Syria's New Map and New Actors

117 Pages·2016·1.1 MB·English

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Memorandum
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5 156
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Syria’s New Map and New Actors:
Challenges and Opportunities for Israel
Udi Dekel, Nir Boms, and Ofir Winter
Institute for National Security Studies
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006.
The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is first, to conduct
basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related
to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international
security affairs. Second, the Institute aims to contribute to the public debate
and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top
of Israel’s national security agenda.
INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the
defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in
Israel and abroad, and the general public.
INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it
maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in this
publication are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations and
individuals that support its research.
Syria’s New Map and New Actors:
Challenges and Opportunities for Israel
Udi Dekel, Nir Boms, and Ofir Winter
Memorandum No. 156 August 2016
:םישדח םינקחש ,השדח הפמ — הירוס
לארשיל תויונמדזהו םירגתא
רטניו ריפואו סמוב רינ ,לקד ידוא
Graphic design: Michal Semo-Kovetz, Yael Bieber
Cover photo: Areas in Syria under control of different actors
Cover design: Michal Semo-Kovetz
Printing: Elinir
Institute for National Security Studies (a public benefit company)
40 Haim Levanon Street
POB 39950
Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 6997556
Tel. [phone]
Fax. [phone]
E-mail: [email protected]
http://www.inss.org.il
© All rights reserved.
August 2016
ISBN: 978-965-7425-95-4
Contents
Executive Summary 7
Preface 9
Chapter 1: The Rise of the Non-State Actors in Syria:
Regional and Global Perspectives 13
The Non-State Actors in Syria 14
Israel’s Approach to the New Reality in Syria 19
Chapter 2: Mapping the Non-State Actors in Syria
and their Attitudes toward Israel 25
Salafi Jihadist Actors 26
“Pragmatic” Actors 30
Local Actors: Southern Syria 37
Local Actors: The Kurdish and Druze Minorities 40
Independent Initiatives by Syrian Opposition Activists 45
Chapter 3: Israel and the Actors in Syria:
The Toolbox and the Rules of the Game 51
Limitations and Risks 52
Opportunities for Cooperation 58
Tactical Partnerships versus Strategic Partnerships 61
Military Modes of Action 63
Diplomatic Modes of Action 66
The Economic Toolbox 68
Humanitarian Activities 70
Conclusions and Recommendations 79
Appendix: Syrian Activists on Israel’s Role in the Crisis in Syria 85
Personal Background 85
Highlights of the Responses to the Questionnaire 89
Notes 103

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The civil war underway in Syria since a few months after the onset of the
so-called Arab Spring has changed the face of the Middle East in general and
the Syrian Arab Republic in particular, which until then was characterized
by approximately four decades of relative stability. The Syrian war, which
has killed nearly half a million people, is the greatest catastrophe to hit the
Levant since the Armenian genocide. The crisis that erupted in March 2011
expanded within a short time, resulting in political shockwaves and a refugee
crisis throughout the region. While Israel succeeded in isolating itself from
the immediate effects of this crisis, the events unfolding in Syria have created
new dilemmas, and call for Israel’s formulation of new policies in relation to
the changing situation along its northern border. This memorandum aims to
describe Israel’s process of policymaking in the Syrian context, analyze its
current effectiveness, and suggest some alternative thinking that addresses
the changing realities in the southern part of Syria and the new opportunities
for engagement.
The memorandum maps the diverse actors operating in Syria today,
primarily the non-state actors, analyzing their respective positions toward
Israel, surveying their interactions with Israel during the civil war, and
urging a more proactive Israeli policy toward them. The study also proposes
modes of action aimed at formulating a new Israeli strategy vis-à-vis the
changing Syrian arena in general and southern Syria in particular. In doing
so, it focuses on what we define as “positive” actors, including a number
of Sunni groups and the Druze and Kurdish minorities, which are currently
emerging as the candidates with the best potential for cooperation with
Israel. The study devotes less attention to actors that espouse pro-Iranian or
Salafi jihadist and Islamist views and therefore have a lower potential for
cooperation with Israel, such as the Islamic State, the Nusra Front, Ahrar
ash-Sham, Hezbollah, and the Alawite ruling minority.
According to the recommendations of this memorandum, Israel should
strive to translate its policy of non-intervention in the war in Syria into one
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8 Syria’s New Map and New Actors
of active promotion of relations and engagement with more “positive” Syrian
actors, as well as with regional and international actors with whom it shares
similar interests. These actors wield influence in the current reality in Syria,
and can be expected to play a significant role in the shaping and stabilizing
of the country in any post-war reality. These realities may include the fall
of the Assad regime as well the establishment of new state entities such as
a pro-Iranian Alawite enclave, a sovereign recognized Kurdish autonomy,
or an autonomous region in southern Syria. Israel would do well to consider
the possibility of adopting, in coordination and cooperation with these
actors, a more proactive policy vis-à-vis the Syrian arena that will offer it
viable short term and long term objectives. Such a policy should be part
of a comprehensive strategy that enables Israel to build effective levers of
influence in the Syrian arena, establish a degree of influence in southern
Syria, and promote its own tactical and strategic interests – first and foremost,
maintaining calm in the Golan Heights and preventing “negative” actors
from establishing themselves in the Syrian-controlled part of this region.