Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance. PDF
Preview Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance.
Comparative Political Studies Volume 39 Number 1 1CK0oe.lm1e1mp7ae7rna/0 t/i0 vS1eu0 Pi4no1gl4 if0toi0cr5a El2 uS8r3tou2pd1ei9es February 2006 101-127 © 2006 Sage Publications Suing for Europe 10.1177/0010414005283219 http://cps.sagepub.com hosted at Adversarial Legalism and http://online.sagepub.com European Governance R. Daniel Kelemen Lincoln College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Thisarticle developsaconceptual frameworklinkingprocessesofregional integrationwithtransformationsinlitigation.Theanalysisfusestheworkof AmericanpubliclawscholarsandEuropeanintegrationexpertstoexamineif, how,andwhyanAmerican“adversariallegalism”–styleisdevelopinginthe EuropeanUnion(EU),whythisiscausallylinkedtoprocessesofintegration, andwhatthismeansfordemocracyintheEU.Thearticleprovidesasystematic andcomparativecross-sectoranalysisofEUpolicytorevealboththechangein rights available to citizens and how these affect legal claims and democracy. Keywords:EuropeanUnion;law;judicialization;EuropeanCourtofJustice; litigation M anyEuropeansviewAmericanlegalandregulatorystylewithanair of detached amusement. They view the proliferation of ambulance- chasinglawyers,class-actionlawsuits,massivedamageawards,and,more generally, adversarial, litigious relationships between regulators, regulat- edindustries,andinterestgroupsasdistinctivelyAmericanphenomenafrom whichtheyare,thankfully,immune.Theliteratureoncomparativeregula- torypolicysupports thiscommon wisdom,showingthattheUnitedStates Author’sNote:TheauthorthanksKarenAlter,RoderickBagshaw,ErhardBlankenburg,Tanja Börzel,RachelCichowski,LisaConant,PaulCraig,ElizabethFisher,DavidHine,Christopher Hodges, Robert Kagan, Xavier Lewis, Duncan Liefferink, Walter Mattli, Christopher McCrudden,ClaudioRadaelli,MartinShapiro,andAlecStoneSweetfortheircomments,as wellasparticipantsinseminarsandpanelsattheEuropeanCommission,UniversityofOxford, theUniversityofAmsterdam,theUniversityofWashington,andtheAmericanPoliticalScience AssociationConvention.TheauthoralsothanksTimoIdemaandOliverMunnfortheirresearch assistanceandthankstheZilkhaFundatLincolnCollegeandtheDepartmentofPoliticsand InternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford,forfinancialsupportforthisproject.Pleasead- dresscorrespondencetoR.DanielKelemenatLincolnCollege,UniversityofOxford,Oxford, OX1 3DR, United Kingdom; e-mail: [email protected] 101 102 Comparative Political Studies does rely on a particularly adversarial, legalistic regulatory style, distin- guished by its emphasis on detailed rules, substantial transparency re- quirements,adversarialproceduresforresolvingdisputes,costlylegalcon- testation involving many lawyers and frequent judicial intervention in administrative affairs (Kagan, 2001). Although most Europeans may feel secureintheirimmunitytothis‘AmericanDisease,’thereareincreasingindi- cationsthattheAmericanlegalstyleisspreadingacrossEurope.Adebate has emerged among scholars of comparative law and public policy as to whetherAmericanlegalstyleistakingholdinEuropeandsupplantingestab- lished national styles. Some scholars have argued that patterns of law and regulationacrossEuropeareconvergingonanAmericanmodel(Galanter, 1992; Kelemen & Sibbitt, 2004; Shapiro, 1993; Shapiro & Stone, 1994; Trubek et al., 1994; Wiegand, 1991), whereas others have argued that entrenched national legal institutions and cultures will block convergence (Kagan,1997;Legrand,1996;vanWaarden,1995). Thisarticlelinksthisemergingdebateonstylesofgovernancewiththelit- eratureonEuropeanintegration,arguingthatashifttowardAmericanlegal styleisoccurringintheEuropeanUnion(EU)andthatitsspreadisinextrica- blylinkedtotheprocessofEuropeanintegration.Europeanintegrationen- couragesthespreadofadversariallegalismasamodeofgovernancethrough two related mechanisms. The first involves the process through which the economicliberalizationassociatedwiththeEU’sSingleMarketundermines cooperative,informal,andopaqueapproachestoregulationatthenational level. To achieve their regulatory objectives in a liberalized environment, nationalpolicymakersarepressuredtorelyonmoreformal,transparentreg- ulationsandprivateenforcement,oftenattheEUlevel.Thesecondmecha- nism stems from the policy-making dynamics lawmakers encounter when they reregulate at the EU level. The EU is a highly fragmented regulatory statewithapowerfuljudiciary.Thefragmentationofpowerbetweeninstitu- tionsattheEUlevelencouragestheadoptionoflawswithstrict,judicially enforceablegoals,deadlines,andtransparentproceduralrequirements.Also, giventheEU’slimitedimplementationandenforcementcapacity,EUlaw- makershaveanincentivetoempowerprivatepartieswithjusticiablerights and rely on adversariallegalismasameans of decentralizedenforcement. Far from advocating thespread of adversariallegalism,EU policy makers professtheircommitmenttoadoptingflexible,informalapproachestogov- ernance.AlthoughtheEUdoesemployavarietyofinformal,flexiblepolicy instruments,theimpactofsuchinitiativesisovershadowedbythelessdis- cussedbutmorepervasivespreadofadversariallegalismacrossanumberof policyareas. Kelemen / Suing for Europe 103 The shift toward adversarial legalism in European governance involves changesinthethreeinstitutionalvariablesidentifiedintheintroduction to thisspecialissue.Adversariallegalismreliesonanexpansionintherangeof EU rights, the empowerment of national and EU courts, and the enhance- mentofaccesstojusticeforprivateparties.Thenormativeimplicationsof thespreadofadversariallegalismareambiguous.Althoughmanyobservers wouldviewthisshiftastheregrettablespreadofanAmericandisease,others would view it as enhancing transparency, access to justice, accountability, andpublicparticipation.Theexpansionofrightsstrengthensdemocracy,and enhancedaccesstojusticeconstitutesavitalformofdemocraticparticipa- tion,ifnottheformthatcriticsoftheEU’sdemocraticdeficithaveinmind. Ultimately,anynormativeassessmentmustweighthegainsintermsoftrans- parency, rights, and access to justice for previously marginalized groups againstthedeadweightlossesinvolvedinincreasedlegalexpenses,slower policy-makingprocesses,anddiminishedcooperationbetweenstakeholders inaffectedpolicyarenas.Likeothercontributionstothisspecialissue,this articlerecognizesthatincreasedaccesstojusticecanenhancethequalityof democracy; however, this article raises a note of caution concerning the undesirablesideeffectsofopeningthecourtroomdoors. Theremainderofthisarticleisdividedintothreesections.Thefirstsec- tiondetailsmyexplanationforthespreadofAmericanlegalstyleacrossthe EUandconsidersrivalarguments.Next,Iturntoaninitialempiricalassess- ment of the argument, discussing both overarching trends and develop- ments in four policy areas. The finalsection considers normative implica- tionsofthisphenomenon,particularlyconcerningthenatureandqualityof democracy. Explaining the Spread of Adversarial Legalism Given the significant differences in regulatory styles across member statesandpolicyareas(Richardson,1982),anyefforttomakebroadgeneral- izationsaboutthesestylesisproblematic.Nevertheless,anumberofcom- monattributesdodistinguishtraditionalEuropeanregulatorystylesfromthe Americanstyle(Kagan,2001).Theapproachestoregulationthatlongpre- dominated across Western Europe were more informal, cooperative, and opaqueandreliedlessonlawyersandcourtsthanthoseintheUnitedStates. Systems of regulation prevalent across Europe, ranging from the cor- poratismfoundinAustria,Sweden,andGermany(Lehmbruch&Schmitter, 1982),tothedirigismeofFrance(Suleiman,1978),tothechummycoopera- 104 Comparative Political Studies tive style of British regulation (Vogel, 1986), all relied heavily on closed policy-making networks and empowered regulators to pursue informal meansofachievingregulatoryobjectives.Networkinsidershadnoneedto resort to litigation. Outsiders had greater incentives to do so but typically found courts unwilling to block policy initiatives developed within elite networks. The confluence of two developments has sparked a shift toward adver- sariallegalisminEuropeanregulatorystylesincethemid-1980s.First,the economicliberalizationresultingfromthe1992SingleMarketinitiativeand ongoing efforts to complete the Single Market undermined traditional approaches to regulation at the national level. Many national regulations have been struck down by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as illegal nontariffbarrierstotrade,andotherinformalregulatorypracticesareregu- larlyattackedfortheirlackoftransparencyandlegalcertainty.Thegrowing diversity of players in liberalized markets has subverted informal, opaque systemsofregulationthatreliedoninsidernetworksandtrust.Astraditional approaches break down, national regulators seek new means by which to pursue their regulatory goals, better suited to the liberalized environment. Followingafundamentalinsightofthesociologyoflaw,onewouldexpect that as the social distance and distrust between regulators and regulated actorsinmarketsincreases,lawsandregulatoryprocesseswillbecomemore formal, transparent, and legalistic (Black, 1976). As a result, some move- ment toward adversarial legalism would have been likely even had re- regulationbeenconductedexclusivelyatthenationallevel.IntheEU,how- ever,muchofthereregulationthathascomplementedtheconstructionofthe SingleMarkethasoccurredattheEUlevel. ThehighlyfragmentedinstitutionalstructureoftheEUhasencouraged therelianceonadversariallegalismasamodeofgovernance.Democracies vary considerably and systematicallyin the specificityof the legalobliga- tions(statutes,contracts,courtrulings)andintheirrelianceonlitigationasa means of enforcement (Kagan, 2001). Comparative research suggests that thefragmentationofpoliticalpowerisaprimarycauseofjudicialempower- ment in general (Ferejohn, 2002; Ginsburg, 2003; Shapiro, 1981) and of adversariallegalismasapolicystyleinparticular(Kagan,2001;Kelemen& Sibbitt,2004).Politicalfragmentationcreatesagencyproblemsandsimulta- neouslyoffersatemptingsolutiontothem.Wherepoliticalauthorityisfrag- mented,legislativeprincipalswillhavedifficultyassemblingthecoalitions necessarytocontrolexecutiveagentstowhomtheyhavedelegatedpower. Political fragmentation also enhances the durability of legislation and ju- dicial independence. Anticipating difficulties in controlling bureaucracies expost,lawmakers’sdraftdetailedstatutesthatlimitbureaucraticdiscretion Kelemen / Suing for Europe 105 and establish causes of action that enable private parties to enforce legal normsincourt(McNollgast,1999). ThetransferofregulatoryauthoritytotheEUlevelhasincreasedthefrag- mentation of politicalauthority. Authority in many policy areas isdivided verticallybetweentheEUandmemberstategovernmentsandhorizontallyat theEUlevelbetweentheCouncil,theParliament,theCommission,andthe ECJ.Thisfragmentationofpowerhasencouragedtheproductionofdetailed laws withstrictgoals, deadlines, and procedural requirements and has en- couragedanadversarial,judicializedapproachtoenforcement(Franchino, 2004;Kelemen,2004;Prechal,1995).Ironically,memberstategovernments havesupportedthisapproachbecausetheydoubtoneanother’scommitment to implementation and seek to facilitate enforcement actions against non- compliant states (Majone, 1995). The European Parliament favors this approach,asitdistrustsmemberstatesandseekstolimittheirdiscretionand encourage the Commission or private parties to take enforcement actions against laggard states (Franchino, 2004; Kelemen, 2004). More generally, widespreadcriticismsoftheEU’s‘democraticdeficit’anddistrustofdistant Eurocratshavegeneratedpublicdemandsfortransparencyandpublicpartic- ipationinregulatoryprocesses(Harlow,1999;Vogel,2003).Satisfyingthese demandshasrequiredfurtherformalizationofEUregulationsandadminis- trativeprocedures. Finally,thefragmentationofpowerintheEUhasenhancedthepowerand assertivenessoftheECJ.DivisionsbetweentheCouncil,theParliament,and theCommissionmakeitdifficultforthesepoliticalbranchestoactinconcert toreinintheECJ.TheECJcantakeanassertivestanceinenforcingEUlaw against noncompliant member states with little fear of political backlash (Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz, 1998). Knowing that the ECJ and many na- tionalcourtsareindependentandassertive,EUlawmakersregularlyenlist themasagentsofpolicyenforcement,invitingtheCommissionandprivate partiestoenforcecommunitylawincourt. EU treaties, secondary legislation, and expansive ECJ interpretations havealsocreatedanumberoflegallyenforceablerightsforprivateparties. Pursuingpolicyaimsthrougharightsstrategyhasseveraladvantagesinthe EUcontext.Aboveall,itisinexpensive.ByestablishingEUrightsandrely- ingonprivatepartiestoenforcethem,EUlawmakerscanavoidthecostof fundingtheextensiveEurocracyandlarge-scaleprogramsthatwouldother- wise be necessary to implement and enforce policy. By presenting policy goalsasindividualrightsthatprivateactorsandgovernmentsareobligedto respect,theEUcanreadilyshiftthecostsofcompliancetotheprivatesector and member state governments. The creation of these individual rights has enabled private parties to bring litigation against governments before 106 Comparative Political Studies nationalcourtsandaccesstheEUjudicialsystemviathepreliminaryruling procedure,althoughtheimpactofsuchlitigationhasvariedacrossmember statesandpolicyareas(Alter,2001;Cichowski,2006;Conant,2002).With time,thenumberandscopeofEUrightsislikelytoproliferateastheEU’s institutionalstructureencourageswhatEskridgeandFerejohn(1995)have termedvirtuallogrollinginwhichthelegislatureandthejudiciarydeferto oneanother’srights-creatingpreferences. The argument set out above challenges existing orthodoxies concern- ing EU governance and prominent arguments concerning the resilienceof national legal styles and patterns of policy diffusion. First, although the EuropeanCommission(CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,2001a) andscholars(Héritier,2002;Radaelli,2003)emphasizetheEU’sroleinpro- motingnew,flexiblemodesofgovernancerelyingonvoluntaryagreements, frameworkdirectives,softlaw,self-regulation,andtheopenmethodofcoor- dination,myargumentsuggeststhatweshouldactuallyobserveEUinvolve- mentpushingnationalpolicystylesinamoreformal,adversarialdirection. Second, other scholars have suggested that impediments to litigation en- trenchedinnationalinstitutionsandlegalculturesacrosstheEUwillblock thespreadofadversariallegalismingeneral(Kagan,1997)andofEUrights litigation specifically (Alter & Vargas, 2000; Burke, 2004; Conant, 2002; Harlow,1999). Thesearguments identifyavarietyof institutionalimpedi- mentstolitigation—suchasrestrictiverulesofstanding,inadequatefinan- cialsupportandincentives,theabsenceofclassactions—anddeeplyembed- ded norms concerning the role of law and lawyers that all seem to make Europeinhospitableterrainforthegrowthofadversariallegalism.Asaresult ofsuchimpediments,theimpactofadversariallegalismandEUrightscre- ationwillvaryacrossmemberstatesandpolicyareasandisunlikelytogen- eratemanyofthenotoriousexcessesoftheU.S.system.Nevertheless,these authorshaveoverestimatedthestrengthofthesebarriers,manyofwhichare alreadycrumbling.Finally,eventhosewhoagreethatadversariallegalismis ontheriseacrossEuropemightattributethistoadifferentsetofcausesthan those identified here. The most common explanations for the diffusion of policystylesacrosscountriesarebasedonregulatorycompetitionoremu- lation. Regulatory competition (i.e., race-to-the-bottom pressure) has not driventheEUtoadoptadversariallegalismasawayofenhancingitscompet- itiveness.Quitetothecontrary,adversariallegalismoftenimposesfargreater coststhanmoreinformalapproachestoregulation.NorisAmericanregula- torystylespreadingprimarilythroughaprocessofsociallearningoremula- tion.AlthoughmanyU.S.lawsandpoliciesmaybeviewedaslaudablemod- els, most European policymakers view adversarial legalism as anathema. Thus,theexplanationforthespreadofadversariallegalismpresentedabove Kelemen / Suing for Europe 107 bothchallengesargumentsthatemphasizeinstitutionalbarrierstolitigation anddiffersfromthosetypicallyassociatedwithpolicydiffusion(Kelemen& Sibbitt,2005). Assessing the Spread of Adversarial Legalism Theprimaryaimofthisarticleisnottoexplainvariationinchangeoflegal styleacrossmemberstatesorpolicyareas,thoughexplainingsuchvariation is certainly important. The aim, rather, is to examine whether adversarial legalismisemergingasaprevalentmodeofgovernanceacrossawiderange ofpolicyareas,toexplainthephenomenon,andtoassessitsnormativeimpli- cations.Inpursuitofthisbroadambition,thissectionbeginsbyanalyzinga seriesofgeneraldevelopmentsinEUlawandregulationthatsuggestashift toward adversarial legalism. Next, the assessment turns to case studies of fourdisparatepolicyareas—environmentalpolicy,securitiesregulation,anti- discrimination law, and consumer protection. These policy areas were se- lectedtoreflectthewiderangeofareasofregulatorypolicy,botheconomic andsocial,inwhichtheEUisinvolvedandthustodemonstratethebreadthof thephenomena. Although thecaseselectionisnotbasedonamostdiffer- entsystemsdesigninastrictsense,thecomparisonsenableustoexamine whether and how the EU encourages adversarial legalism in policy areas characterizedbydifferentlegalnorms,institutions,andactors. Overarching Trends A number of overarching developments evidence the spread of adver- sariallegalismasamodeofgovernanceintheEU.First,thesteadyexpansion ofthecatalogueofEUrightsandthepersistenttendencyofEUlawmakersto draftaction-forcinglawsrepletewithjusticiableprovisionshaveexpanded thebasesforlegalaction.Second,theEuropeanCommissionhastakenan adversarial,legalisticapproachtoenforcement.Third,theEUactivelyseeks toexpandaccesstojusticeandencouragesprivatepartiestoenforcecommu- nitylawthroughnationalcourts.Finally,thelegalservicesindustryacross Europeisexperiencingatransformationthatwillstrengthenthelegalinfra- structureforadversariallegalism. TherangeofindividualrightsprotectedunderEUTreatiesandsecondary legislation has expanded dramatically. In addition to well-known treaty- basedrightssuchasfreemovementorequaltreatment,theEU’slegislative actorsandtheECJhaveestablishedawidecatalogueoffundamentalhuman andcitizenshiprightsalongwithahostofissuespecificrightsforworkers, 108 Comparative Political Studies consumers, shareholders, immigrants, and others (De Búrca, 1995; Engel, 2001;Kelemen,2003;StoneSweet,2000). DespiterecurrentcommitmentsfromEUlawmakerstosimplifyingEU regulationandmovingtonew,flexibleapproaches,EUregulationremains onthewhole,highlydetailedandprescriptiveandplacesincreasingempha- sisonproceduralformalityandtransparency(Prechal,1995;Senden,2004). AspartofthedrivetorelaunchtheSingleMarketinthemid-1980s,theCom- missionandthememberstatescalledforanewapproachtoregulationthat promisedtomoveawayfromamodelinwhichdirectivesharmonizedrules in painstaking detailand to a model based on minimal harmonization and mutual recognition. Examining an original dataset of directives adopted from1958to1993,Franchino(2006)findsthattheshifttothenewapproach wasindeedassociatedwith,“amoderateshifttowardshorter,moreconcise legislation”sincetheearly1980s.However,themovementtowardsimpler legislationwasshortlived.Withtheadventofthecodecisionprocedure,Par- liamentaddedprecisiontodirectivesandenhancedpossibilitiesforjudicial oversight,withtheaimofreducingdiscretionfortheCommissionandmem- berstateadministrations.(Franchino,2006). TheprecisionofEUlawisbackedbyacoerciveapproachtoenforcement. TheCommissionhasstrengtheneditsenforcementactivitiesradicallysince the mid-1980s (Börzel, 2003). For years, the Commission only pursued infringementcaseswhenmemberstatesblatantlyfailedtotransposedirec- tives into their national legal systems. During the 1980s, the Commission expanded theforms of noncompliance inregard towhich itpursued cases andinitiatedproceedingsagainstmemberstatesthatcompliedonpaperbut notinpractice.Also,theCommissionandtheECJoftensupportstrictinter- pretationsofdirectives,findingmemberstatestobeinnoncomplianceeven incaseswhereEUdirectivesappearedtoprovidememberstateswithconsid- erablediscretion.Inrecentyears,theCommissionregularlyinitiatesnearly 1,000infringementproceduresannually(Börzel,2003;Commissionofthe EuropeanCommunities,2004b).Althoughthevastmajorityofcasesareset- tledbeforebeingformallyreferredtotheECJ,thenumberofinfringement casesbroughttotheECJhasrisensteadily,withtheaveragenumberofcases broughtpermemberstateperyearmorethandoublingsincethemid-1980s (seeFigure1). AtMaastricht,thememberstatesgrantedtheCommissiontheauthorityto requestthattheECJimposepenaltypaymentsonmemberstatesthatfailedto complywithECJrulingsininfringementcases(Article228).Since1997,the Commissionhasinitiatedmorethan100ofthesecases.Thethreatofsanc- tionshas proven extremely effectiveinpressuring errant member statesto complywithEUlaw,andmostsuchcasesaresettledbeforetheECJrules. Kelemen / Suing for Europe 109 Figure 1 AverageNumberofArticle226Referralstothe EuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ)PerMemberState,1978to2003 16.0 14.0 CJ mber of Art 226 Referrals to the E116802....0000 AMLEivCneeemJr aapbrgee (errA MNSvetuearmmategbbeee rrN oSuft maAtbrete) 2r 2o6f ARret f2e2rr6a lRs etofe ErrCalJs ptoer Nu Average 4.0 2.0 0.0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year Source: Börzel, 1999; Comission of the European Communities, 2004b However,theECJhasimposedpenaltiesonthreeoccasions,mostrecently imposingarecord20millionEuropenaltyonFranceforviolatingEUfisher- iesregulations,coupledwithrollingpenaltiesof57.8millionEuroevery6 monthsuntilFrancecomplies(Minder,2005,July13). Enforcement litigationbrought bytheCommissionconstitutesonlythe tipoftheEUlitigationiceberg.RecognizingthelimitsontheCommission’s capacitytoenforceEUlawsingle-handedly,theCommission,theCouncil, and above all, the European Parliament have consistently encouraged the empowermentofprivateactorstoenforceEUlawthrough thecourts.The EUhaslongreliedonprivatepartiestoserveastheeyes,ears,andultimately, the long arm, of community law (Alter, 2001; Schepel & Blankenburg, 2001).Decentralizedenforcementbyprivatepartiesbeforenationalcourts relyingontheArticle234(exArt.177)preliminaryreferenceprocedurehas grownsteadilythroughtheyears(seeFigure2). The increased frequency of referrals for preliminary rulings to theECJ fromnationalcourtsisanaturalbyproductoftheexpandedscopeofEuro- peanlawandthegrowthintradeandotherformsofexchange(i.e.,move- mentofpersons)betweenmemberstates(Fligstein&StoneSweet,2001). 110 Comparative Political Studies However,theincreasedfrequencyofsuchdecentralizedlitigationisalsothe consequence of a deliberate political strategy. The EU’s effort to promote dialogueamongEuropeancourtsandtobuildacommon‘judicialarea’dates back decades (Alter, 2001) and intensified dramatically in recent years. ProddedonbyaCommissioncommunicationemphasizingobstaclestojus- tice and the need to ensure “equal access to rapid, efficient and inexpen- sivejustice”(CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,1997),theTam- pereEuropeanCouncilaskedtheCommissiontolaunchaseriesofjudicial cooperationinitiativestocreatea“Europeanareaofjustice”basedontrans- parency,democraticcontrol,andaccesstojustice(CommissionoftheEuro- peanCommunities,1999a). The EU is actively working to expand financial support for private en- forcement and to spread awareness of the potential for private parties to enforceEUlaw.In2002,theCounciladoptedaRegulation(EuropeanCom- munity,2002)concerningjudicialcooperationincivilmatters,onecentral aimofwhichistoimproveaccesstojusticeacrosstheEU.Pursuanttothis regulation, the Commission proposed an access to justice directive (Com- mission of the European Communities, 2002a) that would have required memberstatestoprovidelegalaidtoindividualswhocouldnotmeetthecost of litigation in cross-border disputes and fund litigation by public interest organizations.TheParliamentstronglysupportedtheproposalandcalledfor theguaranteeoflegalaidtobeextendedtoallcivilandcommercialcases,not justthosewithacross-borderdimension.TheCouncilultimatelyadopteda watereddowndirective(European Community,2003a) thatwaslimitedto cross-borderdisputesandonlyguaranteedaidfor‘naturalpersons’(notfor publicinterestgroups).Nevertheless,thisdirectiveconstitutesanimportant steptowardharmonizinglegalaidrules,andwithongoingpressurefromthe CommissionandParliament,furtherdevelopmentsarelikely. TheECJalsohasworkedtoempowerlitigants,mostfamouslythroughits establishment of the doctrines of supremacy (European Court of Justice [ECJ],1964)anddirecteffect(ECJ,1963)anditsdevelopmentofthedoc- trine of state liability (ECJ, 1991). In a series of rulings beginning with Francovich, the ECJ has developed a doctrine of state liability that estab- lishesconditionsunderwhichmemberstatescanbeheldliablefordamages sufferedbyindividualsasaresultofthememberstate’sfailuretoimplement communitylaw.Moregenerally,aseriesofECJdecisionshaveincreasedthe levelandrangeofdamagesthatlitigantscanclaimundercommunitylaw.For instance, in Von Colson (ECJ, 1984), the court emphasized that damages functionnotonlyasaformofredressbutalsoasadeterrenttofutureharm.In MarshallII(ECJ,1993),theECJruledthatmemberstatesmustallowfull compensation for damages concerning violations of the Equal Treatment
Description:The list of books you might like
