Studies in Process Philosophy I

110 Pages·1974·4.325 MB·English

by  James O. Bennett (auth.), Professor Robert C. Whittemore (eds.)

STUDIES IN PROCESS PHILOSOPHY I
Tulane Studies in Philosophy
VOLUME XXIII
Studies in
Process Philosophy I
edited by
ROBERT C. WHITTEMORE
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA. B.V. 1974
The ediţor invites inquiries and opinion respecting the con~
tents of this volume. Correspondence directed to contributors
will be forwarded. Please address:
Professor Robert C. Whittemore, Editor
Tulane Studies in Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
304 Tilton Hali
Tulane University
New Orleans, Louisiana 70II8
Orders for purchase of the current volume or for previous
numbers should be sent to the Secretary of the Department
of Philosophy at the same address.
C I974 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Martinus Nijhotf, The Hague, Netherlands in 1974
Allrights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN 978-90-247-5174-7 ISBN 978-94-017-4786-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-4786-8
CONTENTS
A PROCESS VIEW OF CAUSALITY: James 0. Bennett I
HERACLITUS AND THE FUTURE OF PROCESS PHILOSO-
PHY: James Wayne Dye 13
THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEO-
RY AND WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANISM:
Henry J. Folse Jr. 32
WHY WHITEHEAD IS NOT A "PROCESS" PHILOSOPHER:
James K. Feibleman 48
WHITEHEAD's DocTRINE oF ETERNAL OBJECTS AND ITS
INTERPRETATIONS: Bart F. Kennedy 6o
PROCESS AND PRAGMATISM: Harold N. Lee 87
ON DE-MYTHOLOGIZING WHITEHEAD's AcTUAL ENTITY:
Barbara Parsons g8
A PROCESS VIEW OF CAUSALITY
JAMES 0. BENNETT
University of Tennessee
I
The purpose of this paper is to sketch a view of causality
that is compatible with some of the characteristic tenets of
process philosophy. In this endeavor, I hope to add something
useful to our understanding of causality, and at the same time
to shed some light on the nature of process philosophy in
general. Process philosophy has been described as an attempt
to take time and continuity seriously.! The view of causality
to be elaborated here does likewise, and in that respect it is
fundamentally compatible with process philosophy. This
"process" view will be shown to be diametrically opposed to
Hume's view, which may be seen as an attempt to exclude the
notions of time and continuity from the notion of causality.
It is hoped that in understanding the implications of Hume's
views, an added appreciation of the basic beliefs of process
philosophy will be acquired.
Bergson asserts that "real" time can only exist where there
is "real" change.2 By "real" change he means genesis (pro
duction, development) as opposed to mere relocation of pre
existing parts. For example, the atomists explained change in
terms of atoms in motion, but the atoms themselves were
conceived of as little Parmenidean units of perfectly im
mutable "being." Atomism thus compromised with Heraclitus
in allowing a form of "change," but it remained solidly behind
Parmenides in its denial of "becoming." Bergson labels such a
system "unorganized"; its essential characteristic is that
nothing which is inexistent to start with ever emerges.
1 H. N. Lee, Percepts, Concepts, and Theoretic Knowledge (Memphis:
Memphis State University Press, 1973}, pp. 3-4.
2 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: The Modern
Library, 1944), pp. 1o-27.
2 A PROCESS VIEW OF CAUSALITY
By contrast, an "organized" system is one in which some
thing not previously existent may eventually come into
existence. For example, the type of change manifested in the
growth of a flower seems to be quite different from the mere
change of location manifested in the movement of the parts
of a watch. The blossom is not "given" to start with. It does
not simply move intact from one part of the flower to another,
but rather emerges.
Temporality is not essential to an "unorganized" system,
since the parts which compose it simply are what they are,
regardless of time. They may be in a different place at any
given time, but their location is incidental to their being. By
contrast, the existence of the parts of a flower cannot be
separated from the stage of growth or development of the
plant at any given time. The blossom does not exist at one
time (early in the plant's growth) but it does exist at another
(maturity). In a world that manifests development, tempo
rality is inseparable from existence.
"Creativity" as well as "temporality" may be seen as a
fundamental concept in process philosophy.! The essence of
creativity is that something not previously existent comes
into being. This is not to say that what becomes comes out
of nothing, but that its genesis involves real transformation
rather than mere relocation.
A corollary to the affirmation of creativity is the assertion
that the future is not already determined and simply awaiting
its appointed time for actualization, like the pictures produced
by the frames of a movie film. The future is "open" in the
sense that it is not yet established, even potentially. As
Charles Hartshorne points out, even an omnipotent God could
not "see" the future, because it is not "there" to be seen; it
implies no limitation of God to say that he cannot "see" what
does not exist.2 The future must quite literally be created out
of actual and present conditions.
1 Whitehead's "Category of the Ultimate" is "Creativity," which
he describes as "the principle of novelty." He proceeds to say that "an
actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the 'many'
which it unifies." Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 31.
2 Charles Hartshorne, "1ntroduction" to Philosophers of Process,
ed. Douglas Browning (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. viii-ix.
A PROCESS VIEW OF CAUSALITY 3
In direct contrast to Bergson's concept of "duration,"
Hume's world-view excludes continuity, genesis, and even
extended time. In the earlier part of the Treatise Hume
vigorously attacks the idea that space and time are "infinitely
divisible."! He argues that an infinite number of divisions in a
finite unit of extension would create an infinite number of
segments; since each segment (no matter how small) would
retain some degree of extension, the original finite unit of
extension would become infinitely extended - a reductio ad
absurdum argument against infinite divisibility.
Hume's argument, however, is not sound, because it
assumes that an infinite number of divisions can be achieved.
Infinity is not a very, very large number at the end of the
number series; indeed, it is not a number in the number series
at all. Rather, it is a rule of progression, which states that
there is always another member of the series. Once it is
realized that at no given time an infinite number of divisions
(and thus segments) can be achieved, no paradox is generated.
The property of infinite divisibility simply specifies that no
matter how many times we make a division, we will still have
something left to divide - that we cannot reduce something
to nothing through successive division.
The property of "infinite divisibility" corresponds to the
property of the "density" of a series under the mathematical
concept of continuity. In a series which is "dense," an inter
vening member can always be found between any two mem
bers; this means that we cannot speak of the "next" member
at any given point of a continuous series. For example, there is
no "next" fraction after one-half. Similarly, in a unit of
extension that is continuous, there are no ultimate units,
because they can always be further divided.
Hume's misguided rejection of "infinite divisibility" is
therefore of the utmost importance, because it leads him
directly into a view of space and time as discrete rather than
continuous. In denying that space and time are infinitely
divisible, Hume asserts that they are composed of ultimate,
indivisible units, which he calls "points" and "moments."
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: At the
Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 26-33.
4 A PROCESS VIEW OF CAUSALITY
Spatial "points" coexist side by side, while temporal "mo
ments" follow each other in serial order.! Each temporal
"moment" has a definite, preceding "moment" and a definite
following "moment." There can be no question of finding
intervening "moments" at this ultimate level.
(It should be noted that the assertion that space and time
are infinitely divisible and thus continuous, does not contra
dict the current beliefs of quantum physics. It may very well
be that matter has ultimate units, below which it simply
cannot exist. In discussing the status of "points" and "in
stants," however, our concern is with space and time them
selves, rather than the physical units which occupy space and
time.)
In treating "moments" and "points" as real entities rather
than conceptual abstractions, Hume commits what Whitehead
termed the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."2 The whole
of Bergson's An Introduction to Metaphysics may be seen as a
sustained polemic against this error.a Furthermore, Bertrand
Russell has shown that the assumption that space and time
consist of a finite number of "points" and "instants" produces
inescapable paradoxes of the sort which Zeno elaborated.4
There is, however, a far more obvious flaw inHume's view:
space and time as ordinarily conceived are completely ob
literated. Hume is led (for reasons not pursued here) to assert
that any extended units must have parts. Any unit with
parts is capable of further division. Thus, Hume is forced to
conclude that the indivisible "moments" and "points" which
constitute the ultimate units of space and time are unex
tended.5
Hume does not seem to realize that such a move destroys
the extension of space and time altogether. Just as a million
zeroes do not add up to anything but zero, a million unex-
1 Hume, pp. 31, 38-43, 228, 429.
2 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New
York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 5o-51.
3 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: The
Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1955).
4 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (New
York: The New American Library, 1960), pp. 106-107, 133, qo.
5 Hume, p. 40.
A PROCESS VIEW OF CAUSALITY 5
tended "points" and "moments" do not produce a second of
time or an inch of space. Hume's view thereby excludes
duration - not only in Bergson's technical sense (which
involves creativity), but even in the most ordinary sense of
the word.
II
Hume's analysis of causality specifies that there is no logical
connection between events, discoverable through a priori
reasoning, and it also denies that we can find any sort of "tie"
or "connection" within the realm of experience.
. . . there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of
connection which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose
and separate. One event follows another, but we never can observe
any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. I
Let us assume that the first half of Hume's argument is
granted - there is no logical connection between events such
that we can deduce an effect from a cause in the absence of
previous experience of the cause. In order to decide on the
truth of the second claim that we experience no connection
between events, we must first decide on what sort of ex
perience possibly could count for or against such a claim.
More precisely, we must elaborate an empirical criterion of
''connectedness.''
It must be logically possible for a causal event to satisfy
such a criterion, or else the claim that we experience no
"connection" between events will be rendered analytic rather
than synthetic. In other words, if Hume's definition of "con
nection" stipulates that it must lie "outside of" all possible
experience, then his claim that we can experience no "con
nection" between events reduces to the bland tautology that
we can never experience what can never be experienced. Much
confusion has been spread because Humeans have often put
forth their claims as synthetic, whereas in fact they are
analytic, and thereby unfalsifiable by experience. However,
1 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1955), p. 85.