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Ford INTELLIGENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW A National Nerve Center Inside the White House Situation Room Michael Donley, Cornelius O'Leary, and John Montgomery Policy and Law Covert Action, Loss of Life, and the 15 Prohibition on Assassination Jonathan M. Fredman Dual Use of Intelligence Technologies Breast Cancer Detection Research 27 Sam Grant and Peter C. Oleson A Blueprint for Survival The Coming Intelligence Failure 35 Russ Travers How to Succeed in the DI Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts 45 Frank Watanabe A Major Intelligence Challenge Toward a Functional Model of Information 49 Warfare L. Scott Johnson HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES The Record Versus the Charges CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union 57 Douglas J. MacEachin A Die-Hard Issue CIA’s Role in the Study of 67 UFOs, 1947-1990 Gerald K. Haines Unpopular Pessimism Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful 85 About Vietnam Harold P. Ford Critics and Defenders A Review of Congressional Oversight 97 James S. Van Wagenen A Persistent Emotional Issue CIA's Support to the Nazi War Criminal 103 Investigations Kevin C. Ruffner A Basic Intelligence Need The Best Map of Moscow 111 Joseph A. Baclawski Cover Photo: William Colby An HonorablMea n William Colby: Retrospect Harold P. Ford That we stand here now on on 28 January 1976 that the House restricted ground, that we inter- of Representatives voted against pub- viewed Colby in his seventh-floor lishing the Pike committee report. office, are signs that the cloak has On the following day, 29 January, started coming off. Colby saw the Church committee split on that coming, and, professional to whether to publish its final report, the end, tried to prepare the CIA with Senators Tower, Goldwater, for the inevitable....To defend and Baker all voting against making his agency, he adopted a policy of the report public. The next day, 30 66 January, was Colby’s last as DCI. cautious candor with investigating committees that sometimes got him into trouble within his Looking back on these events, it is Almost from the outset of agency and in the administra- difficult to quarrel with Colby’s his DCI tenure . . . he had tion. He considers himself assessment that in the end it was the excesses of the Church and Pike com- operated under expendable, and he was mittees—coming on top of his other expended. fundamental constraints troubles with the White House— limiting his authority . . . that made him expendable. Yet Journalist Daniel Schorr, almost from the outset of his DCI 99 January 1976! tenure two years before, he had operated under fundamental constraints During his first year as Director of limiting his authority and the impact Central Intelligence (DCI), William he could reasonably expect to make Colby enjoyed some success in illus- as DCI. trating his managerial skills, his powers of initiative, and—most of To many knowledgeable observers, all—his unique confidence that the Colby’s fall was largely of his own times called for a new, more open making. Former Deputy Director for CIA. His last year as DCI abounded Intelligence R. Jack Smith, for exam- in trouble. Not only was he beset by ple, has stated that “the ethics of a myriad of difficult problems, but personal relationships do not apply to also his position was progressively international affairs. And I do not undermined by indications that the think Bill recognizes that, if you fol- White House had decided to replace low his argument to its conclusion, him. The public’s first inkling of this you cannot have an intelligence ser- came in May 1975, presumably the vice.” In Smith’s opinion, a result of orchestrated leaks from the government has “to have some sort of administration; such leaks continued sanctuary in a society's set of values up to the time President Ford in which secret things take place. announced in November that he was America has never grown up in its firing Colby. thinking about it.”? Similarly, former DCI Richard Helms—not surpris- Harold P. Ford held senior positions It is ironic—and perhaps symbolic— ingly—has at times been critical of in both the National Intelligence that Colby and his adversarial Colby. Yet many senior figures—in Council and the Directorate of Church and Pike committees all fal- and out of the Agency—have given Operations. tered at the very same time. It was Colby very high marks, contending 66 That Colby turned out to be more his own man and less a yes-man than that he handled an extremely difficult the administration had toward greater openness. He never job in an exemplary fashion. For received general appreciation as the initially expected simply example, Senator Charles Percy officer who had uncovered and out- offered this encomium on the eve of aggravated his lawed certain questiouable CIA Colby’s retirement: practices. On the contrary, to a large relationships with degree the television cameras but- At a time when the CIA was Kissinger, Nixon, tressed the public's impression that under great attack from all its concerns about continuing CIA and Ford. fronts for misdeeds before your illegalities were legitimate. directorship, you have main- 99 tained a degree of candor and Colby’s own background also hurt openness and a very welcome and him, especially his earlier involve- appropriate sense ofh umor....1 ment in the PHOENIX program in think you've been a great Ameri- initially expected simply aggravated Vietnam. Correctly or not, that oper- can, and I think you have his relationships with Kissinger, ation was widely viewed as having performed as a great human Nixon, and Ford. involved numerous excesses. Many being.’ would not take Colby’s protestations For that matter, it was perhaps a mis- of good intentions at face value, espe- Colby’s tenure as DCI was one of take for the Nixon administration to cially because he was now have chosen a professional intelli- confirming to Congress and the mixed results. Although he was an often effective manager, only some gence officer as DCI; by mid-1973 American public the reality of certain of his ambitious initiatives led to sig- the Watergate-beset Presidency questionable earlier CIA activities. would have been better buttressed by Moreover, his own rather formal nificant or lasting gain, while his a DCI from outside, some known manner did not help him sell his abrupt style sometimes provoked resistance from both below and public figure who could have lent the reforms. above. Within the Agency, his open- White House some political status of his own. Once in office, moreover, ness with investigating committees Other, broader factors also limited and his particular handling of two Colby’s performance as DCI did not Colby’s chances of success. He had difficult personnel issues—concern- dispel much of the disdain with been dealt a weak hand from the out- ing James Angleton, long CIA’s which the White House had long set of his tenure. By that time, mid- troublesome chief of counterintelli- viewed CIA. Indeed, in spite of 1973, public attitudes with respect being an experienced, deft operator, gence, and former DCI Dick to US intelligence had begun to Helms—earned Colby the lasting Colby’s failure to alert his superiors shift, and some past practices, partic- enmity of many colleagues, especially to certain coming public storms con- ularly those relating to covert cerning alleged past illegal activities in his own Directorate of Operations operations, no longer enjoyed wide (DO). More important, up the line, (the “family jewels”), journalist Sey- support. Rightly or wrongly, a cer- he never became a confidant of mour Hersh’s charges of such tain euphoria about détente signified Henry Kissinger, President Nixon, activities, and past CIA dalliance to many that there was now a less or President Ford. With them, with assassination planning fatally overriding need for continuing Colby remained a senior staff officer, damaged his standing with the covert operations as a ready, effective White House. speaking when he was spoken to and weapon in our country’s Cold War offering the views of US intelligence arsenal. Public support waned fur- on the state of the world. His impact Nor did Colby succeed in gaining ther when Colby himself confirmed on policymaking was thus at best widespread support from the public existing suspicions about certain past indirect; Kissinger remained in effect at large. He assumed that his own CIA practices. Public dismay about the President's DCI, as well as Secre- good intentions would be recognized Watergate had rubbed off on CIA as tary of State and National Security and welcomed. Many of the key well, in light of the many allegations Adviser. That Colby turned out to actors in the country, however, did that the Agency had been involved in be more his own man and less a yes- not consider it in their interest to that scandal. At the same time, the man than the administration had respond positively to Colby’s efforts days of coziness between a DCI and 66 Colby brought to the Directorship a sophisticated vision of Capitol Hill mandarins were coming what US intelligence tees, a sensationalist press, a to an end, and new initiatives were suspicious public, and many CIA col- afoot to create more thorough Con- should be about, and he leagues tied more to the past than to gressional oversight of CIA. was creative in his efforts appreciation of what Colby was Throughout, Colby found he could about.‘ to so transform CIA. not count on Nixon, Ford, or Kiss- inger for much-needed support on 99 Shortly after he left office, Colby Capitol Hill. himself offered perhaps one of the most accurate assessments of his In short, Colby’s effort to strengthen DCI tenure and its significance for US intelligence through candor was adversaries for legitimate intelligence America: seriously constrained from many targets abroad. Even though his own sides. His revelations fueled the earlier career had been almost wholly Did something new emerge? Yes, excesses of the Church and Pike com- in covert action, Colby realized that intelligence has traditionally muttees, fed the public’s such operations were limited in their existed in a shadowy field outside misconceptions about the purposes applicability and should no longer be the law. This year’s excitement of US intelligence, and weakened the considered the central contribution of has made clear that the rule of country’s support of intelligence—at US intelligence to national life. law applies to all parts oft he least for some time thereafter. American Government, including intelligence....lts secrets will be Colby felt strongly that the primary Nonetheless, I believe that while one purpose of US intelligence must be understood to be necessary ones for may criticize certain aspects of Will- to enrich the knowledge of policy- the protection ofo ur democracy in iam Colby’s stewardship as DCI, it is makers, enabling them to deal better tomorrows world, not covers for his positive accomplishments that with the world threats and opportu- mistake or misdeed.... The costs of deserve emphasis. Above all, Colby nities facing the United States. He the past year were high, but they brought to the Directorship a sophis- realized that there was increasing will be exceeded by the value of ticated vision of what US intelligence need for wholly new types of collec- this strengthening ofw hat was should be about, and he was creative tion systems, intelligence analysis, already the best intelligence ser- in his efforts to so transform CIA. He and intelligence interest. Finally, was unique—especially as one who vice in the world.° knowing that greater public support had come out of a wholly clandestine was necessary in order to finance the background in intelligence—in realiz- rising costs of tomorrow’s Intelli- ing that the DCI position he Postscript gence Community, he appreciated inherited in the mid-1970s involved the importance of educating the responsibilities far beyond those tradi- While Colby took a lot of flak over American public about the central tionally championed by the DO. He the years about his DCI perfor- purposes of intelligence—another also appreciated the changes in those mance, he could find some reason for greater openness on the Cold War attitudes that for more consolation in a belated compliment part of the DCI and the CIA. than two decades had so strongly fash- from his principal boss, Henry Kiss- ioned CIA’s character and conduct. inger, a tough critic not known for These insights and Colby’s mixed compassion or confessions of error. As a former lawyer, Colby was deter- record of achievements add up to As Colby recalled, one day late in mined that a DCI and CIA must more than just good intentions gone 1975, Kissinger took him aside in respect the rule of law, must try to bet- awry. His contribution reflected the Oval Office and told him, “Bill, ter fit the secret arms of government broad, statesmanlike appreciations I feel required to say this to you. For into the open patterns and values of and efforts. It is a pity that his overall the longest time | believed that what American political life, and must tenure as DCI had overtones of a you were doing was wrong, that respond to meaningful oversight by Greek tragedy, inasmuch as it was his what you should have done was to the Congress. Accordingly, he fate to be buried beneath the cumula- cry havoc over the investigations in believed that he had to play it straight tive effect of certain past CIA the name of national security. But I with Congress and the White House, illegalities, a hostile White House, have come around to believe that reserving CIA’s skills at conning irresponsible Congressional commit- your strategy was really correct.”° William E. Colby’s CIA Career November 1950 Joins CIA. First assignment: Western European Division, Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) 1951 OPC’s representative in Stockholm 1953 Deputy Directorate for Plans (DDP) political action officer, Rome 1959 Deputy Chief of Station, Saigon 1960 Chief of Station, Saigon 1962 Deputy Chief, Far East Division, DDP 1962 Chief, Far East Division, DDP 1968 Assigned to Agency for International Development as Deputy Director of Civil Operations and Rural Development (CORDS), Saigon 1968 Director, CORDS (with the rank of Ambassador), Vietnam 1972 CIA’s Executive Director-Comptroller 1973 Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) 10 May 1973 Nominated as DCI by President Nixon 4 September 1973— Director of Central Intelligence 30 January 1976 NOTES 1. Daniel Schorr, CBS television interview with William Colby, Washington, DC, 21 January 1976. 2. R. Jack Smith, interview by John Ranelagh, as cited in Ranelagh, The Agency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 558. Smith had earlier served successively as a mem- ber of the Board in the Office of National Estimates, Director of the Office of Current Intelligence, and CIA’s Deputy Director Se Intelligence. 3. Senator Charles Percy, remarks made to William Colby during hear- ing of the Senate Government Operations Committee, 23 January 1976, as aired that evening on WETA TV. 4. Interviews and available documen- tary evidence indicate that, among intelligence officers, many of the severest critics of Colby tend to be operations officers. Other intelligence officers—from such worlds as Congressional liaison, analysis, sci- ence and technology, General Counsel, Inspector General, and non- CIA intelligence organizations—tend to give Colby higher marks. 5. William Colby, article in The New York Times, 26 February 1976. 6. Colby, Honorable Men, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 450. A NatiNoernve aCelnte r Inside The White House Situation Room Michael Donley, Cornelius O'Leary, and John Montgomery Go to the southwest gate of the current intelligence information is White House complex, present the provided to key decisionmakers, guard with identification, and state including the President. your business. If you are on the appointment list, an escort will be called. Walk up West Executive Ave- Mission, Organization, Functions nue aad turn right into the West Basement entrance; another guard The WHSR was established by Presi- will check your pass for White dent Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs 66 House access. Take the first right, disaster in 1961. That crisis revealed down a few stairs. To the left is the a need for rapid and secure presiden- White House Mess; on the right is a Just remember that there tial communications and for White locked door. House coordination of the many are many important people external communications channels of who work in the White Behind these layers of security is the national security information which White House Situation Room led to the President.! Since then, the House, and you’re not one (WHSR), a conference room sur- mission of the “Sit Room” has been of them. rounded on three sides by two small to provide current intelligence and offices, multiple workstations, com- crisis support to the NSC staff, the 99 puters, and communications National Securiry Adviser, and the equipment. The conference room is President. The Sir Room staff is com- soundproofed and well appointed posed of approximately 30 but small and slightly cramped. The personnel, organized around five technical equipment is up to daie, Watch Teams that provide 7-day, 24- though not necessarily “leading hour monitoring of international edge”; every square foot of space is events. A generic Watch Team functional. Visitors typically are includes three Duty Officers, a com- impressed by the location and tech- munications assistant, and an nology, but they are often surprised intelligence analyst. The number and at the small size. composition of personnel varies, depending on shift requirements and While it is widely known that impor- workload. tant meetings are held here, the importance of the WHSR in the Sit Room personnel are handpicked daily life of the National Security from nominations made by military Council (NSC) and White House and civilian intelligence agencies for staff and its critical role in Washing- approximately two-year tours. This is ton’s network of key national a Close, high-visibilicty work environ- Michael Donley was Deputy Execu- security operations and intelligence ment. Egos are checked at the door, tive Secretary of the National centers are less understood. This as captured in the admonition of a Security Council, 1987-89. paper is intended to fill that void. former Sit Room Director to incom- Cor-selius O’Leary is a former Direc- We believe there is a longstanding ing Duty Officers: “Just remember tor of the White House Situation need within middle and senior levels that there are many important peo- Room. John Montgomery is a of the Intelligence Community (IC) ple who work in the White House, former intelligence analyst at the for a basic understanding of NSC and you're not one of them.” Per- National Security Council. and White House fu... ons and how sonal characteristics count: an even 66 In all situations other than nuclear war or physical threats against the temperament, coolness under pres- on-site television broadcasts from President, the Sit Room is sure, and the ability to have a the crisis area and newswire services coherent, professional, no-advance- in effect the 24-hour, one- pumping a steady volume of informa- notice conversation with the Presi- stop shop for the White tion destined for the morning front dent of the United States. pages. The Duty Officer’s task is to House staff. ensure that the President and Sit Room functions are perhaps 99 National Security Adviser are described best in the daily routine of informed not only of the current situ- activities. The day begins with the ation but also how the situation is Watch Team’s preparation of the being portrayed by the media. Less- Morning Book. Prepared for the Presi- than-objective images can sometimes dent, Vice President, and most senior senior decisionmakers to read, and it place the Duty Officer in a position White House staff, the Morning falls to the Sit Room to boil that of having to produce “negative” Book contains a copy of the National information down to its essential intelligence to put the event into cor- Intelligence Daily, the State Depart- elements. text. Occasionally, it may even prove ment's Morning Summary, and necessary to tell the principal that diplomatic cables and intelligence In a typical 24-hour day, the Sit the events as portrayed by the press reports. These cables and reports are Room will provide alerts on breaking are incorrect. selected based on their relevance to events to NSC and White House per- ongoing diplomatic initiatives and /or sonnel. Triggered by specific events While the advancements in telecom- specific subject matter on the Presi- and followed with consultations munications [ave placed more dent’s schedule. The Morning Book is among operations and intelligence pressure on the watch standers, they usually in the car when the National centers, the alert notification process have also simplified the exchange of Security Adviser is picked up for results in a rapid series of phone calls information among participating work. The morning routine also to key officials. Responsibility for agencies. The same satellites that includes the President's Daily Brief, informing the President belongs to allow news reporting from the field which is prepared by CIA, hand-deliv- the National Security Adviser. Later, also enable crisis-support elements to ered, and briefed by a CIA officer to a written “Sit Room Note” will be extract information from remote the President and other NSC prepared, summarizing the event databases, provide for timely report- principals. with up-to-the-minute reports from ing, and, in some cases, engage in other centers, perhaps including a video teleconferencing. In addition, the Watch Teams pro- photo, diagram, or map. At the direc- duce morning and evening tion of the National Security Another typical Sit Room activity is summaries of highly selective mate- Adviser, such a note might be deliv- arranging the President's phone calls rial. These summaries, targeted on ered by a Duty Officer directly to and other sensitive communications current interagency issues, are trans- the Oval Office or the President’s res- with foreign heads of state. This mitted electronically to the NSC idential quarters. After hours, includes coordinating the timing of staff. Such summaries, which draw depending on their personal style or such calls at each end, providing on a number of finished interagency interest, the President or Vice Presi- interpreters where necessary, and products, field reports, and news- dent might call the Sit Room directly ensuring appropriate security and wires, may also elicit requests for the or drop by unannounced for a quick recordkeeping. In this function, the original products. The Sit Room update. Sit Room coordinates closely with staff does not perform intelligence the White House Communications analysis or render the kind of formal The advent of 24-hour-a-day televi- Agency, which supplies communica- interagency judgments found in sion news broadcasting as well as tions technicians to the Watch National Intelligence Estimates. But radio has added a new dynamic to Teams. it is important to recognize that, warning and alert operations. Not especially at the White House, there only do Duty Officers pour over hun- The importance of the Sit Room's is always more intelligence informa- dreds of incoming cables, but they communications function cannot be tion available than there is time for also are constantly bombarded by overstated. In all situations other