The 1968 Paris Peace Negotiations and the Vietnam War Ang Cheng Guan

44 Pages·2007·0.15 MB·English

The 1968 Paris Peace Negotiations and the Vietnam War 1 3 3

The 1968 Paris Peace Negotiations and the Vietnam War

Ang Cheng Guan∗
The paper re-constructs the decision-making of both the American
and the communist side in their mutual search for a negotiated settlement
to the Vietnam conflict after the 1968 Tet Offensive. Most of the writings
on the Vietnam War negotiations tend to gloss over this period. Although a
settlement was not reached by the end of the Johnson administration, the
negotiation process is still worthy of historical attention for an overall
understanding of the search for peace which began with the secret
diplomacy of the Vietnam War in the early 1960s. This paper places the
thinking and the decisions of the communist side - Hanoi, Moscow and
Beijing alongside the better known American side in a single narrative
and shows why it was so difficult to achieve a negotiated
settlement during the last months of the Johnson administration. Readers
who are familiar with the series of secret negotiations prior to the Tet
Offensive and the negotiations led by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho
from 1969 will feel a compelling sense of familiarity in this account.

Key words: Averell Harriman, Johnson, Anatoly Dobrynin, Clark
Clifford, Xuan Thuy, Le Duc Tho, Tet Offensive,
Sino-Vietnam relations, cessation of bombing, peace
negotiations

∗ Ang Cheng Guan is Associate Professor and Head, Humanities and Social Studies
Education, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. He is presently working on a book entitled "The International History of the
Vietnam War 1967-1975: The Final Denouement" to be published by Frank Cass when
completed.
134 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

Introduction
This paper attempts to re-construct the negotiations between the
Johnson Administration and Hanoi during a critical period of the Vietnam
War – between 31 March 1968 and 5 November 1968, a fairly short
period of about eight months, which in the view of this writer, has not
received as much scholarly attention compared to the subsequent peace
negotiations which took place during the Nixon Administration.

Most of the best known studies on Johnson’s conduct of the Vietnam
War concentrate on his decision to Americanize the war in 1965, his
management of the war that culminated in the 1968 Tet Offensive, which
was a major turning point in the war and his 31 March 1968 decision not
to run for re-election as president.1 Given the significance of the Tet
Offensive, it is not surprising that there has also been a lot scholarly
attention, focused on the intelligence, the decision-making and events
surrounding the Tet Offensive, the Offensive itself and its repercussions
on American domestic politics during the Johnson administration.

Although most of the key primary documents of the Johnson
administration have been published and have been available for some
time, there has not been that much interest in Johnson’s decision-making
with regards to the peace negotiations in the period after his 31 March

1 See for examples, Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmasking of a President: Lyndon
Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Larry Berman,
Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1989); Brian Van Demark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the
Escalation of the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); George C.
Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1994).
The 1968 Paris Peace Negotiations and the Vietnam War 135

1968 announcement to 20 January 1969 when Nixon (elected on 5
November 1968) was sworn in as the new president.2 It was in those
months that the first public steps were taken by both sides to seriously
negotiate a peace settlement.

Most writings on the Vietnam peace negotiations however overlook
this period and focus on the Nixon-Kissinger phase. For example, the
recent study of the peace negotiations by Pierre Asselin treated the talks
during the Johnson period as insignificant.3 But in the view of this author,
the last ten months of Johnson’s tenure certainly merit closer study on its
own terms as it was in those months that the framework of the peace
negotiations was finally established, the fruition of the process which
started with the secret contacts in 1965. Throughout the secret
negotiations of 1966-67, Hanoi was basically demanding that the
Americans must first capitulate.4 Participating in the US-Vietnamese
dialogue led by Robert McNamara on the missed opportunities of the
Vietnam War, Chester Cooper (who had served in the CIA, National
Security Council and the Department of State) opined that “in the last
analysis, there was nothing that we could propose until 1968 that would
elicit a positive, constructive response in respect to negotiations…”5
Indeed, it is now common knowledge that the breakthrough came only

2 The selections in Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (ed)., The Search for Peace in
Vietnam 1964-1968 (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004 hardly dealt
with this period.
3 See Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris
Agreement (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
4 Ang Cheng Guan, “The Vietnam War from Both Sides: Revisiting ‘Marigold’,
‘Sunflower’ and Pennsylvania’ in War & Society, Volume 23, No. 2, November 2005.
5 Robert S. McNamara, Arguments Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam
Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 290.
136 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

when both sides, in their own ways, suffered significant defeats at the
1968 Tet Offensive - the US politically and the Vietnamese communists
militarily.

On the communist side, there is even less written about this period
although this is the first time since the war began that the Vietnamese
communists agreed to negotiate directly with the Americans. The failure
of the January 1968 Tet Offensive to achieve its objective led to a series
of prolonged internal debate within the North Vietnamese communist
leadership (and with its Chinese and Soviet patrons) about the next best
course of action. This was apparently a very sensitive and critical period
for the communists particularly in Vietnam (and also in China because of
the on-going Cultural Revolution). Despite the fact that in the last one and
half decade, we know much more about the strategy and decision-making
of the communist side than ever before, the historiography of the
communist side of the Vietnam War remains limited.6 Information on
1967 and 1968 is even harder to come by. The works of Ilya Gaiduk and
Qiang Zhai gloss through this period. The communist documents
published by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) for this
period are also conspicuously scanty.7

This paper thus attempts to revisit those eight months by putting the
actions, responses and counter-responses of all the key players in the war

6 See Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2001); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the
Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Robert Brigham, Guerilla Diplomacy: The
NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
7 See http://www.CWIHP.org
The 1968 Paris Peace Negotiations and the Vietnam War 137

into a single narrative. In the view of this author, by integrating the
findings of the communist and non-communist sides of the war, and
giving both sides equal treatment on the basis of existing sources, it is
hoped that we would be able to re-construct a more balanced and coherent
account of the peace negotiations of the Vietnam War during the last year
of the Johnson Administration.

This essay can also serve as a useful case study to illustrate some of
the key theories on the termination of war.8 Through the simultaneous
re-construction of events and the interactions from both sides, hopefully
we can further our understanding as to why Johnson was unable to
achieve a negotiated settlement before the end of his term of office, why
Averell Harriman, his chief negotiator, failed in 1968 whereas Henry
Kissinger was successful in negotiating the Paris Peace Agreement in
1973.

The Decision to Negotiate
Washington and Moscow
We begin on 31 March 1968 as it marked the turning point in US
strategy in the Vietnam War. One of the most important public statements
about US strategy in Vietnam, relating it with remarkable candour to
America’s global difficulties was Johnson’s address of 31 March 1968. As
Robert M. Collins showed in his study, “the decision to halt the escalation

8 See for examples, Michael Handel, “The Problem of War Termination” in Michael
Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989); Fred Charles Ikle,
Every War must End (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1991); Joseph A.
Engelbregcht Jr., “War Termination: Why Does a State Decide to Stop Fighting”, PhD
thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, UMI Dissertation, 1992;
138 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

of the war was as much economic as it was political or military”.9

In addition to announcing the scaling back of the bombing of North
Vietnam and offering to enter into negotiations, Johnson indicated the
close relationship between the ability to deploy more American troops to
Vietnam and the gravity of the United States economic and financial
difficulty. The cost of the war was now weighing heavily on the US
budget, leading to a deficit which could only be remedied by a tax
surcharge - a measure strongly opposed by Congress. In the absence of a
reduction of the deficit, and in a situation where the American balance of
payments was also in trouble, any decision to increase troop levels into
Vietnam, as requested by General Westmoreland, would have disastrous
consequences for the global position of the United States. In the words of
Arthur Okun, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during the
Johnson Administration, “There’s no dimension of the American economy
in the last three-and-half years which hasn’t been touched by Vietnam;
Vietnam changed the entire budget posture. It took all the elbow room
away”.10

International pressure on the value of the dollar, in terms of the dollar
price of gold in the world marker, had been growing since the devaluation
of sterling in November 1967. It reached a peak in mid-March 1968,
when world central bankers met in Washington to decouple the private
gold market from the Bretton Woods arrangements between central banks,

9 Robert. M .Collins, “The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the “American
Century” in The American Historical Review, 101 no. 2, (April 1996): 396-422, 417.
10 Quoted in Robert. M .Collins, “The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the
“American Century” in The American Historical Review, 101 no.2 (April 1996): 401.
The 1968 Paris Peace Negotiations and the Vietnam War 139

which depended on the price of gold remaining fixed at $35 per ounce. By
the end of March, Johnson knew that the immediate gold crisis had been
resolved, and that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had finally
agreed to the creation of ‘special drawing rights’ which would ease
pressure on the dollar as the world’s principal reserve currency. But the
condition of a return to stability was, in effect, an end to the escalation of
the war in Vietnam. Johnson had no choice but to limit further troop
commitment to a level of 13, 500 instead of the 206,000 requested. It
meant, too, an end to the search-and-destroy strategy in Vietnam.

Thus after months of debate over the course of policy in Vietnam
post-Tet Offensive, it was finally decided that American public
opinion/domestic politics/financial situation left Johnson with no option
but to disengage from Vietnam even if it was true that the American
military was in fact winning the war at this stage.

Given the bad experiences of the previous two years or more trying to
negotiate with Hanoi, it was felt that Washington would require the
assistance of Moscow as go-between. As Ambassador at Large, Averell
Harriman, put it “considering the suspicions that exist between Hanoi and
Washington, we need some outside influence to assist in reaching a
settlement, and there is no other that could be as effective as the Soviet
Union”.11 Johnson therefore met with Soviet Ambassador to the US,
Anatoly Dobrynin on 31 March, just two hours before his speech and told

11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam,
January-August 1968 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), Document
164: Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk,
Washington, 29 March 1968. Subsequent documents are all from this Volume.
140 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

him that given the tactical situation on the ground, he could not order a
total cessation of bombing without endangering the lives of American
soldiers. Comparing the American situation with that of the Russian
soldiers confronting the approaching German forces during World War
Two, he reminded Dobrynin that it was the responsibility of the Soviet
Union as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference as well as a major
arms supplier to North Vietnam to broker a peace. China, according to
Johnson, was getting “cocky” and “chesty”. He was thus greatly
concerned about Southeast Asia as a whole and not only Vietnam. A wider
war would only benefit Beijing and would not be in the interests of both
Washington and Moscow.

Dobrynin raised a number of questions regarding the bombing pause
and was told that bombing would cease above the 20th parallel and that
there was no firm limit to the period of the bombing halt, to which
Dobrynin replied said that it was good and that it was better not to have to
hurry Hanoi.12 Johnson later told Senator William Fulbright that
Dobrynin did not say what he would do but was very courteous and
seemed to be very pleased and impressed with what he had been told.13

Having met Dobrynin, President Johnson addressed the country, the
substance of which is well-known and only the portion regarding the
bombing halt need to be repeated here. In his speech, Johnson said that he
had ordered American aircraft and naval vessels to stop all bombardment

12 Document 168: Memorandum for the Record, 31 March 1968; also see, Anatoly
Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995), 175-179.
13 Document 171: Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Senator J.
William Fulbright, Washington, 1 April 1968.
The 1968 Paris Peace Negotiations and the Vietnam War 141

of North Vietnam, “except in the area north of the demilitarized zone
where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens Allied forward
positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies are
clearly related to that threat….”14

But soon after the 31 March speech, American planes bombed the
vicinity near Thanh Hoa, 205 miles north of the DMZ, 81 miles from
Hanoi and below the 20th parallel. Thanh Hoa was believed to be a major
transit point for communist troops and supplies moving into South
Vietnam and Laos, and which also had a recently activated airfield. The
bombing immediately led to accusations that the Johnson administration
had once again reneged on its promise. Apparently, Johnson’s
announcement on the limits of American bombing was not sufficiently
precise. In a 2 April 1968 memorandum to the President, Averell
Harriman, (newly appointed as the President’s personal representative to
the peace talks) described the Thanh Hoa bombing as a “disastrous trend”
and urged the President to issue an immediate clarification of the bombing
limits.15 The administration subsequently published a statement on 3 April
which clarified that the 20th parallel was the “restriction line”.

Hanoi
Despite the bombing controversy, to the surprise of everyone, Hanoi
responded positively to Johnson’s 31 March speech. Secretary of Defence
Clark Clifford commented that Hanoi’s response was beyond the Senate’s

14 Document 169: Editorial Note; Also, see for example, James Mayall & Cornelia
Navari (ed.), The End of the Post-War Era: Documents on Great Power Relations
1968-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 88-91.
15 Document 174: Notes of Telephone Conversation, Washington, 2 April 1968.
142 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs

furthest dreams.16 The Radio Hanoi broadcast on the morning of 3 April
1968, for the first time since the war, stated that despite the fact that the
US had not unconditionally stopped the bombing, it was ready to “appoint
its representative to contact the US representative with a view to
determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the
bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV (Democratic
Republic of Vietnam or North Vietnam) so that talks may start”.17

Why did Hanoi respond the way it did? US intelligence at the time
suggested that it could be a tactical move on the part of the communists to
force a complete bombing halt by influencing US public opinion and
pre-empting an American intensification of the war; to create divisions
between Washington and Saigon and undermining South Vietnamese
morale; and communist losses in the Tet Offensive leading to a struggle
amongst the top leadership.18

Apparently both Beijing and Hanoi were aware of the link between
the Vietnam War and the global and financial crisis facing the United
States. An article in the 26 January 1968 issue of Peking Review
commented that “from the financial and economic point of view the war
of aggression against Vietnam is like a bottomless pit”. It added that
“what warrants particular attention is the fact that the position of the
dollar has become precarious since the devaluation of the pound. The
continuation of the war of aggression against Vietnam will only speed up
the deterioration of US finance and its international payments. This is

16 Document 178: Notes of Meeting, Washington, 3 April 1968.
17 Document 175: Editorial Note.
18 Document 175: Editorial Note.