Substance, sorts, and consciousness : Locke's empiricism and his account of personal identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

258 Pages·2001·8.7 MB·English

by  Kort, Eva Deane

SUBSTANCE, SORTS, AND CONSCIOUSNESS:
LOCKE'S EMPIRICISM AND HIS ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
IN AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
By
EVA DEANE KORT
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
2001
Copyright 2001
by
Eva Deane Kort
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT vi
CHAPTERS
ONE INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT AND TO PART ONE 1
Introduction to the Project 1
Introduction to Part One 2
Notes 6
TWO LOCKE'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT AND 9
HIS REJECTION OF INNATISM
Locke's Introduction to the Essay 9
Locke's Introduction to Innatism 12
Locke's Attack on Innate Speculative and 14
Practical Principles
Hints of Locke's Alternative 20
Conclusion 25
Notes 28
THREE LOCKE'S EMPIRICIST ALTERNATIVE TO INNATISM 34
Introduction 34
LSoicmkpel'esIdIenatsrodaundctiLooncket'oshAisttaTchkeoroyn AosfsuImdpetasions .... 3368
Regarding Essential Features of Material
SimpleandIdeIamsmataseriBaalsicSuMbasttearnicaelss of Thought and .... 45
Knowledge and Locke's Rejection of the Idea
of Substance in General
Other Distinctions Between Ideas 49
Conclusion 32
Notes 33
FOUR LOCKE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 62
Introduction 62
Words as Marks of Ideas 63
Imperfections and Abuses of Words 65
General Terms and the Launching of Locke's 68
Attack on the Schools
Locke'HsisDAitstcaucsksioonn otfheEsSscehnocoelsand the Furthering of . . 72
Conclusion 76
Notes 38
FIVE LOCKE'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 85
Introduction 85
LLoocckkee''ss DDiissccuussssiioonn ooff KSneonwslietdigvee KofnowCloe-degxeistence .... 8926
Conclusion 96
iii
Notes 97
SIX INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 101
SEVEN LOCKE'OSFTSHUEBOSRTYANOCFEIIDNEAGSENAENRDALHIS ATTACK ON THE IDEA . 104
Introduction 104
Locke's Attack on the Cartesians 105
The Senses as Intermediaries 107
Locke's Category of Complex Ideas 110
Complex Ideas of Substance Ill
Conclusion
Notes 115
EIGHT LOCKE ON SUBSTANCE, SORTS, AND ESSENCE 121
Introduction 121
LSoucbkset'asnceAttKaicndkson the Adherents of the Schools . . . 112235
Real and Nominal Essences 127
LCiomnictlautsiioonns to Our Ideas of Particulars and Kinds . . 113320
Notes 134
NINE LOCKE'S THEORY OF IDENTITY 139
Introduction 139
Locke's Discussion of the Identity Relation 140
Locke's Discussion of Identity and General 143
Categories of Substance Kinds
Locke on Identity, Masses of Matter, 145
and Living Things
Identity Conditions for Human Beings 149
Conclusion 150
Notes 151
TEN LOCKE'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 155
Introduction 155
Same Man and Same Person 156
Constraints on the Resources to Which Locke 159
Can Appeal
Conclusion 104
Notes 106
ELEVEN INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 168
TWELVE BUTLER'S RESPONSE TO LOCKE'S THEORY OF 171
PERSONAL IDENTITY
Introduction 171
BBuuttlleerr''ss CDriistciucsissimosn ooff LIodceknet'istyCranidterLiiovningforThing.s..... 117741
Sameness of Person
IV
Conclusion: Problems with Butler's Criticisms .... 180
Notes 186
THIRTEEN LEIBNIZ'S RESPONSE TO LOCKE'S THEORY OF .... 188
PERSONAL IDENTITY
Introduction 188
Leibniz's Introduction to Identity and the 188
Internal Principle
Leibniz's Response to the Problem 191
Leibniz's Criterion for Sameness of Person 196
Identity and Determination 197
NCootnecslusion: Problems with Leibniz's Criticisms . . . 220021
FOURTEEN REID'S RESPONSE TO LOCKE'S THEORY OF 204
PERSONAL IDENTITY
Introduction 204
Reid's Criticisms of Locke's Theory of 204
Personal Identity
ThinkiSnigmilSaurbsttaoncTehosaendofConBsuctiloeursnaensds: Criticisms . . 207
Leibniz [1.1,1.2]
The Brave Officer [2] 209
SpecifSiicmil(aorr Ktiondt)hatvs.ofReHaulmeId[e4]ntity: A Criticism . . 212
Successive Consciousnesses [3,5] 217
Conclusion: Problems with Reid's Criticisms 218
Notes 219
APPENDICES
A COMMENTARY ON LOCKE'S CONTEMPORARIES 224
B COMMENTARY ON LOCKE'S USE OF 'IDEA' 230
C VIEWS ON LOCKE'S PRIMARY/SECONDARY 235
QUALITY DISTINCTION
BIBLIOGRAPHY 239
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 251
v
Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy
SUBSTANCE, SORTS, AND CONSCIOUSNESS:
LOCKE'S EMPIRICISM AND HIS ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
IN AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
By
Eva Deane Kort
May, 2001
Chair: Dr. Kirk Ludwig
Major Department: Philosophy
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke famously
introduces both the problem of personal identity over time and a
controversial solution to it. The problem is to provide a
criterion for when a person, A, at a time, t, is the same as a
person, B, at a later time, t'. Locke's proposal that A at t is
the same person as B at t' just in case B at t' is conscious of
some episode in the mental life of A at t has drawn considerable
criticism and given rise to a specialized area of research in
metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. I argue that many of
what have become standard attacks on Locke's theory of personal
identity are vitiated because they divorce Locke's discussion of
personal identity from the rest of his argument in the Essay.
The criticisms attack, in effect, a consequence of Locke's
discussion but not the epistemological assumptions that drive it.
In particular, many of the criticisms ignore Locke's empiricist
critique of the general idea of substance, which is of central
importance in understanding how Locke arrives both at the problem
of personal identity and his response to it.
vi
.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT AND TO PART ONE
Introduction to the Project
This project shows how Locke's theory of identity and
personal identity, in particular, are consequences of his larger
argument in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1979)
(henceforth Essay). Part One will provide an overview of Locke's
argument; each chapter will present that part of Locke's argument
covered in the consecutive books of the Essay.
Locke's argument consists of both an attack on the views of
his contemporaries and an alternative to them. His alternative
view works within the criticisms of the views of his
contemporaries in significant ways. Most importantly, for our
purposes, Locke's attack on the views of the Schools and the
Cartesians commits Locke to a position regarding substance that
limits the options that he has for his theory of identity and
personal identity, in particular. In Part One, we shall look at
how Locke's overall argument consists of both this attack on the
views of his contemporaries as well as his positive
alternative 1,2
Part Two focuses on Locke's attack on the Cartesian and
Aristotelian conceptions of substance and essences3'4 (henceforth
"the doctrine of substance and essence") and how this attack
limits Locke's options for his discussion of identity and
personal identity, in particular. Finally, Part Three examines
1
2
responses to Locke's theory of personal identity by three of his
near contemporaries; we shall see that although Locke's theory of
personal identity is a consequence of his larger project,
standard attacks against Locke's theory of personal identity by
Butler, Leibniz, and Reid have not taken the argument of the
Essay into consideration. They have, instead, attacked the
theory that is a consequence of it and, in doing so, have not
fully engaged with Locke.
Introduction to Part One
Part One provides the background for situating Locke's
theory of identity, and personal identity, in particular, within
Locke's general line of argument, of which it is a consequence,
by showing how Locke proceeds to develop a consistent line of
argument through all four books of the Essay. By beginning with
an overview of Locke's line of attack against the innatists in
Book One, we see that Locke offers his positive view in Books
Two, Three, and Four as an alternative to the views that he
attacks. Recognizing in what ways Locke's view provides a
response to the competing views of his time will be helpful for
seeing how the parts of Locke's positive view work together to
provide a coherent alternative to the views that he attacks that
works within the limits of his lines of attack.5
While Locke does not go into detail about particular figures
that he is attacking, it seems that the Essay is, in the first
instance, though not exclusively, against the position of the
Schools, or his Aristotelian contemporaries. It is to the
Schools that, in Book Four, he attributes the innatist view that
he attacks in Book One.6 Specifically, the argument of Book One
3
aims to show that the foundations of knowledge are not innate and
that they are not principles.7 Locke argues that these claims
are false and provides an alternative account of how we acquire
the materials of thought and knowledge in Books Two and Three.
While this attack against the Schools drives the main
argument of the Essay Locke's positive view, as well as some
,
subsidiary negative points, is also clearly intended as a
response to the Cartesians. Locke does share some doctrines with
the Cartesians. Like the Cartesians, for example, Locke argues
that the foundations of knowledge are clear and distinct ideas.
Unlike the Cartesians, however, Locke claims that our ideas are
distinguished from one another, in part, on the basis of whether
they are acquired passively as objects affect the senses or
through acts of mind. By providing an account of how we
gradually acquire clear and distinct, or simple, ideas passively
that, in turn, provide the basic materials for the ideas created
by acts of mind, Locke undermines the Cartesian claim that we are
in possession of foundational ideas stamped upon the mind by God.
According to Locke's alternative account, we acquire ideas
gradually from experience; we first acquire simple ideas of
sensation from external objects acting on the senses-these are
ideas of sounds, tastes, colors, touch, and smell. While Locke's
explanation of how these ideas are acquired, if correct,
undercuts the Cartesians, his conviction that these simple ideas
of sensation are certain, clear, distinct, adequate, and true
seems supported by Descartes' (1985) example of the idea of color
as something of which we can be certain in the face of skepticism
about the external world:
4
Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these
particulars-that my eyes are open, that I am moving my head
and stretching out my hands-are not true. Perhaps, indeed,
I do not even have such hands or such a body at all.
Nonetheless, it must surely be admitted that the visions
which come in sleep are like paintings, which must have been
fashioned in the likeness of things that are real, and hence
that at least these general kinds of things-eyes, head,
hands and the body as a whole-are things which are not
imaginary but are real and exist. For even when painters
try to create sirens and saytrs with the most extraordinary
bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new in all
respects; they simply jumble up the limbs of different
animals. Or if perhaps they manage to think up something so
new that nothing remotely similar has even been seen
before-something which is therefore completely fictitious
and unreal-at least the colours used in the composition must
be real. By similar reasoning, although these general kinds
of things-eyes, head, hands and so on-could be imaginary, it
must at least be admitted that certain other even simpler
and more universal things are real. These are as it were
the real colours from which we form all the images of
things, whether true or false, that occur in thought.
(pp. 13-14)
Locke's characterization of simple ideas of sensation as certain
and immutable seems grounded on considerations similar to those
which Descartes expresses in this passage-in particular, that our
ideas of colors must be real. Locke supports this conviction by
providing an explanation for how we passively acquire simple
ideas from sensation and how it is that we use them actively to
construct complex ideas of kinds of things and their
representative instances. Locke appeals to this characterization
of how we acquire ideas to address skepticism about the external
world; as we shall see in Part Two, while Locke does not claim to
have a full response to the radical skeptic, he does allow that
appealing to regularities among the patterns of ideas that we
passively receive is adequate for providing a response to
skepticism. While, then, Locke seemingly bases much of his
theory of ideas on the views of the Cartesians, he is also
critical of their failure to appreciate the importance of