Syrian Intervention in Lebanon

382 Pages·1986·0.39 MB·English

by  Naomi Joy Weinberger

SYRIAN INTERVENTION
IN LEBANON
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SYRIAN INTERVENTION
IN LEBANON
The 1975-76 Civil War
NAOMI JOY WEINBERGER
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1986
Oxford University Press
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Copyright © 1986 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
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All rights reserved. No part of this puhlieation may he reproduced,
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without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress C'ataloging-in-Publication Data
Weinberger, Naomi Joy.
Syrian Intervention in Lebanon.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Lebanon—History—Civil War. 1475-1976.
2. Syria—Foreign relations—Lebanon. 3. Lebanon—
Foreign relations—Syria. I. Title.
DSX7.5.W45 19X6 956.92'044 86-8353
ISBN 0-19-504010-4
246X9753 I
Prinited in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
To my mother and
in memory of my father
whose inspiring examples of professional
dedication and personal commitment will
always guide my endeavors
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Preface
A decade after its initial intervention in Lebanon's civil strife, Syria
remains deeply embroiled in its neighbor's dilemmas. This costly
engagement stemmed from long-standing ties between the two
countries, nourished by Syria's regional leadership ambitions. Yet
the goal of restoring stability to Lebanon remains elusive, while
the frustration of ongoing occupation bedevils both Lebanese and
Syrians.
Despite its distinctive characteristics, this case is highly revealing
about the dynamics of intervention in general. Many factors fa-
vored Syria over other great and small power interveners elsewhere
in the globe. Syria was intimately acquainted with its neighbor's
political system and society. A multiplicity and diversity of contacts
spanning the Lebanese political spectrum yielded manifold chan-
nels of influence. By the eve of its intervention in the Lebanese
Civil War of 1975-76, the paramountcy of Syrian influence over
that of any other external actor was widely acknowledged by Le-
banese. Moreover, Syria's bilateral ties with domestic Lebanese
parties were augmented by its predominant influence over Pales-
tinian guerrillas in Lebanon.
Yet despite the advantages of intimacy and influence in the
Lebanese arena, Syria fell into the same trap as most interveners
in miscalculating the potential costs of its commitment. President
Hafiz al-Asad and his advisers were unable to assess correctly the
balance of forces between the parties into Lebanon's civil strife.
They also erred in overestimating Syria's leverage over its tradi-
tional allies in Lebanon. As a consequence of both miscalculations,
Syria's expectation that Lebanese stability could be restored
through a finite, measured commitment proved invalid. Despite
impressive tactical flexibility, Syria was caught in a dynamic of
Vlll PREFACE
escalation that carried its Lebanese commitment far beyond de-
sired limits.
A distinguishing feature of Syria's intervention in Lebanon was
the fragmented nature of each of the key actors—Lebanon, the
Palestine Liberation Organization, and Syria itself. The splintering
of Lebanon along sectarian, socioeconomic, and ideological lines—
defying clear-cut categories of analysis—gave rise to unstable co-
alitions during the Civil War and invited external manipulation.
Palestinian guerrilla organizations maintained a symbiotic part-
nership with anti-establishment groups in Lebanon, but divisions
within Palestinian ranks led to ambivalent relations with Lebanese
authorities as well as with Syria. The apparent decisiveness of
Syria's authoritarian regime projected a contrasting image of co-
herence. In reality, however, the underlying fragmentation of Syr-
ian society was a perennial source of apprehension for Syria's
leaders. Syrian objectives in Lebanon therefore reflected a gnawing
defensiveness, lest Lebanese unrest spark comparable threats to
Syria's narrowly based military elite.
Baffling associations and divisions, within and across key play-
ers, account for the inherent complexity of analyzing Syria's in-
tervention in Lebanon. Significantly, realization of Syrian
objectives was stymied by these internal divisions rather than by
external constraints. Although both regional and great powers
sought to influence Syria's Lebanese strategy, neither Arab states,
Israel, nor the superpowers fundamentally altered the course of
the Syrian intervention. Syria gained pervasive acknowledgment
of the paramountcy of its influence, yet the draining commitment
in Lebanon ultimately complicated Syria's bid for recognition as
a leader in the Arab world.
The full saga of Syria's adventure in Lebanon would fill many
volumes, and the final outcome is yet to be determined. Striving
for depth of analysis, this volume focuses on the opening chapter
of Lebanese civil strife—and of the Syrian commitment—in 1975-
76. The developments of subsequent years are alluded to in the
concluding chapter and will also provide the motif for my second
book, Peacekeeping Strategies: Lessons from Lebanon.
The preparation of this book benefited from the inspiration of
many colleagues. Those whose constructive criticism helped shape
the manuscript include J. C. Hurewitz, Donald J. Puchala, Marius
Preface ix
K. Deeb, Itamar Rabinovich, William J. Foltz, Richard W. Bulliet,
Yaacov Bar-siman-Tov, Robert O. Keohane, Fred Donner, Maan
Z. Madina, Lisa Anderson, Raymond Baker, and Mike M. Moch-
izuki. The excellent editorial guidance of Susan Rabiner and Joan
Bossert at Oxford University Press was also much appreciated, as
was Roberta Dulong's dedicated processing of many drafts of the
manuscript.
I am grateful for access to the research facilities of the Shiloah
Institute of Tel Aviv University, whose primary source materials
in Arabic were indispensable for this study. Ghassan Nakad paid
meticulous attention to the accuracy of my Arabic translations.
Generous grants from the Institute for the Study of World Politics
and the Josephine de Karman Foundation were enormously help-
ful. Beyond a doubt, the warm encouragement and supportiveness
of my husband, Dr. Sylvain Weinberger, was the critical ingredient
in seeing this project through to completion.
May 1986 N.J.W.
New Haven, Connecticut