Techniques of Secret Warfare: The Complete Manual of Undercover Operations

175 Pages·1996·48.03 MB·English

by  Carl Hammer

TECHNI~UES OF
SECRET WARFARE
CARL HAMMER
P.O. BoxB30760
Miami FL33283·0760
TECHNIQUESOFSECRETWARFAREbyCarl Hammer
Copyright© 1996byCarl Hammer
Publishedby:
J.FloresPublications,Inc.
P.O. Box830760
Miami, FL33283-0760
Directinquiresand/orordertotheaboveaddress.
Allrightsreserved. Exceptforuseinareview,noportionofthisbookmaybereproducedin
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Neithertheauthornorthepublisherassumesanyresponsibilityfortheuseormisuseofthe
information contained in this book. The author and publisher specifically disclaim any
personal liability,loss,orrisk incurredasaconsequenceoftheuseandapplication,either
directlyorindirectly,ofanyadviceorinformationpresentedherein.
Thispublicationisdesignedtoprovideaccurateandauthoritativeinformationinregardto
thesubjectmattercovered.Itissoldwiththeunderstandingthattheauthororthepublisher
arenotengagedinrenderinglegalorotherprofessionalservice.Iflegaladviceorotherexpert
assistanceisrequired,the~ervicesofacompetentprofessionalpersonshouldbesought.
Be advised that there may becertain itemsrepresented in this bookas to which the sale,
possession,constructionorinterstatetransportationthereofmayberestricted,prohibitedor
subjecttospeciallicensingrequirements.ConsultwithyourlocalATFandlawenforcement
authoritiesinyourareabeforeobtainingorconstructingsuchitems.
Technical data presented herein, particularly technical data on dealing with dangerous
chemicals,poisons,explosives,drugs,andsafetyproceduresinevitablyreflectstheauthor's
individualbeliefsandexperiencewithparticularequipmentandenvironmentsunderspecific
circumstanceswhich thereadercannotduplicateorexperienceexactly.Theinformationin
thisbookshouldthereforebeused forguidanceonlyandshouldbeapproachedwithgreat
caution.
Since neither the author nor the publisher have control over the materials used, use of
techniquesorequipment,orthe abilitiesofthereader, no responsibility,eitherimpliedor
expressed,isassumedfortheuseormisuseofthedataorproceduresgiveninthisbook.
ISBN0-918751-40-3
LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:92-72147
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Warning Notice
Neithertheauthornorthepublisherassumesanyresponsibilityforthe
use ormisuse ofthe informationcontained in this book. The authorand
publisherspecificallydisclaimanypersonalliability,loss,orriskincurred
as aconsequence ofthe use andapplication, eitherdirectlyorindirectly,
ofanyadviceorinformationpresentedherein.
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative
information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the
understandingthattheauthororthepublisherarenotengagedinrendering
legal or other professional service. Iflegal advice orotherexpertassis
tance isrequired, theservicesofacompetentprofessionalpersonshould
besought.
Beadvisedthattheremaybecertain itemsrepresented inthisbookas
to which the sale, possession, construction or interstate transportation
thereofmay be restricted, prohibited or subject to special licensing re
quirements. Consultwithyourlocal lawenforcementauthorities inyour
areabeforeobtainingorconstructingsuchitems.
Technicaldatapresentedherein,particularlytechnicaldataondealing
with dangerous chemicals,and safety procedures inevitably reflects the
author's individualbeliefsandexperiencewithparticularequipmentand
environments underspecific circumstances which the reader cannot du
plicate orexperience exactly. The informationinthis bookshouldthere
fore be used for guidance only and should be approached with great
caution.
Sinceneithertheauthornorthepublisherhavecontroloverthemate
rials used, use oftechniques orequipment, orthe abilities ofthe reader,
no responsibility, either implied orexpressed, is assumed for the use or
misuseofthe dataorproceduresgiveninthisbook.
"An army withoutsecretagentsisexactlylikeaman
withouteyesorears."
ChiaLin,
Tangdynasty
writeron militarysubjects
"Importantstatesecretsandespeciallycluesto the in
tentionsandplansofpotentialenemiescannotbefound
in librariesorencyclopedias, butonlywheretheyare
beingkeptunderlockandkey."
AlexanderOrlov,
ex-General,NKVD
Table Of Contents
The Significance OfHUMINT
(Human Intelligence) - 9
Infiltration - 14
Maintaining Cover - 19
Temporary Missions - 27
Protracted Missions - 63
Security - 79
Escape - 99
Reporting Systems And Communication
Techniques - 141
Photography - 157
Enemy Interrogation Techniques And How To
Counter Them - 170
1
The Significance
Of HUMINT
(Human Intelligence)
HumanIntelligence (HUMINT) is the technique ofcollecting intelli
gence throughtheuse ofsecretagents.
The use of secret agents is fraught with danger. The failure and
exposure ofa HUMINT operation might well lead to death, torture, or
imprisonment ofthe agents in questionas well as aconsiderable loss of
internationalprestige forthe governmentemployingthem. Furthermore,
secret agents are also the group ofpersonnel mostdifficult to selectand
to train.
Despite these risks, secret agents continue to be one of the most
important intelligence assets, maybe the most important one when it
comes tostrategicintelligence.
Thereasonforthisis thatHUMINToperationsarestill oftenthe only
waytocollectreallyvitalintelligence.Intelligencecollectingbytechnical
meanscanprovide alotofvaluableinformation, butitcanneverinform
ofwhat is being planned in the enemy's most guarded installations and
headquarters.HUMINTcan,withalittleluckandgreatskill,oftenprovide
suchinformation.
Someintelligenceservices,notablytheKGB,considersecretagentsto
be their absolutely most important intelligence source. Other agencies,
suchas the CIA, do usesecretagents butto aconsiderablylesserextent.
ThislackofinterestinHUMINTtechniqueshasledtoseveralintelligence
failures in recent times, when technical means ofintelligence collecting
turned outto beimpossibleorunsuitable.
The following two examples serveto showwhatthe effectsofsucha
failure can be, ifthe government in question does not have the proper
readiness tohandlean agentoperation.
10 TECHNIQUESOFSECRETWARFARE
ThefirstcaseistheappallinglybadU.S.understandingofandplanning
for secretoperations inIran,shortlybeforeAyatollahKhomeiniresumed
control over the country. In 1979, when this happened, there were no
Americansatallinsidethecountry.TheU.S.Administrationwastherefore
totallyunpreparedforwhatwastohappen.
After the u.s. embassy had been occupied by the Iranians, the CIA
desperately tried to infiltratethe country. They soonfound outthat their
only way ofdoing this was to recall an already retired agent, known as
"Bob", ashe was the onlyonecapableofhandlingthesituationinIran.
Thisappallingpreparednesswasshowntotheworldevenmoreclearly
the 24th April 1980, when the muchpublicized rescue attemptended in
disaster. Several participating aircraft collided, eight men died, and the
rescue had to be called off. One ofthe reasons for this failure was the
preposterousbeliefthattheoperationwouldbepossibletoperformdespite
the lackofeventhemostelementaryintelligence.
Thesecondexample isacasefromthe summerof1985. Acolonelof
theKGB, Vitaly Yurchenko, had defectedto the United States. Afterthe
defectionhestayedforthreemonthswiththeCIA,whichinterrogatedhim
severaltimes.However, noattempttoacclimatizehimtohisnewcountry
wasdone,apparentlybecausenobodyhadthepsychologicalpreparedness
to takecareofadefectorofthiskind. AcoloneloftheKGB couldnotbe
handled in the same way as anordinary ex-private SovietArmy soldier,
whichisthekindofdefectormoreoftenentertainedbytheU.S.authorities
(not bythe CIA, however, as theyusuallydo notentertainany defectors
atall).
TheresultofthiswasthatYurchenkogrewhomesick.Duringarestau
rant visit in Washington, he excused himself for a moment, left the
premises, and returned to theSovietembassy. Meanwhile, his American
supervisorsremained inthe restaurant, notrealizingwhathadhappened.
Naturally,theSovietUnionmadeapropagandacoupoutofthis,claiming
thattheCIAhadkidnappedYurchenko,druggedhimandinterrogatedhim,
butthatthe colonel laterhad managedto escape.
Boththese two cases made internationalnews, thereby damaging the
international prestige ofthe United States. The first failure also led to
muchsufferingfortheAmericanstakenashostage,aswellastothedeath
ofcertain soldiers during the airaccident. In orderto avoid this type of
situation, itis imperativethatan intelligenceservicemaintainsitsability
to handleagentoperations.
Human Intelligence 11
A field operative must be well trained and experienced, both in the
techniques used inintelligence collecting aswell as inmany otherareas
ofknowledge. He should be a resourceful individual possessing good
judgement and complete self-confidence. It is an advantage if he is
physicallystrongand it isadefiniterequirementthathepossesscourage
to meetunforeseensituations. Anability to make quickandsound deci
sionsisalsorequired.Hemustalsobepsychologicallystrongandhealthy.
The field operative must also have the ability to act in a particular
assumed role, his cover. He must have a memory capable ofrecalling
incidents without the use ofnotes, as he will encounter many situations
where notescannotbetakenorwillcompromisehim.
Ifthe cover assumes a certain occupation, he must be skilled in that
occupation.Hisphysicalappearanceandcapabilitiesmustalsobeconsis
tent with his qualifications. His hobbies, interest in sports and other
subjects, musical ability, andso on mustalso be consistentwith the role
he isrequiredto act in.
Last but not least, alinguistic ability isadefinite requirement. There
havebeeninstanceswhenextremelytalentedfieldoperativesmanagedto
successfullyconclude importantoperationswithoutany linguisticability
atall, butthereare many morecases in whichtheoperative wascaught,
killed, or otherwise failed only because ofhis lack of knowledge in a
certain language required byhiscover.
The training ofan agent must begeared toward adeep knowledge of
theconditionsinthecountryinwhichhewillbeexpectedtooperate.This
mustincludeasmuchinformationaspossibleontheculture,history, and
daily life in the country in question. It is also imperative that the agent
learns as much as possible about the way oflife ofthe different social
classes in the country, and the average views ofmany subjects among
different groups of people. Naturally it is also vital that the national
languageaswell asthe localdialectsbeproperlylearned.
The agent should also learn as much as possible about practical
psychology.Finallyhemustlearnwhichintelligenceismostsearchedfor,
and what is already known. Inthis way the agent is able to planhisown
intelligencecollectinginaproperway, aswellasunderstandingwhenan
earlierknownpieceofinformationisno longervalidandneedsupdating.
Naturally, no field operative is expected to know all possible intelli
gencetechniquesandallfields ofgeneralknowledge,languages,etc.The