
why they go on being salesmen or academics or taxi drivers,a nd
then stop thinkinga bout it after a certain period of inconclusive
reflection.
Although they may be motivated froma ct to act by those im-
mediate needs with whichl ifep resentst hem,t heya llow the process
to continue by adhering to the general system of habits and the
formo f lifei n whichs uch motivlesh ave theirp lace-or perhaps only
by clingingt o lifei tself.T hey spend enormousq uantitieso f energy,
risk, and calculation on the details. Think of how an ordinary
individual sweats over his appearance, his health, his sex life, his
emotional honesty,h is social utility,h is self-knowledget,h e quality
720 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of his ties with family,c olleagues, and friends,h ow well he does his
job, whetherh e understandst he world and what is going on in it.
Leading a human life is a full-timeo ccupation, to which everyone
devotes decades of intensec oncern.
This fact is so obvious that it is hard to findi t extraordinarya nd
important.E ach of us lives his own life-lives with himselft wenty-
four hours a day. What else is he supposed to do-live someone
else's life? Yet humans have the special capacity to step back and
survey themselves,a nd the lives to which they are committed,w ith
that detached amazement which comes from watching an ant
struggleu p a heap of sand. Without developing the illusion that
they are able to escape fromt heirh ighlys pecifica nd idiosyncratic
position,t hey can view it sub specie aeternitatis-and the view is at
once soberinga nd comical.
The crucial backward step is not taken by asking fors till another
justificationin the chain, and failingt o get it. The objectionst o that
line of attack have already been stated; justificationsc ome to an
end. But this is preciselyw hat provides universal doubt with its
object. We step back to findt hat the whole systemo f justification
and criticism,w hichc ontrolso ur choices and supportso ur claims to
rationality,r ests on responses and habits that we never question,
that we should not know how to defendw ithoutc ircularity,a nd to
which we shall continue to adhere even after they are called into
question.
The thingsw e do or want withoutr easons,a nd withoutr equiring
reasons-the thingst hat definew hat is a reason foru s and what is
not-are the starting points of our skepticism.W e see ourselves
fromo utside, and all the contingencya nd specificityo f our aims
and pursuitsb ecome clear. Yet whenw e take thisv iew and recognize
what we do as arbitrary,it does not disengageu s froml ife,a nd there
lies our absurdity: not in the fact that such an externalv iew can be
taken of us, but in the fact that we ourselves can take it, without
ceasing to be the persons whose ultimate concerns are so coolly
regarded.
III
One may try to escape the position by seeking broader ultimate
concerns,f romw hich it is impossible to step back-the idea being
that absurdityr esultsb ecause what we take seriouslyi s something
small and insignificanta nd individual. Those seeking to supply
their lives with meaning usually envision a role or function in
somethingl arger than themselves.T hey therefores eek fulfillment
in service to society, the state, the revolution, the progress of
history,t he advance of science, or religiona nd the gloryo f God.
THE ABSURD 721
But a role in some larger enterprisec annot confers ignificance
unless that enterprisei s itselfs ignificantA. nd its significancem ust
come back to what we can understand,o r it will not even appear to
give us what we are seeking.I f we learned that we were being raised
to providef oodf oro therc reaturesf ondo f human flesh,w ho planned
to turnu s into cutlets beforew e got too stringy-even if we learned
that the human race had been developed by animal breedersp re-
cisely fort his purpose-that would still not give our lives meaning,
for two reasons. First, we would still be in the dark as to the sig-
nificanceo f the lives of those other beings; second, although we
might acknowledge that this culinary role would make our lives
meaningfult o them,i t is not clear how it would make them mean-
ingfult o us.
Admittedly,t he usual formo f servicet o a higherb eing is different
fromt his.O ne is supposed to beholda nd partakeo f the gloryo f God,
fore xample, in a way in which chickens do not share in the glory
of coq au vin. The same is true of service to a state, a movement,o r
a revolution.P eople can come to feel,w hen they are part of some-
thingb igger,t hat it is part of them too. They worryl ess about what
is peculiar to themselves,b ut identifye nough with the largere nter-
prise to findt heirr ole in it fulfilling.
However, any such largerp urposec an be put in doubt in the same
way that the aims of an individual life can be, and for the same
reasons. It is as legitimatet o findu ltimate justificationt here as to
findi t earlier,a mong the details of individual life.B ut this does not
alter the fact that justificationsc ome to an end when we are content
to have them end-when we do not find it necessary to look any
furtherI.f we can step back fromt he purposeso f individuall ifea nd
doubt theirp oint,w e can step back also fromt he progresso f human
history,o r of science, or the success of a society, or the kingdom,
power, and gloryo f God,' and put all these thingsi nto question in
the same way. What seems to us to conferm eaning,j ustification,
significance,d oes so in virtue of the fact that we need no more
reasons aftera certain point.
What makes doubt inescapable with regard to the limited aims
of individuall ifea lso makes it inescapable withr egardt o any larger
purpose that encouragest he sense that life is meaningfulO. nce the
fundamentald oubt has begun, it cannot be laid to rest.
Camus maintainsi n The Mytho f Sisyphus that the absurd arises
because the world fails to meet our demands for meaning. This
suggests that the world might satisfy those demnandsi f it were
differentB. ut now we can see that this is not the case. There does
ICf. RobertN ozick," Teleology,"M osaic,x u, 1 (Spring1 971): 27/8.
722 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
nota ppeart o be anyc onceivablwe orld( containinugs ) aboutw hich
unsettlablde oubtsc ould not arise. Consequentlyth e absurdityo f
our situationd erivesn ot froma collisionb etweeno ur expectations
and the world,b ut froma collisionw ithino urselves.
IV
It may be objectedt hat the standpointf romw hicht hesed oubts
are supposedt o be feltd oes not exist-that if we take the recom-
mendedb ackwards tep we willl and on thina ir, withouta ny basis
forj udgmenta bout the naturalr esponsesw e are supposedt o be
surveyingI.f we retaino ur usual standardso f what is important,
thenq uestionsa bout thes ignificancoef w hatw e are doingw itho ur
livesw illb e answerablien t heu sualw ay.B ut ifw ed o not,t hent hose
questionsc an mean nothingt o us, since therei s no longera ny
contentt o the idea of whatm attersa,n d hencen o contentt o the
idea thatn othingd oes.
But thiso bjectionm isconceivetsh en atureo f theb ackwards tep.
It is not supposedt o give us an understandinogf what is really
importants,o thatw e see byc ontrastt hato url ivesa re insignificant.
We never,i n the courseo f theser eflectionasb, andont he ordinary
standardst hat guideo ur lives. We merelyo bservet hemi n oper-
ation,a nd recognizet hat if theya re called into questionw e can
justifyt hemo nlyb y referencteo themselvesu,s elesslyW. e adhere
to themb ecauseo f the way we are put togetherw; hats eemst o us
importanto r seriouso r valuable would not seem so if we were
differentcloyn stituted.
In ordinaryli fe,t o be sure,w e do not judge a situationa bsurd
unlessw e have in minds omes tandardso f seriousnesss,i gnificance,
or harmonyw ithw hicht hea bsurdc an be contrastedT.h is contrast
is noti mpliedb y thep hilosophicajul dgmenot fa bsurditya,n d that
mightb e thoughtt o maket hec onceptu nsuitablef ort hee xpression
of such judgmentsT. his is not so, howeverf, ort he philosophical
judgmentd ependso n anotherc ontrastw hichm akesi t a natural
extensionf romm oreo rdinaryc ases. It departsf romt hemo nlyi n
contrastintgh ep retensionosf lifew itha largerc ontextin whichn o
standardsc an be discoveredr,a thert hanw itha contextf romw hich
alternativeo,v erridinsgt andardsm ay be applied.
v
In thisr especta, s in othersp, hilosophicaple rceptionof thea bsurd
resemblese pistemologicaslk epticism.I n both cases the final,
philosophicadl oubt is not contrastedw itha ny unchallengecde r-
taintiest, houghi t is arriveda t by extrapolatiofnr ome xampleso f
doubtw ithint he systemo f evidenceo r justificationw,h erea con-
trastw itho therc ertaintieiss impliedI. a bothc aseso url imitedness
THE ABSUD 723
joins with a capacity to transcend those limitations in thought
(thus seeing them as limitations,a nd as inescapable).
Skepticism begins when we include ourselves in the world about
whichw e claim knowledge.W e notice that certaint ypeso f evidence
convince us, that we are content to allow justificationso f belief to
come to an end at certainp oints,t hat we feelw e know many things
even without knowingo r having grounds for believing the denial
of others which,i f true, would make what we claim to know false.
For example, I know that I am looking at a piece of paper, al-
thoughI have no adequate grounds to claim I know that I am not
dreaming;a nd if I am dreamingt hen I am not lookinga t a piece of
paper. Here an ordinaryc onceptiono f how appearance may diverge
fromr eality is employed to show that we take our world largely
for granted; the certainty that we are not dreaming cannot be
justifiede xcept circularly,in termso f those very appearances which
are being put in doubt. It is somewhatf ar-fetchedto suggest I may
be dreaming; but the possibilityi s only illustrative.I t reveals that
our claims to knowledged epend on our not feelingi t necessaryt o
exclude certain incompatiblea lternatives,a nd the dreamingp ossi-
bility or the total-hallucinationp ossibilitya re just representatives
for limitlessp ossibilitiesm ost of which we cannot even conceive.}
Once we have taken the backward step to an abstract view of our
whole system of beliefs,e vidence, and justification,a nd seen that
it works only, despite its pretensions,b y taking the world largely
forg ranted,w e are noti n a positiont o contrasta ll these appearances
with an alternativer eality.W e cannot shed our ordinaryr esponses,
and if we could it would leave us with no means of conceiving a
realityo f any kind.
It is the same in the practical domain. We do not step outside
our lives to a new vantage point fromw hich we see what is really,
objectivelys ignificantW. e continue to take life largelyf org ranted
while seeing that all our decisions and certaintiesa re possible only
because therei s a great deal we do not bothert o rule out.
Both epistemologicals kepticisma nd a sense of the absurd can
be reached via initial doubts posed withins ystemso f evidence and
justificationt hat we accept, and can be stated withoutv iolence to
our ordinaryc oncepts. We can ask not only why we should believe
therei s a flooru nderu s, but also whyw e should believet he evidence
of our senses at all-and at some point the framableq uestions will
I am awaret hats kepticismab outt hee xternawl orldi s widelyt houghtto
haveb eenr efutedb,u tI haver emainecdo nvinceodf i tsi rrefutabilsiitnyc eb eing
exposeda t Berkeleyto ThompsonC larke'sl argelyu npublisheidd eas on the
subject
724 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
have outlasted the answers.S imilarly,w e can ask not only why we
should take aspirin,b ut why we should take troubleo ver our own
comforta t all. The fact that we shall take the aspirin without
waiting fora n answer to this last question does not show that it is
an unreal question. We shall also continue to believe,t here is a
flooru nder us withoutw aiting fora n answer to the other question.
In both cases it is thisu nsupportedn aturalc onfidencet hat generates
skeptical doubts; so it cannot be used to settle them.
Philosophical skepticism does not cause us to abandon our
ordinaryb eliefs,b ut it lends thema peculiar flavor.A ftera cknowl-
edgingt hat theirt ruthi s incompatiblew ithp ossibilitiest hat we have
no groundsf orb elievingd o not obtain-apart fromg roundsi n those
very beliefsw hich we have called into question-we returnt o our
familiarc onvictionsw ith a certaini ronya nd resignation.U nable to
abandon the natural responseso n whicht heyd epend, we take them
back, like a spouse who has run offw ith someone else and then
decided to return;b ut we regardt hemd ifferently(n ot that the new
attitude is necessarilyi nferiort o the old, in eitherc ase).
The same situation obtains after we have put in question the
seriousnessw ith which we take our lives and human life in general
and have looked at ourselves without presuppositions.W e then
returnt o our lives, as we must, but our seriousnessi s laced with
irony.N ot that ironye nables us to escape the absurd. It is useless to
mutter:" Life is meaningless;l ifei s meaningless.. . " as an accompa-
niment to everythingw e do. In continuingt o live and work and
strive,w e take ourselvess eriouslyi n action no matterw hat we say.
What sustains us, in belief as in action, is not reason or justifi-
cation, but somethingm ore basic than these-for we go on in the
same way even afterw e are convinced that the reasons have given
out.' If we tried to rely entirelyo n reason, and pressed it hard, our
lives and beliefs would collapse-a form of madness that may
actually occur if the inertialf orceo f taking the world and life for
grantedi s somehowl ost. If we lose our gripo n that, reason will not
give it back to us.
As Hume says in a famousp assage of the Treatise:" Most fortunatelyit
happens,t hat sincer easoni s incapableo f dispellingt hesec louds,n atureh erself
sufficest o that purpose,a nd cures me of this philosophicaml elancholya nd
deliriume, itherb y relaxingt hisb ento f mind,o r by somea vocation,a nd lively
impressionof mys enses,w hicho bliteratael l thesec himerasI. dine,I playa game
of backgammonI, c onversea,n d am merryw ithm yf riendsa;n d whena ftert hree
or fourh ours'a musementI, wouldr eturnt o theses peculationst,h eya ppear so
cold, and strain'd,a nd ridiculoust,h at I cannotf indi n my heartt o enteri nto
thema ny farther"(B ook 1, Part 4, Section7 ; Selby-Biggep, . 269).