7829_C000.fm Page i Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM Terrorism Organized and Hate Crime Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations Second Edition Michael R. Ronczkowski Boca Raton London New York CRC Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business 7829_C000.fm Page ii Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742 © 2007 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business No claim to original U.S. Government works Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Number-10: 0-8493-7829-X (Hardcover) International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-8493-7829-4 (Hardcover) This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reprinted material is quoted with permission, and sources are indicated. A wide variety of references are listed. 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Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ronczkowski, Michael. Terrorism and organized hate crime : intelligence gathering, analysis, and investigations / Michael Ronczkowski. -- 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8493-7850-8 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8493-7850-8 (alk. paper) 1. Hate crime investigation--United States. 2. Hate crime investigation. 3. Terrorism--United States--Prevention. 4. Terrorism--Prevention. I. Title. HV8079.H38R66 2006 363.325’165--dc22 2006018580 Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the CRC Press Web site at http://www.crcpress.com T&F_LOC_A_Master.indd 1 6/12/06 4:22:59 PM 7829_C000.fm Page iii Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM Dedication For my family, and all the hardworking men and women in law enforcement, both sworn and nonsworn, and the armed forces who make sacrifices every day in honor of their country. Keep up the fight! 7829_C000.fm Page iv Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM 7829_C000.fm Page v Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM Foreword to First Edition As I write this foreword, the entire world is focused on the Middle East and the continuing threat of more terrorist attacks against Americans, both here and abroad. And while the military continues its deployment of troops and equipment to address the possibility of war, law enforcement personnel in this country scurry to hire and train analytical specialists — individuals essential to our ability to address matters of homeland security. The present-day practice with regard to the hiring and use of analytical specialists in law enforcement agencies is in stark contrast to the common practices in 1965 when I began my law enforcement career with the Miami- Dade Police Department (MDPD) in Miami, Florida. Throughout my 27 years in South Florida, I witnessed first-hand how detectives were forced to rely on personal contacts and individual practices to gather and analyze information. I still remember how, as a young General Investigations Unit lieutenant, I would sit at my desk every morning plotting burglary trends from the previous day’s crime reports. I would gather the information, try to put it into some type of usable format, push pins into a district map in the uniform roll call room, and then provide the data to the uniform lieutenants for dissemination to their officers. It was the best that we could do at the district level in the mid-1970s. What few analysts the department hired were devoted to organized crime analysis and plotting the relationships among the various organized crime figures plying their trade in the Miami area. It was, in fact, the com- bination of the successes enjoyed in the organized crime investigations arena and the attendant frustration the rest of us were experiencing in analyzing crime data that finally caused the agency to recognize the need to have personnel specialized in gathering and analyzing information assigned throughout the department. I was the deputy director when I left MDPD in 1992. By then, the use of analysts in the agency was much more widespread. Not only was the intelligence unit beginning to realize the value of having professionally trained analysts, so were many of the criminal investigative units both at headquarters and throughout the district. As police chief in Tampa, Florida, I continued to recognize the need to have an effective medium in which to gather, analyze, and share information among agencies. The Tampa Police Department (TPD) had an effective analytical function. They did a great job of gathering and analyzing information and 7829_C000.fm Page vi Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM disseminating it to internal units. Unfortunately, and through no fault of the personnel, they did not do a good job of sharing information as it related to youth gangs. In spite of the plainly visible graffiti and gang tags on walls throughout the city, the city administration remained adamant in its position that there was no youth gang issue in Tampa. Through detailed briefings with the political structure, I was able to convince those in the administration of the importance of acknowledging the problem so that we could deal openly with other local authorities, law enforcement agencies, social service agencies, and the judiciary. The chief judge for the Circuit convened a summit on youth gangs, and we were well on our way to confronting this serious issue. Not only do local agencies have to share among themselves, they must also share with state and federal agencies. Local law enforcement frequently possesses information that may be germane to state and federal investiga- tions, but the conduit to share it is lacking. In fact, many agencies still rely on personal contacts and friendships among detectives as means for sharing information. As director of the U.S. Marshal’s Service (USMS) from 1993 to 1999, I observed just how many federal agencies are dependent upon infor- mation from local, county, and state agencies to address matters of national security and interests. Terrorism and threats to homeland security have been major concerns in Washington, D.C. for many years. As director at USMS, I witnessed first-hand the impact that terrorists, foreign or domestic, can have on our society and way of life. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania strained the resources of dedicated federal investigators. And, while I was not the director during the tragic and violent 1992 incident at Ruby Ridge involving alleged members of the Patriot movement, I was involved in the subsequent review of the actions of the deputy marshals. I certainly came to recognize the continuing need to monitor and comprehend organized hate groups such as the Patriot move- ment in the United States. There has been a constant need for national intelligence and analysis after these tragic events, but also a new emphasis on information that can identify possible future attacks. However, much of the training and materials available to law enforcement has focused on preparing and responding. There has been a training and analytical void in law enforcement on the full context of the terrorism and organized hate crime issues faced by officers and analysts. That was, until now. This book is extremely topical and current. Mike Ronczkowski has spent over 20 years in law enforcement — 8 years managing and teaching intelli- gence analysts. He serves as an adjunct professor at a local university, teaching a course on how to recognize and deal with terrorism. As he worked on his lesson plans, he came to recognize the need for a book like this. This book is relevant for law enforcement personnel around the world and, at the same time, appropriate for students seeking to learn more about one of criminal justice’s hottest topics. 7829_C000.fm Page vii Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM Material in this book undoubtedly provides personnel with an under- standing and approach for gathering intelligence and conducting analysis on terrorism-related matters. The reader will also find that many of the concepts are applicable to other law enforcement investigations. From a management perspective, I believe that hiring and training ana- lysts is essential. I have seen many agencies promote clerical staff members into analytical roles and just assume that they would learn on the job. This is a fallacy. As this book points out, law enforcement managers and policy makers need accurate and quality intelligence. This will enable them to make informed decisions if they are to properly address issues. How can this be achieved without training and an understanding of the topic being analyzed? I firmly believe that the author’s approach, as detailed in this book, will greatly aid in addressing the analytical needs faced by agencies, filling in the gaps and voids that exist today. In my current role as Commission Secretary for the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), I have witnessed growth of an emphasis on agencies hiring, training, and even certifying analytical personnel to address such topics as homeland security, terrorism, and organized hate crime. The problem has been the lack of materials appli- cable to law enforcement — that is, until the author wrote this book. I congratulate him for addressing the needs of so many law enforcement agencies and for sharing his knowledge and experience with the rest of the law enforcement community. It has been an honor to review and write the foreword for this book, and I strongly recommend use of it by law enforce- ment practitioners, managers, and students. Eduardo Gonzalez Director, U.S. Marshal’s Service (1993–1999) Chief of Police, Tampa, Florida (1992–1993) Deputy Director, Miami-Dade Police Department, Miami, Florida (1965–1992) 7829_C000.fm Page viii Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM 7829_C000.fm Page ix Monday, October 2, 2006 11:46 AM Foreword Following the events of September 11, 2001, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) held a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit in Alexandria, Virginia, in which participants posited that failures of the intelli- gence process contributed in no small measure to the events of that tragic day. They further concluded that the ability of law enforcement agencies — at all levels — to collect, collate, analyze, disseminate, and share intelligence was key to fighting the war on terror. The IACP thus proposed the devel- opment of a federal initiative to enable accomplishment of this objective. In response to this proposal, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance in 2002 created the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) and tasked it with the responsibility of developing what is now known as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. This plan provides a framework to improve our nation’s ability to develop and share criminal intelligence information and to bolster the safety and security of our communities. A recommendation that IACP Summit participants identified as core to achieving the goals of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan was to “promote intelligence-led policing through a common understanding of criminal intelligence and its useful- ness.” Intelligence-led policing is defined as the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform law enforcement decision making at both the tactical and strategic levels. Intelligence-led policing is predicated on the production and application of intelligence information and products. For intelligence-led policing to be effective, the process must be an integral part of an agency’s philosophy, policies, and strategies and must also be integral in the organization’s mission and goals.* Embodied within the term “intelligence-led policing” is the underlying concept that decisions regarding the delivery of police services should, * U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, The National Criminal Justice Sharing Plan, October 2003, p. 3–4.
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