Studies in scientific realism PDF
Preview Studies in scientific realism
Page iii Studies in Scientific Realism André Kukla New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1998 Page iv Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Bombay Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1998 by André Kukla Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Kukla, André, 1942 Studies in scientific realism / André Kukla. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0195118650 1. Realism. 2. Science—Philosophy. 3. Science—Methodology. I. Title. Q175.32.R42K85 1998 501—dc21 9727726 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acidfree paper Page v To Kaila, for the gift of balance Page vii Preface The title of this book is somewhat misleading. Studies in Scientific Realism suggests a series of discontinuous investigations, wherein the author turns from one issue to another as different aspects of the topic strike his fancy. In fact, I've tried to provide a systematic and exhaustive survey of all the important considerations that bear on the question whether the unobservable entities postulated by science can be known to exist. The most precisely correct title would have been Realism and Antirealism in the Philosophy of Science. Unfortunately, a book with that title appeared just as I was putting the finishing touches on my own manuscript. Other, terser candidates, such Scientific Realism, Science and Reality, and Reality and Science are also taken. So there it is. A substantial portion of this material has been culled from prior journal articles. However, it's been rewritten, supplemented with new insights, and reorganized for continuity to the point where it's no longer possible to line up specific chapters with specific articles. Here's a list of the articles that were mined: "On the coherence of instrumentalism," Philosophy of Science, 1992, 59, 492–497. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Copyright 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. "Nonempirical theoretical virtues and the argument from underdetermination," Erkenntnis, 41, 1994, 157–170. Reprinted with kind permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers. "Scientific realism, scientific practice, and the natural ontological attitude," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45, 1994, 955–975. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. "Scientific realism and theoretical unification," Analysis, 55, 1995, 230–238. Reprinted by permission of the author. "The two antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 26, 1995, 431–454. Copyright 1995, reprinted with kind permission from Elsevier Science Ltd., The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington OX5 1GB, UK. Page viii "Antirealist explanations of the success of science," Philosophy of Science, 63 (Supplement), 1996, S298–S305. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Copyright 1996 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. "Does every theory have empirically equivalent rivals?", Erkenntnis, 44, 1996, 137–166. Reprinted with kind permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers. "The theoryobservation distinction", Philosophical Review, 105, 1996, 173–230. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. I thank the following people whose email, snailmail, and facemail have helped to clarify my ideas about scientific realism: Ron Amundson, James Brown, Danilo Chiappe, Christopher Green, Rebecca Kukla, Larry Laudan, Stephen Leeds, Jarrett Leplin, Margaret Morrison, and Bas van Fraassen. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada has provided research support during the several years it took me to complete this project. A.K. TORONTO, ONTARIO JULY 1997 Page ix Contents 1. The Varieties of Realism 3 1.1 The Vertical Varieties of Realism 3 1.2 The Horizontal Varieties of Realism 8 1.3 The Degrees of Epistemic Realism 10 1.4 Things to Come 11 2. Realism and the Success of Science 12 2.1 The Missing Counterargument 13 2.2 Truth and Truthlikeness as Explanations for the Success of Science 14 2.3 Antirealist Explanations for the Success of Science 18 2.4 The Circularity of the Argument from the Success of Science 24 3. Realism and Scientific Practice 27 3.1 The Failure of the Theory Conjunction and Multiple Models 29 Arguments 3.2 The Unavailability of Any Other Incompatibility Arguments 31 3.3 Van Fraassen's Scientific Practice Argument 34 3.4 A Clutch of Circularities 38 3.5 What's Wrong with the Natural Ontological Attitude? 40 4. Realism and Theoretical Unification 43 4.1 Friedman's Argument for Realism 44 4.2 Friedman's Account of Unification 48 4.3 A Bayesian Account of Unification 51 4.4 Evolving Probability and Scientific Progress 53 4.5 Laudan on Conceptual Problems 56 Page x 5. Realism and Underdetermination I: Does Every Theory Have Empirically 58 Equivalent Rivals? 5.1 The Varieties of Arguments from Underdetermination 60 5.2 The Arguments from the Variability of the Range of the Observable and 62 the Instability of Auxiliary Assumptions 5.3 The Concept of a "Genuine Rival" 66 5.4 The Parasitism Criterion 68 5.5 The Superfluity Criterion 71 5.6 The Criterion of Scientific Disregard 72 5.7 The Intuitive Criterion 74 5.8 On the Putative Epistemic Inferiority of Algorithmic Rivals 77 5.9 The Denouement 80 6. Realism and Underdetermination II: Does Empirical Equivalence Entail 82 Underdetermination? 6.1 The Nonempirical Virtues of Theories 82 6.2 Indirect Confirmation 84 6.3 Epistemically Insignificant Empirical Consequences 88 6.4 A Note on Entity Realism 90 7. The Vulnerability Criterion of Belief 92 7.1 The Deflationist Rejoinder 92 7.2 The Vulnerability Criterion of Belief 97 7.3 Conjunctive Empiricism Revisited 99 7.4 T*, T#, T^, and T 101 7.5 The Overly Liberal Element in Constructive Empiricism 104 7.6 The Status of the Vulnerability Criterion of Belief 104 8. The BeliefAcceptance Distinction 106 9. The TheoryObservation Distinction I: Fodor's Distinction 111 9.1 Fodor's TheoryObservation Distinction 113 9.2 Does Fodor's Distinction Do the Job That Fodor Wants? 116 9.3 Does Fodor's Distinction Do the Job That van Fraassen Wants? 124 10. The TheoryObservation Distinction II: Van Fraassen's Distinction 129 10.1 The Continuity Argument 130 10.2 The ElectronMicroscopeEye Argument 132 Page xi 10.3 The SciencewithoutExperience Argument 136 10.4 The Incoherence Arguement 138 10.5 Friedman's Argument 139 11. The TheoryObservation Distinction III: The Third Distinction 143 12. Realism and Epistemology 151 12.1 The History of Antirealism in the Twentieth Century 151 12.2 The Irreconcilability of the Debate 152 12.3 The Epistemological Options 154 12.4 The New Epistemology versus the Bayesian Epistemology 156 12.5 The New Epistemology versus Epistemology X 158 12.6 The Last Word 162 Notes 165 References 169 Index 173 Page 3 1— The Varieties of Realism The first order of business is to distinguish among several varieties of realism and antirealism. This unexciting but essential preliminary task is made all the more tedious by the lack of a standardized nomenclature in the field. Take "instrumentalism". In the current philosophical literature, this term is often used to refer to a form of antirealism which denies that theoretical statements have truthvalues. Almost as often, however, it covers any form of antirealism about theoretical entities. In the first sense of the term, van Fraassen isn't an instrumentalist; in the second sense, he is. In this chapter, I present a taxonomy of realisms and antirealisms that will (usually) be adhered to throughout this book. Current usage is taken into account as much as possible, but I've had to make some arbitrary decisions. I've even had to introduce a couple of neologisms. The resulting scheme is adequate for the purpose of locating the present work in its broader philosophical context. Perhaps it will also encourage terminological standardization among other workers in the field. It shouldn't be expected that my scheme will be exhaustive of all the forms of realism and antirealism that have occupied the attention of philosophers. Those that I deal with do, however, constitute a set of core positions. They're the "main sequence" of realist and antirealist views in our era. 1.1 The Vertical Varieties of Realism Realisms and antirealisms can be divided vertically, by the tenuousness of the objects to which they allude, or horizontally, by the thesis asserted or denied of these objects. Some realisms and antirealisms also have philosophically interesting differences of degree. In this section, the focus is on the vertical distinctions. Consider the following sequence of existential hypotheses: 1. Sensedata, like "being appeared to greenishly", exist. 2. The commonsense objects of perception—sticks and stones—exist.
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