Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations

21 Pages·0.125 MB·English

by  Gause III Gregory F.

Systemic Approaches to
Middle East International Relations
F. Gregory Gause III
T
heideathatinterstaterelationsintheMiddleEastcompriseasystemisno
revelation.Itisagiventhateventslikethe1967Arab-IsraeliWar,theIra-
nian Revolution, and the Gulf War have important effects on the entire
region, not simply on the countries directly involved. The emphasis analysts
place on transnational ideologies like Arab nationalism and political Islam—
either their continued relevance or their “death”1—for regional politics assumes
an interconnection among the players in the Middle East game that is more than
simplegeographicproximity.Characteristicofsystems,eventsinonepartofthe
Middle East have had surprising and unintended consequences in other parts of
theregion.2InthewordsofoneArabdiplomat,“IntheMiddleEasteverythingis
related to everything else.”3
In international relations theory debates, the systemic level of analysis has
had a privileged position at least since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s The-
ory of International Politics.4 The importance of systemic-level analysis as the
starting point for inquiry is widely acknowledged, even by those who argue that
analystshavetomovebeyondsystemicfactorstoexplainmostinternationalout-
comes.5 With the end of the Cold War, there is a new scholarly awareness that
1FouadAjami,“TheEndofPan-Arabism?”ForeignAffairs57,No.2(1978–79);and
Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1994).
2Robert Jervis, Systems Effects (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997),
pp. 17–21.
3Quoted in L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 16.
4KennethN.Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics(Reading,Mass.:Addison-Wes-
ley, 1979).
5Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1989), pp. 61–62; Jervis, Systems Effects, p. 209; and Gideon Rose,
“Domestic Realism,”World Politics51, No. 1 (1998).
© 1999 International Studies Association
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.
12 F. Gregory Gause III
geographicregionscanbeanalyzedassystemsinandofthemselves,notsimply
as subordinate components of a global international system.6
These two widely held assumptions—that the “system” is the place to begin
looking for answers to questions about state behavior in international relations,
and that the Middle East forms a “system” or a “regional subsystem”—have
underlainimportantworksontheinternationalpoliticsoftheMiddleEast.Some
have been efforts by international relations scholars who claim no particular
Middle Eastern expertise to test general hypotheses against Middle East cases:
John Mearsheimer on conventional deterrence, Stephen Walt on alliances, and
BenjaminMillerongreatpowercrisisbehavior.7Othershavebeenworksbystu-
dents of the Middle East using systemic-level variables to explain specific
Middle Eastern outcomes: Shibley Telhami on Camp David; Ian Lustick on
the absence of Middle Eastern great powers; and Michael Barnett on inter-Arab
politics.8
Giventheprevalenceofthesetwoassumptionsandtheimportantworkbased
uponthem,itispuzzlingthatmoreattentionhasnotbeenpaidtothosebooksthat
attempttodefinepreciselytheelementsoftheMiddleEasterninternationalsys-
tem, investigate the regularities generated by those elements, and identify
changes, if any, that have occurred in it. This essay examines four such efforts:
Barnett’s constructivist account of inter-Arab politics; Walt’s neorealist reading
of the same topic; Carl Brown’s formulation of a Middle Eastern “diplomatic
culture”;andGamilMatarandcAlial-DinHilal’srenderingoftheArabregional
system.9 Walt and Barnett are well-known international relations scholars, but
their work has not received the attention it deserves from Middle East regional
6Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,1995);andDavidA.LakeandPatrickMorgan,eds.,Regional
Orders:BuildingSecurityinaNewWorld(UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniver-
sity Press, 1997).
7John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press,1983),Chap.6;StephenM.Walt,TheOriginsofAlliances(Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell
University Press, 1987); and Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great
Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 1995).
8Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to
theCampDavidAccords(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1990);IanS.Lustick,
“The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political ‘Backwardness’ in Historical
Perspective,” International Organization 51, No. 4 (1997); and Michael N. Barnett,
DialoguesinArabPolitics:NegotiationsinRegionalOrder(NewYork:ColumbiaUni-
versity Press, 1998).
9Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics; Walt, Origins of Alliances; Brown, Interna-
tional Politics and the Middle East; and Gamil Matar and cAli al-Din Hilal [Disuqi],
al-nizam al-´iqlimi al-carabi [The Arab regional order] (Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal
al-cArabi, 1983).
Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations 13
specialists. Brown is one of the founders of Middle East regional studies in the
United States. The Matar and Hilal book is the leading academic analysis in
Arabic of inter-Arab politics, and a popular text in universities throughout the
Arabworld.Theselattertwoworks,byhighlyrespectedMiddleEastspecialists,
have been largely ignored by international relations theorists using the Middle
East to test general theories.
This essay is an effort to bridge that gap. It critiques these important books
and, based on that critique, suggests an alternative way of conceptualizing the
MiddleEasterninternationalsystem.Thisalternativeviewisaimedatovercom-
ing three serious problems in the analysis of Middle Eastern international
relations: (1) the lack of connection to mainstream international relations
debates, leading to the sui generis fallacy that characterizes much work on Mid-
dle Eastern international politics by regional specialists; (2) the imprecision in
identifying exactly what is unique about the interactions of the states in the
region;and(3)theadhocwaymostregionalexpertsthinkabouthowtheinterna-
tional politics of the Middle East have changed during the last fifty years.
Defining the Middle Eastern Regional System
Noneoftheworksunderconsiderationprovidessatisfactorycriteriaforidentify-
ing the boundaries of the Middle East regional system. Walt simply lists states
thatdefinehissystem;Israelandextraregionalgreatpowersarein,butIran,Tur-
key, and the North African states are out. Barnett, Brown, and Matar and Hilal
offer explicit criteria for system membership, but in doing so, raise more prob-
lems than they resolve. Brown includes all the states whose territory was once
under Ottoman control, plus the great powers, because his explanation of the
workings of the system lies in an “Ottoman political culture” inherited by those
states. Thus Turkey and Israel are in the system, but Iran and Morocco are not,
fortoincludethemwould“stretchtoofaranalreadybroadlyconceivedtopic.”10
The other two works limit system membership to Arab states. Barnett’s system
includesonlythefoundingmembersoftheArabLeague(Egypt,Lebanon,Syria,
Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia), along with the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, on the grounds that they “were at the forefront of and defined the debate
aboutregionalorder.”11MatarandHilalincludeallArabstatesintheirdefinition
of the system, and explicitly exclude all other states, regional or great power.
Their purpose is clearly normative; they believe that Arab states should see
themselvesasconstitutingasystem,andassertthattheydo:“Theprimaryfactor
forming the basis of the Arab system is the element of nationalism.”12
10Brown,International Politics and the Middle East, pp. 7–11. Quote on p. 11.
11Barnett,Dialogues in Arab Politics, p. 16.
12Matar and Hilal,al-nizam al-´iqlimi al-carabi, p. 57.
14 F. Gregory Gause III
Thesebasesforestablishingsystemmembershipareflawed,largelybecause
theyignoreconflict.AsRaymondAronpointedoutmorethanthirtyyearsago,it
makes no sense to define an international system in such a way that states
engaged in war with each other are not members.13 David Lake makes a similar
point in defining a regional security system as a set of states affected by at least
onetransborder butlocalsecurityexternality.14TheArabstatesfighttheirwars,
for the most part, against non-Arabs: Israel, Iran, and the great powers. Exclud-
ing Iran and Israel from the Middle East, because they are not Arab and do not
share in an Ottoman diplomatic culture, hardly helps us to understand regular-
izedpatternsofrelationsamongregionalstates,oreventounderstandtheforeign
policy behavior of states like Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, which are included in all
definitionsoftheregionalsystem.MatarandHilalrecognizethisintheiradmis-
sion that the Arab system has seen increasing “intrusions” from both the world
system and from the “peripheral states” of Iran and Israel.15 Barnett similarly
sneaks Israel and the great powers in through the back door, identifying Arab
states’ relations with them as two of the three major issues that comprise the
agenda of Arab politics.16
Defining the boundaries of the Middle Eastern system is more than just an
academic issue. It has become part of the political contests in the region, further
complicatingeffortstousetheconceptof“system”inananalyticalway.Progress
in Arab-Israeli peace talks in the mid-1990s, along with the publication of
Shimon Peres’s The New Middle East, generated much literature among Arab
intellectuals,arguingthatPeres’snotionofaneconomicallyintegratedregionwas
simply a new variant on Israeli plans to dominate the Middle East.17 Even Arab
scholarswhohavepubliclyendorsedthepeaceprocesshavewritteninthisvein.18
13Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York:
Praeger, 1967), p. 94.
14David Lake, “Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach,” in Lake and
Morgan,Regional Orders, pp. 48–49.
15Matar and Hilal,al-nizam al-´iqlimi al-carabi, pp. 52–53.
16Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, p. 6. Avraham Sela falls into the same trap,
investigatingthedevelopmentofthe“Arabstatessystem”throughitsrelationshiptothe
Arab-Israeliconflict.Sela,TheDeclineoftheArab-IsraeliConflict(Albany:StateUni-
versity of New York Press, 1998).
17Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993). Barnett pro-
vides a summary of this debate, inDialogues in Arab Politics, pp. 229–231.
18For example, cAbd al-Muncim al-Sacid cAli is one of the founders of the Copenha-
gen Group, an organization of Arab and Israeli intellectuals aimed at promoting the
peaceprocess.YethewroteascathinganalysisofPeres’sideaofaneconomicallyinte-
gratedregion.“al-takammulal-´iqtisadial-carabiwaal-sharqawsatiyya[Arabeconomic
integration and “Middle Easternism”], al-mustaqbal al-carabi [The Arab future] No.
214(1996): pp. 7–16.
Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations 15
Mustafa Mursi’s al-carab fi muftariq al-turuq [The Arabs at the crossroads] is
representativeofthemorereasonedargumentsofthe“sharqawsatiyya”[“Middle
Easternism”]debate.AlthoughnotrejectingeithertheideaofpeacewithIsraelor
greater economic cooperation in a “new Middle East,” and admitting that there
have been exaggerations in Arab reactions to Peres’s book, he argues forcefully
that plans for such cooperation seem to assign to Israel the leading regional role,
keepingArabsstatestiedtoadominantIsraelieconomy.Heseesseriousrisksto
Arab national identity in such plans, not the least of which is the dissolution or
absorptionofexistingArabinstitutionsintolarger“MiddleEastern”groupings.19
The normative aspects of the definition of system membership cannot be
ignored by analysts of the region, but they should not override empirical con-
cerns in constructing systemic arguments. Identity issues help define how states
spendtheirforeignpolicyresources,andtowardwhomtheydirecttheirpolicies,
but such issues hardly exhaust the scope of their foreign policies. Certainly, in
theMiddleEast,membershipinformalinternationalorganizationsliketheArab
League and the Gulf Cooperation Council is not an adequate basis for defining
the regional system.20 Conflict is equally, if not more, important in explaining
international conduct and outcomes as is the desire for greater integration. Any
definitionofsystemmembershipthatignoresimportantconflictdyadsissimply
notausefulbasisuponwhichtoproceedtomoresubstantiveanalyticalissues.In
the conclusion, I suggest a definition of the Middle Eastern regional system that
is both theoretically based and analytically practical.
Clarity of Concepts: Dependent Variables
Among the works under consideration, Walt’s is the clearest about what exactly
it wants to explain—alliance or alignment behavior. He wants to test whether
statesaremorelikelytobalanceagainststatesthatposeathreatortobandwagon
with those threatening states.21 The Middle East is a “hard case” for the neo-
realist theory of balancing, for he discerns numerous bandwagoning incentives
in the region related to transnational ideologies and identities. If balancing
behavior predominates even in the Middle East, then the neorealist case has
received strong confirmation.
We can argue with how Walt codes his cases of balancing and band-
wagoning,butheisverypreciseabouthisdefinitionsoftheconcepts.22Yetwhat
19Mustafa Mursi, al-carab fi muftariq al-turuq [The Arabs at the crossroads] (Cairo:
Maktab al-Shuruq, 1995), pp. 138–141, 150–160.
20Charles Tripp, “Regional Organizations in the Arab Middle East,” in Fawcett and
Hurrell,Regionalism in World Politics.
21Walt,Origins of Alliances, p. 3.
22Ibid., pp. 18–21.
16 F. Gregory Gause III
Waltgainsinprecisioninhisdependentvariable,helosesinbreadthofexplana-
tory ambition. The other authors seek to explain a broader category of Middle
Eastern state behavior, but in doing so make it more difficult to operationalize
theirdependentvariables,andthereforetotesttheirassertionsabouttheregional
system.
Barnett wants to explain the “normative fragmentation” of Arab politics.23
He contends that Arab states at different times have been constrained in their
dealings with the West, Israel, and one another by normative guidelines derived
fromtheirshared(thoughnevercompletelyshared)understandingofArabiden-
tity. The failure of Arab unity schemes, the more direct and open assertions of
state interest in Arab foreign policy, peace with Israel, and open alignment with
the United States all result from (and also help to cause) a fraying of that shared
understanding. These tangible political changes in the Arab world are evidence
of the “normative fragmentation” that Barnett seeks to explain.
Barnett provides relatively clear guidelines for how to operationalize “nor-
mative fragmentation.” Changed behavior on Arab unity (less interest in it),
policy toward Israel (willingness to make peace), and alignment with Western
powers(moreopenacceptance)iseasytoidentify.TheproblemforBarnettisin
measurement.Ineveryperiod,someArabstateswerewillingtoignorethedomi-
nant normative understandings of Arabism he identifies. In the 1950s, when
Barnett contends that the widely shared understanding of Arabism prohibited
open alignment with Western powers, Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact, Saudi Ara-
bia supported the Eisenhower Doctrine, and Lebanon and Jordan invited
American and British forces into their countries. The question of how many
exceptions would constitute a challenge to his classification of some periods as
characterizedbystrongnormativeconsensus,andothersbynormativefragmen-
tation, remains unanswered.
The other two works are less self-conscious about, and much too vague in,
theirspecificationandoperationalizationofdependentvariables.ForBrown,the
object of explanation is what he calls “the rules of the Eastern Question game,”
bothastyleofdiplomacyandtheoutcomeofsuchdiplomacy.ThestyleofMid-
dle East diplomacy that he discerns includes frequent shifts in alliances, heavy
penetrationofthesystembyoutsidegreatpowers,apreferenceforfaitaccompli
in bargaining, emphasis on “reactive politics or diplomatic counterpunching,”
and a prevalence of a “zero-sum mentality” in the players’ outlooks. Brown
termstheoutcomeofthisdiplomaticstyle“homeostasis,”aninabilityofanyone
actor to impose its will on the region because of the countervailing reactions of
the other players.24
23Barnett,Dialogues in Arab Politics, pp. 49–52.
24Brown,International Politics and the Middle East, pp. 16–18.
Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations 17
Matar and Hilal are the least precise in defining their dependent variable(s).
The closest they come to specifying a dependent variable is the concept of sys-
tem transformation, which seems to be similar to Barnett’s “normative
fragmentation,” but not as clearly delineated:
Transformation in the system [al-tahawwul fi al-nizam] means more than a
change or a group of changes in the policies of members of the system or the
systemasawhole.Whatismeantbytransformationisafundamentalshiftinthe
power capabilities in the system, or in the types of dominant ideologies, espe-
cially its major doctrine [caqidatu al-ra´isiyya], or in the forms of alliances in
suchawaythatleadstoadisturbanceofthebalanceofpowerinitandthefor-
mationofnewaxesonideologicaloreconomicbases....Likewise,thesystem
is transformed if its major interactions are merged into the interactions of a
higher or a more-encompassing system, or if foreign powers penetrate the net-
workofregionalinteractionsandsucceedinreducingthemorredirectingthem
to fields far from the goals of the system.25
It is hard to identify from Brown’s discussion just what kinds of diplomatic
behavior would qualify as “reactive politics” or fait accompli, and also how the
“Eastern Question game” can be characterized by both seemingly contradictory
traits. Brown’s idea of homeostasis—the inability of a single power to achieve
hegemony in the region—is more easily operationalized. The concept of “trans-
formation”isevenmurkier.MatarandHilalprovidenoguidanceforidentifying
just what kinds of changes in the distribution of regional power are “fundamen-
tal,”whenalliancechangesbecomethe“formationofnewaxesonideologicalor
economicbases,”orwhenanideologybecomesa“majordoctrine.”Falsification
of such concepts is impossible.
BrownandMatarandHilalfallintothecommonregionalisttrapofpilingup
dependent variables rather than clearly operationalizing a few important ones.
Theyignorethekeypointthateffectsareasimportantanalyticallyascauses,and
need to be as specified as those causes. Systemic approaches can be sweeping,
but they should not be mushy.
Independent Variables and Causation
Thecoreofsystemicargumentshastobeaboutwhatmakesthesystemworkand
whatexplainstheoutcomesitproduces.Heretheworksunderconsiderationdif-
fer profoundly in what they see as the motor of systemic outcomes, the
independent variable(s) in the Middle East regional system, and their causal
links to the dependent variables already discussed.
Walt, following Waltz, identifies anarchy and multipolarity as the key sys-
temic forces driving alliance behavior in the Middle East. Under these
25Matar and Hilal,al-nizam al-´iqlimi al-carabi, p. 59.
18 F. Gregory Gause III
conditions, each state is constrained to develop balancing alliances against
threatstoitsexistenceandindependence.Counterintuitively,heargues,Arabism
and Islamic solidarity do not lead to a significant amount of bandwagoning
behavior; rather, they contribute to threat perceptions and thus to balancing.26
We can question Walt’s definition and operationalization of threat (his major
theoreticalinnovationandatopicdiscussedlater),buttheclarityofhisexplana-
tory framework is admirable. The relationship between his independent and
dependent variables is clear and direct: multipolar anarchical system and threat
leads to balancing against that threat.
Brown’s independent variable is equally clear: a “diplomatic political cul-
ture” inherited by the successor states from the Ottoman Empire.27 Whereas he
acknowledgesthatthemultiplicityofactors,bothregionallyandintermsofout-
side powers, is an important constitutive element of the Middle East
international system, it is this distinctive culture more than Waltzian structural
elements that creates the rules of the Eastern Question game. The equation is
simple: Ottoman political culture creates the Eastern Question rules.
BarnettidentifiesthreedrivingforcesintheArabstatessystem,twoofwhich
are constants. The first constant is sovereignty, the organizing principle of the
statesysteminheritedfromEuropeancolonialismandenshrinedinthefounding
documents of the Arab League.28 Sovereignty makes Middle Eastern politics
look like international politics elsewhere. The second is the desire of Arab lead-
ers to remain in power, which makes them both willing to ignore normative
constraints and extremely sensitive to the demands of their populations regard-
ingforeignpolicyissues,demandslargelydrivenbynormativeconsiderationsof
Arabism.29 The third, which is variable and bears the weight for Barnett of
explaining “normative fragmentation,” is Arabism. That shared value and iden-
tity provides the best explanation for Middle Eastern international politics from
the1940sthroughthe1960s.The“declineofunderlyingsharedvaluesandiden-
tities” explains the decline of unionist programs, moves toward peace with
Israel,andopenalignmentwiththeWestfromthe1970stotoday.30ForBarnett,
changing notions of Arabism drive changes in Arab state foreign policy
behavior.
Matar and Hilal identify three independent variables: the distribution of
power and capabilities (including what they call “the dominant ordering of val-
ues,” presumably referring to the relative strength of ideologies), patterns of
26Ibid., Chaps. 5–6.
27Brown,International Politics and the Middle East, p. 14.
28Barnett,Dialogues in Arab Politics, pp. 29–31, 239.
29Ibid., pp. 34–37, 270.
30Ibid., p. 50.
Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations 19
policies, and patterns of alliances.31 They also see the latter two as dependent
variables at other points in their work—that systemic transformation has led to
differentkindsofpoliciesanddifferentaxesofalignment.Theirperiodizationof
change in the Arab regional system gives a better indication of what they see as
themostimportantindependentvariablesaffectingsystemtransformation.They
seesystemtransformationsinthemid-1950s,astheperiodwhenanticolonialism
ends and when Naseerist and Bacthist Pan-Arabism begins; in the early 1970s,
with the oil revolution, the declining influence of Pan-Arabism and the new
Americaninvolvementintheregion;andfromthelate1970s,withthesolidifica-
tionofstate-interestdiplomacyandtheriseofIslamicmovements.32Changesin
both the distribution of power and in the dominant ideology of the system
(which,whencapturedbyaparticularstateorleader,becomesapowerresource
in itself) drive change in the system. For Matar and Hilal, the explanatory equa-
tion is murkier than for the other authors: distribution of power + ideological
change + outside power interference = system transformation, although none of
the three independent variables is necessary, and any one of the three is suffi-
cient, for system transformation.
All these works run into problems in operationalizing their independent vari-
ables and in establishing their causal links to dependent variables. For Walt, the
difficultyisindetermininghowstatesprioritizeamongthreats.Helistsfourpossi-
ble sources of threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power,
and aggressive intentions.33 He fails to recognize that in a multipolar system like
theMiddleEaststatescanfacemultiplethreatsfromdifferentcountriesandofdif-
ferenttypesatanyonetime.Whatheidentifiesasbalancingofaparticularthreat
could just as easily be coded as bandwagoning with another threat. For example,
whenSaudiArabiaalignedwithIraqagainstIranin1980,wasitbalancingtheIra-
nian revolutionary ideological threat (as Walt codes it) or bandwagoning with an
IraqthatseemedtobeemergingastheGulf’sdominantmilitarypower?Likewise,
wasJordan’sdecisiontojointhe1967ArabalignmentagainstIsraelacaseofbal-
ancing the Israeli military threat, or bandwagoning with a politically dominant
Egypt (Walt’s choice)? By failing to provide criteria for determining threat pre-
dominance, Walt calls into question the usefulness of “threat” as an independent
variable in determining alliance behavior. By folding very different elements of
threatintoasingledefinition,Walthastakenthequestforparsimonytoofar.
BrownisexplicitaboutthelinkbetweenOttomandiplomaticcultureandthe
rulesofthe“EasternQuestiongame,”butunpackinghisconceptofcultureraises
doubts about just how “cultural” Ottoman diplomatic culture is. Multipolarity is
31Matar and Hilal,al-nizam al-´iqlimi al-carabi, p. 58.
32Ibid., pp. 60–61.
33Walt,Origins of Alliances, pp. 21–26.
20 F. Gregory Gause III
hardlyaculturalelementofMiddleEastinternationalpolitics.Theintrusiveness
ofgreatpowersintheregionisgovernedlessbyregionalculturalnormsthanby
definitions of great power interest—be it in the routes to India or access to oil.
Hasthe(nodoubttemporary)endofgreatpowergeostrategiccompetitioninthe
region, with the end of the Cold War, changed regional politics in the Middle
East? If so,thatchange results notfrom cultural change intheregion butfroma
changeinthedistributionofpowerglobally.Ifcultureistohaveanyvalidityasa
category,ithastobemorethanacompendiumofother,morematerialist,consid-
erations. Brown fails to establish “Ottoman diplomatic culture” as something
distinct from other, more generalizable variables. His notion of culture seems
much less “cultural” when examined closely.
Matar and Hilal tend to conflate their independent and dependent variables,
makingitdifficulttoestablishjustwhatistheircausalargument.Iftheywantto
privilegeideologyintheirexplanatoryframework,thentheyneedtomakesome
important distinctions. First, they must distinguish ideas from more materialist
conceptions of power, or at least explicitly establish what the relationship is
betweenthepowerofideasandthepowerofgunsandmoney.Second,theymust
show how the power of ideas translates into specific incentives for and con-
straints on decisionmakers. The role of money and guns in establishing such
incentives and constraints is clear. Ideas can be just as important in leadership
calculations about foreign policy decisionmaking, but Matar and Hilal do not
present a clear case for that importance.
Barnett’s causal explanation avoids the pitfalls the other authors encounter.
Unlike Walt, Barnett is clear that Arabism is not a catch-all category that folds
togethermaterialpower,ideationalpower,andintentions.UnlikeBrown,hedoes
not confuse a distinct Middle Eastern cultural trait with a specific distribution of
power. Unlike Matar and Hilal, he clarifies precisely the linkage between the
power of ideas and policy outcomes: Arab leaders want to remain in power, and
thusmustplacatepublicswhoseinterestinArabismhaschangedovertime.Nev-
ertheless, in this concentration on identity and ideas, Barnett begs the important
questionsofwhennormsmatterforpolicymakersandhowthosenormschange.
Barnett has trouble accounting for state action that violates the normative
constraints of Arabism operative in various periods. In the 1950s, some Arab
statesopenlyalignedwithWesternpowers(asmentionedearlier),whenBarnett
argues that the norm against such behavior was strong. After the norm
supporting Arab unity had weakened, which Barnett dates to the mid-1960s,34
Egypt, Syria, and Libya declared a unity program in 1971, Egypt and Libya did
thesamein1973,andSyriaandIraqdidsoin1978.Iraqjustifieditsinvasionof
Kuwaitin1990onunionistgrounds.Noneoftheseplanscameclosetofruition,
but, then again, neither did the Hashemite unity plans of the 1940s and 1950s,
34Barnett,Dialogues in Arab Politics, p. 162.