Studies in Intelligence - Central Intelligence Agency

102 Pages·2013·1.18 MB·English

Studies in Intelligence
Journal of the American Intelligence Professional
Unclassified articles from Studies in Intelligence Volume 55, Number 2
(June 2011)
Cultural Topography: A Research Tool
for Intelligence Analysis
Improving Policymaker Understanding of Intelli-
gence
The Pursuit of Intelligence History in
the United Kingdom
From the Archives—At cia.gov only
The Evolution of US Army HUMINT
Reviews
Grappling with Covert Action after the Cold War
Takes on Intelligence and the Vietnam War
Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
Center for the Study of Intelligence
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The Mission The mission of Studies in Intelligence is to stimulate within the Intelligence
Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand
knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of
the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of
public literature concerning intelligence.
The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which
includes the CIA’s History Staff, CIA’s Lessons Learned Program, the CIA
Museum, and the Agency’s Historical Intelligence Collection of Literature. The
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impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.
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Editor
Studies in Intelligence
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Awards The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most signifi-
cant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in
Studies. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of
equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstand-
ing. An additional amount is available for other prizes.
Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the
graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an
intelligence-related subject.
Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the
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awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness,
secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are
excluded from the competition.
The Editorial Board welcomes readers’ nominations for awards.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) i

C O N T E N T S
CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE
Washington, DC 20505
EDITORIAL POLICY
Improving Analysis
Articles for Studies in Intelligence may Cultural Topography: A New Research
be written on any historical, opera- Tool for Intelligence Analysis 1
tional, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect Jeannie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berrett
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting Improving Policymaker Understanding of Intelligence
or rejecting an article rests with the An Educated Consumer Is Our Best Customer 23
EditorialBoard.
Dennis C. Wilder
The criterion for publication is
whether, in the opinion of the Board,
Coming to Clarity
thearticle makes a contribution to the
The Pursuit of Intelligence History:
literatureof intelligence.
Methods, Sources, and Trajectories in
the United Kingdom 33
EDITORIAL BOARD
Christopher R. Moran
Peter S. Usowski, Chairman
Pamela S. Barry From the Archives—At cia.gov only.
Nicholas Dujmovic
The Evolution of US Army HUMINT:
John McLaughlin
Intelligence Operations in the Korean War 57
Philip Mudd
Wayne M. Murphy John P. Finnegan
Matthew J. Ouimet
Valerie P. Grappling with Covert Action after the Cold War 71
Michael Richter
Matthew P.
Michael L. Rosenthal
Barry G. Royden
Takes on Intelligence and the Vietnam War 73
Ursula M. Wilder
Clayton Laurie
Not listed are three members who are
under cover. Members of the board are
drawn from the Central Intelligence Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 79
Agency and other Intelligence Commu- Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake
nity components.
EDITORIAL STAFF
Andres Vaart
Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) iii

Contributors
Matthew Berrett is the Assistant Deputy Director for the DNI President’s Daily
Brief. He has served as an analyst and manager of analysts covering Middle East is-
sues in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence.
Jeannie Johnson is a lecturer in the Political Science Department at Utah State Uni-
versity. Ms. Johnson worked in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence on Balkans issues
during 1998–99. Her primary research interest, strategic culture, is the role of nation-
al and organizational cultures on the formation of security policy.
Clayton Laurie is a CIA historian. He also teaches military and intelligence history
at the University of Maryland Baltimore County.
Dr. Christopher R. Moran is a research scholar at the University of Warwick. He fo-
cuses on the development of government secrecy in Cold War Britain. Interests include
spy fiction and growth of intelligence communities in the 20th century.
Hayden Peake is curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served
in the CIA’s Directorates of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.
Matthew P. is a clandestine service officer assigned to the CIA History Staff.
Dennis Wilder is a senior officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. He has
served as an analyst, a manager of analysts, a Special Assistant to the President and
Senior East Asia Director on the National Security Council, and a senior reviewer of
the President’s Daily Briefing.
On the Web:
John P. Finnegan was a US Army historian who focused on military intelligence his-
tory. He died two years after his unclassified article appeared in a classified issue of
Studies in 2000. Unfortunately, it was not extracted for an unclassified issue at the
time.
Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) v

Improving Analysis
Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool
for Intelligence Analysis
Jeannie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berrett
In the third edition of his “History of the World,” J.M. Roberts
“
notes that “Historical inertia is easily underrated…the historical
forces molding the outlook of Americans, Russians, and Chinese for
centuries before the words capitalism and communism were
American
invented are easy still to overlook.”1 In this article, Jeannie Johnson
decisionmakers have
and I offer a variation on Roberts’s view: Cultural inertia is easily
shown a need for help in
underrated, and American decisionmakers have shown a need for
isolating and
help in isolating and understanding the complexity, weight, and rel-
understanding the evance of culture as they consider foreign policy initiatives.
complexity, weight, and
The view I bring to this discussion is not one of an anthropologist
relevance of culture as
but rather one of a former economic analyst in US intelligence who
they consider foreign
has been a senior manager of analysts in various disciplines for a
policy initiatives.
decade. My analytic and management positions have repeatedly
” brought me into indirect and sometimes direct interaction with top-
level US decisionmakers including several US presidents. As I wit-
nessed these decisionmakers in action and tried to help deliver
insights they needed, I came to conclude that the "inertia of culture"
was often underrated in their assessments of opportunities and
obstacles, in part because few if any of their information sources
offered a systematic and persuasive methodology for addressing this
inertia and its implications for their policy options. I also came to
conclude from direct observation and some readings out of the aca-
demic field of strategic culture that America's cultural view fea-
tures the notion that Americans can achieve anything anywhere
including going to the moon—if they just invest enough resources.
This notion is understandable but perhaps hazardous. America’s
remarkable history of achievement includes being the first nation
actually to go to the moon, but the we-can-do-anything part of Amer-
ican self-identity also leads some to argue still that US failures in
The endnotes and an appendix are available in the digital version of the article in
cia.gov.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern-
ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 1
Mapping Culture
Vietnam were not the consequence of a poorly managed investment; they were the consequences of invest-
ing too little.2 How many resources and over what period would have been sufficient to strike “suc-
cess”—particularly if success would have required changes in Vietnam at the cultural level? I have rarely
seen American policymakers ask “Will our desired foreign policy outcome require change over there at the
cultural level? Over what period and with what resources is such cultural change achievable?”
The more I observed the policy-intelligence dynamic, the more I perceived a need for an analytic con-
struct designed exclusively to illustrate clearly and persuasively the inertia of culture. Cultural influ-
ences are typically touched on within US Intelligence Community (IC) analyses as peripheral factors,
described with passing references, and often in general and superficial terms. Although the IC is full of
world-class expertise on foreign peoples, places, and organizations, this industry rarely isolates and illus-
trates culture as a factor deserving its own sophisticated and thorough treatment.
To remedy this perceived deficiency, I teamed with Jeannie Johnson—formerly an intelligence analyst
at CIA and now with Utah State University—who had brought her academic training in strategic cul-
ture to a pursuit similar to mine. For some time she had been amassing training ideas in the area of cul-
tural analysis for IC experts, and our combined efforts, along with significant input from other members
of my former office,3 trial runs of intelligence products, research, and continued refinements over the past
four years have resulted in a process we call “Cultural Mapping.” This process, or methodology, is
designed to isolate and assess cultural factors at play on issues of intelligence interest and to distin-
guish the degree to which those factors influence decisionmaking and outcomes. Mapping exercises done
across time, spanning multiple issues, and on diverse groups within a society may aid in understanding
that society’s “Cultural Topography.” We describe the process below.-mtb
Target Audience: norms onto others.” Intuition, a requires a significant number of
Intelligence Analysts compass regularly employed by years viewing the world
career analysts, is culturally through the lens of one specific
Understanding this methodol-
encoded and, by nature, ethno- domain. This concentration
ogy and its specific structure
centric. Johnston warns of its gives the expert the power to
requires a grasp of the users for
use as a barometer for analyz- recognize patterns, perform
whom it was designed: intelli-
ing or predicting the behavior of tasks, and solve problems, but
gence analysts. Anthropologist
foreign agents.5 According to it also focuses the expert’s
Rob Johnston was hired in the
Edward Stewart and Milton attention on one domain to the
wake of 9/11 to complete an eth-
Bennett, American cultural ten- exclusion of others.”7
nographic analysis of the IC’s
dencies are particularly unhelp-
analytic cadre and to offer sug-
ful in this regard. Despite vast Johnston’s cautionary counsel
gestions for improving its per-
information resources and expo- regarding the habits of experts
formance. He observed biases
sure to exotic cultures, Ameri- echoes that penned by Rich-
produced by both ethnocen-
cans continue to overemphasize ards Heuer two decades earlier:
trism and expertise, which
similarity and assume that
resulted in rather serious cogni- Once people have started
other social groups have values
tive gaps, and he noted a lack of thinking about a problem
and aspirations in line with
systematic tools for going after one way, the same mental
their own.6
cultural data.4 circuits or pathways get
It may seem counterintuitive activated and strength-
Johnston defines ethnocen- to see expertise as a source of ened each time they think
trism as the tendency to proj- bias but Johnston points out about it. This facilitates
ect “one’s own cognition and that “becoming an expert the retrieval of informa-
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)