Substantive Perspectivism: An Essay on Philosophical Concern with Truth

228 Pages·2009·3.871 MB·English

by  Prof. Bo Mou (auth.)

SUBSTANTIVEPERSPECTIVISM
ANESSAYONPHILOSOPHICALCONCERNWITHTRUTH
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIESINEPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC,METHODOLOGY,ANDPHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCE
Editor-in-Chief:
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JOHNSYMONS,UniversityofTexasatElPaso,U.S.A.
HonoraryEditor:
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Editors:
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THEOA.F.KUIPERS,UniversityofGroningen,TheNetherlands
TEDDYSEIDENFELD,CarnegieMellonUniversity,U.S.A.
PATRICKSUPPES,StanfordUniversity,California,U.S.A.
JANWOLEN´SKI,JagiellonianUniversity,Kraków,Poland
VOLUME344
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SUBSTANTIVE
PERSPECTIVISM
AN ESSAY ON PHILOSOPHICAL
CONCERN WITH TRUTH
By
BO MOU
SanJoseStateUniversity,SanJose,CA,U.S.A.
123
Prof.BoMou
DepartmentofPhilosophy
SanJoseStateUniversity
SanJose,California95192
USA
[email protected]
ISBN978-90-481-2622-4 e-ISBN978-90-481-2623-1
DOI10.1007/978-90-481-2623-1
SpringerDordrechtHeidelbergLondonNewYork
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Toteachersonmyway:
(Su,Guoxun), (Geng,Liping),
(Tu,Jiliang), RichardFeldman,Rolf
Eberle,TheodoreSider,RobertHolmes,Donald
Davidson,AdamMorton, (Shun,
Kwong-loi), AloysiusMartinich
Preface
I have been thinking about the philosophical issue of truth for more than two
decades. It is one of several fascinating philosophical issues that motivated me to
changemyprimaryreflectiveinteresttophilosophyafterreceivingBSinmathemat-
icsin1982.Someseriousacademicworkinthisconnectionstartedaroundthelate
eightieswhenItranslatedintoChineseadozenofDonaldDavidson’srepresentative
essaysontruthandmeaningandwhenIassumedtranslatorforAdamMortonwho
gaveaseriesoflecturesontheissueinBeijing(1988),whichwasco-sponsoredby
mytheninstitution(InstituteofPhilosophy,ChineseAcademyofSocialScience).I
havelovedtheissuebothforitsownsake(asonespecificmajorissueinthephilos-
ophyoflanguageandmetaphysics)andforthesakeofitssignificantinvolvementin
manyphilosophicalissuesindifferentsubjectsofphilosophy.Havingbeenattracted
totheanalyticapproach,Iwastheninterestedinlookingattheissuebothfromthe
pointsofviewofclassicalChinesephilosophyandMarxistphilosophy,twomajor
styles or frameworks of doing philosophy during that time in China, and from the
pointofviewofcontemporaryanalyticphilosophy,whichwasthenlessrecognized
intheChinesephilosophicalcircle.(Indeed,myownreflectivepracticeontheissue
has shown me that, for such a jointly-concerned fundamental philosophical issue
likethatoftruth,across-traditionexplorationcansignificantlyenhanceourunder-
standingandbroadenourvision,someaspectsofwhichwouldbehardlyachieved
from an examination merely within one single tradition or style of doing philos-
ophy.) This intention contributed to my decision to resign from my then research
positionandrestartasastudenttopursueaPh.D.inanalyticphilosophyabroadin
1989(myactualapplicationswerelimitedtoanumberofschoolsintheUSnearto
myelderbrotheratCornell,whothenpursuedhisdoctorateinbiologythere).The
foregoingbackgroundandmotivationpartiallyexplainwhyIthenchosethephilo-
sophical issue of truth as my dissertation topic in the philosophy of language and
metaphysicsduringmyPh.D.studyperiodatRochester;theyalsoforeshadowone
orientationofthecurrentwork,i.e.,takingananalyticapproachwhileendeavoring
tolookattheissuethroughaholisticframeworkandfromacross-traditionvantage
point.
The ideas in the current work have been developed and elaborated throughout
thepasttwodecades;thisprocesscanbedividedintotwostages.Theformerstage
ran through the first decade roughly from 1989 when I came to the US for my
vii
viii Preface
Ph.D. study to 1999 before I moved to California. During this period I primarily
focusedonearlierversionsofthemajorideasinChapter2onTarski’sapproachand
Chapter3onQuine’sapproachaswellasthoseideasrelatedtothedebatebetween
deflationism and substantivism. The original versions of the foregoing ideas came
largelyfrommydissertationwork.Thelatterstageisfromthe1999–2000academic
year,whenIcarriedoutrelevantresearchesatUCBerkeley,tothecurrentmoment
in2009whenIcompletethefinalversionofthismonograph.DuringthisperiodI
haveworkedoutthemajorcontentofthisworkanddevelopednewideas,asgiven
inChapters4,5and6.Therearethreemainfeaturesofmyworkatthelatterstage.
(1)Ilookattheissueinaholisticsetting;(2)Itakeacross-traditionapproach;(3)I
developanewaccountoftruth.
During the core period of the former stage, i.e., my dissertation-writing period
(1993–1996),Iwassofortunatetohavethreedistinguishedscholarssupervisemy
thesis at the University of Rochester. They are Richard Feldman, Theodore Sider,
and Rolf Eberle. They have not only published in the philosophy of language but
are well-respected experts respectively in some other major areas of philosophy
wherethenotionoftruthplaysimportantrole:Richinepistemology,Tedinmeta-
physics, and Rolf in logic. Their distinct scholarly strengths were complementary
inthesupervisionofmythesiswriting.Ihavelearnedalotfromthem.Indeed,my
dissertationworklaiddownasolidfoundationformyfurtherexploration,although
themajorcontentofthecurrentworkisnew.Iwouldliketotakethisopportunityto
expressmydeepappreciationtoallofthem.IamindebtedtoRichfortheclarityand
sophisticationofhisphilosophicalreasoningwhichhelpedmeimprovethequality
ofmyphilosophicalargumentsandforhiskeenphilosophicalinsightsanddiscern-
ingcommentswhichchanneledmyeffortsinvariousways.IamgratefultoTedfor
hishelpfulcriticalcommentsonvariousversionsofthethesisandforhisintensive
discussion of some crucial points. My special thanks go to Rolf for his instructive
and comprehensive comments on various versions of earlier writings concerning
Chapter 2 and some other parts in this work that involve logic and philosophy of
logic.Ialwayslearnedsomethingnewduringourmanyconversations.
IamgratefultolateW.V.Quineforclarifyingandexplainingsomeofhisideas
inresponsestoanumberofquestionsconcerninghisworksatameetinginsummer
of 1997. I am grateful to Graeme Forbes for his helpful detailed comments on a
presentationpaperofmineconcerningTarski’sapproachattheAPAEasternDivi-
sion 1995 meeting. My thanks also go to the following scholars who have offered
theirhelpfulcriticalfeedbacktomyrelevantwritingsduringtheformerstageofthis
project:JohnBennett,DavidBraun,MattBurt,MarianDavid,DouglasDempster,
HartryField,AnilGupta,andKeithSimmons.
As far as my work at the latter stage is concerned, my deep appreciation first
goes to late Donald Davidson. Davidson’s bearing on this work is unique. This is
notmerelybecausethereisonespecificcaseanalysisonhisrelevantthoughts,but
primarily because of the way in which Chapters 4 and 5 are intrinsically related.
The initial ideas in Chapters 4 and 5 came from a research related to a collec-
tiveresearchproject,‘Davidson’sphilosophyandChinesephilosophy:Constructive
engagement,’ which I initiated and coordinated during the 2001–2005 period and
Preface ix
inwhichDavidsonhadactivelyparticipateduntilhispassingawayin2003.During
the process of this project, I have learned a lot from him (especially on the issues
involvedinChapters2,4and5).
MyspecialthanksgotoAdamMorton.Adamhaswitnessedthewholeprocess
of my academic work on the issue in a distinctive way. At the outset I mentioned
thatmyacademicworkontheissuepartiallystartedwithmyservingastranslator
for his lecture series on the issue of truth in Beijing in 1988. At that moment I
began to work on a Chinese version of introduction to the philosophical issue of
truth;Adam’slecturemanuscriptandmytranslationnotesareamongthereference
materials, which were unfortunately lost after several moves. I appreciate Adam’s
helpful critical comments on an early version of the complete manuscript of this
work.
IamgratefultoA.P.MartinichforhishelpfulcommentsonsomeideasinChap-
ter 6 and a writing of mine related to the contents of Chapters 4 and 5. Actually,
I started learning from Al in the late 1980s when I together with some other col-
leagues translatedhiseditedanthology volume, The Philosophy ofLanguage, into
Chinese.
IamgratefultoChenyangLiandLinheHanfortheirhelpfulcriticalcomments
on an early version of Chapter 5. My sincere thanks also go to Nicholas Gier for
hishelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonapaperwhosemajorcontentsdevelopedto
Section5.3.
Many thanks go to my school, San Jose State University in California, USA,
itsCollegeofHumanitiesandtheArts,anditsDepartmentofPhilosophyfortheir
substantial support for this book project, including a California State University
ResearchGrantfor2003–2004andtheCollegeofHumanitiesandtheArtsRelease
TimegrantforSpring2008.IamgratefultoTomLeddyandRichardTieszen,my
philosophycolleaguesatSJSU,fortheirconstructiveinsightsandhelpfulcomments
onmypresentationofsomebasicideasinChapter6atadiscussionforumontruth
atthe2008SJSUPhilosophyConference.IamalsogratefultoAnandVaidya,also
my philosophy colleague at SJSU, for his helpful comments on an early version
of Chapter 6. I am thankful to those students at SJSU who attended my classes
onthephilosophyoflanguageandmetaphysicsorservedasmyassistant,fortheir
stimulating questions and feedback to my relevant discussion and writings on the
issueoftruth.Amongothers,IamespeciallythankfultoBrendaHood,whoreadan
earlierversionofthemanuscriptandsomeofthemostrecentsectionsinChapters1,
5 and 6, and Christopher Cloos, who gave a keen examination of my writings on
deflationisminChapter3,fortheircarefulexaminationandhelpfulfeedback.
I am grateful to Jaakko Hintikka, former Managing Editor of the ‘Synthese
Library’ monograph series, for his helpful critical comments on a paper of mine
on Tarski’s approach, which was later published in Synthese. I am indebted to the
anonymous referees of the monograph series’ publishers (first Kluwer Academic
Publishers,andthenSpringer)atdifferentstagesofthemanuscriptpreparationpro-
cessfortheirhelpfulcriticalcommentsandfeedback.Iamespeciallygratefultothe
last reviewer, who read through two versions of the complete manuscript, for his
x Contents
orherveryhelpfulevaluativecommentsandconstructivesuggestionsfromwhichI
havebenefitedalotinmyfinalrevisionsofthemanuscript.
IamgratefultotwohouseeditorsatSpringerforthe‘SyntheseLibrary’mono-
graphseries,FloorOostingattheearlystage,andIngridvanLaarhovenatthelater
stage,fortheirkindandtimelyprofessionalassistanceandsupport.
PartialcontentsofChapter2originallyappearedunderthetitle‘TheEnumera-
tiveCharacterofTarski’sDefinitionofTruthandItsGeneralCharacterinaTarskian
System’inSyntheses124:1&2(2001).PortionsofChapter3arebasedonmaterials
thatoriginallyappearedunderthetitles‘Tarski,Quine,and“Disquotation”Schema
(T)’inTheSouthernJournalofPhilosophy38:1(2000),‘AMetaphilosophicalAnal-
ysis of the Core Idea of Deflationism’ in Metaphilosophy 31:3 (2000), and ‘Con-
ceptofTruthandMultipleFacetsoftheSpeech-actEquivalenceThesisConcerning
“True”’inTruthandSpeechActs:StudiesinthePhilosophyofLanguage,editedby
DirkGreimannandGeoSiegwart(London:Routledge,2007).SomepartsofChap-
ters 4 and 5 are based on material that originally appeared under the title ‘Truth
PursuitandDaoPursuit:FromDavidson’sApproachtoClassicalDaoistApproach
inViewoftheThesisofTruthasStrategicNormativeGoal’inDavidson’sPhilos-
ophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement, edited by Bo Mou (The
Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006). My thanks to the publishers and
editorsforpermissiontoreusethematerialshere.
SanJose,California BoMou
Contents
1 StartingPointandEngagingBackground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 ASummaryofSubstantivePerspectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 AVarietyofDistinctProjectsinPhilosophicalConcernwithTruth 7
1.2.1 ACharacterizationofVariousProjectsConcerningTruth . 7
1.2.2 FurtherExplanationsandClarifications. . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 ABackgroundDebate:DeflatinismVersusSubstantivism . . . . . 16
1.4 MethodsandStrategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4.1 MethodologicalConsiderations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.2 StrategyofArgumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 Case Analysis I: Tarski’s Semantic Approach in the
MetaphysicalProject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Tarski’sStrategy,Schema(T),andConventionT . . . . . . . . . 36
2.1.1 AnAnalysisofPre-TheoreticUnderstandingof
TruthandItsPerspectiveElaborationsinOrdinaryLanguage 36
2.1.2 Schema(T)andConventionT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 AdequacyofConventionT:TwoDiagnoses . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.1 DiagnosisI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.2 DiagnosisII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Enumerative Character of Tarski’s Definition
andItsGeneralCharacterinaTarskianSystem . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3.1 ABackgroundIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.2 ConditionsforExtendingEnumerativeDefinitions
toNewCases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3.3 ConventionTandPotentialGeneralCharacter
oftheTarskianDefinition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4 ATarskianGeneralDefinitionofWhatItIstoBeaTruthDefinition 66
3 CaseAnalysisII:Quine’sDisquotationalApproachinthe
LinguisticProject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.1 Quine’sDisquotationalApproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1.1 Quine’sDual-CharacterInterpretationof(T) . . . . . . . . 80
3.1.2 DualCharacterof(T)orTwoDifferentEquivalenceTheses? 84
3.1.3 IstheConflationofTwoEquivalenceThesesJustifiable? . 86
3.1.4 IstheConflationInnocent? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
xi