Strong Evaluation without Moral Sources: On Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics (Quellen Und Studien Zur Philosophie)

401 Pages·2008·1.16 MB·English

by  Arto Laitinen

Strong Evaluation without
Moral Sources: On Charles
Taylor's Philosophical
Anthropology and Ethics
Arto Laitinen
Walter de Gruyter
Arto Laitinen
Strong Evaluation without Moral Sources
≥
Quellen und Studien
zur Philosophie
Herausgegeben von
Jens Halfwassen, Dominik Perler,
Michael Quante
Band 86
Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York
Strong Evaluation
without Moral Sources
On Charles Taylor’s
Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics
by
Arto Laitinen
Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York
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Preface and acknowledgements
The questions discussed in this book have engaged me for more than a
decade now. My M.A. thesis at the University of Canterbury at Kent
(1995), and Phil.Lic (2000) and PhD (2003) dissertations at the
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyv(cid:2)skyl(cid:2),
were written more or less on these topics. Indeed, this is a revised version
ofmyPhDdissertation,soperhapsawordonthechangesisappropriate.
Onechapter,oninterpersonalrecognition,wasleftoutentirely.Myviews
on that topic have been developed elsewhere in a series of articles (still in
progress). And what were four chapters on the nature of values and
morality in the dissertation have been squeezed into two chapters,
currently five and six. I hope to give a fuller account of those issues in
some other format later.
Therearefewerchangesinthechaptersfromonetofourandsevento
nine. One terminological choice is perhaps worth noting here: earlier I
calledthepositiondefendedhere“culturalmoralrealism”butIthinkthat
“engaged value realism” is doubly better. “Engaged” is better than
“cultural” as it chimes with Taylor’s distinction between engaged and
disengaged theories. And as strong evaluation covers more than morality
in the narrow sense, talk about value realism captures the scope of the
idea. But there would be nothing wrong with “engaged moral realism”,
norindeedwith“culturalmoralrealism”–theviewisthesamebutwitha
better title.
Taylor’s massive A Secular Age (Harvard 2007) appeared while this
manuscript was at its last stages. In that book, Taylor does not use the
term “strong evaluation” a lot, perhaps only once, but the main theme,
discussing theist and atheist takes on “fullness of life” could be expressed
in terms of strong evaluations. The issue is the same and Taylor has not
changed his views on its centrality. The topic of “moral sources” is
explicitly discussed throughout his new book. Although the closely
relatednotionofconstitutivegoodsdoesnotseemtosurface,byandlarge
Taylor has sticked to his earlier views. That is of course better for the
continuing relevance of my book, but (in my opinion) worse for the
account in A Secular Age. The critical points made here against the
notions of “moral sources” or “constitutive goods” can be directed with
VI Preface and acknowledgements
the same force against A Secular Age. Indeed, the cross-pressures between
religion and materialism discussed there seem to me to point towards the
kind of non-reductive anthropology of strong evaluators and value
realism without sources defended here.
Someportionsof thethistexthaveappearedinprintbefore.Iwantto
thank the publishers for permission to use material from the following
sources. “Culturalist Moral Realism”, in A. Laitinen, N. Smith (eds.)
2002, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Charles Taylor. Helsinki: Societas
Philosophica Fennica, 115–131; “Strong Evaluations and Personal
Identity” in C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer, E. Runggaldier (eds.) 2002,
Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Kirchberg Am Wechsel: ALWS,
127–129; “Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur on Self-Interpretations and
Narrative Identity”, in R. Huttunen, H. Heikkinen, L. Syrj(cid:2)l(cid:2) (eds.)
2002, Narrative Research. Voices of Teachers and Philosophers, Jyv(cid:2)skyl(cid:2):
SoPhi,57–71;“ACritiqueof CharlesTaylor’sNotionsof MoralSources
and Constitutive Goods”, in J. Kotkavirta and M. Quante (eds.) 2004,
Moral Realism. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica, 73–104.
I am grateful to several individuals and institutions whose support has
made writing this book possible. I wish to thank first of all Jussi
Kotkavirta, my supervisor at Jyv(cid:2)skyl(cid:2), Sean Sayers, my supervisor at
Univerity of Kent, and Heikki Ik(cid:2)heimo, who has been an important
peer reviewer for my ideas through these years. I also wish to express my
gratitude to Michael Quante and Nicholas Smith for all sorts of support
and guidance along the way.
My cordial thanks to Ruth Abbey, Eerik Lagerspetz and Nick Smith
whoreadthedissertationwithgreatcare,gaveveryencouragingfeedback,
posed a number of tough questions and suggested a number of
improvements, some of which I fear I haven’t been able tocarry through.
I’d like to thank a number of people whowere involved in different ways
at different stages, Robin Celikates, Simon Glendinning, Axel Honneth,
Pekka Kaunismaa, Petri Kuhmonen, Irma Levom(cid:2)ki, Timo Lilja, Ossi
Martikainen, Markku M(cid:2)ki, Petteri Niemi, Richard Norman, Sami
Pihlstrçm, Hartmut Rosa, David Schweikard, Juha Sihvola, Charles
Taylor, Thomas Wallgren and Mikko Yrjçnsuuri, and all the others with
whom I’ve had a chance to discuss these topics. Many thanks to Michael
Peacock for help with English language and Taina Seiro for help with
proofreading.
The work was done mostly as a researcher at the Department of
Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyv(cid:2)skyl(cid:2), with visits to
Preface and acknowledgements VII
departments of philosophy at Columbia University, Westf(cid:2)lische Wil-
helms-Universit(cid:2)t M(cid:3)nster, University of Reading and Oxford Univer-
sity. I wish to thank Thomas Pogge, Ludwig Siep, Christoph Halbig,
Michael Quante, Jonathan Dancy and Joseph Raz for making these visits
possible and most fruitful for me.
IthanktheAcademyof Finland,theCultural Foundation of Finland
and the University of Jyv(cid:2)skyl(cid:2) for financial support; the Finnish
Academy of Science and Letters for the doctoral dissertation prize; and
my current employer Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies for a
supportive working environment.
And finally, thanks to all my friends and relatives. Lasse, Terttu and
Sari, thanks for your familial kind of support. Oiva, in some weeks from
now, you’ll be able to sink your teeth in this; I’m very much looking
forward to your comments. Sanna – loving thanks for everything so far,
Helsinki 13.3.2008 Arto Laitinen

Contents
Introduction .......................................... 1
Strong evaluation and philosophical anthropology ...... 4
Strong evaluation and ethics ....................... 6
Part I: Philosophical anthropology of strong evaluation
1 What is strong evaluation? A reading and reconstruction of
Taylor’s central concept ............................... 13
1.1 The essence of strong evaluation: identity-constituting
evaluation based on qualitative distinctions concerning
worth ......................................... 15
1.2 Additional characterizations of strong evaluation ........ 27
1.3 Is the notion of strong evaluation too broad? .......... 33
1.4 Is the notion of strong evaluation too narrow? ......... 44
1.5 Conclusion ..................................... 57
2 Human agents as strong evaluators ...................... 61
2.1 The disengaged and engaged perspectives ............. 62
2.2 Philosophical anthropology and the engaged view ....... 69
2.3 Why transcendental arguments?..................... 77
2.4 The inevitability of strong evaluation: humans, persons,
subjects and selves ............................... 85
2.5 The identity crises of Anna, Bertha and Cecilia ........ 94
2.6 Counter-examples? ............................... 99
2.7 Conclusion ..................................... 104
3 Personhood as strongly valued: tpdel a strong evaluator as an
end in itself ........................................ 106
3.1 Introduction: an end (in itself) ..................... 107
3.2 Descriptive (or metaphysical) personhood ............. 109
3.3 The moral status of actual persons .................. 120
3.4 The moral status of potential persons ................ 124
3.5 The moral status of the fellow members of the species ... 126