TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THOUGHT by Benjamin Max Manson

193 Pages·2012·7 MB·English

by  Ben Manson

TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICAL THOUGHT

by

Benjamin Max Manson

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2012

© Copyright by Benjamin Max Manson, 2012
DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS

The undersigned hereby certify that they have read and recommend to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies for acceptance a thesis entitled “TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS
IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICAL THOUGHT” by Benjamin Max Manson in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Dated: August 20, 2012

Supervisor: _________________________________
Readers: _________________________________
_________________________________

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DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

DATE: August 20, 2012
AUTHOR: Benjamin Max Manson
TITLE: TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICAL
THOUGHT
DEPARTMENT OR SCHOOL: Department of Classics
DEGREE: MA CONVOCATION: October YEAR: 2012
Permission is herewith granted to Dalhousie University to circulate and to have copied
for non-commercial purposes, at its discretion, the above title upon the request of
individuals or institutions. I understand that my thesis will be electronically available to
the public.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts
from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s written permission.

The author attests that permission has been obtained for the use of any copyrighted
material appearing in the thesis (other than the brief excerpts requiring only proper
acknowledgement in scholarly writing), and that all such use is clearly acknowledged.
_______________________________
Signature of Author

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for e.g.h.

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Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………….……………………. vii
List of Abbreviations Used…………………………………….……….….. viii
Acknowledgment……………………………………………………….….. ix
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 - Introduction to the Problem and a Survey of Previous Views…….......1
1.2 - Some Points About Aristotle’s Critique of Plato………………...……14
1.3 - Teleology, Function and Awareness………………………….….…... 24

Chapter 2: Ethical Principles and Moral Education

2. - Introduction……………….…………………………….………….......... 33
2.1 - The Participation of Moral Virtue in Phronêsis
2.1.1 - Moral Virtue and the Law……….………………..……....... 39
2.1.2 - Moral Virtue for the Sake of Phronêsis…….…………......... 53
2.1.3 - The “Orthos Logos” and the “Horos”…….………..….….....71
2.2 - Ethical Principles, Moral Education and the Three Lives
2.2.1 - Wish, Character, and the Appearance of the Good…….........84
2.2.2 - States of Character as Dispositions to Learn………….…..... 105

Chapter 3: Phronêsis as a Science and the Practical Syllogism

3. – Introduction………………………………………………….………… 115
3.1 - Deliberative Desire
3.1.1 - Introduction…………………………………….……............119
3.1.2 - The Temporal Standpoint of Animal Practical Cognition….. 130
3.1.3 - The Temporal Standpoint of Human Practical Cognition….. 141
3.1.4 - The Structure of Deliberative Desire……………………….. 147
3.2 - The Practical Syllogism
3.2.1 - Explanatory Reasons……………………………………….. 160
3.2.2 - Phantasia and the Practical Syllogism in the De Anima….... 173
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Chapter 4: Conclusion…………………………………………………. 176

Bibliography…………………………………………………….……. 179

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Abstract

In a famous argument at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that
the function and good of the human being is the "actuality of the soul in accordance with
virtue". Presenting a view critical of the widespread intellectualist reading of Aristotle's
Ethics, in this thesis I argue that the characteristic function of the human being is
constitutive of a distinctly human life as a dynamic formal cause teleologically operative
in human awareness. I argue for the validity of my own view in a preliminary way in the
introduction by way of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic forms.

In the second chapter, I argue that the processes of the non-rational part of the soul are
acquired and actively operate once acquired independently of singular dictates of active
reason within the individual. By this I mean that the virtues do not obey reason in the
sense that they receive individual commands from discursive reason to desire or feel in
certain ways. Rather, although the moral virtues are formed gradually by repeated acts of
choice, as affective states, they are activated by being affected from without by external
stimuli. These external stimuli produce impulses in the soul which are conducive to
virtuous action, including a cognitive element: primarily, non-rational and non-discursive
evaluative judgments of phantasia, which supply a human agent immediately with the
ends of his action and the beginning-points of deliberation. These judgments are the
awareness of sensible particulars as pleasant.

In the third chapter, I turn to the De Anima in order to illuminate the cognitive conditions
of human praxis. Following on the arguments contained in the second chapter, I argue
that there are two primary cognitive moments which are necessary conditions of action.
While the ends of desire are immediate objects of awareness and move humans as
unmoved movers, motivational desires, which move as efficient causes, are initiated by a
distinct cognitive power: proclamations to pursue or avoid.
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List of Abbreviations Used

Works of Aristotle

Pol. Politics
Phys. Physics
Meta. Metaphysics
Mem. On Memory and Recollection
DA On the Soul (De Anima)
EE Eudemian Ethics
NE Nicomachean Ethics
APo. Posterior Analytics
De Inter. On Interpretation (De Interpretatione)

Works of Plato

Men. Meno
Rep. Republic
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Acknowledgments

There are a great number of people whom I must thank, without whose help I would not
have been able to complete this project.

For their generous financial support, I thank both the Killam Trusts and the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

My parents have always encouraged me to pursue those things most important to me,
have endowed me with a spirit of independence and a love of argument, and have taught
me never to fear that my aspirations might drive me into unconventional territories. I am
thankful for Emma Hassall, for her patience and understanding when I had to return to
New York for two months this summer to work on this thesis, but more especially for all
the support which she has given me over the years in keeping my head above water
amidst all the turbulence of day-to-day life. My close friends Evan King and Jacob Singer
have, in the many years that I have known and lived with them, provided countless hours
of conversation about philosophy (and much more!) which have brought me much joy.
Bryan Heystee has been there since the beginning and Daniel Watson was there urging
me on at the finishing line, offering much perceptive guidance along the way. Donna
Edwards has assisted me and brought order to my university life, I am sure, in more ways
than I will ever know. My teachers, Dennis House, Sarah Cohen, Peter O'Brien, Leona
MacLeod, Thom Curran, and Neil Robertson, have left lasting impressions on me. I am
grateful for Michael Fournier's helpful comments on this thesis.

Of my teachers, there are two who require special recognition. First, my supervisor Eli
Diamond has been abundantly generous with his time and care ever since I first became
his student. I am particularly grateful to have had the privilege of participating in his
graduate seminar on the De Anima in 2008/2009, where I was first introduced to
Aristotle, as well as for his concerted effort in assisting me over the course of the past
four years, especially during the past two months. Second, Wayne Hankey has not only
taught me in the seminars which have been the cornerstone of my education, but also, on
several pivotal occasions, he has offered me personal guidance and compassion, without
which I would not now have the opportunity to acknowledge those who have helped me.
I am most appreciative for the high standard to which I have been held by my teachers
from the very beginning of my time as a student in Halifax, and I can imagine few
blessings greater than if, in Aristotelian fashion, it were permanently ingrained into my
character.
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τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς
μή τι μάτην δόξῃς, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι
ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς
νοῦς ἄρχει σύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.
-Plato, Philebus (30d)

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 – Introduction to the Problem and a Survey of Previous Views

While in our own day it is assumed by many that the Aristotelian writings which
have come down to us amount to lecture notes of some kind, compiled and organized into
distinct treatises by Aristotle’s successors in the Peripatos in an effort to clarify and
preserve for posterity the teachings of their master shortly after his death, none of the
principal texts of the corpus evokes the genre of lecture as explicitly as the Nicomachean
Ethics. Of the several passages which suggest that the work was at some point presented
as a lecture, perhaps the most significant is a passage early in the treatise, where Aristotle
delineates which traits a person must possess in order to be admitted as a student of
practical philosophy.1 The Greek word which Aristotle uses for student in this context is,
revealingly, “akroates” (ἀκροατής), which means “hearer”. There are several conditions
which a prospective student must meet before he can attend lectures on political and
ethical matters. In order to take part, a student must: (1) have acquired a well-rounded
and broad education, with the result that he possesses good judgment (κρινεῖν) and
understands what level of exactness should be expected from the inquiries into ethical
matters, given the science to which such questions belong, (2) he must have acquired a
certain level of experience, because the content of ethical reflection is drawn from the
lived experience of practical situations, (3) he must have lived for long enough to reach
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1 NE 1.3.1094b30-1095a13, NE 1.4.1095a31-1095b13
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