SUBSTANCE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF MINDS IN DESCARTES AND LOCKE

246 Pages·2012·2.66 MB·English

by  Eugenio Enrique Zaldivar

SUBSTANCE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF MINDS IN DESCARTES AND LOCKE

By

EUGENIO E. ZALDIVAR

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2012
1
UMI Number: 3569556
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI 3569556
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346
© 2012 Eugenio E. Zaldivar

2
To Victoria and Maya, who make coming home better than anything else

3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank the members of my supervisory committee and the Department of
Philosophy for their guidance, instruction and support throughout my years of study. I
thank my friends and family for their encouragement and patience, especially Ron
Claypool for his comments and insight. Finally, I thank the chair of my committee,
Stewart Duncan, for his incredible support and hard work which made this dissertation
possible; his mentoring and advice have raised the level of my work to heights I could
not attain alone.

4
TABLE OF CONTENTS

page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 4
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 7
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 8
1.1 Introductory Remarks .......................................................................................... 8
1.2 Descartes ............................................................................................................ 9
1.3 Locke ................................................................................................................ 11
1.4 Summary Notes ................................................................................................ 13
2 THE ARGUMENT FOR REAL DISTINCTION ........................................................ 14
2.1 Introductory Remarks ........................................................................................ 14
2.2 Descartes’ Consistency .................................................................................... 15
2.3 Dualism and what the Epistemological Argument is not. .................................. 18
2.4 The Epistemological Argument ......................................................................... 20
2.5 Substances Are Identical With Their Principle Attributes .................................. 31
2.6 How do Principal Attributes Relate to Each Other? .......................................... 39
2.7 A Single Argument ............................................................................................ 47
2.8 Summary Notes ................................................................................................ 51
3 TRIALISM ............................................................................................................... 53
3.1 Introductory Remarks ........................................................................................ 53
3.2 Pluralism ........................................................................................................... 56
3.3 Hylomorphism ................................................................................................... 58
3.4 Mixed Modes .................................................................................................... 72
3.5 Summary Notes ................................................................................................ 85
4 DESCARTES’ SUBSTANCE AND CONTEMPORARY OBJECTIONS .................. 86
4.1 Introductory Remarks ........................................................................................ 86
4.2 Hobbes ............................................................................................................. 87
4.3 Gassendi ........................................................................................................... 96
4.4 Locke .............................................................................................................. 105
4.5 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 113
5 MYSTERIOUS SUBSTRATA AND COMPLETE INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES .... 114
5.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 114
5.2 Substratum and Substance ............................................................................. 115
5
5.3 Bennett: The Embarrassment of Mysterious Substrata ................................... 130
5.4 McCann: The “No theory” Theory ................................................................... 135
5.5 Ayers: A Material Substance ........................................................................... 141
5.6 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 158
6 THE LINK BETWEEN IDENTITY AND SUBSTANCE .......................................... 160
6.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 160
6.2 A Link Between 2.23 and 2.27 ........................................................................ 161
6.3 Persons Are Modes ........................................................................................ 167
6.4 How Are Persons Related to Substance? ....................................................... 171
6.5 Are Persons Also Substance Sorts? ............................................................... 178
6.6 Thing-like Entities............................................................................................ 181
6.7 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 187
7 PROPERTY DUALISM, SPIRITS AND SUPERADDED THOUGHT .................... 190
7.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 190
7.2 Consistency Throughout 2.23 ......................................................................... 190
7.3 Was Locke a Dualist? ..................................................................................... 197
7.4 Superaddition .................................................................................................. 214
7.5 Simple Superaddition ...................................................................................... 223
7.6 Naturalistic Superaddition ............................................................................... 228
7.7 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 231
8 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 235
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 238
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................... 245

6
Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

SUBSTANCE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF MINDS IN DESCARTES AND LOCKE
By
Eugenio E. Zaldivar

December 2012

Chair: Stewart Duncan
Major: Philosophy

In this work I present an analysis of Rene Descartes’ and John Locke’s theories
of substance and their ontology of minds. I first take a close look at each philosopher’s
general theory of substance and then consider various interpretations of each theory.
The picture that emerges of Descartes’ view is one in which he is absolutely confident in
our ability to comprehend the nature of substance and to forge an understanding of our
own minds based on that knowledge. He further concludes that there are only two kinds
of substance and that minds are unmistakably immaterial substances. Locke’s
understanding of substance is more cautious and grounded in our inescapable
epistemic limits. His considered view of a mind is that it is, strictly speaking, a
combination of a bare substratum and mental qualities. More specifically, a mind is a
perfection that emerges from the proper arrangement of physical qualities.

7
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introductory Remarks
In this work I will present an analysis of Rene Descartes’ and John Locke’s
theories of substance and their ontology of minds. I shall proceed by first taking a close
look at each philosopher’s general theory of substance. In doing so, I will consider
various interpretations of important aspects of each theory and either suggest
alternative interpretations or provide novel arguments in defense of traditional positions.
A natural question to ask at this point is “Why focus on Descartes and Locke?”
Why work on both of them? This is a fair question.
Descartes and Locke are often held up as the flag bearers of Rationalism and
Empiricism. Indeed they are in many ways the central figures of these respective
schools of thought. Subsequent philosophers such as Spinoza, Malebranche, Berkeley
and Reid often felt the need to respond to Descartes and Locke. The latter group
informing our understanding of, and even defining, the work of the former pair. In
contemporary instruction and discussion the later Rationalists and Empiricists are often
taught as evolutionary projects grounded in paradigms established by Descartes and
Locke.
Interestingly, Descartes and Locke are also often cast as philosophical
antagonists; it is perhaps too easy to split them into opposed, or at least divergent,
camps. Descartes the rationalist defender of innate ideas; Locke an early leader in
championing empirical analysis. Descartes the metaphysician; Locke the
epistemologist. Descartes the mathematician; Locke the political theorist. Descartes the
well known dualist. And Locke? A dualist? A monist? Agnostic?
8
When we look into Locke’s view of the sorts of things that exist in the world it is
remarkably unclear what his view really is. He has been labeled a dualist, a materialist,
an idealist, a thinker disinterested in the question and a skeptic. In this work I attempt to
untangle the various strands of his thought and answer the questions: what did Locke
think about substance and what is the metaphysical status of minds?
On the other hand Descartes’ reputation is very well established. He is a dualist,
full stop. Or perhaps the more nuanced reading is that he believed in two created
substances, mind and body, and one necessary substance, God. We can also note a
reading which argues that Descartes believes that there are many mental substances,
but only one physical substance. Then there is the newest interpretation: Descartes was
a trialist. He believed in three created substances: mind, body and human beings. In
this work I consider how the trialist reading of Descartes as well as his general claims
on substance.
Still, why the two of them at once? In short each takes the opposite view of the
question “Is a substance identical with its attribute,” and that difference plays an
underappreciated role in forming their ultimate conclusions. Indeed, in the case of
Locke, his theory is partially predicated on an argument against Descartes’ answer to
the question.
1.2 Descartes
Descartes’ view of mind is really just what is now the traditional view: minds are
the finite immaterial, i.e. mental, substance in a dualistic ontology. The other substance
is, of course, body, which is to say the material, i.e. physical, substance of a dualistic
ontology. These two substances are fully distinct and independent, each capable of
existing even if the other were completely annihilated. Thus Descartes thinks that
9